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The DER in MARKET TIME
136 The DER in MARKET TIME
By Lieutenant Commander W. J. Moredock, U. S. Navy
138 Phantom Carrier
By Captain Eric M. Brown, O.B.E., Royal Navy
142 The Water-Spray
Aircraft Arresting Gear
By Dr. John Thomlinson
145 U. S. Strike Command
By Lieutenant Commander Eugene I. Greenwood,
U. S. Navy
148 Notebook
Professional Notes
Edited by Captain Daniel M. Karcher,
U. S. Navy
With the disbanding of the early warning barriers in the Atlantic and Pacific in mid-1965, 14 radar picket escort ships found themselves making hasty preparations to take up new patrol stations around South Vietnam. These DERs would become part of Operation MARKET TIME, the effort to halt the Communist infiltration of men and arms into South Vietnam.
There would be no more monotonous, month-long patrols scanning the skies with radar. Instead, these ships, built in World War II, would track and investigate thousands of the junks that motor and sail along the 1,200-mile coast of South Vietnam. This type of operation has not been carried out by the U. S. Navy since the Civil War, and before that since the days of Stephen Decatur during the War with Tripoli.
To the MARKET TIME forces, friend and foe are indistinguishable unless they are wearing an enemy uniform or are shooting. It is also very difficult to isolate contraband material, because items such as food and food preservatives are high on the Viet Cong priority list. How much rice or how much salt is too much for a single junk to be carrying? Inspection of a junk’s papers is difficult, since forgery is easily accomplished. MARKET TIME forces must also be alert for draft dodgers and deserters, as the Viet Cong will employ them if they are not gainfully employed by the South Vietnamese government. The great majority of the junks that sail each day contain innocent tradesmen and fishermen, but those few that do not cause every junk to be stopped, boarded, and searched. This does not mean stopped once a week or once a month, but nearly every day, and in daylight or darkness.
For the DERs, this has made necessary a new shipboard organization, with many men
qualifying in boarding crews and with more than the first division being trained in launching the whaleboat. The deck officers quickly become alert to fish traps, nets, unlighted junks, and the shallow, poorly charted coastal waters. The problem is compounded by monsoon winds and seas, and a tenacious and versatile enemy.
The commanding officer of a DER reporting for duty in one of these coastal areas will find himself faced with one of the most unusual situations he may ever encounter in his naval career. Instead of being handed a cumbersome, overly detailed operation order, which leaves little to the imagination and ingenuity of the commanding officer, he is given broad guide lines, consisting primarily of the rules of engagement, and a directive “to board and reboard all the junks he detects in his assigned area.” In most cases his search encompasses thousands of square miles of water and hundreds of junks.
To accomplish his mission the commanding officer will be required to exercise every facet of his imagination, and to use every tool available; all his men must be positively motivated and mentally alert. If the tools are not on board, he must fabricate them if he is to accomplish his mission. While no two commanding officers approach the problem in the same way, the basic goal and requirement—to prevent infiltration and to board junks—must be the end result of every effort made. In one DER, for example, you will see in use a metal locator similar to that employed by a beachcomber in Malibu. Another ship uses a towing system for her whaleboat. In still another DER, an additional speedboat is used to increase boardings per day and save precious patrol time. Other tools of the trade include chemical testers, 24-inch searchlights, and new, electrically primed, 3-inch star shells.
The DER’s commanding officer has a highly effective platform from which to carry out his mission. The original designers and the men who reconfigured these ships in the mid-1950s for their radar picket roles might well have had MARKET TIME-type operations in mind. With her economical diesel plant, the DER is not tied to an oiler’s apron strings, and the ship has the range required to accomplish her search mission. The ship is well equipped and has electronics and communications matched by few other destroyer- type ships.
Although the DER has a relatively shallow navigational draft, she retains an effective ASW capability and can hurl 3-inch shells five miles. The 170 personnel on board are about optimum for consistent reliable operations. The ship is largely air conditioned, a great morale booster on the hot days and nights in the South China Sea or the Gulf of Siam. Few ships that are smaller than the DER can weather the monsoon storms and remain an aggressive unit night and day, hence the DER can remain on station when many smaller MARKET TIME units must seek a lee.
The DER has acted as mother ship for 83- foot Coast Guard patrol boats (WPB) and the 50-foot Navy Swift boats (PCF). Often two PCF crews and one PCF will be deployed with the DER, with the larger ship providing the lodging and logistics support to allow the PCF to remain away from her home base for extended periods. The DER also provides moral as well as gunfire support for the smaller patrol boats as they search areas too shallow for the DER. The fuel and lubricating oils required by these small craft are compatible with the DER and further improve the efficiency of the operation.
On occasion, the DER will enter port near the local coastal command center to be brought up to date on the detailed intelligence picture. In an operation like MARKET TIME, where weather, tactical considerations, enemy movements, and even the friendly forces available are so fluid and fluctuating, “old” information may mean a matter of hours or days. This center also provides a communications link with the Commander, Coastal Surveillance Force, in Saigon. Normally, the U. S. units in MARKET TIME are provided with Vietnamese liaison officers who provide local intelligence and serve as members of the junk boarding teams. These liaison officers on many occasions are able to obtain valuable intelligence data since they can speak fluently with the fishermen.
Operation MARKET TIME is what each DER makes it. The mission is clearly defined, the enemy is at hand, and the DER commanding officer is basically independent in accomplishing his mission, all of which offer an interesting challenge for all hands.
RADAR PICKET ESCORT SHIP
Displacement, light | 1,210 tons |
Displacement, full-load | 1,710 tons |
Length, overall | 306 feet |
Beam | 37 feet |
Draft, maximum | 14 feet |
Machinery | Diesel, twin shaft, 6,000 |
| horsepower |
Rated speed | 21 knots |
Armament | 2 3-inch/50cal. guns. Several .50 cal. machine- |
| guns |
| ASW weapons |
Endurance | 11,500 miles at 11 knots |
By Captain Eric M. Brown,
O.B.E., Royal Navy,
Former Deputy Director,
Naval Air Warfare*
PHANTOM CARRIER
CVA.01 was the designation given to the new aircraft carrier for the Royal Navy which was authorized for design studies by Britain’s Conservative Government in July of 1963. This decision had been reached after a series of the most searching studies into the validity of the concept of the aircraft carrier as a limited war vehicle. Inevitably, there were arguments over size, cost effectiveness, vulnerability, and detectability of such a ship.
