Sooner or later the name of the game on any ship becomes “Damage control— ready or not!” The emergency may be a fire, a flooding, structural damage, or loss of some vital system. The cause may be an operational casualty, collision, grounding, storm damage, or enemy action. The effects may be extensive (with large scale hull damage, system outages, multiple fires/flooding and personnel casualties) or relatively minor. Even without damage, chemical and biological agents can render a ship incapable of carrying out her mission.
When the time comes to play the damage control game for real on board your ship, will the personnel concerned be ready to do the job required of them? The chances are they will not for two basic reasons: faulty administration and inadequate training.
The following eight common administrative deficiencies have an adverse effect on damage control readiness:
• The Damage Control Assistant (DCA) does not have the authority commensurate with his responsibilities. The problem concerns the shipwide nature of the DCA’s responsibilities, the position of the DCA in the shipboard organizational structure, and the relative priority assigned to damage control readiness in relation to the other demands on ship’s personnel.
The DCA is concerned with the watertight and gastight integrity of the entire ship, the adequacy and readiness of damage control equipment throughout the ship, and the training of all hands in damage control. His responsibilities are shipwide, cutting across all departmental lines. However, the DCA is not the executive officer, and therefore cannot tell anyone outside of his own immediate organization to do anything. He is not even a department head, so he cannot deal directly with the other department heads as a coequal. Therefore, he must request co-operation and action through his immediate superior, the Chief Engineer, who must in turn request co-operation from the Executive Officer, the other department heads and, if necessary, the Commanding Officer.
In practice, this organizational structure operates poorly or not at all. The Chief Engineer is the DCA’s boss and, in accordance with Navy Regulations, is also the Damage Control Officer. Many Chief Engineers, however, find themselves fully occupied keeping up with the problems of their boilers, engines, generators, pumps, valves, piping, electrical and interior communication equipment. There is usually very little of their energy left to apply toward damage control, and what they usually seek in the DCA is a man who will not add to their burdens by initiating requirements for training time, OPTAR funds, and demands on the Executive Officer and department heads for people and support.
The Commanding Officer is naturally most concerned with the operations of his ship as they pertain to the accomplishment of its mission. Damage control does not contribute directly to the accomplishment of the ship’s mission. Therefore, the C.O. usually expends the greatest part of his attention on navigation, operations, communications, air operations, and the like. The Executive Officer is also quite busy running the ship, and is primarily involved in personnel administration. In the area of inter-departmental co-ordination, his natural tendency is to establish a smooth-working relationship with the department heads which minimizes the need for his direct supervision. For these reasons, programs such as damage control which require large-scale planning, co-ordination, monitoring and sustained follow-through find a hard time getting started, let alone completed. The other department heads, of course, also have primary responsibilities which must receive their first considerations. In addition, they are usually senior to the DCA, so can act on his requests for co-operation at their leisure. The result is a situation in which damage control readiness gets pushed further and further into the background, and the DCA is powerless to do anything about it.
• The DCA’s collateral duties usually take more of his time and effort than his primary duty. As Repair Officer he co-ordinates all ship’s force, tender and yard work (much of which involves extensive investigation, planning, liaison and follow-through). He is also responsible for the maintenance of the ship’s auxiliary machinery (on a carrier this includes catapult steam systems, aircraft, bomb and stores elevators, oxygen-nitrogen plants, emergency diesel generators and boat engines, laundry and galley equipment, air-conditioning for electronic spaces, refrigeration plants, and capstans and winches). And he usually draws his share of watch, committee, board, and legal assignments.
There is little time available for planning, co-ordinating and implementing effective damage control training and preventive maintenance programs, and for self-study to comprehend fully the ship’s built-in damage control features, type and ship damage control doctrine, and any watch qualification programs which may be required—e.g., officer of the deck and engineering officer of the watch.
• The Bureau of Naval Personnel and individual ship C.O.s usually assign non-career officers or limited duty officers to damage control billets. This practice tends to retard any effort by DCAs to rectify the problems described herein, because the non-career officers develop the short-range view and the LDOs tend not to engage in controversial issues with their seniors. It also results in many senior line officers in the Fleet who have never had a tour in damage control, or even engineering. This in turn results in widespread lack of appreciation of damage control requirements and problems, and a lack of advocates at the senior level to set things right.
