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"Old Bruin”: Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry
By Samuel E. Morison. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. 482 pp. Illus. $12.50.
REVIEWED BY
Richard A. von Doenhoff
(A graduate of George Washington University, Air. von Doenhoff, is Head, Early Records Section of the Division of Naval History and a contributing editor of Military Affairs journal. He is the author of “Biddle, Perry, and Japan,” in the November 7966 Proceedings, and is presently editing Observations of the Russo-Japanese War, to be published by the U. S. Naval Institute.)
Once again Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison has turned his attention to the Navy, and has produced a biography of one of America’s truly outstanding naval officers, Commodore Matthew C. Perry.
Readers who are familiar with Admiral Morison’s biography of John Paul Jones will doubtless find a difference in treatment between that Pulitzer Prize winner and Old Bruin. Whereas Jones was a dashing hero figure, typical of those found in a Wagnerian setting, Perry devoted his career to the less spectacular task of improving the naval establishment. For this reason, Admiral Morison has concentrated on Perry’s achievements in the fields of educational reform, steam development, and politico-military negotiations, rather than battles.
There are a few notable instances in which Admiral Morison indulges in his favorite pastime of recounting naval battles. The reader is enchanted by vivid accounts of Oliver Hazard Perry’s exploits on Lake Erie, Calbraith’s siege of Vera Cruz, and “riverine” operations conducted by Perry’s forces along the Mexican east coast.
Perhaps the best chapter of the book takes up the matter of the mutiny in the U. S. Navy brig Somers. Not only is the chapter a clear and concise account of the events leading up to the mutiny, and the subsequent trial, but it is spiced throughout with such typically Morisonesque passages as:
. . . Somers, rolling' and dipping in the long
120
swells, had the wind just where she wanted di on the quarter, to make best time over a sapphire ocean flecked with whitecaps. Flying fis^ flashed silver past the foam at her bow. Puffy tradewind clouds raced her overhead, and occasionally one lashed her with rain.
Most shipboard mutinies are indicative 0 a basic flaw in the naval system. Admit3 Morison deftly recounts how Perry used shipman Spencer’s actions in the Somers to su^ stantiate his objections to the U. S. Navy5 manner of appointing and training officerS' Shortly after the Somers affair in 1842, the Navy established its Academy on the banks0 the Severn River.
Many pages in Old Bruin are devoted to explaining Perry’s attitude toward naval dlS cipline. Persistent legends throughout years have created the impression that I’err' was a Captain Bligh “sundowner.” Admit3 Morison pursued this point at length throng'1 deck logs, official reports, and private journal5. He concluded that, though Perry was a strong advocate of corporal punishment, there is 11(1 evidence to support claims that he was a hats'1 or arbitrary disciplinarian.
Few modern historians go to such lengt'lS as Admiral Morison in recreating the sceneS of bygone events. In another Pulitzer Pr'ze winner, Admiral Of The Ocean Sea, the author personally traced anew Columbus’ route across the Atlantic, adding to his writings a flavot unobtainable from dusty documents. In conducting research for Old Bruin, Admit3 Morison once again set out for the actua' locales of Perry’s operations in Mexico and
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*'1'' later negotiations with Japan. Although " Bruin sorely lacks in the mechanics of P^cise source citations, this point is adequately compensated for by the author’s first- and knowledge of pertinent geographic and 'typographical features.
p Almost half of Old Bruin is concerned with erry’s negotiations with Japan during 1853—
I 54. Admiral Morison traces quickly the 0ng history of Japanese isolation, from about to 1853, (pp. 261-269) and the many efforts to open that closed society to commerce. The object of this brief chapter is to ^strate the character of pre-Perry Japan, aUd the failure of previous Western missions trj negotiate the treaty sought for so many •ears. Japan, at the time of Perry’s first v'sit in 1853, is described as a country whose Eolation was still theoretically firm, com- P'ete and immutable, but cracks and fissures Were beginning to appear in the monolithic 'Ticture of the Tokugawa Shogunate.” East ”s*an scholars recognize that the Dutch ''''dement at Nagasaki enabled the Japanese ’"telligentsia to glimpse the West through j'anslated books on a variety of subjects, "vorite subjects for such translations were Western studies in science and technology. s far back as 1811, the Shogunate founded office to translate particularly interesting °r useful Western books.
Abe Masahiro, often cited in Old Bruin as a '‘ading advisor to the seclusionist Shogun, c°nsulted with Shimazu Nariakira (daimyo of ^atsuma), whose great-grandfather Shige- a'de (1745-1833) was the leading patron of Dutch learning” in the han (a feudal district), 'lrid had a special familiarity with foreign af- ^irs through his vassal, the king of the apanese controlled Ryukyu Islands. Sakuma ^hozan (1811-1864), a samurai in central Honshu, coined the slogan, “Eastern ethics 4r>d Western science,” after studying Western Sunnery in 1842. This thought was to prove c°rnforting to the whole new generation of ^bsequent Japanese modernizers.
, Many of these early reform thinkers were ‘Uiprisoned or executed for their liberal views, isolationism was the professed policy of the
Shogunate prior to 1854, but the seeds of reform are in evidence well prior to Perry’s arrival. Admiral Morison contends that Western influence in Japan was negligible, and that only a small minority of Japanese thinkers had the slightest concept of Western society. Nevertheless, Western history has proved that sweeping reform movements were effected by the work of a small number of thinkers, and in no case did a Western feudal society leave national policies in the hands of farmers, fishermen, and handicraftsmen.
Admiral Morison traces the negotiations with a touch as fine as that guiding the original proceedings. Contrary to Commodore James Biddle’s effort seven years earlier, Perry elected to parley only with the Emperor or one of his personal emissaries. This resulted in much discussion among the officers and specialists accompanying the expedition, and caused the rumor that Perry was high-handed in his approach. Nevertheless, a treaty was successfully negotiated, whereas all before had failed.
One might normally expect a history such as Old Bruin to have been written by an author in his prime years. Admiral Morison, now in his eighties, is still demonstrating why he is generally considered to be the dean of American naval historians.
The Fall of Japan
By William Craig. New York: The Dial Press, 368 pages; illustrated, $6.50.
