Comment and Discussion

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"United Nations Peacekeeping”

(See pages 37-43, September 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant M. J. Moynihan, U. S. Coast Guard—Mr. Barrett’s article on the role of and preparations for United Nations peace­keeping operations comes at a critical time in United Nations history. The vast potential role of sea power in these peacekeeping opera­tions has not yet been fully developed. How­ever, in the area of ships and harbor control units, there is an untouched force available with a mission dedicated to humanity and the protection of life and property—the U. S. Coast Guard.

While many of the smaller countries of the world might not know of the U. S. Coast Guard, most of those with maritime interests do. The Coast Guard now has a representa­tive at the U. S. Mission to the United Na­tions to assist smaller nations in requesting aid or information in the establishment, or­ganization, and operation of small maritime police and coast guard forces. The presence of a white-hulled Coast Guard cutter might not strain or offend any tense situation where a U. N. peacekeeping force is deemed necessary as might a large, gray man-of-war. A cutter’s arrival at a peacekeeping operation coupled with the departure of heavily armed naval units could signal an easing of tensions and thus reinforce the peacekeeping intent of the operation.

Ships capable of this type of operation are now in commission in the U. S. Coast Guard as well as in several foreign navies, and more are being built. The characteristics of these ships were described in a recent article by Captain J. M. Waters, Jr., U. S. Coast Guard. * These medium-size vessels, equipped with helicopters and modern communication equip­ment, are well suited for the type of law en­forcement, harbor control, and peacekeeping duties envisioned by Mr. Barrett.

Another possible Coast Guard contribution to the peacekeeping force comes from the service’s duties involving law enforcement and port security in the United States. Selected groups or units with boats and communica­tion equipment could be organized and de­ployed rapidly to any place in the world to work as a harbor control unit of a U. N. peace-

* J. M. Waters, Jr., “Little Ships With Long Arms.” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1965, pp. 74-81.

The Coast Guard, which most re­cently has demonstrated the broad scope of its capabilities by deploy­ing patrol boats to Vietnam, would be well-suited to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. At right, the seaplane tender Currituck (AV-7) and the landing ship Floyd County (LST-762) service Coast Guard 82- footers off Vietnam; at far right, one of the patrol boats refuels while en route to her new base.

keeping force. This mobility has recently been shown by the movement of the Coast Guard Patrol boats from the United States to South Vietnam. Certainly the Coast Guard’s ex­perience in these operations could be used to advantage in assisting and training similar Units from other nations.

Finally, but not least in importance, is the Possibility of applying the experience learned ^1,1 the mixed-manning demonstration on hoard the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) to a United Nations-orientated concept of opera­tions. Here is an area where the true interna­tional spirit of co-operation can be shown in United Nations peacekeeping missions by sailors of different nations manning a ship operating under the United Nations flag to inaintain the peace or truce in an area of ten­sion and unrest.

Maladie de Paix”

('see pages 78-87, September 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant R. L. Porter, U. S. Navy (Weapons Officer, USS Epperson, DD-719)— The logistics support of our combatant ships is often a sore point to those of us attempting to stay “on station,” with an effective ship, °^r the maximum possible length of time.

One point which I read between the lines of the article, and which should certainly be used by the planners who ever hope to see a nuclear-powered Navy, is that both vertical replenishment and Carrier Onboard De­livery offer us the chance to do away com­pletely with alongside time—wasted time away from combat and time of high vulner­ability—except that we still must fuel along­side. Has anyone in the Department of De­fense ever computed the money spent just in getting fuel to our combatant ships including the “wasted” alongside time? Was this cost added into the cost of the “fossil fuel” ship when the now-famous comparisons of a few years ago were made? Over the 20- to 30-year life of a ship I would imagine that this sum alone would almost make up the difference in cost between the nuclear-powered ship and the oil-burner.

The problem of handling stores on our ships is, of course, a major one. On a destroyer we may receive stores either by vertical replenish­ment (VERTREP) or by alongside transfer, but we must keep the stores landing area clear. This clearing is still done on destroyers by the oldest handling equipment in existence—the all-hands working party. Our transfer equip-

U. S. Coast Guard

ment is fairly rapid, but very often we must hold up the transfer rate because men simply cannot rapidly move the stores. Admittedly, a destroyer does not have space for much fancy equipment, but certainly an improvement could be made in design. As an example, the FRAM I destroyer in which I am now serving has a stores chute at the after end of her heli­copter deck. This chute is useless for VERTREP because (1) we cannot have an open hatch at the landing point, and (2) we cannot have our stores-handling personnel immediately under a hovering helicopter.