• No established procedure exists for allocating a portion of ships’ operating funds (OPTAR) for the procurement and maintenance of damage control equipment. In some ships the DCA has his own fund; in others, he shares the money allocated to the Engineering Department. In the latter case, procurement of parts and consumables needed to run the ship usually take precedence over damage control equipment. Another variation is to have the DCA procure repair locker equipment, and each of the ship’s departments buy the equipment normally stowed in their spaces—fire hose, battle lanterns, etc. The availability of funds for damage control equipment will vary from department to department, resulting in condoned thievery between departments to avoid censure at zone inspections.
• There has been an almost complete disappearance of War Damage Reports from shipboard files. Ships’ officers and damage control personnel have therefore been deprived of vital knowledge as to how much damage ships of their type can endure.
• Many type and ship organization manuals require the Fire Party and Rescue and Assistance Party to be organized on an equipment basis (each man to provide a particular piece of equipment), rather than on a functional basis. This usually results in the first man at the scene bringing the flame safety lamp (it is the lightest item to carry), which is not even needed until the fire is out.
• There is a lack of interest in damage control on the part of all members of the crew, officers and enlisted, not assigned directly to the damage control organization. Although all Type Commanders require mandatory attendance of certain percentages of ships’ crews at damage control and firefighting schools and require the implementation of an effective all hands training program, these requirements are rarely met in whole or in part, nor is any great effort expended to ensure that they are carried out. The general attitude becomes “Damage control is somebody else’s job!” The results are chronic problems in setting and maintaining material conditions of readiness, inability of onscene personnel at emergencies to take the proper action until repair party personnel arrive, and failure to keep divisional damage control equipment (fire hoses, battle lanterns, closure fittings, etc.) up to the required state of readiness.
• Type and ship organization manuals normally assign a yeoman as the captain’s 1JV talker on the bridge during GQ. (On carriers it is the C.O.’s Marine orderly). The 1JV circuit at GQ is used primarily by main engine control and damage control central to advise the C.O. of main propulsion/damage control casualties, and their effect on the operation of the ship. More often than not, the yeoman (or Marine orderly) is totally unfamiliar with engineering/damage control terminology and equipment, with the result that communications effectiveness deteriorates—repeats, garbles, omissions, etc. In effect a non-conductor is placed in the circuit.
In addition to the above, there are seven training deficiencies which also contribute to marginal damage control readiness. These are:
• The infrequency of refresher training and operational readiness inspections (ORIs) to ignite and sustain shipwide interest in damage control (once every two or three years). Although this concern—particularly at the C.O. level—is supposed to be constant, it can usually be expressed as a curve, peaking during the pre-training and training (or ORI) periods, and nose-diving during the remainder of the training cycle. This infrequency also severely reduces the opportunity for observation and evaluation by qualified personnel.
• Refresher training and ORIs frequently omit important aspects of damage control training and evaluation. Examples are: stability problems, rigging of emergency communications, chemical warfare detection and protective measures, radiological decontamination of aircraft, operation of installed fire protection systems (e.g., hangar bay sprinkling, remote valve controls, 002 flooding), personnel casualty treatment and transportation, isolation of piping systems (compressed air, JP-5 and avgas, firemain), and rigging jumpers where possible.
• The competitive exercise system currently in effect allows the use of completely unqualified people—inexperienced junior officers, two-week active-duty-for-training reservists, and embarked aviators—to observe and grade damage control exercises. Their very ignorance makes them attractive candidates, because they are less likely to detect faults. In addition, the requirements for the number of observers are not specified in current directives. Therefore, frequently one officer observer will show up to grade damage control exercises, most of which require as a minimum one observer at the scene, one observer at the nearest repair locker, and one at Damage Control Central.
• Extreme turnover of personnel severely hinders training development. In addition to the turnover experienced by the ship as a whole (discharges, transfers, etc.), the damage control organization is depleted continuously as partially trained E-2s and E-3s are fleeted up to fill GQ billets in their parent departments (e.g. gun mounts and engine rooms). This continuous turnover results in a few men completing the damage control training syllabus, loss of teamwork and continuity in the repair parties, and a deadening of morale for remaining personnel as the same fundamental lessons must be repeated for the newcomers at the expense of advanced training.
• There is little opportunity for realism in damage control training. Material condition ZEBRA or CIRCLE WILLIAM are not set because they make the ship heat up. Installed equipment, such as the washdown system, drainage systems, remote valve controls, are rarely operated. Consumables—OBA canisters, C02 foam, shoring—are not used because of the expense. Hoses are not charged because they might leak. Gas masks and protective clothing are rarely broken out from storerooms. Simulation of events, equipment, and procedures become so common that training loses all value.