In 1966, however, the then new Labour Government decided to cancel the CVA.01, largely as a measure to reduce soaring national defense costs.
The CVA.01 was designed with the longterm objective of being able to handle any aircraft likely to serve with the Fleet Air Arm in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, considerable crystal gazing was called for. As a basic criterion, a take-off weight of 70,000 pounds was set as the upper limit.
The Admiralty’s Directorate of Naval Air Warfare (D.N.A.W.) was responsible for the carrier’s flight deck layout, the feature which essentially gives any carrier her individuality, and in this respect CVA.01 was going to be something new. This D.N.A.W. Future Planning Section consisted of operational aviators, test pilots, and an aviation engineer. In addition, a Work Study Group of non-aviators, attached to the Department of the Director General-Ships, was responsible for incorporating the proposals of the Planning Section in the over-all ship design.
It has always been the obvious ideal to have parallel and separate lanes for landing, for take-off, and for parking, but somehow over the past 20 years there seems to have grown
* Captain Brown, while D.D.N.A.W. from 1961 to 1964, was responsible for design of many of the operational features of the CVA.01.
m
up a reluctance amongst carrier designers to pursue this ideal. Contentment seems to have set in with the advent of the partial benefits obtained by the angled deck. This latter idea has been an eminently successful development, but it has had two major drawbacks: First, the angled-deck layout isolates, on the port quarter, a deck area of considerable dimensions which is virtually unusable during landing operations. Such real estate on a flight deck is much too valuable to be wasted, and the parallel deck design removes this area from the port to the starboard quarter where it can be fully used. Second, during landing in conditions of low cloud or poor visibility, the pilot’s first view of the deck occurs very late, so that with the high approach speeds of modern aircraft he has little or no time to make a correction in line. Errors in lining up with the center line of the angled deck are numerous and often lead to accidents or missed approaches, particularly at night.
Interrogation of a cross section of naval pilots confirmed that the first thing a pilot sees on making a carrier approach in bad weather is the ship’s wake, which is considerable from such a ship doing 30 knots, and at uight is usually brilliantly phosphorescent. However, the wake coincides with the center line of the ship, but not that of the angled deck, so is of no use as a line-up datum. With
a landing lane parallel to the center line of the ship the wake is a useful line-up reference.
Subsequent examination by the Work Study Group showed that a truly parallel deck was impossible within the 184-foot width limitation of the flight deck. However, the angle required to be put on the parallel deck was cut down to the negligible one of 2f degrees (compared to an angle of about 10 degrees in Forrestal-class carriers), so that the objective was virtually achieved.
On landing aboard the GVA.01 an aircraft would fold its wings and turn out of the arrester wires to an arming and refuelling park on the starboard side aft. Then, the aircraft would return forward to the catapult launch position. This would mean a counterclockwise traffic circulation of taxiing aircraft in the parking lane, but the problem was how to define the taxi paths to allow two aircraft to pass safely in opposite directions. The solution was to position the island 34 feet inboard on the starboard side, so that there would be a solid interspace as in highways, with aircraft going aft being on the inboard side and those going forward on the outboard side. Flight deck vehicles, such as tractors, would be parked in tunnels through the island structure at flight deck level.
The 200-foot long and 18-foot wide island shape and position (420 feet from the bow) was the subject of extensive wind-flow tests to
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ensure an optimum position, which was found to be farther aft than anticipated.
Although the ship’s after lift was to be of the normal deck-edge variety, British and U. S. experience had convinced us that a forward deck-edge lift took too much of a beating in heavy seas, hence it was decided to replace it with a lift set slightly off the ship’s center line. Of course, three lifts are always better than two, but the penalty in hangar space for a second internal lift was too great in a carrier of the size of CVA.01 with a 660- by-80-foot hangar. The position of the forward lift was such that it could be operated while the starboard catapult was being used with the jet blast deflectors raised.
Although not a flight deck feature, the ship’s quarterdeck run-up position is directly connected with flight deck operations. Formerly, an engine change or fault in an aircraft had always necessitated a run-up on the flight deck during a lull in flying operations. Since the repair had usually been made in a quiet corner of the hangar, it meant a major hangar shuffle to get the aircraft on to a lift and all this within a time limited to a gap in flying operations. Once on the flight deck the aircraft had to be tied down and then run-up, much to the annoyance of all for it usually means a prolonged period at full power with the attendant thunderous noise. Finally, if an adjustment was still found necessary, it was back to the hangar and a complete repeat of this upheaval at some future time. All these disadvantages could be removed in the CVA.01 by rolling the aircraft straight out of its quiet corner of the hangar on to an open platform at the stern of the carrier where it can be run up with its tail pointing aft (and usually downwind) and adjustments made ad infinitum without interfering with flying operations. This was an extension in idea of the fantail engine run-up stand the author had seen on the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65). From a point of view of space, it is unlikely that the above feature could have been incorporated except that it had been proposed to fit a Seadart ship-to-air missile system installation aft, and it and its magazine would only use up half of the available quarterdeck space. The Seadart system, incidentally, was only fitted to give a final self-defense capability against attacking aircraft in the event of any breaking through the outer defense ring provided by the carrier’s escorts. Missile systems in the target ship are twice as effective as those on the screen, so this was deemed a sensible, seaman-like precaution. The position of the Seadart system was chosen to give the best all-around field of fire without encroaching on flight deck space.
This after missile position did mean that the flight deck ramp was forward of the quarterdeck and that an aircraft falling short on landing could make a nasty mess on top of the missile system. Extensive research of accident records showed that since the introduction of the mirror landing system, and with the four arresting wires positioned well up the flight deck, we had no case of a stern crash with the aircraft falling short of the flight deck. The airflow in this region was also checked by wind tunnel tests to ensure there was no turbulence to affect approaching aircraft.
This confidence in the survival of the Sea- dart installation was not the reason for having only one; that factor was a matter of keeping below a limited financial ceiling.
Another innovation planned for the CVA.01 was the arresting gear. The Royal Aircraft Establishment at Bedford had developed an arresting gear working on the water spray principle for emergency use at airfields. [1] This gear had shown itself to possess tremendous entry speed development potential and to be about one-third of the weight and one-half of the cost of any existing arresting gear. The proposal was made to adapt this to shipboard use, where its unusual characteristic of providing a constant arresting wire pull-out distance for any entry speed or landing weight within the gear’s operating envelope would simplify and speed up landing operations since the flight deck controllers and handlers could be precisely pre-posi- tioned for assisting the aircraft to turn out of the wires.