Another major problem destroyers face is caused by the Navy’s present dispersed forma­tions. We spend days operating many miles from the CVA or CVS, during which time any spare parts or stores requirements may or may not be sent to us. The solution now being tried, of course, is the roving replenishment ship. The author’s suggested use of an Essex- class carrier is refreshing; it offers a fast, VERTREP-capable supply ship, carrying her own protection, which can cover a large dis­position rapidly. We still must worry about taking on fuel oil, but at least we should im­prove our maintenance capability with sup­port of this kind.

"The Gun Gap and How to Close It”

(See pages 26-36, September 1965 Proceedings)

Captain F. L. Slattery, U. S. Navy[1]—In his excellent article, Colonel Heinl mentions one often overlooked shortcoming in present day shore bombardment capability—the lack of large-scale charts.

Although Colonel Heinl is correct in stating that the 1:50,000 scale has been adopted as the standard large scale for Army topo maps and Navy combat charts for amphibious ob­jective areas, the production of larger scale (i.e. 1:25,000) for specific limited objective areas is not prohibited.

In response to a stated 1964 requirement of Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, the Mapping and Charting Directorate of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has pulled this problem out from under the rug.

At DIA’s direction, up-to-date, large-scale mapping photography of Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, was obtained by the Air Force. The Army Map Service and the Naval Oceanographic Office then produced, jointly, a 1:25,000 scale prototype photomap/chart of the area for evaluation by forces of all services participating in joint exercise QUICK KICK VII last March.

The new product is a quick-response, mechanically enhanced photo-mosaic, with hydrographic and topographic data added from all available sources. Judging from en­thusiastic user response, it may provide an acceptable substitute for plotting naval gun­fire as well as other missions requiring large scale coverage of the beachhead area.

Further evaluation will be conducted by Pacific forces using a similar prototype pro­duced for San Clemente Island, California.

A special version, produced for Da Nang, South Vietnam, is also being evaluated by the Marine Corps. Perhaps the map and chart makers have plugged their part of the “gun gap.” At least they recognize the problem.

The Art and Science of Navigation

Lieutenant Richard T. Fleming, U. S. Naval Reserve—Two consecutive Proceed­ings articles on the practice of navigation should be an adequate message to all con­cerned with the safety of our ships and with the training of navigation personnel. In the August 1965 issue of the Proceedings, the unasked question of “An Analysis of Naviga­tion Practices in the U. S. Navy” by Ensign Lyman, was answered verbally in his own article and very graphically in the preceding article, “Don’t Throw Away Your Sextants, Boys, the Stars Will Rise Again!” by Lieu­tenant Commander White. The unasked question is “What should we be training for?” and the obvious answer is “the practice of piloting.” Repeatedly, officers quoted by Ensign Lyman attest to the importance of the practice of piloting. Lieutenant Commander White’s table on page 59 of the August Pro­ceedings clearly demonstrates the relative importance of the practice of piloting where the “distance from danger” demands far greater “accuracy required” and allows for less “time available to obtain position” than elsewhere.

Instructors of navigation personnel can ease

considerably the lack of piloting training by more frequently requiring advance prepara­tion in practical work. A midshipman, officer candidate, or junior officer at sea can be turned loose with the publications and charts necessary to simulate entering a strange harbor. The questions and work can cover such practical problems as chart selection and information, time of sunrise, celestial fix, radar landfall, radar approach, light char­acteristics, identification of points for visual fixes, combination radar and visual fixes, sonar information, Fathometer information, Rules of the Road information, harbor regula­tions, tide and current information, bridge clearance, dead reckoning, and preparation of tracks, turning points and turning bear­ings, and many more items.

Lives and dollars will continue to be lost until proper training emphasis is placed on the practice of piloting.

"A Long Look at the Rules”

(See pages 40-53, August 1965 Proceedings)

Lieutenant C. E. Giese, Jr., U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Marysville, EPCER- 857)—I notice that Rule 4 Paragraph (c) of the International Rules of the Road now ap­plies to vessels engaged in replenishment at sea as well as those launching or recovering aircraft. The sighting of the day shapes and night lights required to be shown by these and other vessels falling under this rule is going to become more and more a daily occurrence.