REVIEWED BY
Captain Wade DeWeese, U. S. Navy (Retired)
{Captain De Weese, after graduating from the Naval Academy in 1920, served on the China station. He was in China during the Panay incident and the fall of Shanghai. At the time of the atomic bomb tests, he commanded the battleship Arkansas. Captain DeWeese was Director of the Naval Academy Museum for 12 years prior to his retirement in 1963.)
In all recorded human history, the rise and fall of empires have, of course, supplied the greatest drama. The case of Japan, however, is unique, for with the exception of its defeat
Okinawa campaign.
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two countries moved toward peace in
by the United States, it had never known defeat.
It could be said that Japan became an empire with the defeat of Russia on land and sea in 1905. But with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the government of Japan had remained in the firm grip of the military.
No better example can be found than the Panay incident in 1937. The bombing of this U. S. Navy Yangtze River gunboat showed utter disregard of the existing Japanese foreign policy, and even dismayed the Japanese military leaders. The writer had command of a destroyer in the U. S. Asiatic Fleet on that day, and most of us would not have been greatly surprised had the United States declared war. It is interesting to speculate on the American lives and property that would have been saved could we have done so. In any case, the Fleet was put on a wartime basis and remained so until the Japanese surrender.
Mr. Craig has done a masterful job on this last and most dramatic year of the war. His journalistic style makes for easy reading that brings alive the exciting subject. An unusual feature of the book is the fact that much of its material, formerly confidential, has recently been released by both governments.
The conception, organization, and initial successes in 1944 of the Special Attack Corps, the kamikazes, or suicide pilots, by the violent General Onishi, are described in detail. This was the last desperate tactic of an enemy already doomed. In the opinion of many U. S. naval historians, the war was decided at the Battle of Midway. This attack was engineered by Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who could well be called the brains of the Japanese Navy. He had given the Emperor his opinion that Japan could never win a long war with the United States. He had spent some time in the United States and was more familiar with the U. S. industrial potential than most of his colleagues. He planned the Pearl Harbor attack, which proved more successful than the Japanese had hoped, even though it was one of the most stupid blunders any nation ever made. Midway was supposed to knock out the balance of U. S. naval power. Thanks in great measure to the breaking of the Japanese code, an absurdly smaller U. S. force defeated Yamamoto’s great fleet and forced its retirement. If a negotiated peace had been instituted then, the lives of over 12,000 Americans and more than 100,000 Japanese would not have been lost in 1
Curtis E. LeMay introduced the new bombing tactics. These giant planes, the same type that delivered the Hiroshima and Na§3 saki bombs, now flew at a low level and car ried fire bombs. The devastation inflicted °n the thousands of homes, constructed praC|! cally of paper, can be imagined all too We ' The first fire raid was carried out on 9 Mar 1945, and by the end of May, over 50 perce*1 of the capital city was destroyed.
The chapter entitled, “Diplomacy in 9c feat” is interesting throughout, as is near ■ every sentence in the book. Due principally’ll
the efforts of Captain E. M. Zacharias, U- ' 1 the early
1945. The writer must confess that one of 111 reasons for his own appreciation of the aC count is the fact that Captain Zacharias "a> an old friend and shipmate in the battlesh'P Michigan many years ago and that the writer knew he was one of the foremost Japanese eN perts in the United States. ^
The development of the uranium bon1 (“Thin Man”) and the plutonium boflj (“Fat Man”), although covered in detail 'jj other volumes, is well summarized. The deta of their delivery and the implications a(e dramatized in a manner in which Mr. Cra1^ seems particularly capable.
The chapter devoted to Japan’s final dec| sion to surrender defies description. Suffice to state that the decision was made by Emperor himself in an historic conference 1,1 his air-raid shelter under Tokyo on 14 AugllSt 1945. Even after the atomic bombs had beel1 dropped and the Emperor’s will made kno"'11’ it was still doubtful if the Japanese wow surrender. It is tragic to contemplate thaj Emperor Hirohito was so ignorant of wod affairs he did not take the initiative, years bc' fore, on the advice of his most intelligent pr°' fessionals, and realize that the war with l^e United States had to be won within l1 months, or lost.
One of the most daring and courageo1'5 events in the history of warfare was the drop' ping, by parachute, of small O.S.S. teams 1,1 enemy-held territory for the rescue of Ameia"
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prisoners of war. In many of these areas, ■' Japanese were not aware of the official Ctlding of the war. The astounding effrontery ^ such a maneuver usually confused and ^stifled them. These teams were always ^cornpanied by a Japanese interpreter, usu- ;hy a Nisei, which added to their confusion, any of these are graphically described by
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Craig and are alone worth reading. Indelibly, none of these O.S.S. teams suffered a 1|riS?le casualty.
. One of the fascinating aspects of history is J8 trivia, as all great writers have realized. IJrthermore, unless a writer intends to devote Jfle or more volumes to a broad aspect of history, he is forced, from a practical point of V‘eW, to concentrate on one aspect or incident, feal or imagined. An example of such trivia Recurred during the surrender ceremony. °mmodore M. C. Perry’s flag, which was t,ovvn from the U. S. Naval Academy Museum the battleship Missouri for the occasion, was ^properly displayed at the ceremony. The boint is that this fact has scarcely ever been Noticed, or at least mentioned. A photograph the surrender ceremony in Mr. Craig’s book . °ws this flag mounted on one of the bulk- leads of the Missouri with the blue field confining the stars in the upper right-hand ■°rner.
tn summation, it is this reviewer’s opinion bat The Fall of Japan is one of the most fas- :iriating books that has been written on the deject during or since World War II. Mr. raig’s dramatic style is well suited to his ainatic subject.
aval Review 1968
|’rank Uhlig, Jr., (ed.) Annapolis, Md.: U. S. 'Wal Institute, 1968. 420 pp. Illus. $12.50. ^Viewed by
Captain Carl F. Pfeifer, U. S. Navy
^paptain Pfeifer, a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, f served in destroyers, a cruiser, a carrier, and an auxiliary.
e has also been a member of the faculty of the Industrial flege of the Armed Forces. He was Commanding Officer of f MSTS Office in Vietnam in 196&-67, prior to becoming nspector General MSTS.)