Two steam catapults of 250-foot stroke were to be fitted, one on the starboard side of the take-off lane and one on the port side of the landing lane. These were to be the first catapults of this length fitted in a British carrier. Ideally, they should both have been fitted in the take-off lane, but the length of stroke was such that a catapult on the port side of the take-off lane would have encroached severely on accommodation and hangar space in a 53,000-ton ship.
The area on the starboard quarter recovered by use of the parallel deck concept was to be an operating platform for a Sea King SH-3D antisubmarine helicopter or a smaller rescue helicopter.
Besides red or possibly white floodlighting, CVA.01 would have been fitted with the revolutionary new Bedford Lighting Pattern, developed by Bedford, and now being introduced aboard current British carriers. Its main feature is the remarkable reduction in the number of flight deck lights for an increase in attitude reference data.
A new carrier-controlled approach system was to be developed in time for installation in CVA.01, with retrofit planned in other British carriers. Basically, it was to be a much less sophisticated system than the U. S. Navy’s SPN-10 as it was felt that the low percentage occurrence of a 200-foot ceiling and half-mile visibility minimum did not justify a high-cost and high-complexity system, especially as such weather conditions usually coincided with a sea state which would in itself restrict flying operations, f
Two inertial navigation systems were to be fitted in the CVA.01, as her aircraft would almost certainly use a similar navigation system and so require data from the ship’s system as the master reference.
It is perhaps ironical that it was the Royal Navy’s intention that CVA.01 would start life as a Phantom carrier, but in an operational sense. The ultra-supersonic F-4K Phantom II all-weather fighter together with the Buccaneer Mk. 2 low-level strike aircraft were to comprise her main force on commissioning in 1972-1973. In addition, she was to carry airborne early warning aircraft, SH-3D Sea King ASW helicopters, and utility helicopters.
The actual numbers of aircraft that CVA.01 was to carry cannot be revealed. Two-thirds of the total aircraft complement could be housed in the hangar and two-thirds on the
t See Commander Edwin F. Stobie, U. S. Navy, “The All-Weather Carrier Landing System,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1965, pp. 156-159.
flight deck. The space for the “extra third” was to be available for a reinforcing squadron of either carrier aircraft or land-based aircraft such as the V/STOL Kestrel (P.1127) strike-fighter.
The essential statistics for the CVA.01 hull design came from the Royal Navy’s Director General-Ships. These included a displacement of 53,000 tons with an over-all hull length of some 900 feet and an extreme flight deck width of 184 feet.
Design speed for the carrier was 28 knots while “deep and dirty.” This was to be achieved on three shafts driven by oil-fired steam turbines. Three shafts were chosen because they offer a better margin for battle damage than do two and require less space and manpower than do four shafts.
The complement was to be 3,200 officers and enlisted men, accommodated in fully air- conditioned quarters.
On the premise that every ton displacement would cost £1,000, the basic cost was going to approximate £53 million and probably nearer £60 million. Building time was to be 5 5 years.
This, then, was to have been the CVA.01 ... a ship that would have offered many contributions to the advancement of carrier aviation and to British naval strength.
THE WATER-SPRAY AIRCRAFT ARRESTING GEAR
In the late 1940s, with the advent of heavier, faster, and costlier aircraft, and without the corresponding increase in runway length, the need for some arrangement at the ends of runways to stop overshooting aircraft became self evident. This need was fulfilled at Royal Navy Air Stations by the revival of the drag- chain arresting gear which was developed during World War II. For the next decade this equipment demonstrated the value of over-run arresting gears. It is difficult to picture a cheaper type of arresting gear, but the chain-drag system had two major disadvantages: the ponderous effort required to return the chain link cables back to the ready position and the chain in the ready position, lying alongside the runway edges, presented a hazard to normal aircraft operations.
Toward the end of the 1950s, with the large, jet-propelled Scimitar and Sea Vixen aircraft in service and with the Buccaneer pending, it was decided to replace the drag-chain gears with more sophisticated equipment, since the necessary weight of chain cable was becoming unmanageable.
The replacement gear was required to stop a naval aircraft of up to 50,000 pounds with engaging speeds of up to 130 knots. Following an appraisal of the problem, hardware development proceeded on two lines: a rotary friction gear, involving a number of novel features, and a linear hydraulic gear. The latter established an ascendancy and in consequence the former was abandoned. Amongst the many design objectives to be achieved if possible was one that the gear should be ready at all times, without prior adjustment, and to arrest an aircraft no matter at what weight and speed it engaged the gear. It was an objective also to use the full run-out of the gear for all weights and speeds, and under these conditions the resistance developed by the gear should be as uniform as possible and appropriate to the aircraft weight and engaging speed. In the interests of reliability of performance, simplicity of design was also a prime objective. Full-scale development was embarked upon with the essential components of the gear and using piloted aircraft, but with little regard to the form of the final in-service installation details.
Figure 1 shows the essential components of the gear. A 1,300-foot length of steel wire rope, of 95,000-pound ultimate strength, is disposed across the end of the runway and passes over a pair of runway-edge sheaves. Each end of the steel rope terminates in a simple piston 3f inches in diameter by about nine inches in length. Each piston is free to slide in a 510-foot steel tube with but a few thousandths of an inch clearance. The rope passes into the tube through a simple sleeve-
type gland or bush, again with but a “few thou” clearance. The gland end of the tube and its corresponding runway-edge sheave are mounted on a common concrete foundation block and the 510-foot length of tube is held level on the tops of steel stakes. Along the entire length of the crown of each tube are some 400 f-inch diameter threaded holes through the tube walls. Into each of these holes is screwed a stainless steel plug, down the pendant the initial shock tension wave travels down each half of the rope system at sonic speed—about 10,000 feet per second—and quickly reaches each piston and fractures the breaking elements, leaving the pistons free. Movement of the pistons, under the action of the aircraft via the piston ropes, is controlled by hydraulic pressure acting on each piston, this hydraulic pressure being generated in consequence of the piston movement dis-
axis of which passes an orifice hole 0.143- inches in diameter, with a bell-mouth at the inner end.
Each tube is filled with water, with completion of filling being indicated by the overflow of water from the orifice plugs. Water which seeps past the piston is prevented from being lost from the tail, or open end, of the tube by giving this end a slight upward sweep over the last few feet so that the lower lip is level with the plug outlets.
In this state the gear is ready to arrest aircraft of any weight and speed within the limits of approximately 50,000 pounds and 130 knots. Also, the arresting gear can stand ln a state of readiness for long periods with little, if any, attention.