As the commanding officer of a small naval vessel engaged in oceanographic research Work and other “underwater services,” I have found that some merchant seamen are still loathe to abide by Rule 4. The wording of this ^rule states that vessels showing the red-over­white-over-red shapes or lights are to be con­sidered by other vessels as “not under com­mand” and that they are therefore “unable to get out of the way.”

The Marysville does the great majority of her work far removed from waters frequented by naval vessels, but in and around areas traversed by merchant vessels of all registries. Of approximately 30 sightings of merchant vessels, on only two occasions did we observe the approaching vessel recognize the displayed signals and maneuver in time to leave no

doubt as to her intentions. On the other occa­sions a number of the approaching vessels appeared to relish the prospects of a hair­raising passage guaranteed to test everyone’s courage. A vessel sighting another engaged in performing underwater services has no way of determining just what the nature of those services might be. There are many services which do not place a vessel in the “not under command” category in the strictest sense of the word, but do incapacitate her for move­ment of any kind. Lying to, with engines secured, while making a Nansen cast, places you at the utter mercy of an approaching vessel; you are truly “not under command.” Towing an 800-foot thermistor chain beneath the ship, using only one engine to obtain cor­rect towing speed, leaves your vessel “under command” but seriously hampered in her movements. There is no way to let the ap­proaching ship know that your draft is 125 fathoms and that you may well run aground while trying to avoid him. The conduct of

flight operations or replenishment at sea obvi­ously leaves the ships concerned “under com­mand,” but short notice cancellation of flight operations or emergency breakaways while pumping black oil are not eagerly anticipated evolutions. Hopefully, early recognition of the red-over-white-over-red signal should pre­clude the above from happening.

Captain Cahill, in his article “The Burden of Being Privileged,”* stated that if a ship makes a course and speed adjustment early, before the Rules apply, then collisions and the danger of collisions would occur much less frequently. I could not concur more strongly. To hold course and speed no matter how privileged, while conducting underwater services, places the Marysville in Jatalis at a point where the other vessel is in extremis, but still able to extricate herself. I think the same could be said of other vessels falling under Rule 4.

A recent cruise to waters off the tip of Baja California and into the Gulf of California provided some excellent examples of disregard for the displayed signals and shapes required by the Rules. On one occasion, while steam­ing in what for us was relatively shallow water, i.e. 180 fathoms, we were approached on the port bow by a fully loaded, high-speed merchantman. The Marysville was privileged in view of being in the classical crossing situa­tion and also by right of being engaged in underwater services. As the water on either side of the track indicated a shoaling ten­dency, we were committed to maintaining course, if not speed. The approaching vessel, when finally challenged by light, altered course only enough to pass 500 yards ahead. By this time we had reduced speed to bare headway in order to facilitate the ship’s cross­ing. Had the other vessel’s course change been five degrees less we would all have been sta­tistics, for we could not have maneuvered to avoid him. Twenty minutes later we watched with grim fascination as the radar image of our recent stranger in the night merged with that of another vessel approaching on a reciprocal course. This latter incident demonstrates that we had perhaps come upon the only vessel at sea which had complete disregard for all rules.

* Richard A. Cahill, “The Burden of Being Privileged,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1965, pp. 37-42.

In a second case, we were approached on a reciprocal course by a vessel of foreign regis­try. It was a clear day and the sea was flat, thus any move by one vessel was clearly evi­dent to the other. An early radar plot indi­cated collision and as closing speed was close to 25 knots, it was imperative that someone make a definite maneuver soon. When it be­came evident that the approaching vessel was not yielding, we were forced to secure all recording equipment and go to full speed on our one engine in order to facilitate a port-to- port passage. As the other vessel passed by at 2,000 yards, we noted what must have been the bridge watch staring at us through binocu­lars. Again, an early course change, as recom­mended by Captain Cahill, would have dis­pelled any thoughts of collision.

I have come to be especially wary of the movements of other shipping when we are showing the red-over-white-over-red. Some seamen apparently fail to realize that when they are in extremis the vessels displaying the above signal may be able to do nothing more than man collision stations.

"The Military Value of the Cape Cod Canal”

(See pages 82-91, August 1965 Proceedings)

The subject of the photograph which ap­pears on page 84 of the August 1965 issue of the Proceedings is not August Belmont, but Colonel William Barclay Parsons, U. S. Army, chief engineer of the Cape Cod Canal project. The Proceedings regrets the error. Editor.

