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"Incredible Midway”
(See pages 64-73, June 1967 Proceedings)
J. D. Harrington, JOC, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Oahu yard workers did not complete 90 days’ work in less than 48 hours. The 90-day figure was the leisurely, peacetime estimate for putting the Yorktown into first- class condition. The 1,000-plus yard workers chiefly loaded provisions into the ship. Some bulkheads were braced, and some plates welded to her port side. Her superheater boilers, damaged at Coral Sea, were left untouched.
Bombing Three did not pick out a third carrier “by a lucky break,” and that carrier was not the Soryu. Given astute advice about winds aloft and observing the sea’s surface, all the Yorktown aircraft flew almost directly to the Japanese carriers, with only a slight course change to right for a direct approach once within sight of the enemy. This put Torpedo Three in position to attack the Hiryu, at the northeast “corner” of an aircraft carrier box formation. Bombing Three went after the Kaga, not the Soryu, making four direct hits and five near-misses. Later, on 4 June, Bombing Three made four direct hits on the Hiryu, plus near-misses on a battleship and a cruiser, and this after an Enterprise contingent missed.
Japanese bombers did not “follow” the American SBDs (Dauntless dive bombers) to the U. S. Fleet. They accomplished this by homing on a radio signal emitted by a Japanese scout which hovered around the Yorktown and her escort.
The Japanese were not “overconfident” in that they did not use the carrier guikaku at
Fighters from the U. S. carrier Enterprise of Bombing 6 took part in the attack on 6 June 1942 against the remaining Japanese operational carriers, Mogarni and Mikuma, the latter shown after U. S. air attacks.
Midway. They simply could not furnish aircraft to the ship, because they were so committed in other areas, and production was not what had been hoped.
★ ★ ★
Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Barde, U. S. Marine Corps—In the article, the ships, and in particular the carriers that launched the planes, are all positioned as they were on that bright and suspenseful day 25 years ago on 4 June 1942. On 4 June, the Enterprise launched a mix of aircraft, including fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo planes. The 33 SBDs, not 37, were under the direct command of Lieutenant Commander C. W. McGlusky, the air group commander. Unfortunately, all the Dauntlesses are shown belonging to Bombing Six. In fact, 16 were from
Bombing Six, one belonged to the air group commander, and the remainder were from Lieutenant Wilmer E. Gallaher’s Scouting '^'x- The 16 planes that flew with Gallaher contributed materially to the Japanese defeat at Midway.
The planes of VS-6 concentrated on the Akagi, following the dive of the air group commander. While few planes of VS-6 received damage during the dive, the extended range and the requirement for formation %ing, combined with the failure of the career to make its projected Pt. Option, caused several planes to land in the water for the Nvant of fuel. Eight of the 16 planes failed to return to the Enterprise. Both Lieutenant C. E. Dickinson and Ensign J. R. McCarthy ditched and were subsequently rescued, the former by lne destroyer Phelps, in which he had served before going to flight training. Six pilots were never seen again.
Six of the eight returning VS-6 pilots flew again in the afternoon strike against the remaining operational carrier, the Hiryu. The squadron also participated in the search of 5 June and in the attack the following day on the damaged Mikuma and Mogami. Finally, it was Scouting Six which provided the plane that Lieutenant Cleo J. Dobson flew on the last mission of the battle, the one that produced the famous still photo of the heavily damaged and sinking Mikuma.
The submarines of Task Force Seven totalled 19 craft rather than 12. (Submarines were: TG 7.1: Cachalot, Flying Fish, Tambor, Trout, Grayling, Nautilus, Grouper, Dolphin, Gato, Cuttlefish, Gudgeon, Grenadier; TG 7.2: Narwhal, Plunger, Trigger; TG 7.3: Tarpon, Pike, Finback, Growler.) From Lieutenant Commander Lindsey’s Torpedo Six, five rather than four retired from attacking the Japanese Mobile Force. One of these, piloted by Machinist A. W. Winchell, made a water landing before sighting the Enterprise. The experiences and the ordeal of Winchell and his gunner, Cossitt, surviving 17 days on the open seas in a rubber boat is a story in itself.
"The Merchant Marine: Subsidies and Competition”
(See pages 70-80, January 1967; pages 116-117, May 1967; and pages 113-116, July 1967 Proceedings)
John J. Clark, St. John’s University, College of Business and Administration, New York—Vice Admiral E. S. Land forcefully states the case for the protectionist approach to the American maritime dilemma.