When an aircraft engages the runway placing water through orificed outlets between the piston and the gland.
Onlookers, during an arrest, witness a spectacular curtain of water jets springing from the tubes, with the jets quickly breaking into spray and the jets being shut off in rapid succession as the pistons traverse their respective tubes—a spectacular demonstration of energy transfer. In this context, 37 ^-million foot-pounds of aircraft kinetic energy (50,000 ■ pounds at 130 knots) are, in a period of six seconds, transferred into kinetic energy of 4,350 pounds of water, the latter having been first pressurized to up to 4,650-p.s.i.
In order to re-set the gear, each piston is provided with a fiber tail rope some 530 feet long. One end is attached to the aft face of the piston, and with the piston in the ready position the fiber rope is laid out neatly on the ground, behind the rear end of the tube, as shown in Figure 1. During an arrest, as the piston traverses the pressure tube, the fiber rope is drawn progressively into the tube. To reset the gear a light vehicle takes the rope end remaining outside the tube and drives away, thus drawing the piston back. The breaking element is replaced, the straining device pre-tensions the wire rope system, and the tubes are refilled with water—tasks which can be accomplished in ten minutes.
As described, we now have an arresting gear of greater capacity than the drag-chain device which it replaces. It has a shorter run-out without corresponding increases in retardation, and is re-settable with far less effort and in far less time. Because the tubes at ground level constitute a hazard corresponding to the drag-chains, for service installations two trenches some 520 feet long are cut in the ground, pointing in any convenient directions away from the two runway-edge sheaves. In the trenches are laid 18-inch diameter commercial steel pipes and the trenches are then filled in. Both pressure tubes are then inserted into these casing tubes. The casing tubes are half filled with water, thus flooding and submerging the pressure tubes. With this installation, the orifice discharge is retained within the casing tubes and the pressure tubes are automatically refilled as the pistons are drawn back to their ready positions by their tail ropes. The water of the gear is afforded some protection against freezing by being accommodated below ground level, and further protection can be afforded by the addition of a proportion of non-freezing liquid.
Service reports indicate that the water- spray systems now installed are welcome, are trouble free, and their cost more than recovered in the value of aircraft saved.
The progress and success of this gear has been closely followed by the designers of carrier-type arresting gear and there is no doubt that the simple concept of a length of wire rope, with two pistons operating in a pair of perforated water filled tubes, could meet the demands of carrier arresting gear performance. Although the prime obj ect of both an airfield gear and a carrier gear are the same, the environment and cycling requirements are so different that the design of a carrier gear using the principle described above for airfield equipment introduces a host of extra problems, solutions to some of which (in an acceptable manner) are not immediately obvious. To mention but a few: the installation of four or five pairs of long tube units presents the ship designer with severe problems; to maintain the pressure tubes full of water, in spite of ship motion, while pos-
sible, throws up unattractive solutions; and the problem of resetting the gear within 30 seconds, leads to still further complications.
However, the Royal Navy, in its quest for a successor to its current Mk 13 carrier arresting gear, has produced a prototype water- spray arresting gear which is now undergoing development ashore prior to installation in fleet carriers.
By Lieutenant Commander Eugene I. Greenwood,
U. S. Navy,
Former Assistant Public Information Officer,
U. S. Strike Command
U. S. STRIKE COMMAND
At the height of the Berlin crisis in July of UTx. 1961, the late President John F. Kennedy affirmed in unmistakable terms that the United States would meet all levels of Communist pressure with whatever levels of force required: “We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action.” This statement of intent signaled the beginning of a massive increase in size, potency, and mobility of the nation’s general-purpose land and air forces based in the continental United States. It also brought with it a modernization of the command lines to reduce their reaction time.
In September of 1961, General Paul D. Adams, U. S. Army, was directed to organize a command to meet this national requirement. The following month he was named Commander-in-Chief of this newly established U. S. Strike Command, commonly referred to as CinCStrike, and was given continuous operational command of all combat- ready Army and Tactical Air Command units based in the continental United States.
CinCStrike was directed to mold these forces into an integrated, mobile, flexible, rapid-reaction force to be used either to augment other U. S. forces throughout the world or to be employed in areas where no U. S. combat forces are already deployed.
After much study and debate, on 1 December 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expanded the responsibility of CinCStrike to all U. S. defense activities in the 63-country area of the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and Southern Asia to the western border of Burma. This geographic area, which covers one-quarter of the world’s land area, is referred to as MEAFSA. General Adams’ second hat title for this responsibility is U. S. Command er-in-Chief MEAFSA.
This MEAFSA area includes the Red Sea and Persian Gulf and operational command over the small naval force, known as the Middle East Force, which operates primarily in these two bodies of water. It is composed of two destroyers, on rotation from the U. S. Sixth Fleet, a small command ship, and a C-54 transport aircraft.
By 1961 six unified commands had been established: U. S. Pacific Command (CinCPac), U. S. Atlantic Command (CinCLant), U. S. Alaskan Command (CinCAl), U. S. European Command (CinCEur), U. S. Continental Air Defense Command (CinCConAD) and the U. S. Southern Command (CinCSou). All U. S. general-purpose combat forces at that time were under a unified commander except for the combat-ready Army and tactical air forces based in the United States. Thus, when Strike Command was formed in 1961, the family of unified commands was complete.
All U. S. combat forces now come under the operational command of a unified or specified commander reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*
U. S. Army Forces Strike Command is the ground arm of Strike Command and includes all combat-ready divisions in the continental United States plus smaller combat and combat support units, in size ranging down to 36-man hospital detachments.
U. S. Air Forces Strike Command is Strike Command’s air arm. It consists of all combat- ready fighter, reconnaissance, and assault airlift squadrons of the Tactical Air Command based in the continental United States. The primary tactical aircraft in these fighter and reconnaissance squadrons are the F-100 Super Sabre, RF-101 Voodoo, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief, RB-66 Destroyer, and re* Only one specified command is now active, the Strategic Air Command.
The American full-rigged ship Aristides painting by Mr. Robert Salmon which appeared on the cover of the Proceedings for April 1965 is available in full color as a large- size print (26"X22") suitable for framing. List price $5.00 per print. Member’s price $l+.00 per print.
Prints Available
cently acquired F-4G and RF-4G Phantoms. The assault airlift squadrons are equipped with the C-130 Hercules.