The Naval Review for 1968 is a fact-filled btofessional publication which will appeal I t'°t only to the military, but also to civilians b'ho desire to become better informed on 'hose political, economic, and military factors which affect our national security. The 1968 Review is divided into three parts. Part One includes eleven essays; Part Two is devoted to three subjects, two of which are concerned with naval and maritime events during the period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967; and the third with fighting boats of the United States. Part Three presents the U. S. Defense Program 1968-1972 and an index of the Naval Reviews from 1963 through 1967. The publication is profusely illustrated with photographs and maps of areas in South Vietnam taken under discussion; in the essay “The Fishermen and Fishing Boats of the United States”, by Commander R. M. Thomas, U. S. Coast Guard, drawings and sketches permit the reader more readily to grasp techniques and principles involved in commercial fishing. A preface by Frank Uhlig, Jr-., editor of the Naval Review, sets the stage for what the reader will find in the ensuing pages.
It is significant that, of the 11 essays which comprise Part One, five are concerned with operations in Vietnam. The opening essay, by Brigadier General E. H. Simmons, U. S. Marine Corps, is an historical account of Marine Corps operations in Vietnam from March 1965 through September 1966. Although General Simmons’ essay is primarily concerned with the strategy and tactics employed by the Marines in action with the Viet Cong, he has also included efforts at pacification (or civic action) in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
The point is well made in General Simmons’ essay that civic action could not be undertaken until the Viet Cong were eradicated from an area. In other words, first things must be taken first. Actually, this is accepted procedure in counterinsurgency operations: first to defeat the guerrilla and then pacify the countryside. It is obvious that our civic action efforts in Vietnam have, in many cases, been nullified by the Viet Cong, but, as General Simmons observes, the national election to choose members of the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of drafting a new constitution, held on 11 September 1966, resulted in a turn-out of 81 per cent of the registered voters. This despite acts of terrorism to keep them from the polls. So we have achieved some degree of success in uniting a country which for centuries has condoned and accepted division within its
society for reasons associated with religion, race, and place of origin, to mention only a few.
Market Time and Game Warden are the two naval operations in Vietnam intended to deny the sea approaches and inland waterways as waterborne supply routes to the Viet Cong. The former is discussed by Captain James A. Hodgman, U. S. Coast Guard, in his essay, “Market Time in the Gulf of Thailand.” In his concluding remarks, Captain Hodgman makes certain observations concerning operational techniques, the proper “mix” of craft to be employed in offshore surveillance, and problems still unsolved. He recommends that a U. S. coastal surveillance task force, including both operating units and floating support, be retained on a permanent basis; a task force ready for immediate deployment anywhere.
Two other essays on operations in Vietnam are “Jackstay; New Dimensions in Amphibious Warfare” by Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Muinford, Jr., U. S. Navy, and “Building the Advanced Base at Da Nang” by Captain K. P. Huff, U. S. Naval Reserve. Operation Jackstay was conducted in March 1966 in the Rung Sat Special Zone, 35 miles south of Saigon, and was the first full-scale U. S. amphibious operation of the Vietnamese war to be carried out in a river delta. Building the base at Da Nang, in contrast, involved the development of an advanced base for combat logistical support. This is a well-documented account and tells the story of the emergence of Da Nang as the most efficiently operated port in South Vietnam. Captain Huff’s essay, incidentally, complements the one on Marine Corps Operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone by General Simmons, since both cover the same time period.
It has been said that logistics is as vital to military services as daily bread is to daily work. Rear Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, U. S. Navy, Commander Service Force, Pacific Fleet, has contributed to the 1968 Naval Review through his essay “The Service Force, Pacific Fleet, in Action.” Admiral Hooper’s report on Service Force, Pacific Fleet operations covers underway replenishment, resupply into undeveloped areas, the operation of advanced support bases, salvage operations, survey operations, medical support, the construction of air bases and ports, and sh°r® facility support. He singles out for speC1 emphasis two new types of ships which ha'e already produced spectacular performan^ figures, USS Sacramento (AOE-1) and ^ Mars (AFS-1), and dwells at some length problems associated with the resupply °f Nang, Chu Lai, Hue and Phu Bai, Tan ^ ’ and Dong Ha. He comments also on D0’1^ Tam, a marine basin adjacent to the Mek0'1? River, carved out of rice paddies, which 1 currently providing support for the Mot*1 Riverine Assault Force. Dong Tam reprt sents a unique logistics support base in a v'er- primitive environment. Admiral Hooper co11 eludes his essay by paying tribute to the mcl1 of the Service Force whose responsiveness changing operational needs met the ever-'1' creasing requirements at such bases as Suh,c Bay, Guam, Yokosuka and Sasebo in Jap3'1 and Taiwan.
The U. S. Merchant Marine is referred 10 as our “fourth arm of defense” and no N°ia Review could be considered complete with°l some discussion on its current status and outlook for the future. Included in the 1 ' Naval Review are two essays on our mercha1 marine; one is by Mr. Lane C. Kendall, vV'1L) is Commercial Shipping Advisor to the Co1*1 inander, Military Sea Transportation ServiV' and the other by Rear Admiral W. J. McN®* ’ U. S. Naval Reserve (Ret.) who, until nd 1967, was president of the Grace Line. In h15 essay, “U. S. Merchant Shipping and Viet nam,” Mr. Kendall traces the acquisition 0 shipping by MSTS from mid-July 1965 throng1 1966 in order to meet the build-up of LT- ' Forces in South Vietnam. He acquaints d1^ reader with the types of ships acquired an how they were acquired, and why ships vrt* particular capabilities and specifications needed to meet the requirements and pr°d lems associated with the TransPac movement One example of this is the length limitation 0 585 feet imposed on vessels transiting the Sa* gon River. Air. Kendall’s essay is filled 'vlt, factual data and shipping terminology, 311 presents some of the administrative pr°cC dures employed in the shipping industry' Having reviewed in every conceivable deta1 the “Sealift” to Vietnam, he concludes his eS say with some ten observations, two of whi^1’ because of their timeliness in evaluating
"eed for a strong U. S. Merchant Marine and !' ■ present status of our National Defense Reserve Fleet, point up significantly:
''The need for ships to support a large overSeas military campaign. Despite the tremendous growth in the capabilities of aircraft, about 97.5 per cent of all the cargo delivered to Vietnam moves in ships. Such cargo could not be handled without hundreds of merchant ships and thousands of merchant seamen. ''That the National Defense Reserve Fleet is now an asset of only limited value. When operations in Vietnam began, it consisted of about 400 usable ships, including 150 ten-knot Liberty ships. While 161 of the usable ships have been reactivated, and many of these will have undergone substantial upgrading as a result of their service, some will have to be trapped at the end of their present tours of duty. The speed, slow by current standards, relatively small size, and other limitations of the Victory ships reduce their value for any future military transportation requirements.
