On the evening of 2 December 1943, the harbor of Bari, Italy, was crowded with more than 30 Allied vessels in the process of unloading war supplies. The greatest proportion were merchant ships of American, British, Polish, Norwegian, and Dutch registry. The initial invasion of Italy, at the Straits of Messina three months earlier, had been followed by a major attack across the beaches of Salerno on 9 September. Bari, an important port city of one-quarter million inhabitants located east of Naples on the Adriatic coast, had been easily occupied by the British Army a short time later. On 28 November, the battle for Rome had commenced. Allied strategy was based principally on a proposed advance up the spine of Italy to be followed by an amphibious attack at Anzio. The advance was dependent upon supplies from Bari and, as it turned out, the events of this night were to delay significantly that advance.
It was known that the Germans still had an effective air force in Italy, yet, unaccountably, as darkness fell that Thursday evening, all available lights were turned on to speed the docking of ships and the discharging of their vital cargoes.
At 1930 hours, the Luftwaffe attacked the brilliantly-lit port with more than 100 JU-88 bombers. Using chaff and “window” dispensed from pathfinder aircraft, they had managed to confuse the Allied radars and had achieved almost complete surprise upon reaching Bari. Opposition was non-existent. Although the raid only lasted 20 minutes, the results were spectacularly successful for the Germans. Not since Pearl Harbor had the Allies lost so many ships at one time. Hits on two ammunition ships resulted in explosions of major proportions which shattered windows seven miles away. An oil pipe line on a quay was severed and the gushing fuel soon ignited. Oil and gasoline from burning tankers contributed to this tremendous sheet of waterborne flame which spread over much of the harbor. Ships otherwise unscathed were now enveloped in fire. All told, 16 ships carrying 38,000 tons of cargo were totally destroyed and eight others damaged that night. Loss of life among Armed Guard personnel and American seamen was heavy. It would be weeks before the port could resume normal operations. But there was yet another tragedy in the making.
When the attack began, the merchantman SS John Harvey was berthed stern-on to the mole which runs along one side of the harbor. There were 17 ships berthed or anchored in close proximity to her. Her cargo, not yet unloaded, consisted of high explosive munitions and approximately 100 tons of 100-lb. mustard bombs—to be used in retaliation if the Germans initiated toxic warfare. The raid had been in progress only a short time when the John Harvey was hit and exploded. Although the bombs containing the liquid mustard were not fused, many of the thin casings were shattered. Liquid mustard began spreading insidiously across the harbor, some of it sinking, some burning, some mixing with oil floating on the surface and some of it evaporating and mingling with the clouds of smoke and flame. Fortunately, there was an offshore breeze and much of the gaseous mustard was carried out to sea. The real menace, presenting a deadly and still unknown peril to the survivors of the raid, was the oil-mustard layer on top of the harbor waters. Many of the oil-covered survivors, who had jumped or been blown overboard or whose ship had sunk, were now being pulled from the contaminated waters by rescue parties. Other personnel were contaminated by contact with these men, the oily water in the lifeboats or the spray from the many near-miss explosions. All were unaware of the presence of the mustard.
The military port authorities knew that the John Harvey carried mustard. In the stress of the situation, however, no one remembered. The crew of the John Harvey, who would most certainly have thought of it, had been completely obliterated. Mustard has a characteristic odor and some of the survivors recalled later that they had noted “an odor of garlic.” Mixed as it was with the odor of oil, gasoline, and smoke, however, it is hardly surprising that its significance did not register. Thus, no gas alarm was given and none of the rescue parties or first-aid teams knew that any survivor had been exposed to a toxic agent.
Shortly after the raid began, the limited hospital and first-aid facilities in Bari were swamped with casualties. Because of the tremendous explosions that had taken place, most of the obvious injuries were due to blast or fire. Of lesser concern were the casualties thought to be due to immersion and exposure and, under the circumstances, it is not surprising that lowest priority for treatment was given to those just covered with “oil.” The staff of one hospital heard a rumor that mustard gas might be present and inquired further. The rumor could not be confirmed and the matter was dropped.
Many of the survivors who had been in the water, and those who had had oil splashed on them, appeared in good condition and were sent to an Auxiliary Seamen’s Home still clothed in their contaminated garments. Others who appeared to be suffering from shock were merely wrapped in blankets, given warm tea and left alone for 12 to 24 hours— still covered with “oil.” They were not washed and their contaminated clothing was not removed. Only a few individuals, acting on their own initiative, took the trouble to clean themselves of all traces of “oil” promptly that night. The significance of this action will be seen shortly.
The survivors who had been exposed to mustard were the first to note that something was wrong. Some complained as early as an hour or two following exposure that their eyes felt as though they had sand in them, but these symptoms did not appear in most of the men until approximately four to six hours later. This unpleasant gritty feeling was followed by burning sensations and pain sufficient to wake up those who had fallen asleep.
The resuscitation wards in the hospital were now beginning to note that many of the immersion and exposure cases did not fit the usual clinical pattern of shock. Instead of exhibiting restlessness, anxiety or acute distress, these patients were apathetic and their extremities were warm instead of cold. Moreover, their response to shock therapy such as external heat, warm fluids, morphine and plasma infusions was atypical. The eye problems and some blistering of the skin were observed but still no one made a correct diagnosis. Finally, some 12 to 14 hours after the raid, the port authorities found some fractured mustard bomb casings, belatedly remembered the John Harvey, and notified the hospitals that exposure to mustard might have been possible.