Fast-moving Composite Air Strike Forces, known as CASFs, can be deployed to reach any part of the world either separately or as part of a Strike Command Joint Task Force. Such a force of jet fighters, reconnaissance planes, and assault airlift aircraft can be tailored in size and structure to meet any situation.
While Strike Command does not “own” any aerial tankers, these are a necessary part of tactical aircraft operations, especially in overseas deployments. All KC-135 tankers are operated by the Strategic Air Command which serves as a single manager for tanker aircraft, assigning them to the support of Strike Command when necessary.
Strike Command’s philosophy for the employment of joint forces is to select a precise mix of Army and Air Force units needed to meet a specific threat. The selected force can then be deployed to the nearest friendly overseas base where it will be staged for the final move to the trouble spot. Such response may vary from an airlifted rifle company and an element of jet fighters to Strike Command’s entire ground and air inventory.
If time is the critical factor, the final move to the objective will be by airlift loaded with paratroopers and supported by tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. If follow- on forces are needed, they may be sent by the “building-block” concept, either by airlift or sealift.
Strike Command Headquarters, located at McDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, has an integrated staff of some 600 officers and enlisted men from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. It is a unified headquarters in fact as well as in theory. If the chief of the one directorate is Air Force, his deputy is Army or Navy or Marine, or vice-versa. The Command Section is typical of this practice. General Theodore J. Conway, U. S. Army, relieved General Adams as CinCStrike on 1 November 1966. His Deputy Commander-inChief is Lieutenant General Fred M. Dean, U. S. Air Force, and the Chief of Staff is Rear Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, U. S. Navy.
When Strike Command was established in 1961 the sea services were represented by two naval officers and one Marine Corps officer. The assumption of the MEAFSA responsibility caused an increase of Navy and Marine Corps personnel into Strike Command Headquarters until today there are 50 Navy and 30 Marine Corps representatives.
Within the staff structure of Strike Command Headquarters are two Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Each numbers approximately 75 officers and enlisted men drawn from all the staff sections who perform this function as an additional duty.
These JTF headquarters are maintained in a high state of readiness, with command field equipment packed and ready to go at all times. Within two hours after being alerted, these mobile headquarters teams can begin moving by air to any trouble spot in the world. To insure the ultimate in mobility and rapid reaction, at least 25 per cent of each JTF headquarters is parachute qualified.
Strike Command has developed a uniquely adaptable Communications Support Element (CSE), located adjacent to the main headquarters at McDill Air Force Base. Made up
*
*
of 700 communicators, half Air Force and half Army, the CSE is the only organization of its kind in the U. S. military establishment. It employs a combination of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps equipment, which is all air transportable by C-130 Hercules aircraft.
This CSE has the ability to establish and operate communication systems to link Strike Command Headquarters to units in the field anywhere in the world. It is also configured to tie into world-wide networks operated by the Army and Air Force.
In order to maintain a constant state of readiness, Strike Command conducts three primary types of exercises which focus directly on developing increased skill in joint operations and speed of reaction. These are: rapid reaction exercises, overseas exercises, and large-scale stateside exercises.
The initial air and ground elements of any joint task force must be ready to deploy on extremely short notice, therefore the airborne divisions maintain a reinforced battalion on an around-the-clock, rapid-reaction posture, as do the reconnaissance, fighter, and assault airlift squadrons in numbers sufficient to support such a force.
A realistic appraisal of this quick-reaction capability is obtained by the use of “unannounced” exercises, such as the ONE SHOT series. In this type exercise, a reinforced airborne company, a fighter squadron, an aerial reconnaissance element, and the required number of troop carrier aircraft will simultaneously be given the order to move—normally at night. Fighters and “recce” aircraft % to advanced bases within striking distance of the objective area.
At the same time, C-130 airlift aircraft fly from their home bases to the loading base and then airlift the paratroopers and their equipment to an advance staging base or directly to the objective area, where an airborne assault is macle at daybreak.
The alerted units never have any hint of the operation until the alert order arrives from Strike Command Headquarters.
Since one of Strike Command’s missions is to augment overseas unified commanders with air and ground forces which must be ready to fight upon arrival, the Command reaps much firsthand experience and training in overseas exercises.
A good example of a Strike Command overseas exercise was BIG LIFT in late 1963. Fifteen thousand troops of the 2nd Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, were airlifted to airbases in Germany in 63J hours. Once on the ground the troops were married up with prepositioned heavy equipment. Concurrently, a Composite Air Strike Force of three fighter squadrons, a reconnaissance element, and supporting troop carrier aircraft flew to dispersed operating bases in northeastern France. After arrival the joint forces participated in a NATO exercise and then returned to the United States.
Strike Command had become known as early as 1962 for its huge, complex, joint training field exercises in the United States. Exercise DESERT STRIKE, conducted in the Mojave Desert in the spring of 1964, is a good example. More than 100,000 soldiers and airmen and over 1,000 aircraft participated in this massive maneuver which ranged over 13 million acres of desert terrain. In size and numbers it was the largest stateside exercise since World War II.
During the first five years of its existence, Strike Command has:
• Provided 100,000 men and 1,000 aircraft to augment CinCLant during the Cuban crisis of 1963.
• Deployed tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to the Western Pacific to reinforce CinCPac during the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964.
• Provided a JTF command element and the C-130 airlift force for the joint Belgian- American rescue operations at Stanleyville and Paulis in the Congo during 1964, resulting in the rescue of 1,500 civilian hostages.
• Provided a quick-reaction augmentation to CinCLant during the 1965 Dominican Republic crisis. In six days and 15 hours, 15,558 combat personnel and 13,643 tons of cargo were moved from the United States to the island.
• Deployed more than 200,000 soldiers and airmen in combat-ready Army and Tactical Air Command units to CinCPac for the war in Vietnam.
Above all, Strike Command has provided the organization and impetus for major components of different services to function together as a joint team.
i
Notebook
U. S. Navy
s Navy Tests ACLS at Sea (Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 November 1966): Navy last week conducted sea trials of its AllWeather Carrier Landing System (ACLS) on board the carrier America (CVA-66) with McDonnell F-4G and Ling-Temco-Vought F-8E test aircraft from the Flight Test Div. Naval Air Test Center, Md.
The trials were the last for the ACLS, which gives aircraft a “hands-ofF’ landing capability, prior to system operational evaluation scheduled for next April.
Deployment of the system with the first fleet squadron, expected to be LTV A-7A aircraft, is scheduled for December, 1967, according to Capt. F. R. Fearnow, Naval Material Command ACLS project manager.