“No reference to balance of payments,” the Admiral said. Admittedly, the need to conserve foreign exchange can offer a strong incentive to a nation to subsidize a national flag merchant marine. However, the U. S. economic disadvantage in the maritime field is so pronounced that on the average a dollar or more of subsidy is needed to generate a dollar of foreign exchange. Moreover, the scale of subsidies implicit in Admiral Land’s comments would likely precipitate retaliatory action which might impair the nation’s overall trade and payments balance.
“Ship subsidy money stays at home,” he stated. The argument applies to any U. S. import and, if accepted, logically leads to a cessation of all foreign trade. Surely “Buy American” runs counter to the spirit of U. S. postwar trade argeements recently exemplified by the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations.
“Eighty-five per cent of the cost of shipbuilding goes to labor,” he said. The estimate cited seems high. The 1965 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development report gives the following percentage of labor cost in the value of ship construction:
Japan 23.1 per cent
United States 40 per cent
United Kingdom 30 per cent
Sweden 28 per cent
No matter which set of figures we choose to accept, it simply establishes that American shipbuilding, unlike many other U. S. industries, has not offset higher domestic labor charges with rising output per man hour. This was precisely the point of our article.
“The Japanese work 60 hours a week and a six-day week (not much chance of our matching that,)” he said. The preceding source tabulates a 44.8-hour week in Japanese ship construction compared to the American norm of 40.6 hours. Once again, it is not the total hours worked that determines the price advantage but the output per man-hour.
“What about the Russian menace? They are building 641 merchant ships,” the Admiral said. The U. S. Department of Commerce in 1 July 1966 reported that, the U.S.S.R. has 160 ships under construction or
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged. The U. S. Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion published, at the rate of $45.00 per printed page in the Proceedings.
on order compared to 40 for the United States. But Russia does not limit itself to building in domestic yards. Over 100 of their ships are being built in foreign yards!
“One large missing link relates to the building of U. S. ships abroad . . . Hundreds of thousands of tons of merchant shipping are being built abroad by U. S. citizens,” he stated. We assume that Admiral Land is here referring to the flag of convenience vessels. If so, the contention supports the case presented in the article; namely, to establish a viable economic basis for an American-flag merchant marine rather than to rely on larger doses of subsidy. This we have not done. The flag-of- convenience-owner, like it or not, has placed his operation on a financially sound footing.
I concur in Admiral Land’s concern over the present status of the American merchant marine. The problems of the industry must be realistically faced and resolved in the national interest. Tariffs, Admiral Land correctly notes, do give a measure of protection to the domestic producer in the home market. But the analogy does not extend to the maritime trades which are uniquely international in character. Construction subsidies, operating differential subsidies, cargo preference, and other forms of protection have not given to the U. S. merchant marine an assured advantage in meeting foreign competition. The history of post-Civil War maritime legislation attests to the failure of protectionist policies. The time is ripe to explore the alternatives.
“A New Course for the NROTC”
(See pages 80-84, February 1967; pages 127, May 1967; pages 107-109, July 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant F. N. Mangol, U. S. Navy— The regular and contract programs have been re-evaluated annually for years by unit staff members. Many proposals made by Ensign Bopp, in his excellent article, have been either considered, tried or are in actual use.
Recruiters visited every high school in California. The Navy League was enlisted, supporting and publicizing the program admirably. High school counselors were visited and treated to weekend Navy tours. Interested newspapers and television stations helped. Although referrals jumped, recruited numbers did not. Why?
sci-
,nce. c°urses, for example, are carried as aca- Clll*c overloads, which do count toward no3 Uat*on’ at a number of the colleges. Thus Pr°gram-wide curriculum change will 3 every°ne—either students or the Navy.
, 0nly progressive solution is to allow dis individual commanding officer wide eretionary powers as to curriculum require- Vvj<j!Us versus college credits. Return control, of‘ln liberal policy bounds, to the Professor aval Science on the scene.
Un t °rC imPortant, the number of NROTC the S C°U^ be Pared by half and still produce CersSaine number of reserve and regular offi- • annually at a greatly reduced cost per
The large percentage of students who apply [°r the regular Naval Reserve Officer Train- lng Corps (NROTC) either have been steered to the program (until recently limited to the Navy) by members of the armed forces, or have dug the information out of their high school counselors while searching for future college financial aid. Enthusiastic parents who See the opportunity offered are the best recruiters. Most educators are defensive, and distrust a “military education,” however tberal. The great majority of students at this age do not wish to contract military obligations unless the draft forces their hand.
eneral Louis B. Hershey’s monthly call is the best recruiter the NROTC program, regular or contract, has.