Mr. Kendall has asked me to acquaint our Baders with an error which appears in his tssay on page 142. The term “Traffic Management Agency” should be changed to read MSTS/MARAD Conference.”
Because of his past experience in important Positions in the business world and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, Admiral Mc- ! ^eil, since his retirement, could be referred to ; ^ a “president emeritus” of the shipping in- dnstry. He has authored many interesting Articles and his contribution to the 1968 ^aval Review is no exception. In “The Economic Importance of a U. S. Flag Merchant ^farine,” he offers a new argument in support of a strong merchant marine—a justification Msed on economic analysis. In the early part °f his essay he states that most economic Judies of the merchant marine have been dased on the “scarcity of resources” theory 'vhich holds that an increase in the production °f one commodity (or service) means that fewer resources will be available for the production of something else. When applied to die U. S. Merchant Marine, this philosophy Postulates that the resources devoted [to the Merchant marine] could produce a greater value if they were devoted to some other prod- bets, simply because, when devoted to the bierchant marine, they are unable to yield bn equivalent return on investment. This narrow approach (the “scarcity of resources theory”), the Admiral asserts, has no practical application in this country since the U. S. economy is not concerned with eking out scarcity, but rather with marshalling abundance. For example, if the “scarcity of resources” theory were applied to cotton farming in the United States, it could be shown that cotton farming in the United States should be discontinued since it could be done more cheaply somewhere else. “Any industry receiving any form of subsidy or protected by import duty, would fall victim to this method of economic analysis,” he states. Admiral McNeil continues by pointing out that in the 1930s the United States was emerging from its shell of isolationism and now in the 1960s is the largest single factor in worldwide economic interrelationships. The U. S. Merchant Marine cannot be justified by conditions which existed in the 1930s; it must rather be considered in the light of present and future conditions and structured accordingly. The United States has, in effect, become a “have not” nation and depends largely on the importation of many basic raw materials including strategic and critical materials, but we have paid little attention to the weak link in the availability of these resources—the transportation necessary to bring them to the United States. This is, in effect, the economic justification for a strong merchant marine. The Admiral supports his premise by translating tons of waterborne raw materials into the number of ships required to carry them as of today and projected to the year 2000. This scholarly and refreshing study of the discernible effect of having U. S. flag companies operating on routes vital to our national foreign trade is impressive and eye-opening. He quotes from a Department of Commerce report:
The maritime industry contributed materially to our foreign trade. In particular, variety and convenience of shipping service and the ability to discourage excessively high rates to U. S. shippers and receivers in relation to competing sources for markets are significant protections to the national economic interest.
Finally, the Admiral urges that the merchant marine be provided as an instrument of national policy, even though subsidy is required to offset the higher wage standards of
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American labor. He considers that the economic values of a merchant marine, in terms of the entire economy of the nation and its international economic and political relations, justify the price of supporting it. He concludes with a plea for understanding by the government and public of the relationship between the merchant marine and the nation’s economy: “If such understanding can be achieved, a progressive government policy will unquestionably provide the opportunities for developing a merchant fleet that comes close to theoretical self-sufficiency.”
This review has already noted how the Service Force, Pacific Fleet, immediately proceeded with the build-up of Pacific bases with the escalation of the war in Vietnam. An evaluation of military bases, worldwide, however, is presented in Captain C. R. Calhoun’s excellent essay “How Valuable are Overseas Bases?” “The United States began, at the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, to develop a pattern of overseas bases,” he states. Although we soon acquired some bases or sites for bases in the Atlantic, we failed, between World Wars I and II, to establish a sufficient number of bases in the Pacific in order to protect adequately our logistic support of the Philippines. After World War I, for example, we permitted the division of the German islands between Japan and Britain. The history of World War II records how costly it was for the United States to take some of them and repossess others in our island-hopping campaign.
Captain Calhoun addresses himself to the strategic importance of overseas bases and why they are placed where they are. It is important to realize that, for our own part, and contrary to what our opponents (Soviets and Red Chinese) tell us, overseas bases have a significant effect in preventing war. He gives us a current status of naval bases in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific. Captain Calhoun closes his essay with a look into the future; this is not a “crystal ball” approach but, rather, a studied appraisal which includes base requirements considerations on both the northern and southern flanks of NATO and in the central theater of Europe. He concludes by observing that, whereas there is no specific formula by which we can determine our requirements for overseas bases, we do require a balanced base struct1'1 treei and should exert every effort to maintain,Hua suitable mix of bases for ground and grou"c hly tethered air forces and for deployed na',:''ain forces supported by mobile bases afloat.
The 1968 Naval Review covers a br0‘li4src spectrum of subjects; it is only proper, theGaniz fore, that one of these subjects be concert Wa with research and development. Included 11 'idei this year’s Review is Rear Admiral E. C. O1'1 he law’s essay on “V/STOL in the Navy of ^‘jd, Future.” V/STOL is defined “vertical/shdAod take-off and landing.” Admiral OutlaThe essay is not intended to evaluate a specif tti concept or design as being the most practice1 economically and militarily, but to stimuli !et thinking among his readers as to the many $ vantages a vertical-lift capability offers. T‘,c advantages referred to, as one might surml5f, are concerned primarily with short take-1- and landing (with an infinite number0 launching and recovery areas), and, the aircraft carrier, elimination of expensi" catapults and arresting gear together with : saving of space now occupied by these equip” ments, and an elimination of officer and e<t‘ listed billets which could be used elsewhete The Admiral discusses the tactical applief tions of this type of aircraft, including an" submarine warfare, and states that, although there are disadvantages due to the “curre"1 state of the art” these problems are not i"' surmountable and can be eliminated through specific development efforts. This essay i"’ eludes photographs of entries built by firr"5 (U. S. and British) in the V/STOL field, e. the Hawker P.1127 (XV-6A) (Jet) and the Ryan XV-5A (Lift-fan). I found Admit" Outlaw’s arguments, in favor of the V/STOh: outweighed the disadvantages and conc"r wholeheartedly with his concluding recoin' mendation “to proceed ... in a deliberate) well-funded program leading to the earlies1 possible realization of vertical flight in nava and military roles.”