The first death due to the toxic effect of mustard took place 18 hours after the raid. In the intervening hours between notification and the first fatality, the hospitals had done their best to deal with the rapidly deteriorating condition of their mustard casualties—but the damage had been done. The failure to take simple prophylactic measures such as a bath, resulted in many deaths that need not have occurred. The few individuals who bathed on their own initiative sustained only minor burns. All told, there were 617 known mustard casualties (the true number will never be known because many of those suffering only minor burns never reported to a hospital), of which 83 persons or 13.6 per cent died. The causes of death could be divided basically into those associated with severe external chemical burns and those caused by internal damage due to ingestion or inhalation of mustard. The vapor pressure of liquid mustard is fairly high and gaseous mustard is given off at normal temperatures. Thus, those who were covered with “oil” were continuously inhaling mustard gas. In some cases, blast damage to the lungs, that would not otherwise have been lethal, when combined with relatively mild, non-lethal doses of mustard vapor, produced death.
Although the first fatality occurred shortly after the raid, the 83rd death occurred over a month later. The hospital care afforded the casualties was excellent under the circumstances, but the medical personnel were discouraged by the lack of progress and response to treatment made by these patients. Furthermore, each casualty with burns over 100 per cent of the body surface, as many patients had, required essentially the full-time attention of one nurse or corpsman.
Although many of the eye burns were serious, and every mustard casualty sustained some degree of injury to the eyes, there did not appear to be any permanent eye damage among those who survived. From a military standpoint, however, it should be noted that many were incapacitated from eye burns who suffered no other ill effects. This varied from four days to more than a week, the experience of the crew of one Allied ship, the Bistera, being a case in point. Their ship had come through the raid undamaged, thereby permitting them to engage in the initial phases of rescue work. After the Bistera had picked up 30 survivors, however, the port authorities ordered the harbor cleared, and she headed for Taranto. Four to six hours later, nearly the entire crew began having trouble with their eyes—the gritty sensation, followed by burning and pain. The commanding officer ordered all hands to use an an eye wash, but this seemed to have no effect and the eye problems continued to increase in severity. The ship reached Taranto harbor 18 hours after the raid where her crew, now almost completely blind, had great difficulty in mooring her. The ship’s combat readiness then dropped the remaining few percentage points to zero as the crew was transferred to a hospital. The fact that all recovered a few days later with no lasting eye damage does not overshadow the fact that a combatant ship was put out of commission completely because the crew was unaware of their exposure to a toxic chemical and thus failed to take any prompt remedial action.
Another problem associated with the effect of mustard on the eyes was the psychological one. Even though these burns were relatively mild, due to the diluting effect of the fuel oil, many of the patients who were temporarily blinded thought that the condition would be permanent. This caused them to be severely depressed and further degenerated the military aspects of the situation. In many cases, it was later necessary for the medical personnel to force the eyelids open to prove to the patients that they could see. The medical report described the resulting effect on morale as dramatic.
The official report of the Bari incident upon which this article is based was dated 20 June 1944 and classified Secret. Although regraded to Unclassified in 1959, it does not appear that the story has never been told, at least within Navy circles. Since this is one of the very few times that U. S. military personnel have been exposed to any of the effects of toxic warfare agents, there may be lessons to be learned from this tragic affair.
The one lesson that is strikingly obvious is the absolute necessity of having immediate knowledge that personnel have been exposed to a BW/CW agent. Although high concentrations of toxic agents can produce serious casualties rapidly, lesser concentrations offer opportunities to apply quick-reaction defensive and prophylactic measures, thereby greatly increasing the possibility of retaining an effective fighting force. In the incident described here, most of the mustard had been so diluted that very few of the 617 casualties need have died had the knowledge of their exposure been available to the rescue parties, first-aid teams, and hospitals. The fatalities were due principally to the prolonged exposure (including inhalation) to the diluted mustard. In the case of the Bistera’s crew, a simple chemical warning system and the donning of gas masks during the rescue operations would have prevented her incapacitation as a combat ship. Even hospital personnel received burns, particularly of the eye, which were totally unnecessary.
One of the factors contributing to the failure to provide a gas warning the night of the raid was the tendency (which continues today) to cloak all matters pertaining to BW/CW agents in a mantle of secrecy and safety precautions. Had the knowledge of the SS John Harveys cargo been more widely held, someone would have remembered, and appropriate measures could have been taken to check whether or not mustard had been released during the raid. Chemical defense procedures could then have been instituted.
The effects of the raid on the hospital facilities in Bari were such that all were forced to operate far in excess of normal capacity. The mustard casualties severely complicated a poor situation, not only because of the number involved, but because of the intensive treatment required for many of the patients. Unless those subjected to BW/CW agents are warned early and then adequately protected, it appears safe to surmise that any widespread exposure will overload existing medical facilities, military or civilian. One way to improve this prognosis would be to develop better medical methods of treating these casualties. Because there have been few exposures since World War I, however, it cannot be said that this expertise has been developed. In Bari, where exposure had occurred, the heavy burden carried by medical personnel prevented them from making the necessary scientific investigations and laboratory studies which would have helped.
History has recorded the fact that the invasion at Anzio was a bitter and frustrating experience for the Allies. The enemy was able to contain the Allied Forces on a beachhead for a longer period of time here (over four months) than during any other campaign of the War. Success at Anzio hinged on the success of the Allied advance up the spine of Italy and when the latter failed to meet its objectives, success at Anzio was long in coming. Although bad weather, poor roads, and a desperate enemy slowed the northward advance, one of the contributing factors was undoubtedly the Bari Incident.