Many universities actively support the armed forces ROTC program administra- llvely, academically, and morally. They are Proud of their units, and say so. These camPus units are annually the largest, although e schools differ in organization, financial ase, and academic reputation. Many, public and Private alike, do not.
The curriculum has been flexible within ffieral limits. Student interest, academically and Professionally, is stimulated by the instructor and the unit attitude as a whole, Tegardless of the course), in competition with ^ e hundreds of demands which compete for each student’s time and interests. Since the °rt courses in weapons and engineering are e only experience any of the Midshipmen to P rece*ve i'1 these areas prior to reporting ? Cet Un*ts> it would be a doubtful move to or[en them in either time or content. Credit nsiderations vary greatly—all naval
graduate. Discontinue the many small units which historically have recruited small numbers of contract students and which exist almost solely for the regular program. At the same time, enlarge those which have always produced.
Some schools (the Ivy League units are prime examples) produce few career officers at an unusually high per capita cost which is not competitive by any standard comparison. For example, the Navy can educate a regular NROTC student at an excellent major state university for half the cost or less of an Ivy League graduate. The former is not at a disadvantage competitively in the Fleet, and will make the Navy a career by a three-to-one margin over the latter. The contract students in these units augment at an even higher rate. Can the Navy really afford these expensive units? A second Naval Academy by comparison would be an economic and professional bargain.
"SS Naess Voyager—Flag of Convenience Ship”
(See pages 157-159, October 1966; and pages 118— 119, May 1967 Proceedings)
Richard K. Smith—I feel obliged to say that I provided Admiral Hayes with the crew list he used. The crew list was from Voyage No. 10 of the SS Flying Eagle, a C2-S-AJ1 freighter built in 1944. On that voyage she was in the around-the-world service of American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, and I was signed on her articles as second engineer. The makeup and ages of her crew on the previous and subsequent voyages were no different: the average age of officers and crew being somewhere between 40 and 45. In my experience this was not unusual. On the other hand, it has been unusual to have any crew members in their early twenties.
Thanks to the maritime academies, there is today some infusion of young blood in the officer categories. With the crew, however, it is different. The maritime unions which look after the interests of the unlicensed personnel have had a virtually closed membership since 1948. This has loosened up somewhat in recent years. But it can still be said, generally, that those men who crewed American merchant ships during the late 1940s still form the backbone of most crews today.
NAVAL INSTITUTE INSIGNIA
Theoretically, it is the right of any American citizen to obtain seaman’s papers which are “endorsed” for the “entry ratings” of ordinary seaman, wiper, or messman. These are “unqualified” people. Their papers certify them for nothing, really, and merely serve as identification.
The young man who wants to “ship out” usually goes to the office of some steamship company, where he is told that the company cannot hire him unless he has seaman’s papers. The papers are issued by the U. S. Coast Guard. He goes to the Coast Guard, where he is told that they will not give him the papers unless he has a “letter of commitment,” i.e. a letter from a steamship company or a maritime union, which states that they are ready to employ him and request the Coast Guard to issue the papers. So he goes back to the steamship company and asks for the “letter.” But they refuse to give it to him— with the excuse that how can they promise to hire him when he has no seaman’s papers? They do their hiring through a union hiring hall anyway. So he goes to the union, and gets much the same answer. During 1948-1964 the maritime unions had more members than jobs anyway. The young man may go back to the Coast Guard office, or he may not. It would do him no good in any case.
The net result is that the young person is turned away, and the principal body of maritime personnel remains static—except for their increase in age. There are signs that this is changing, but slowly, and none too soon.
It can be generalized that the American Merchant Marine is suffering on two counts: old ships and old men; and it seems to me that Mr. Lambert owes Admiral Hayes’ favorite Navy charity one hundred dollars!
"The Computer’s Role in Command Decision”
(See pages 60-68, September 1966; and pages 106108, April 1967 Proceedings)
Henry V. Mandle, Yeoman Third Class, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant T. F. Driggers stated: “The majority of yeomen could not compete in civilian life with a secretary just out of school looking for her first job.” Conversely, no secretary fresh from school, and very few experienced secretaries, could fill even a third class yeoman’s billet, particularly if the billet were on board a small auxiliary or combatant ship, where the yeoman is required to act as yeoman, personnelman, postal clerk, and, in some instances, storekeeper, and disbursing clerk.