“Intelligence and the Navy,” by Captai"
W. H. Packard, U. S. Navy (Retired), is well written, so well organized, and contain5 so much basic information on the subject tha1 it could be issued in pamphlet form in orde1” to acquaint the young officer with its impot' tance. I say this because we are not aware o* its importance early enough in a servic"
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•uctt*1 ifeer 'phg au^hor discusses what intelligence itai» dually is, who participates in collecting it and roufl "alyzing it, and finally, who needs it. He lain tains that, with the establishment of the £• *A, “intelligence production for all users
broal 5s recently been compartmented into one or- thet* ^nization independent of the Navy, the cer^1 Army, and the Air Force, a move that has ded widened the gap between the producer and • O1'11|(- consumer.” According to Captain Pack- 1 d rd, this gap makes the task of the intelligence /sh^Jroducer more difficult and the support of e intelligence customer less effective. It is
ctica1- of (ijg responsibility for making decisions to ntlaj let conflicting intelligence and thus be aware uncertainty, than to be misled into believ- that information from a single source is ^rrect because he has no information to con- ict with it.
Some 13 years ago when I had a destroyer ■'•mmand, I chased a trawler (heading for e “barn”) off Long Beach for almost 15 Minutes before I was able to draw alongside 5>id barter for some fresh-caught, deep-sea 'ass. According to Commander Richard M. ^homas. U. S. Coast Guard, in the final essay in Part One of the 1968 Naval Review, lhere are more productive (and accepted) ^ethods than mine for reaping the ocean’s arvest. “The Fishermen and Fishing Boats the United States” is a highly informative essay on the craft, gear, and methods employed in commercial fishing off both our coasts, in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes. Our country has been engaged in commercial fishing since pre-Revolutionary *Var days, when fish was our most important Export. In more modern times, however, the United States has become an importer of fish. Although the domestic fishing industry is gradually increasing its annual catch, it is not Wping pace with population growth; in 1956, Lf. S. fishermen supplied 70 per cent of the domestic demand, but this figure has now dropped to 35 per cent. The fishing industry Suffers from some of the same ills which beset °ur merchant marine: long periods away from home; exposure to the elements; the ever-present danger from the sea; difficult working conditions (being tossed around for weeks in a crowded vessel); and finally, a variable wage depending on the net proceeds of the trip. The future of the industry depends on what measures the U. S. government is willing to take to reverse the current trend which will drop us to sixth place before 1970. The author states:
... If things continue as they are going, not only will the dollar drain accelerate in this particular corner, but the availability to the Navy and merchant marine of young men trained in seamanship will diminish with equal speed.
Part Two of the Naval Review 1968 includes “Naval and Maritime Events 1 July 1966-30 June 1967,” by Lieutenant Commander Clark M. Gammell, U. S. Navy, which is a chronological listing of events during the period. This work is similar to Appendix A of the 1967 Review, and is an excellent reference. Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy (Retired), has again contributed with his essay on “Sea Power, July 1966-June 1967: a Commentary,” which is similar to Appendix B of the 1967 Review. Interesting and informative reading, Admiral Hayes’s essay is a factual accounting of international events of maritime significance during the period. Captain Richards T. Miller, U. S. Navy, has contributed to the 1968 Review in “Fighting Boats of the United States.” This excellent reference work is confined to small craft; it includes coastal fighting boats, river fighting boats, landing craft, amphibious support craft, mine countermeasures craft, and experimental craft. In manner of presentation, it is quite similar to Jane's Fighting Ships. Part Three of the 1968 issue consists of the “U. S. Defense Program, 1968-1972,” the statement by the former Secretary of Defense before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee, and an “Index to Naval Review 1962-1963 through 1967.”
The 1968 Review is a splendid continuation of the 1967 Review, and it well deserves a place in your professional library.
I
Professional Reading
Compiled by Robert A. Lambert Associate Editor
Admiral of the Fleet: Cunningham of
Gyndhope
^liver Warner. Athens, O.: Ohio University Press, l967. 301 pp. Illus. $7.50.
?riginally published in England and now available from a domestic source, this fine volume was one of lhe outstanding naval biographies of last year.
Admiralty Manual of Navigation, Volume 1
J-ondon: HM Stationery Office, 1967. 310 pp. "us. $9.00. British Information Service, 845 Third V., New York, N. Y. 10022.
A Practical guide to navigation which has been brought UP to date in the chapters on radio, navigation, and Navigational instruments. Both the 1948 and 1960 'uternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions Sea are given in full.
Afrika Korps
^laj. K. J. Macksey, M. C. New York: Ballan- *'ne, 1968. 160 pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
^'Om February 1941 to October 1942 the German Afrika Korps comprised only two small divisions plus an improvised light division that Rommel formed °Ut of a few odd infantry and artillery units. With *his basic force, the Afrika Korps acted as a magnet l"at attracted an Allied counter-force far out of I Proportion to its own size. And in doing so, it uninten- tonally taught the Allied armies the fundamentals I °f modern, mobile warfare.
Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations
Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Pantheon, 1968. 3 vols. 2300 pp. Illus. $8.50 per set (paper); $25.00 Per set (cloth).
focusing on India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thai- 'and, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, with I some commentary on Laos, South Vietnam, and I Cambodia, these three volumes are a critique of Western theories on Asiatic behavior and an analysis
of almost every element of the social and economic life of the areas under study. Many questions are opened, many conclusions are reached, but the main conclusion is that economic development is failing, and a drastic overhaul in attitudes and planning must be made by Westerners and Asians if development is to take place.
Australia Faces Southeast Asia
Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch. Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1968. 175 pp. Illus. $5.75.
A study of the changing political patterns that form the backdrop for the developing foreign policy of a formerly reclusive Western society in Asia.