The ACLS provides a greatly improved capability for precision control of carrier jet aircraft during landing approaches and is expected to provide a considerable reduction in the carrier landing accident rate, especially during night operations, according to Fearnow.
Accuracy possible with ACLS is +4 ft. vertically from the optimum glide slope and approximately +20 ft. longitudinally from the optimum touchdown point on the carriers’ flight deck.
During the trials five “bolters”—non- arrested landings requiring go-around for another landing approach—occurred during 55 automatic landing attempts, according to George Griffin, flight test project engineer.
Major components of the system include:
• Bell Aerosystems AN/SPN-10, consisting of precision tracking radar, tracking computer, data stabilization system, navigation computer, signal data converter, and shipboard consoles and displays.
• Airborne Instruments Laboratory AN/ SPN-41 approach radar consisting of two shipborne transmitters for aircraft azimuth and elevation data relative to the desired glide slope and an ILS-type crosspointer display in the aircraft cockpit. The system is similar to the advanced integrated landing systems (AILS) developed by the company for the FAA.
• Radiation, Inc. AN/ASW-25A data link unit in the aircraft which receives computer-generated data from the shipboard equipment on a time division, discrete address basis for each aircraft.
jnj Frozen Blood Called Success (The New
York Times, 17 November 1966): The Navy says the trial use of frozen blood for Vietnam wounded has been a success.
“This study in Vietnam,” a spokesman said, “has demonstrated that frozen red cells can be used in multiple transfusions to wounded servicemen with excellent clinical results.”
The new transfusion technique was developed at the Chelsea Naval Hospital and the Massachusetts General Hospital. It has been used in Vietnam for a year.
Lieut. Comdr. C. Robert Valeri, officer in charge of the new naval blood research laboratory in Boston, said 40 injured men were given 400 pints of the frozen blood. The results, he said, showed its use to be “feasible and safe.”
s Navy Shipyards Lack Workers (Andrew Hamilton in New Orleans Times-Picayune, 2 December 1966): The nation may be courting another Thresher disaster.
This is the dire outlook expressed by some Navy officers who are worried about an increasing acute shortage of shipyard facilities, funds and trained personnel to overhaul and repair the fleet.
Exactly what caused the nuclear attack submarine Thresher to sink off Boston in April, 1963, with a loss of 129 lives, was never determined. But mechanical failure was suspected.
Today, the Vietnam war has increased the tempo of fleet operations to the point where shipyards are falling behind ship overhaul schedules. This means subs and other major vessels, which normally are overhauled every three or four years, are being pushed to endurance, perhaps at considerable risk.
A recent spate of freak accidents has further complicated the overhaul problem.
The accidents include fires aboard the carriers Oriskany and Franklin D. Roosevelt off Vietnam, the grounding of the submarine Tiru off the Australian coast and the collision between the submarine Nautilus and the aircraft carrier Essex.
Officers in a position to evaluate the condition of the fleet are distressed by the current situation.
“Some of us would like to have Brooklyn again” for repair and overhaul work says one of these officers. The Brooklyn Naval Shipyard was closed last year by order of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara despite opposition from New York’s political leaders.
Many of the workers at Brooklyn declined to leave the New York area for employment elsewhere in the naval shipyard system. Now there is a definite shortage of trained personnel at some other shipyards.
The hiring problem is acute on the West Coast, where both private and public shipyards are scrambling for workers to carry out the heavy workload imposed by the war. The naval shipyard at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, has advertised extensively for workers.
Another shipyard having a hard time finding qualified workmen is Charleston, S. C. Charleston is a major East Coast overhaul and repair station for submarines.
Employment at all naval shipyards on July 31 was 81,993. The yards have authority to expand to 87,000 personnel by Dec. 31. “The yards are calling for 1,000 more workers a month,” says one source, “but they’re not going to be able to find them.”
Despite an extensive effort, known as the “subsafe program,” to improve all deep-diving Polaris and attack submarines, there is concern that regular overhaul work is not being performed frequently enough to prevent major faults from developing on some
of the Navy’s submarines.
The special “subsafe program” was established following the loss of the Thresher.
The Navy recently took steps to make use of idle ship repair and overhaul facilities at San Diego, Cal., in an effort to ease the overload on other West Coast shipyards.
The San Diego Naval Repair Facility was inactivated in January 1965 as the result of a Dec. 12, 1963, base closing order from McNamara. The Navy retained ownership of the facility as part of its mobilization plan.
At the end of September this year, the Navy decided to lease out the facility for private operation under condition that it be used only for Navy repair and overhaul work.
Testifying before the House defense appropriations subcommittee earlier this year on the current defense budget, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. David L. McDonald said the Navy needed $150 million more than the $299 million McNamara had allowed for ship overhaul and repair.
However, the extra funds were not supplied by Congress.
McDonald indicated that the Defense Department had not approved all of the ship overhaul and repair work the Navy considered important, in part because the Navy had never been able to accomplish all the ship overhauls requested in past years.
The reason for this slippage, McDonald said, was that costs of overhaul and repair work were constantly rising.
He said the $150 million was needed to keep ships on the move by making needed repairs quickly while in port.
Asked if the approved budget would “take care of the wear and tear ... on your equip-, ment and your ships,” McDonald replied:
“I don’t think so ... I think that is an area where I not only didn’t get what I asked for, but I think I need a little more than I requested.” He said that the current tempo of naval operations was not fully anticipated when the budget was drawn up.
Other U. S. Services
53 Bomber Request Fails McNamara Test
(Richard Fryklund in Washington Evening Star, 17 November 1966): The latest Air Force request for a new long-range bomber has again failed to meet Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s basic objections.
The new proposal is more specific about the plane top Air Force leaders want, but it does not answer satisfactorily the basic McNamara question: What would any new bomber add to the deterrents of war that is worth $10 billion?
Unless McNamara changes his decisionmaking techniques or unless the President bows to pressure from Congress, the Air Force is almost certain to be turned down.
What the Air Force wants ultimately is permission to buy about 200 hot new bombers called the AMSA (for advanced manned strategic aircraft). It would replace the obso- lescing B-52s in the 1970s.
What the Air Force wants immediately is permission to refine the design of the airplane so that the project can be put up for bids from the aircraft industry.
The money immediately involved is not large. The preliminary design work can be done for about $50 million. But the implications of McNamara’s decision are vast.
McNamara believes that refinement of the design is not the important issue today. He wants to know what AMSA would do to further American foreign policy.
The McNamara decision-making process, as he and his subordinates have described it, is to fit weapons and men to foreign policy objectives—at the least possible cost.