• Little training is done in ballasting because ships seldom, if ever, follow the standing instructions on this subject. The engineers fear that incomplete removal of the sea water from fuel tanks will result in loss of fires in boilers, or at least a buildup of sludge in the tanks. Aviators fear that contamination of the JP-5 will occur and jet engine flameouts will result. There is also extreme reluctance to flood damage control voids (on ships so equipped) because of the rusting effect and manhours required for represervation.
• Lack of interest concerning the composition and training of the in-port Duty Repair Party nullifies its readiness. Frequently this organization is characterized by a casual muster of personnel who change from duty- day to duty-day due to schools, leave, special liberty, standby liberty. These personnel receive little or no training on individual equipment or as a team; they are not familiar with the ship as a whole; and they are seldom exercised at any evolution except fire drills, although floodings, NBC attacks and personnel casualties can occur in port as well as at sea.
The aforementioned problems must be solved if our ships are to survive the many possible threats to their existence. There is a wealth of experience and know-how available among personnel in the Fleet, both officers and men, which can be brought to bear on this situation. Some specific recommendations are:
• Assign the Damage Control Assistant to the Executive Officer’s staff. In effect, the Exec will become responsible for damage control. Assign to the DCA all the damage controlmen, and a damage control petty officer for three months’ temporary duty from each division (large ship) or department (small ship). This would place the burden on the Executive Officer of ensuring inter-depart- mental co-operation, and scheduling sufficient time for damage control training. To some extent the Executive Officer’s administrative duties will suffer, but the tradeoff in increased combat readiness will be worth the cost.
• Allow the DCA to concentrate on damage control matters—material readiness of the hull, damage control systems and equipment, and training of personnel—all hands, repair parties, and schools. Assign responsibility for repair matters to an experienced LDO, WO or senior petty officer in the engineering department, who will have control of the shipfitters, carpenters, and auxiliary personnel for routine work.
• Have the Bureau of Naval Personnel and ship C.O.s revise their officer assignment policy to program at least 75 per cent of all 1100 officers through damage control billets sometime during the first ten years of their naval career. If the DCA will be allowed to concentrate on damage control as recommended above, there is no reason why 1310 /1320 officers cannot be assigned as the DCA on CVA/CVS/LPH after benefit of the ten-week damage control school.
• Establish a Fleet-wide policy that each ship will have a Damage Control Material Fund for the procurement and maintenance of damage control equipment, to be administered by the DCA. The fairest way to implement this is to take a pro rata share from each department’s existing OPTAR. The total amount will vary from ship to ship, and quarter to quarter, depending on existing shortages which must be filled and normal use of consumables such as C02, foam, and batteries.
• Republish the World War II War Damage Reports and distribute to all ships of the types concerned for reading by all line officers on board, particularly the C.O.s and Executive Officers.
• Revise the type and ship organization manuals to form the repair parties (both at- sea and in port) on a functional basis, using the three-group concept as described in the Bureau of Naval Personnel publication “Principles of Naval Engineering,” to wit: The Attacking Group, which proceeds to the scene of the fire or flooding and takes action to control the damage; the Containing Group, which sets fire or flooding boundaries on the four sides, and the decks above and below; and the Supporting Group, which brings additional equipment to the scene (pumps, foam, special tools, etc.) as it is needed from the nearest repair locker.
• Establish procedures to implement Type Commander instructions now in effect regarding all hands shipboard damage control training and attendance at damage control and fire fighting schools. (There is a bonus effect from this program in that junior officers develop more confidence after battling various types of fires for a week.) In addition, promote the shipwide qualification of Firefighter Assistants, as described in the BuPers Manual, with a possible graduated incentive pay of ten dollars for non-rated men, and up to 25 dollars for CPOs.
• Change the billet assignment for the 1JV talker on the bridge to a machinist mate or damage controlman.
In regard to the deficiencies in the training area, the following recommendations are submitted:
• Cycle ships through short refresher training periods at least three times between overhauls. The first period would be immediately following overhaul and should be the maximum length allowable. The remaining two periods would be at appropriately spaced intervals (approximately the one-third and two-thirds points of the overhaul-to-overhaul time span), of no more than two weeks’ duration, and conducted in the vicinity of the ship’s home port. Many damage control exercises can be conducted while the ship is at the pier or anchorage. The Type Commander can provide the necessary assistance teams (observers) from other ships of the type, repair ships, school staffs, and DIV/RON/FLOT staffs. These teams might not be as expert as the ship riders at the Fleet Training Groups, but they will at least force the ship to focus attention on battle readiness, including damage control.