"The Navy’s Tin Bubble”

(See pages 170-171, August 1965 Proceedings)

Ralph H. Upsonf—Colonel Rankin seems to have access to considerable information which is generally reliable. His only sub­stantial numerical error is in the maximum speed, quoted as 62 m.p.h. The carefully con­trolled NACA tests gave the ZMC-2 a top speed of 70.7 m.p.h.

The usual pronouncement on stability of almost any aircraft in the era of the ZMC-2 lacked quantitative significance, and com­monly meant no more than whether the pilot liked the way it flew. To my knowledge, no airship ever built had static stability in the

f Mr. Upson was chief engineer for metalclad air­ship development, Aircraft Development Corporation.

sense now applied to an airplane (NACA Re­port 405). The ZMC-2, in studies and tests, showed satisfactory stability. Still, in view of the ZMC-2’s unusual shape, a simple anti­yawing device was incorporated with the upper movable surfaces. It was apparently never used either by naval personnel or by the NAG A in the speed and drag tests (NACA Re­port 397). To have attained the speed quoted, the flight path must have been remarkably straight. The test pilot had previously re­ported satisfactory stability and “the most maneuverable ship the writer has ever flown.” If this still “left something to be desired” in directional stability and control, it is hard to say what it would be other than the slower response to be had naturally in a larger, more massive airship.

The Dolphins: 'Like An Arrow They Fly Through the Sea’ ”

(See pages 42-50, July 1965 Proceedings)

Dr. Bruce Johnson (Engineering Depart­ment U. S. Naval Academy)—Ensign Brown >s to be complimented on his fine history of dolphin investigations. However, his inter­pretation of the applicability of dolphin re­search to naval ship construction is somewhat

misleading.

There is no doubt that the dolphin is a ^Very efficient propulsion system. In the May 1963 issue of the Naval Engineers Journal, T- G. Lang of the Naval Ordnance Test Station makes some interesting comparisons between the predicted and observed speeds °f dolphins, whales, and fish. He and Ensign Brown both point out that the apparently high propulsion efficiency of the dolphin may ue caused by a stabilization of the laminar boundary layer next to the skin of the swim­ming animal. Since the boundary layer is the ^legion where the viscous resistance to motion occurs, a smooth laminar layer will have less

enter the forum

Regular and Associate Members are invited to pOte brief comments on material published in the Roceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in ^ese pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings \t^t0 f^>rov'^c*^{e a} place where ideas of importance to the ^{1 av}y can be exchanged.

drag than an eddy-filled turbulent layer. Thus, delaying transition from laminar to turbulent boundary layer past the “natural” transition point may account for the low ap­parent drag of the dolphin.

It is highly doubtful, however, that this stabilization can have any useful effect on the drag of a fleet-type submarine. Even under ideal conditions, transition cannot be de­layed indefinitely. The upper limit of stabi­lized laminar flow in a boundary layer is generally given in terms of a Reynolds Num­ber (velocity times length divided by kine­matic viscosity). This is estimated to be not over 3X10⁶ for natural transition. The best technique now available is the use of suction slots, and this has yielded values up to 4 X10⁷. At a speed of 20 knots in 60-degree Fahren­heit water, this corresponds to a maximum length of 14 feet of laminar boundary layer. This length is reduced at higher speeds since the Reynolds Number contains a speed- length product. Although some small under­water vehicles fall within this length limita­tion, submarines do not. However, one area applicable to large submarines which is still under study is the reduction in flow noise in a laminar layer compared to a turbulent boundary layer.

Another section of Ensign Brown’s paper which is in error is his discussion of boundary layer control by heat regulation. He states that an increase in temperature decreases the Reynolds Number. While this is true for gases, it is not true for water and other liquids since the viscosity of water decreases with increasing temperature. In fact, water in a tow tank has been heated to increase the Reynolds Number for better similitude con­siderations in model testing. Heating only the layer next to the body may affect the shape of the boundary layer profile, since the lower viscosity next to the skin would tend to make the profile fuller, and possibly tend to stabilize the layer.

Heating the skin of a submarine does not seem practical since the kinematic viscosity of water changes only 1.3 per cent per degree Fahrenheit. When one considers that mil­lions of pounds of water pass through the boundary layer of a submarine in a relatively short time, and that it takes one BTU to heat each pound of water one degree Fahrenheit,

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it is doubtful if this scheme is worth the ex­penditure of research funds.

One area of promise in the reduction of drag in small vehicles is the injection of a dilute solution of high molecular weight polymer into the boundary layer. Several Trident Scholars at the Naval Academy are working in this area, and one of them has achieved a drag reduction of 23 per cent on a submerged body of revolution. This figure is lower than some reductions reported since the tow tank used in the tests is capable of only relatively low speeds. It is hoped that this year’s research will yield valuable in­formation concerning the mechanism of the drag reducing properties of the polymer.