This is, of course, an extreme example. On board a large combatant ship or on a shore station where there are sufficient people and space, a third class yeoman may perform only one or two specific tasks, but before he can be advanced to petty officer status he must have a working knowledge of many more.
Before he can be advanced, a man must also pass a military examination which is not required of civilian or civil service secretaries. As a man advances in his rate, the required knowledge, abilities, and skills become both greater and more rigid as is necessary. By the time a man becomes a first class yeoman, he is a qualified personnel administrator, and for yeoman “C” school graduates, a qualified stenographer, and has acquired these skills over and above the qualifications for third and second class yeoman.
A large percentage of secretaries attend one
—lutansuu allowances in Bupers Hstruction 5400.42B, “Selected Programs of Naval -
the
form or another of secretarial school, while comparatively few yeomen attend “A”, “B” °r “C” school, but rather gain their knowledge through on-the-job training, correspondence courses, and their own initiative.
As a yeoman, I feel that an average business secretary with two or three years experience is not comparable to a yeoman with a similar amount of experience and vice versa. This is chiefly due to the wide diversification °f required and applied skills.
In essence, I agree that the yeoman could not compete with a civilian secretary. But the basic point is that the yeoman of today is both trained differently and required to perform entirely different tasks. A yeoman is not competing with a secretary and a secretary is not competing with a yeoman because the two are incomparable.
TOD on a Carrier”
(See page 160, May 1967 Proceedings)
Captain William E. Kenna, U. S. Navy (Retired)—In the “Progress” photograph, 'Te C-2A carrier-on-deck (COD) airCraft ” COD means carrier on board
delivery.
Sea Power in Reserve”
(See pages 74-80 June 1967 Proceedings) Lieutenant Commander Robert C. Steen- snia, U. S. Naval Reserve—An often devilish ‘lemma facing today’s ambitious Naval Reserve officer is that if he performs his duties 'yell enough to be selected for promotion to e rank of commander or captain, he will Probably find himself rewarded for his ex- ce lence by a loss of his pay billet and affili- at‘°n with a unit of the selected Reserve, ne his contemporaries who have been Passed over for the first time are continued in Pay status. Thus, the reserve officer corps is ^urdened with a policy of “up and out” (y*ther than “up or out,” as it is in the regular - avy and should be in the Naval Reserve. * Inch of the present difficulty results from e rather idealistic
Reserve,” which specifies by an and designator the officers eligible for .'Pay ar>d associate-pay participation in m‘ripUS *TPes units- These allowances per- 11 'dR flexibility in the selection of officers
and seem to assume the availability of the required ranks and designators in ideal proportions in all localities where Naval Reserve training centers are located, a condition which is rarely found except in large metropolitan areas where there are usually a few billets for commanders and captains. Many units suffer from a lack of officers to handle the staggering administrative and training responsibilities, while, at the same time, recently promoted commanders and captains are forced out of these units and are denied opportunities to contribute their experience and skills to alleviate these conditions.
The problem of these senior officers could be solved partially by a reconsideration of the officer allowances in Bupers Instruction 5400.42B. Such a re-examination might well result in the revision of the allowances so as to permit the following:
(1) The raising of the rank levels permissible for each type of program, e.g., permitting billets designated for lieutenants to be filled by lieutenant commanders, and so up the line;
(2) the opening of associate-pay billets in various programs to any officer of any designator or rank, provided he is otherwise eligible in age and promotional status.
Thus, for example, a commander might be allowed to serve as commanding officer of a medium-sized surface division (which currently rates only a lieutenant commander in that billet), and a line or supply or law officer might fill a training or administrative billet in a Seabee unit. After all, all officers are supposed to be capable of working in administration and training, a capability which the present billet allowances seem to suggest they do not and cannot possess.
"The Flying Cloud”
(See April 1964 Proceedings Cover)
Charles Rosner—The painting of the Flying Cloud that you reproduced on the Proceedings cover and are offering for sale is, I regret to say, not very accurate.
When the three upper sails were furled, the yards were braced more or less parallel to the tops’l yard. In older vessels, long before Flying Cloud, the upper yards, after the sails had
been furled, were sometimes left square or ’thwartships. But Warren Sheppard, the artist, has them cockbilled, something nobody could do with those yards. When lowered, they hung in their lifts and no power on earth could raise one side or the other.
Now look, if you will, at the way the ship is carrying sail; two jibs are set plus the fores’1 but the spanker for some strange reason is made fast. Any landlubber can tell you that a ship under such canvas is very poorly balanced and would be a brute to steer. During the five years that I spent as a foremast hand in the big Cape Horners before World War I, we never took the spanker in when the ship was reaching or hove to; only when running before the wind was the spanker taken in.