• Change the nature and scope of the exercises conducted during refresher training and ORIs to include more advanced exercises which will evaluate ships’ ability to handle serious flooding casualties (stability computations, use of main drain systems, fuel oil transfer systems, secondary drainage system, counterflooding systems, and portable pumps). Exercises should also include magazine fires, oxygen-nitrogen generating plant fires, aviation fuel pumproom fires, and detection, defense and decontamination against biological/chemical attacks. Nor can we overlook isolation and repair of vital piping systems—e.g., firemain and compressed air; rigging of emergency communications, not only on installed X40J runs, but also throughout the ship, depending on the location and nature of the casualty. We should also de-emphasize radiological effects of a nuclear explosion, and re-emphasize blast effects, which must receive first priorities from the damage control organization—flooding from ruptures in hull and piping systems; ruptured steam lines; loss of firemain pressure from ruptured piping; loss of propulsion and electrical power as the lighter hull foundation moves in relation to the heavier machinery, causing machinery to be deranged; and, finally, multiple fires due to aircraft slamming together and rupturing fuel tanks. Any ordnance adrift, as when preparing for a strike, becomes an additional problem.
• Change the competitive exercise system to ensure that officers/senior petty officers are designated as qualified observers in certain fields, and only these persons are permitted to serve as observers for the exercises in those fields, or eliminate the requirement for competitive exercises altogether, using other means to evaluate ships for competitive purposes (e.g., refresher training, ORI, operational performance, administrative and material inspections) and holding the exercises themselves on a non-competitive basis for training only.
In both alternatives, the number of observers required and their stations for a particular exercise should be specified.
• Establish internal administrative procedures for each ship to limit the turnover of repair party personnel to that of the ship as a whole. Basically, this means that, except where unavoidable, a man assigned to a repair party for GQ will remain with that repair party as long as he is on board. Not only is personnel stability essential for training and teamwork, it is vital for the individual’s knowledge of his area of responsibility. Few Executive Officers and department heads seem to realize the time it takes for the average sailor to learn the whereabouts, under conditions of obscured visibility—loss of lighting, smoke-filled spaces—of any or all of the following: doors and hatches, closures, valves, fire hoses, C02 bottles, controls for C02 flooding systems, magazine sprinkling systems, casualty power connections, stretchers, first aid boxes, and the like. Knowledge of the man’s area of the ship is as important as knowledge of damage control procedures. They are both necessary.
• Generate as much realism into damage control training as possible. It is recommended that a fleet-wide questionnaire be sent out requesting suggestions as to how this can be done, and a knowledgable group of personnel be assigned to analyze the replies for feasibility, cost, and implementation. A few suggestions in this area are:
Conduct an operational exercise at least once a year of the water washdown system, using GQ, personnel to actuate all valves.
Conduct dewatering drills (in port as well as at sea), using ship’s fresh water, feed water, and ballast tanks or voids, using installed drainage systems, portable pumps and eductors.
Ensure that hoses are always charged when conducting fire drills.
One OBA cannister should be used for training for every five men in fire drills (both the attacking and containing groups) to ensure that personnel are familiar with their use under working conditions (e.g., handling hoses, climbing ladders).
Conduct chemical warfare exercises using mild incapacitating agents dispensed from aircraft, projectiles, and buoys. This would encourage the officers and crew to develop a better respect for their gas masks and protective clothing.
Make maximum use of portable gas mask trainers where available.
Conduct shoring drills using dunnage, often available at shore activities for the asking.
• Establish a firm requirement that all ships ballast in accordance with current liquid loading instructions, and conduct counterflooding drills on ships equipped with torpedo protection systems at least quarterly. The capability to do each of the above tasks should be evaluated by outside observers at least once a year.
• Establish administrative procedures to stabilize the personnel in the Duty Repair Parties, primarily through ensuring that if assigned personnel are to be gone temporarily (school, leave, special liberty, etc.), they are replaced by another man from the department concerned with the same or better damage control qualifications. A training program should be established to cover all areas of damage control (not just firefighting), and records kept for each duty section and for each individual therein, as to training conducted and qualifications attained. Since the duty repair party is responsible for controlling damage anywhere in the ship on their duty day, their training should include a thorough shipwide indoctrination program spelling out the location of repair lockers, damage control equipment, firemain, and installed fire protection equipment.
The resolution of the problems discussed above, and the implementation of the recommended solutions, in most cases can only be done at the expense of other shipboard activities which heretofore have taken greater priority than damage control.
It is high time that these priorities were reviewed, and that damage control readiness be given its proper share of the effort towards over-all combat readiness.