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AMSA is proposed as a nuclear-war weapon. It could fly from the United States to targets deep in Russia or Red China and would destroy enemy weapons or cities with short-range (50- to 100-mile) nuclear missiles.
For the past several years McNamara has been asking what this sort of weapon would add either to this country’s objective of deterring nuclear war or to its ability to fight and survive one.
McNamara has said that even if the Soviet Union launched a surprise attack on this country, destroying many American long- range missiles, and even if four-fifths of the surviving American missiles should fail, the remaining small fraction could inflict overwhelming damage on Russia.
That is, a severely crippled American missile force could still destroy one-third of the population and one-half of the industry of the Soviet Union.
If Russia understands this, McNamara says, she will not attack deliberately. She is deterred from irrational attack, whether or not the United States has bombers.
The situation is similar with China. Fifty American missiles (out of the 1,712 being installed) could kill 50 million Chinese, destroy one-half the Chinese industry and kill most of the key Chinese governmental, technical and managerial officials and a large proportion of the skilled workers.
Therefore, McNamara concludes, Red China, too, would be deterred by our missiles alone if she had a long-range nuclear force.
But what if our missiles don’t work at all? The Air Force does not claim that Minute- man and Polaris will fail. They have considerable faith in the weapons. But they would like a hedge. They don’t want all of the nuclear eggs in the missile basket.
But McNamara says, in effect, we can hedge with two missile baskets more effectively than with a bomber basket—and save money. If there is sound reason to doubt the reliability or survivability of a thousand Min- utemen, he reasons, you can add another thousand as a hedge for less than the cost of AMSA. Or, if bombers are somehow necessary, we will soon have 200 smaller FB-lll’s, the bomber version of the TFX.
But if the war does start, he asks in effect, how many American lives and how much
American property would $10 billion worth of AMSA save?
The Air Force answer is involved, but it concedes that in most possible war situations bombers would arrive over the enemy territory too late to destroy enough of his weapons to affect the damage done back at home.
For AMSA to be useful in alleviating damage, the enemy would have to hold back a substantial number of his weapons long enough for the American bombers to arrive and destroy them. This is an unlikely event in the eyes both of military and civilian leaders in the Pentagon.
The Air Force has another argument. A new bomber would force the Soviet Union to improve its antiaircraft forces at great expense, and that’s good for us.
McNamara’s reply is that the FB-111, already approved, will force Russia to convert to a bomber defense system, anyhow.
s OV-1 Believed Undergoing Combat Tests (Aviation Daily, 5 December 1966): The Army and Navy, in combination with Defense Department censors, have managed to create a mystery on whether a “new” close support aircraft is being tested. The plane involved is the Grumman OV-1 Mohawk, which the Navy says it is testing for use with air droppable ordnance by the Army, while the Army says it is being used only for pilot training and ordnance development. At the same time the Defense Department says the Navy is correct.
The Mohawk had been stripped of its armament over a year ago after Army Chief of staff General Harold K. Johnson discovered on a battlefield tour that the Grumman planes, ostensibly reconnaissance types, were carrying out close support and counter guerrilla missions. Exempt, however, were the first six Mohawks which had arrived in Vietnam and they continued attack missions for some time, especially river-clearing operations.
The matter rested until 10 October when the Navy got clearance from the Pentagon security review section on a story carried by the official Naval Aviation News.
The story said the Army was testing at Patuxent “to determine what types of armament (the OV-1) can safely carry and release.” The magazine reported the plane had originally been tested by the Navy, had seen much action in Vietnam and “as combat pilots gained experience with the airplane . . . they realized that new and additional weapons capabilities would be required.”
Since the ordnance branch of the Weapons Test Division at Patuxent had the facilities, the Army turned again to Patuxent and branch pilots “have dropped or fired a wide variety of weapons from the OV-1, different types of high explosives, fragmentation, smoke and napalm bombs, folding fin aircraft rockets such as the 2.75 inch Mighty Mouse and 5 inch Zuni, special packages such as cluster bomb units, land mines, grenade launchers, leaflet disseminators, machine gun pods and flare dispensers.”
However, the Army stated Patuxent had only two Grummans. One is said to be assigned to the test pilot school where students operate it in an armed version and report on how well it performed during firing runs. Their statements are compared with known results to see how well man is progressing.
The Army added the other Mohawk is being used merely to evaluate ordnance that could be carried by the new COIN aircraft for the Marines and Air Force.
s New Phantoms for Air Force (Washington Evening Star, 19 October 1966): The Air Force is buying 99 improved Phantom jets equipped for the first time with a built-in gun and designed to give the United States clear superiority over Russian-made MiG-21s in Viet Nam.
The Pentagon, announcing this yesterday, said the initial purchase from McDonnell Aircraft Corp. will cost $272 million.
The new Phantom, unlike its predecessors in Southeast Asia, will have an internally mounted 20-mm Gatling gun capable of firing 6,000 rounds a minute.
Previous model F-4s have had only wing- mounted 20-mm gun pods, which some pilots contended were not accurate enough in air- to-air combat.
The built-in cannon will be in addition to bombs, rockets and missiles which F-4 pilots have at their disposal in close support and interdiction missions as well as dogfights.
The Pentagon said the latest version of the Phantom, designated the F-4E, will also have an improved fire control system and more powerful engines.
Maritime General
H New Hydrographic Survey Ship (Department of Commerce News Release, 11 December 1966): The $2.4 million survey vessel USC&GSS McArthur will be commissioned December 15 at Norfolk, Virginia.
The 175-foot, 995-ton, air-conditioned ship will become part of the Environmental Science Services Administration’s fleet of special purpose hydrographic and oceanographic vessels which are operated by the Coast and Geodetic Survey.
LCDR Ronald L. Newsom will assume command, and his executive officer will be LT Sigmund R. Petersen. The ship will carry a total complement of 36 officers and men.
The McArthur, while essentially a hydrographic survey ship, also has the capability to conduct various sophisticated oceanographic investigations. The new ship is expected to play a major role in improving hydrographic and oceanographic research work of vital importance to the economic growth and wellbeing of the Nation.
The McArthur is built of welded steel construction strengthened for navigation in ice, is propelled by diesel engines with twin-screw reversible-pitch propellers, and is equipped with specialized depth recorders and positioning equipment.
Its initial assignment until mid-June will be
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gravity measurements on the East Coast between Cape Hatteras, N. C., and Key West, Fla., part of the program to determine properties of the continental shelf.