But the worst is yet to come. Instead of showing the fore-tack boarded to the cathead, he has it gently folded over and pulled aft by the sheet. Do you know what would happen to the sail if anybody were fool enough to do that? The sail would flap about and shake itself to pieces in no time.
Finally, I must say a few words about the hull of the ship. It is a clumsy, ugly, misshapen thing that would make Donald McKay, if he could see it, blow his hatch covers. The bow is much too sharp and the stern too beamy. Clipper ships were sharp but they were sharp in the waterlines; they had quite a bit of flare forward and aft they came to a fine, graceful taper.
"An Untold Story”
(See page 63, March 1967 Proceedings)
Admiral Robert B. Carney, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Unhappily, my wartime boss, Admiral William E. Halsey, is no longer with us; if he were, I would debate the details of the Halsey-McCain affair as quoted by Commander Scott and would ask Admiral Wilder Baker, U. S. Navy (Retired) for support and verification. I realize that we old gaffers have memory problems, but this is how I recall the occasion.
One day, at sea, a message came from Vice Admiral J. S. McCain requesting that Admiral Halsey’s Chief of Staff confer with him; the fighting had just ended. When I transferred to McCain’s flagship, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Wilder Baker, told me that his boss was not feeling well; he was in his bunk when I reported to him. McCain told me that the fighting was over, there was nothing more to do, that he wanted to go home immediately, and that he wanted me to persuade Admiral Halsey to release him at once.
I said that I would deliver the message but that I thought he should stay for the surrender, having fought the entire long road from the South Pacific to Tokyo. In spite of McCain’s arguments, Admiral Halsey held him until the surrender was completed and then released him. Without a moment’s delay McCain took off by air for San Diego, stopping only for fuel and crew rest en route.
He reached home and died.
I think that he had known that his days were numbered. He was not a man to quit during the fighting, but with his duty well and honorably done he longed for home. He was a man his four-star son can be proud of.
"U. S. Naval Sailing Association”
(See pages 4-5, February 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Truxtun Umsted, U. S. Navy —I noted the reference to The Royal Navy Sailing Association’s ownership of ten ocean racing yachts and that they campaign them regularly. Recalling Lieutenant Wallace E. Tobin’s narrative of his experiences while representing the U. S. Navy in the 1965 Buenos Aires to Rio de Janeiro Race and his recommendations thereto, it appears that the U. S. Navy is taking the first cautious step in implementing his recommendation-—that of providing a Navy sailing yacht in commission through the year with the specific task of showing the flag and showing the Navy in as many national and international yachting events as can be entered. The Argentine and Italian Navies have been doing this for years, to say nothing of the Canadian and British Navies. Such a program could easily be established in the U. S. Navy today, under the auspices of the Naval Academy, at a minimal cost.
A yacht, 60 to 70 feet, could either be designed and built for the Navy, or the Navy could accept one of the large ocean racing yachts that are frequently offered to the Naval Academy as gifts. [The Naval Academy accepted in April 1967 two such yachts, the Maredea and Severn Star (ex-Ondine).]
In our Navy today there exists, at practi-
Length
of
coast
line
Country
Size in sq. km.
Density
of
inhabi
tants
Index of sea bed area compared to density of inhabitants
Country
Sea bed as a percentage of size of country
cally all ranks and rates, the talent necessary to campaign such a yacht aggressively Funding and operating such a boat, and I think in terms of $60 to $80 thousand a year, could be accomplished a number of ways. The Office of Information, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Office of Naval Research, the Naval Ships Systems Command, to name a few, could easily, and legally, be sources. These organizations have already invested large sums in the same areas in which such a Navy yacht would exist.
In the Navy today there are literally hundreds of sailing and power yachts that are comparatively little used. If the operating expenses of all these “yachts” can be produced, surely the expenses could be met for an “AllNavy Sailing Contender.”
Personnel to man such a boat would probably be something on the order of ten officers two chief petty officers, and three enlisted men. They could be justified in the same manner as the Blue Angels, various service athletic teams, or the aforementioned recreation and official boats. A standard two-year tour would be appropriate for her crew. The boat would be actually racing or showing the flag about ten months the year, the other two months being spent in refit in a homeport with good support facilities such as Annapolis, San Diego, or Newport.