The British Admiralty
Leslie Gardiner. London: William Blackwood, 1968. 418 pp. Illus. 50 shillings (about $6.00).
All the foibles of a bureaucracy hallowed by age and tradition as it moves ponderously through time are charted in this comprehensive, and sometimes delightfully irreverent, history of the Royal Navy’s ruling body.
British and Dominion Warships of World War II
H. T. Lenton and J. J. Colledge. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 638 pp. Illus. $6.95.
Now under an American imprint, this is the same outstanding warship compendium which was published in England and imported into this country in 1964.
The Chesapeake—A Biography of a Ship
Charles B. Cross, Jr. Chesapeake, Va.: Norfolk County Historical Assoc., 1968. 89 pp. Illus. $3.00; $1.00 (paper).
The ill-fated Chesapeake is remembered in this short account that provides many details of her final battle with the Shannon in 1813. An epilogue takes us beyond the battle, and an extensive bibliography rounds out this book.
The Department of Defense
C. W. Borklund. New York: Praeger, 1968. 342 pp. Illus. $6.95.
From DOD’s establishment in 1947, through its various reorganizations to its present structure, the author, who is also the publisher of Armed Forces Management, discusses the organizational growth, the technological developments and the often troubled personal and inter-governmental agency relationships.
Fired in Anger
Robert Elman. New York: Doubleday, 1968. 480 pp. Illus. $7.95.
Beginning with the matchlock gun brought to the New World by Columbus, this work catalogs some of the most famous firearms and describes the owners, the users, and the events which make the guns so interesting. Shown in the illustrations are the pistols used by Alexander Hamilton in his duel with Aaron Burr; the revolver carried up San Juan Hill by Teddy Roosevelt; the six-guns owned by Belle Starr, Bat Masterson, Jesse James; the guns of Andrew Jackson, John Wilkes Booth, John Dillinger, George Patton, Jonathan Wainwright and many others, both famous and notorious. For the gun buff, there are descriptions of the guns themselves, with their present known location; for the history-minded, there are the accounts of their use.
Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918
Ulrich Trumpener. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. 433 pp. $12.50.
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire was an ally of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. That alliance contributed to the collapse of the already decadent Ottoman Empire, permitting a dismemberment which opened the way for drastic political changes in the Middle East. It has always been assumed, based on the outward appearances of German strength versus Turkish weakness, that Germany was a dominant force in controlling Turkey during the war. This fresh look considers some new sources, showing that Germany’s political influence during the war was quite limited, and even in military matters Germany exerted less control over its Turkish ally than has been realized or expected.
The Greatest Treason: The Untold Story of Munich
Laurence Thompson. New York: Morrow, 1968. 295 pp. Illus. $7.95.
Some startling, about-face conclusions are reached concerning Munich and the personalities involved. Not all Czechs, especially the army, were unhappy at the betrayal of their country by France and Britain; the Czech president was not the hero and Chamberlain not the fool that history has made them appear thus far. These conclusions are based on new sources, such as the minutes of Czechoslovakian cabinet meetings, previously secret British diplomatic PaPC[f[ interviews with former French Prime Nlin* Edouard Daladier, and interviews with leaders o' Sudeten Germans.
A Guide to Fishing Boats and Their Gear
Carvel Hall Blair and Willits Dyer Ansel. Cu'. bridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1968. pp. Illus. $5.00.
The basic methods of the commercial fisherman described, the gear is illustrated, and its use Is plained. Over 50 types of commercial fishing 01 and watermen alike.
Hell or High Water—MacArthur’s Landing Inchon
Walter Sheldon. New York: Macmillan, 1968. ^ pp. Illus. $7.95.
MacArthur’s bold stroke, the landing at Inchon dl" ing the early, dark months of the Korean War, came both natural and man-made obstacles to brc‘‘
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Italian Warships of World War II
Aldo Fraccaroli. London: Ian Allan, 1968. 204 pP Illus. 30 shillings, (about $3.60).
All the World War II fighting ships of the Ro>‘‘J Italian Navy, including those which did not reach '■'* operational stage as well as those ships from otU1 countries, which served under the Italian flag or w'e,tj under repairs for such purpose, are illustrated a110 detailed.
Manual on the Avoidance of Pollution of the Sea by Oil
London: HM Stationery Office, 1967. 22 pp. lHllSJ $.80 (paper). British Information Service, 843 Third Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022.
First published in 1957, this, the third edition, sets of1 regulations as prescribed by the International Co”' vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea hi Oil. The amended convention enlarges many of tl>e zones within which the discharge of certain oil-typeS is prohibited; large scale charts are included.
Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador
Ivan Maisky. New York: Scribners, 1968. 408 pP' $6.95.
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tarly years of World War II. Particularly interest- are his assessments of such figures as Chamber-
^ ’ Churchill, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Eden, “aid prove to be a most interesting addition to the !t°ry of that era.
|J0dern Economic Warfare (Law and the aval Participant)
H. Alford, Jr. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Wernment Printing Office, 1967. 426 pp. $2.25.
Purpose of this book, which is within the series ^Wished by the Naval War College on International 1^ Studies, is to alert naval officers to the bearing law has on economic warfare confrontations and . ^nionstrate how that law relates to the discharge : their economic warfare duties. Part I discusses t|!>ciples, while showing that economic warfare is marginally effective. Part II develops principles fussed in the first part and sets up a series of hypo- Jtical cases in which naval officers participate in
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
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ayal Policy Between the Wars
'-Phen Roskill. London: Collins, 1968. 639 pp. Us- 70 shillings (about $8.40).
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°ng the Allies over the disposal of the German the attempts at disarmament agreements, and £ jmpact of the League of Nations on international *irs. Much new research has gone into this volume [ attempt to write a history of naval policy in an rh^ which saw many political and technological sahges, the most dramatic being the military re- j^&cnce of a defeated Germany. Sweep, detail, bolarship, and style are all part of what will prob- 1 be the most important naval book of 1968.
TORPEDOBOAT
SAILOR
BY C. M. BLACKFORD
^val Review 1968
Trank Uhlig, Jr. (ed.) Annapolis, Md ~ ’ Institute, 1968. 419 pp T"
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lo.00 (members).