The McArthur will then proceed to Honolulu, her home base, where she is scheduled to arrive in July. From there she will engage in hydrographic and current surveys, magnetic and gravity observations, and oceanographic research.
The McArthur will be the first Survey ship in 35 years to call Honolulu its home base, except for an 18-month period during the early 1950s when the USC&GSS Pioneer was based there temporarily. Other Survey ships have used Honolulu as a temporary base for short periods during the intervening years while surveying Hawaiian and other Pacific Ocean waters.
The ship is named after LT William P. McArthur, who began his career in the Survey in 1840 aboard the brig Consort engaged in surveys of the Gulf Coast. In 1848, he commanded a hydrographic party sent to the Pacific Coast to make the first survey there. His pioneer work on the Pacific Coast, including a preliminary survey and a successful reconnaissance of the coast from Monterey to the Columbia River, was carried out under the handicaps of mutiny, desertion and McArthur’s recurring attacks of malignant fever. The results of this survey were published in 1851 in “Notices of the Western Coast of the United States.” McArthur died in 1850. His great-granddaughter, Mrs. Jack K. Bennett, of Portland, Ore., christened the ship in November 1965.
s Panama Canal Lets Widening Contract
(The New York Times, 28 November 1966): The last and one of the largest contracts in the Panama Canal’s 10-year plan for widening the Gaillard Cut was let last week.
After analyzing six competitive bids, the $7.68-million award was made by the Panama Canal organization to the Oman Construction Company of Nashville, Tenn.
Excavations are expected to begin early next year to move about 9.6 million cubic yards of earth and rock.
The newest “Big Dig,” designed to widen the cut from 300 to 500 feet so that more and bigger ships may use it, will take approxi-
Notebook 155
mately 4§ years to complete. Ship traffic will not be interrupted.
A spokesman for Panama’s Foreign Office said the widening project would not be affected by current negotiations between Panama and the United States on the future of the canal.
Under the contract awarded last week, Oman Construction must excavate and dispose of all material found at an elevation higher than 95 feet above sea level. Below 95 feet the company will drill and blast, thus preparing the material for removal by Panama Canal dredges.
The maximum design depth of the excavation will extend 47 feet below the average water level. The rated altitude of Gaillard Cut and Gatun Lake, into which it leads, is 85 feet above sea level.
0 Health Ship Hope Arrives Back Home
(From The New York Times, 29 November 1966): “We attracted people to the health talks two ways—with free milk, and Walt Disney movies. Between Donald Duck and the milk we got a lot of Nicaraguans.”
The speaker was Dr. William B. Walsh, the 46-year-old founder and President of Project Hope. He was describing the S. S. Hope’s stay in Nicaragua this year where the vessel’s staff trained medical personnel and treated patients.
The 520-foot, white-hulled ship will enter New York’s harbor tomorrow, ending its fifth voyage. It has spent the last 10 months in Corinto, Nicaragua’s chief Pacific port.
The S. S. Hope left Corinto Nov. 19. “Thousands of people turned out,” Dr. Walsh said, describing the departure, “It was getting dark, but they stayed until the ship disappeared over the horizon, waving, and flashing lights. It’s hard to leave, even though you’ve done it before, and thought you were used to it.”
On previous medical missions the ship has visited Indonesia, South Vietnam, Peru, Ecuador, and Guinea.
During the 10 months, over 20,000 patients Were treated on board the ship or in clinics m Corinto and Leon. Hope surgeons performed about 1,000 major operations, and another 600 minor ones, on board.
By Nov. 1 the staff had given 158,000 immunizations against polio, diphtheria and tetanus, and a shipboard dairy had processed 27,258 gallons of milk. On shore, Hope vehicles traveled about 90,000 miles.
Almost 400 Nicaraguans took medical training while the ship was there.
The ship’s permanent staff during the stay was about 100 doctors, dentists, nurses, technicians, dieticians, and administrators. This was supplemented by five teams of 30 volunteer specialists, who helped with the demonstrations and teaching for two months each.
As has been the case in other countries the S. S. Hope has visited, the project’s involvement does not end when the gangplank is pulled up. A 14-member unit remained in Nicaragua to work with medical personnel. It will stay for three years.
Next stop for the ship will be Chester, Pennsylvania, where she will be refurbished and resupplied.
Her next voyage, early next year, will be to Cartagena, in northern Colombia, for at least 10 months.
0 12-Mile Fishing Zone (The Washington
Post, 15 October 1966): The United States yesterday extended its exclusive fishery zone to 12 miles off the coast in an effort to prevent encroachment by Russian and Japanese fishing fleets.
The former three-mile limit was increased by a bill signed into law by President Johnson. Many of the world’s maritime nations have long had a 12-mile fishing limit.
Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.), who with Sen E. L. Bartlett (D-Alaska) was a chief sponsor of the legislation, said he had been assured that the U. S. Coast Guard would meet violations of the new zone “with swift and positive action.”
Magnuson also said he had been assured by the Fisheries Minister of the Soviet Union that Russia would respect U. S. rights within the 12-mile zone.
At the request of the Navy and State Departments—which are anxious to maintain the traditional freedom of the high seas—the new law makes no effort to extend the sovereignty of the United States beyond the traditional three-mile territorial sea.
Progress
Escape—The armed forces and industry are working on devices to save crewmen from damaged helicopters and low-flying, fixed-wing aircraft. At right, a tractor rocket escape system pulls a man from the rear seat of an AT-6. This device, developed by the Stanley Aviation Corporation, is being fitted to 240 A-1E, -lH, and -1J Skyraider aircraft. A Navy- Vertol test to provide escape from damaged helicopters includes the test of a system using explosive charges to jettison the rotor blades and sever the fuselage section; explosive charges then deploy four parachutes to lower the passenger section to the ground. The photo sequence at right shows a drone H-21 testing the concept.
Weather Ship—The Vancouver, first of two new Canadian Coast Guard weather ships, is shown returning from trials. She has a fullload displacement of 5,340 tons, an over-all length of 404J feet, a 50-foot beam, and a turbo-electric power plant to drive her at 18 knots. The Vancouver and a sister ship, now under construction, will operate on Ocean Station Papa, 900 miles off British Columbia.
A Floating Doughnut—This big hole—16 by 24 feet—in a floating drilling rig will facilitate oil searches in Cook Inlet, Alaska. Built by Todd Shipyards in Alameda, California, the barge is 357 feet long and 82 feet wide.
' The inset shows how an oildrilling derrick rig will be installed over the opening.