Often I have heard civilian yachtsmen criticize the Navy yachting effort. We are a first rate Navy with fourth rate representation in a first rate event. The Navy’s profession is the sea, and we should be the best in every undertaking we attempt on the sea. The U. S. Naval Sailing Association hopefully at some future time will be able to provide the talent and organizational representation for such a worthy project as an All-Navy Ocean Racing Contender.
"The North Sea”
(See pages 20-32 January 1967; and pages 121-123 May 1967 Proceedings)
Commander R. O. Planchar, Belgian Naval Reserve—The principle of the median or equidistant lines, which seems very logical at first sight, is, in practice, a very unfair system of dividing the sea bed. When we look at Figure 4 of Admiral Langeraar’s article, it is obvious that not only West Germany but also Belgium are really penalized by this system. The tiny 4,000 sq. km. allocated to Belgium and the 22,000 sq. km. allocated to the Federal Republic, look very small against 62,000 sq. km. for The Netherlands. The following comparisons speak for themselves:
Allocated sq. km. on
sea bed
Belgium 30,507
Netherlands 33,612
IV. Germany 247,960
302 | 4,000 | 60 km. |
351 | 62,000 | 400 km. |
220 | 22,000 | 310 km. |
Percentage of square kilometers on the North Sea bed allocated to each country compared with its size and inhabitants:
Length of coastline sq. km. of sea bed for each km. of coastline
Belgium 13.1 13.2 66.6
Netherlands 184.5 176.3 155
IF. Germany 8.8 100.0 71
The density of the Dutch population in 1962 was 351 inhabitants per square kilometers and not 379 as stated by Admiral Langeraar.
The Belgian area is crossed by some of the most important sea traffic in the world, and free passage has to be given to traffic coming through the Straits of Dover bound not only for Antwerp, but also for the Dutch, German, Scandinavian, and Baltic ports, not to mention the so-called “cross-channel” services that run from nearly every harbor in Belgium and Holland to the United Kingdom.
Admiral Langeraar does not see how ports and harbors can be brought into relation with the intended share of the continental shelf. It is obvious, however, and has nothing to do with a comparison of the harbor capacities of each country. A harbor or port means shipping lanes to navigate ships into them. Those sea lanes are to be left free from any prospecting or production works. The number of ships using the channels does not matter at all; only the size of the ships entering
the harbors can make a difference in the width of the channel.
That is why Belgium believes that, when an allocated area is crossed by many shipping lanes, which fact reduces the surface of the bottom under sovereignty of this coastal state, some form of compensation should be given.
Furthermore, the historical argument advanced by Admiral Langeraar seems to be a little overdue. No one would contest the right of the United States to sovereignty of their continental shelf because they did not have a big navy during the 16th century. The same is true for every young country.
From a Belgian point of view, it seems logical to back up the German position on this ■Patter, and the Belgian government should also try to reach an agreement with the countries involved in order to obtain a more equable share of the economical treasure that lies under the North Sea.
1 o The or Not to The, In or On a Ship”
(See page 113, June 1967 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Philip A. C. Chaplin, Royal Canadian Navy (Retired)—The absence of tbe definite article before ships’ names is standard lower-deck usage in the Royal Navy which has been taken up by some elements in (he wardroom. To me, “the Queen Elizabeth” ls just plain unseamanlike.
There were printed 150 years ago, forms with the wording “His Maj'esty’s Ship the ...” Captain Rush was apparently unaWare of this. A quick check of the preferences °1 British naval writers shows the following results:
the” Nelson
Capt. Joh n Creswell Adm. Sir. W. M. James Lt. Cdr. P. K. Kemp Capt. S. W. Roskill Cdr. D. E. G. Wemyss
Nelson
Cdr. R. E. D. Ryder Cndecided
Capt. Russell Grenfell R- Adm. R. F. Pugsley
I submit that before ascribing the dropping of the article to Royal Navy influence, a considerable amount of research should be done.
As for in or on, only a longshore loafing soldier says on a ship. On board does not seem to be an adequate basis for an argument since, in my experience, a seaman is more likely to say aboard or inboard.
★ ★ ★
Captain S. R. Heller, Jr., U. S. Navy, Naval Ship Engineering Center, Washington, D.C.—Just how would Admiral Tolley, the four old salts, or the editor of the Proceedings deal with DD-537? Certainly the The Sullivans neither looks nor sounds right!