U. S. Illus. $12.50;
6th edition presents an annual selection of well- ^sidered essays on the naval scene with a natural .’j^phasis on Vietnam operations. Of special note are e essays dealing with logistics, bases, and problems 5 the U. S. Merchant Marine. Naval and maritime pV’ents of the previous year are chronicled; there is a X concise commentary on the state of sea power ;uHng 1966-1967; a Jane's-type pictorial chapter /filing the many fighting ships being used and deeped; and, rounding-out this edition is a digested ^sion of the Department of Defense Program for the ^ars 1968 through 1972.
The colorful account of a young sailor aboard a torpedoboat destroyer on convoy duty during World War I. He describes submarine sinkings, collisions at sea, and the resourcefulness of bluejackets, ashore and afloat. Here began the bitter lessons of modem submarine warfare that pointed the way for the remarkable destroyers of today’s Navy. 160 pages.
Illustrated with pen-and-ink drawings.
List Price $7.50 Member’s Price $6.00
■ m
A New Book About Four-Stackers
(PLEASE USE ORDER FORM IN BOOKLIST SECTION)
Abraham P. Nasatir. New Haven, Conn.: University Press, 1968. 359 pp. Illus. $10.00.
The Need for Civil Authority Over the Military
Duane Thorin. Bryn Mawr, Pa.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Inc., 1968. 32 pp. $1.00 (paper).
This slim pamphlet argues that present day “civilian control” is in actuality “executive control” and does not follow the precepts of the Constitution in which “civil authority” is vested in the Congress. While couched in the style of a constitutional debate, and the reasoning does make interesting reading, this is very pointedly an anti-Administration, anti-Vietnam War polemic.
The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs
William R. Kintner and Harriet Fast Scott (eds. and trans.). Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. 420 pp. $6.95.
Though the Soviets are most secretive about nuclear weapon details, their plans for using those weapons have been widely published in Russia. Using material collected from publications written by and for the Soviet military, this work concludes that their military revolution is nearing the completion of its goals. The weapons and their missile delivery apparatus are accomplished facts; all that remains is the perfection of guidance and control systems.
Protest: Pacifism and Politics
James Finn. New York: Random House, 1967. 528 pp. $8.95.
Views on war and non-violence are exchanged with draft-card burners, teachers, clergymen, and civil rights leaders.
The Sea Brings Forth
Jack Rudloe. New York: Knopf, 1968. 261 pp. Illus. $6.95.
A professional collector of biological specimens gives an account of his career; poorly written.
6th Annual Defense Forecast Issue
Armed Forces Management, April 1968. Illus. $5.00. American Aviation Publications, 1001 Vermont Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C. 20005.
The Military System Directory, which is a large portion of this issue, lists over 3,000 major weapon, support systems, and programs.
Southern Africa and the United States
William A. Hance (ed.). New York: Columbia University Press 1968. 171.pp. $6.50.
In this book, Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay, and Edwin S. Munger, along with the editor, assess South Africa, Rhodesia, Portuguese Angola, and Mozambique in the light of new attitudes in the United States, southern Africa, and independent black Africa. Each
authority takes a separate aspect of the frustrah®' problem of formulating U. S. policies toward southe Africa, which will both improve the politics and 1 economic forces active there, while encouraging P°sl tive improvement in the racial situations.
Spanish War Vessels on the MississipP1'
1792-1796
Though the title is slightly misleading—the book 1 not about the ships themselves, and includes only ° sketch of a small galley—the book is an interest1® piece of scholarship, combining military and sot1, history with ethnology to demonstrate how the P,c~ ence of rival nations—America, England and Fra® ^ —and the threat of Indian uprisings made the Sp®1’ ish existence in the Mississippi valley one of const® fear. Over half of this heavily footnoted work is “ voted to translations of the diaries of men " 1 explored the territory and soldiered there.
Stonewall Jackson as a Military Command^
John Selby. Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 19^' 251 pp. Illus. $8.95.
An English military historian provides a dispassion® ^ appraisal of one of America’s great generals ®”) handles in a rather clear manner the complexities 0 Jackson’s rapid movements. Numerous illustrah0® and two-color, fold-out maps, as well as many singie page maps, help in following campaigns and batdf5' Definitely better than most Civil War fare.
A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions
J. L. Moulton. Athens, Ohio: Ohio Uni vers*1' Press, 1967. 328 pp. Illus. $6.50.
The Norwegian campaign of 1940, the first occas10'1 in which all three elements of modern warfare—se®j land, air—were fully employed, is described a° analyzed by a man uniquely qualified by his o"1' experience as Britain’s former chief of amphibia®5 warfare. An interesting comparison is drawn bet\vcfl1 the British faults in Norway and the American victob in Guadalcanal.
Thailand: Another Vietnam?
Daniel Wit. New York: Scribners, 1968. 205 pP' Illus. $4.95.
All the expected is presented in this book, which h®* only its timeliness to recommend it.
Their Finest Hour: The Story of the Battle d Britain ■
Edward Bishop. New York: Ballantine, 1968. 16® pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
In Germany, Hermann Goering waited for Hitler’ green light to launch his invincible Luftwaffe again-51
{'•'gland in August 1940 in the Attack of the Eagles, ^hen the order for Eagle Day went out, the fate of t |c British Empire rested in the hands of a small group ^ fighter pilots having only 400 first-line fighters to pr°tect the miles of coastline of Great Britain.
^Vo-Star Position Finding 1968
Edward M. Weyer. Grove Beach Road, West- Erook, Conn.: Edward M. Weyer, 1968. 255 pp. Hus. $10.00 (paper).
^ sextant and a radio for time signals or a chronome- |er are the only instruments needed for determining a'itude and longitude by this two-star system. The altitude of the two stars are worked into a unified jhathematical procedure and the solution is reached Ey direct calculation. A simple navigation scheme Eased upon the work of Charles T. Dozier eliminates 'he need for trigonometric training. Bowditch proxies all the necessary tables.
The Typhoon That Stopped a War
Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: McKay, 1968. 244 pp.
55.50.
El March 1889, Germany and the United States faced •'"e another in Samoa with every possibility of a war leaking out between the two. This is a detailed ac- c°unt of that confrontation and of the typhoon that ''E'stroyed the three German and the three American Warships that were in Apia harbor. While the typhoon d'd stop the war before it started, it was hardly, as the author’s last line claims “The Disaster That Saved 'he World.”