★ ★ ★
Commander Malcolm F. Willoughby, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—Ships have personalities and logically may be called by name. To preface the name of a ship always with the clutters up writing and reading with a useless word, often annoyingly repetitious. It serves no purpose. Leaving the out is not new; it has been done for years by innumerable lovers of ships and by many writers who have considered the superfluous. Historian Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, in his 15-volume History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, carefully and consistently omits the. Context would make clear whether, for instance, one referred to battleship Texas or to the state.
As for in or on a ship, Joseph Conrad, who was a master both of English and square- riggers, wrote a serious dissertation on the subject. The only time a man is on a ship is when he is topside; otherwise he is in a ship. That makes good sense. Surely, no one reading “I served in Texas” could be confused even though it might be taken out of context.
[Editor’s Note: The Proceedings inclines toward the use of “in the.”]
"The Soviet Union and the Arctic”
(See pages. 48-57, June 1967 Proceedings)
Anthony Harrigan, Military correspondent, The News and Courier, Charleston, S.C.— For many North Americans, the Far North is almost beyond the pale of interest. Yet R. Gordon Robertson, former Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, has said that
the development of the Far North is a uniquely Canadian ‘space challenge . No doubt this statement should be amended to read North American instead of Canadian, for the wealth of the United States is needed if the Canadian Far North is to be opened at a rapid rate. Though some Canadians are unhappy at references to “continental” resources, it is clear that the Far North has importance to both of the big nations on North America. Indeed the principal source of development in the Canadian Far North in the last generation has been the U. S. defense establishment. In the 1940s and 1950s, tremendous sums were spent on construction of airfields, weather stations and radar sites in the Canadian Far North. The huge Strategic Air Command airfield at Churchill on Hudson Bay is characteristic evidence of American
involvement in the Far North.
The Port of Churchill often is forgotten. Yet this is the northernmost major port of North America. It furnishes part of the proof that the Far North is not destined to be forever isolated from the rest of the busy world. Among some shippers, fear still exists that navigation is impossibly difficult in Hudson Bay. But the Bay route—like other aspects of the Far North—has changed markedly in recent years. Radio stations at remote Arctic points provide weather data for ships using the Northern route. Beacons, direction-finding equipment, icebreaker patrols, and aerial ice reconnaissance have lengthened the season of navigation on Hudson Bay and in Hudson Strait.
Obviously, the changes which ease problems for commercial vessels also have bearing
0n the operations of warships and naval and military aircraft. The Far North, as it is °Pened to commerce, also is likely to become the theater of international conflict, as Captain Araldsen has indicated.
Aside from being strategic real estate, the har North has enormous potential wealth. It is pre-eminently the region of valuable ores. Incredible wealth is embedded in the PreCambrian Shield—gold, radium, silver, iron, and other metals. As these mineral resources ate extracted and surface or sub-surface shipping is better used in transporting it to ore- Processing plants elsewhere in North America 0r in Europe, the need will grow for greater naval activity in the surrounding seas. Indeed Arctic waters are not simply a highway for commerce, but an operating area for naval °rces that threaten the more developed regions of North America. Thus, the day is coming when the United States must start thinking in terms of an Arctic Fleet.
Harvest Moon—Yankee Landmark
ln Carolina”
(See pages 150-153, March 1967 Proceedings)
Eugene B. Canfield—Rear Admiral John ■ Dalhgren is best known for his invention 0 the smooth-bore shell guns which bear his Uame, predominant sizes being the 9-inch broadside and 11-inch pivot. Dahlgren also invented or designed the Navy’s system of -’oat howitzers, a gun lock, a rifled musket, and the 15-inch smoothbore for monitors.
Strangely, the photo of Dahlgren shows him eaning against one of his less successful endeavors, a 50-pounder rifle on board the ao>nee. According to his second wife, who '''cote his biography, Dahlgren became invested in rifled cannon as early as 1856. In any case, a 50-pounder was being fired in 1860 n<f eventually designs for 30-, 80-, and 150- Poiinders were completed and guns fabrica- . dahlgren rifles were cast without trun- k’ons. The trunnions were later supplied by a f,r;'cch strap attached to the finished piece. Qenerally, two vents were started, but only ne was bored through to the chamber, in hC3St successiul °f the rifles was the 7.5- WC 150-pounder. At the end of the war, six fQere soI<I at auction for old iron and at least an'\r Ead burst, having been fired 20, 27, 60 5 times respectively. This tube probably
never was mounted aboard ship and Dahlgren became commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron before his system of rifles was perfected. These rifles should not be confused with Dahlgren’s eminently successful system of boat guns which included 12- and 20-pounder rifles of considerably different form and construction.
Curiously enough, Dahlgren projectiles, as shown in the illustration along with the 7.5- inch rifle, are often identified as being of Confederate origin. This error probably can be attributed to Henry L. Abbot, who collected similar projectiles when they were fired into his Union batteries at Petersburg. How the Confederates obtained the Dahlgren or Dahlgren style projectiles would make an interesting story. Abbot’s inability to recognize the Dahlgren projectile is some indication of the poor communication existing between the Army and Navy on ordnance matters.
"AcDuTra: A Reserve’s Judgment”
(See pages 70-75, March 1967 Proceedings)
Commander Edmund C. Reichard, U. S. Naval Reserve—I have found that the Navy welcomes a reserve officer who can sense what some of the current problems are, define his range of interest, and turn to, assisting in developing effective solutions.
It is expected that a reserve officer has done some homework before making his AcDuTra selection. It is his responsibility to know where and why. Once a request is in process, some specifics should be filled in. This might be done most effectively by a phone call to the receiving activity. Simultaneously, answers would be obtained to fill the officer’s specific requirements on items mentioned by Commander Becker. Thus the reserve officer would be developing his “where and why” and could even indicate areas where he felt he might be most effective.
A postcard to the local Chamber of Commerce would complete the picture of items of interest in the area, if this were his concern. Lastly, a contact with the activity would be natural, after completion of a tour.
Practically every Federal office connects into one or more of the Federal government’s telephone networks. To stop at any such office and to call both before and after an AcDuTra tour involves a minimum of
initiative. Such a call could ensure that the activity visited would report that they “desire to have” another reserve officer, rather than “prefer not to have—cancel our quota for AcDuTra officers.”
The highest recommendation for any officer, regular or reserve, is to be qualified for independent duty. This means that the officer can be “always entirely dependable” in unsupervised situations, even in unannounced AcDuTra.
It is understood that he would find his way from the airport, get through the proper gate, not park in the Commandant’s reserved parking space, and get a job well underway before concerning himself with golf courses, tennis courts or movies. It also implies that his uniforms are in order and that updating ID cards and physicals, which should have been done earlier, will not become primary goals.
Unless a reserve officer is geared to the challenge of the vaguely defined situation, he can surely become a problem to both the Navy and himself. The Reserves are not needed when things are going smoothly; they will only be called when the situation becomes hectic.
Possibly, if more officers considered their AcDuTra in this light, they might bend just that little extra to ensure that their tours would be a satisfying experience to themselves, contributing to both the Naval Establishment and their naval careers. The need for officers to initiate their own communications will increase as district lines get shifted, as the officer corps gets stripped from shore stations, now renamed field stations, and the Department of the Navy undergoes further reorganization in depth.
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Lieutenant Commander William P. Murphy, U. S. Naval Reserve—Restricted line and staff reservists should think of sea duty and assignments to commands afloat as being similiar to the regulars’ Shorevey-Seavey schedules. A specialist in public affairs, I have worked out my own career training plan; much of it by chance. I recommend it not only to PAOs, but, with suitable modification, to other specialists who might otherwise be taking their training in the same shore billet year after year:
(1 & 2) Assistant district PAO, undertaking any of a large number of concurrent projects at the district level (two years).
(3) Collateral PAO aboard a small ship, standingJOOD (or OOD if qualified) watches, as do other collateral PAOs.
(4) Observer in the Office of Chief of Information in the Pentagon.
(5) Assistant PAO on a four-star command such as CINCPAC or CINCLANT.
(6) Observer at Fleet Home Town News Center.
(7) Full-time PAO for a flag staff which has no Regular PAO, where the reservist actually implements a PAO program.
(8) Observer in reservists’s mobilization billet.
(9) PAO monitoring some special event, as Armed Forces Day or other civilian observance involving the Navy.
Many of my cruises were repetitive at district PAOs before I branched out to other areas of career development. Of the past six years, I have spent five afloat, mostly in staff work and on board destroyers with Commander Destroyer Flotilla Five based at Pearl Harbor a flag with no full-time PAO.
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Commander T. W. Lyons, U. S. Navy— As an Executive Officer, I have been contacted by Reserve Training co-ordinators, weeks and sometimes months ahead of time, as to whether I could accommodate a given number of officers, CPOs and enlisted personnel for a certain period. Invariably the answer is “yes,” but then we do not learn until a few days before they arrive, or sometimes until they actually show up, whether we are receiving line officers, supply officers, dentists, or a few of each. The problem in preparing a well thought-out schedule under these conditions is obvious.
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