El-Boat: The Secret Menace
E>avid Mason. New York: Ballantine, 1968. 160 Pp. Illus. $1.00 (paper).
The struggle for the Atlantic sealanes reached its violent peak in March 1943 when German submarines attacked a large, inadequately defended convoy. In five days, the Germans sank 21 ships and nearly broke the convoy system. With a large number of action Photographs, with illustrations of the submarines and 'heir torpedoes, the U-boat story leading up to their v'ctory and their eventual, total defeat is recounted.
Victory at High Tide
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Philadelphia, Pa.. Lip- Pincott, 1968. 315 pp. Illus. $8.95.
In order to avoid an American Dunkirk at the Pusan Perimeter during the early days of the Korean War, it Was necessary to get behind the North Korean army as quickly as possible. This book examines and analyzes the step-by-step planning and execution of 'he amphibious invasion at Inchon. While this book Covers the same piece of history as Hell Or High Water, 'he treatment in this version is what can be expected from a professional military man who is also an accomplished writer. The author makes some interesting
Professional Reading 133
comments on the inter-service clashes which occurred during these first years of U. S. Armed Forces unification and the effects of those clashes on the planning of the Inchon landing.
The Vietnam War and International Law
Richard A. Falk (ed.). Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. 633 pp. $15.00, $3.95 (paper).
Sponsored by the American Society of International Law, this is a collection of published articles containing background essays, legal appraisals, and analyses of the present world order. Among the many contributors, some of the more familiar are John Stuart Mill, Walt W. Rostow, Dean Rusk, and U Thant. Many pertinent documents and treaties which codify the U. S. position are in the appendix.
The Vulnerable Russians
Lev E. Dobriansky. New York: Pageant Press, 1967. 454 pp. $5.95.
MUM
LOGISTICS
By Vice Admiral G. C. Dyer. USN (Ret.)
A basic text in logistics written for the naval officer seeking knowledge in this critical field. Emphasizes applied logistics within the Navy, describes joint, national, and international logistics planning. List Price $7.50 Member's Price $6.00
This is an impassioned volume in which the author depicts the United States as a gigantic fool, unwilling to be convinced of Russian ruthlessness and unwilling to react positively to the Communists’ continual aggression. Unfortunately, the sometimes strident tones
make it difficult to follow the author’s suggestions for turning Russia’s own Cold War tactics against her.
Who Speaks of Civil Defense?
Eugene P. Wigner (ed.). New York: Scribners, 1968. 125 pp. S3.95.
A status report and a collection of essays on the civil defense system in the United States, this book describes more of what is not being done than what is being done to save lives in the event of a nuclear attack. Walter Cronkite wrote the introduction.
Yankees at Louisbourg
G. A. Rawlyk. Orono, Me.: University of Maine Press, 1967. 209 pp. Illus. $2.50 (paper).
This monograph accounts for and describes the most important military achievement of the American colonists prior to the Revolutionary War. Although primarily a New England venture, the siege of Louisbourg gave an important impetus toward a feeling of colonial unity and showed the colonists they could defeat a European power. Later, the return of the fortress to French hands served only to increase tensions between England and her colonies.
PERIODICALS
Data
Data Publications, West Building, Washington National Airport, Washington, D. C. 20001, April 1968, $1.00.
The “Feature Activity Report” and the “Systems Engineering Forum” contain five short articles of naval interest: “Toward Control of the Seas,” “Meeting the Test of Ingenuity and Imagination” by Rear Admiral A. R. Gralla, a status report on “Naval Material Developments in 1968” by Rear Admiral Goodfellow, “A Computer-Based Management System for Diversified Activities” by Captain Holmquist, “Systems Engineering—A Guide to Effective Planning and Action,” and a chart detailing 1968’s ASW status shows few changes from last year’s chart.
"Bibliography of Articles on Underwater Sound Transmission, Detection and Identification 1956-1966”
Johann Martinek. Herman J. Mecklenburg and Paul W. Broome. IEEE Transactions on Geoscience Electronics, February 1968. $2.50 (IEEE member); $5.00 (others). IEEE Editorial Dept., 345 East 47 Street, New York, N. Y. 10017.
More than 1,900 references from over 300 journals and other technical publications have been gathered into this bibliography which provides a number 0 entry points into the subject areas. Foreign literature is also included while the Soviet literature is the most heavily represented.
"A Look at U. S. Sea Power”
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer in Ordnance, May June 1968. pp. 558-561. Illus. $1.00. American Ordnance Association, Transportation Bldg” Washington. D. C. 20006.
The Chief of Naval Operations quickly reviews the condition of our Navy with an emphasis on weap°n systems and fire power. He also takes note of the inter' action between the Navy and industry to bring about technological advances and compares our efforts to those of the Soviet Union’s navy.
"Riverine Warfare: How Services Are Meeting the Delta Test”
Scot MacDonald in Armed Forces Management, May 1968. pp. 42-46. Illus. $2.00. American Aviation Publications. Inc., 1001 Vermont Ave., Washing' ton, D. C. 20005.
Current riverine operations by U. S. and Vietnamese forces are reviewed with respect to their historical antecedents and the newly developing doctrine; the main stress is laid on interservice co-operation in the doctrine development, with some commentary on the equipment being used.
"Story of the Battleship”
Cruiser-Destroyerman, May 1968. pp. 14—21. Illus. No price given. Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Force. U. S. Naval Base, Newport, R. I. 02840.
Backed by some fine photographs, this brief, but excellent, article surveys the battleship era. From the earliest armored warship, the Korean “tortoise boats,’ and the Monitor and Virginia, through Fisher’s Dreadnought to today’s New Jersey, the highlights, background, and some interesting details are presented.
"He Might Have Been Another Halsey”
James J. Kilpatrick in the National Review, March 26, 1968. pp. 288-296. Illus. $.60. 150 East 35th Street, N. Y. 10016.
The subtitle of this article is “A long look at the Navy’s Arnheiter Case, the sad story of a fighting man who dared to sail in dangerous waters.” The writer tries to be objective and still remain the biographer of “the occasional one man, non-conformist, whose sin is to try too hard.”
★