Another method of drag reduction which has received far more attention than it de­serves is the one using a soluble coating of high molecular weight polymer. Most of its advocates, like those advocating heat regula­tion, have never calculated the tremendous number of gallons of boundary layer which pass around a marine vehicle. The coating required to last more than a few minutes and still mix with the boundary layer fluid in sufficient quantities to affect the drag is not very feasible. In addition, the application of the coating would require drydocking, and just getting to where one hoped to use the drag reduction would probably exhaust the coating.

Finally, with regard to the so-called “pres­sure accommodation” theory of dolphin drag reduction, I doubt Ensign Brown’s statement that it is a “more scientific deduction” that the folds observed in a dolphin’s skin upon re-entry into the water are “used to accommo­date unequal water pressures resulting from the rapid motion of the animal.” A fat man skipping rope generates the same effect!

Robert I. VVidder and Vernon O. Hoehne (Aerospace Mechanics Research Division, Battelle Memorial Institute)—En­sign Brown’s article is a fascinating one. How­ever, there appears to be an inconsistency in his explanation of the drag reduction achieved by the dolphin as a result of the hypothesized local temperature control.

The kinematic viscosity of water decreases with increased temperatures, so that the Reynolds Number, an inverse function of kinematic viscosity, would tend to increase at the areas of higher temperature. Thus, the tendency is for turbulent flow in these areas.

An explanation for success of the tempera­ture control phenomenon might lie in the fact that while laminar flow certainly pro­duces less drag than does turbulent flow, it is much more unstable and apt to separate. Separation of the flow in turn produces con­siderably higher drag than does turbulent flow. Therefore, it may be advantageous to ensure that turbulent flow exists, instead of a laminar flow which is subject to separation. This leads one to believe that the temperature control mechanism of the dolphin is used actually to raise the Reynolds Number to bring about a stable, turbulent flow regime which, although it produces higher drag than would be the case with pure laminar flow, eliminates the strong likelihood of separation, present under laminar flow conditions. The locations of the higher temperature zones on the body of the dolphin are in the region where an increasing body cross-section changes to a decreasing cross-section. At this

U. S. NAVAL STATION WASHINGTON, D. C—20390 RE:                         

Your recent letter concerning subject is ac­knowledged. Appropriate action is being taken by this command.

By direction of Commanding Officer

Point on the body, there is a greater tendency for separation than at any other point on the body. Therefore, the actual temperature variation tends to substantiate the above ex­planation.

"Prestige and the Navy Family”

(See pages 58-65, November 1964;

Pages 103-106, March 1965; and Pages 107-108, July 1965 Proceedings)

Captain H. F. Rommel, U. S. Navy (Com- ■oanding Officer, Naval Station, Washington, bb C.)—Failure to answer dunning letters, as recommended in the March and July Pro­ceedings, will hurt the credit of all naval per­sonnel. Such lack of action is rude and it is Unnecessary.

A creditor, even of the less savory variety, is entitled to know that his letter has been re­ceived. At the Naval Station, Washington, bh C., we use a postal card printed as follows:

This card requires only the insertion of the cnan’s name. The card is used in all cases Where there is reason to believe the creditor knows naval policy. The use of this card has been recommended to the Bureau of Naval Personnel for inclusion in the instructions ^regarding debt letters.

Some creditors use their form letters with- °ut much justification or judgment. A form letter rates a form reply. We receive quite a lew form letters which have been forwarded b'om a previous command, and occasionally bad been re-forwarded from a subsequent command. If the man is no longer stationed here we return the letter and send the creditor the man’s new address along with a bill for

-50 for the required record search. A copy of °ur bill is kept in a pending file, and if further correspondence about other men is received h om the creditor before he has paid his bill he is reminded of his obligation, and no action is taken on his new complaint.

What to do about the complaint after the form card has been sent is a matter of judg­ment; each case is different. We all despise the merchant who lures the man into buying a no­down-payment watch, and then lets him hock it in the same or adjoining establishment to get a few dollars. We do not think too much of the outfit which has loaded a man with more kitchen pots than he can use in a lifetime, or furniture to the value of about four months’ pay. We are tempted to throw the complaint in the waste basket. However, Commander Sproule has already referred to the damage to Navy credit in general by such a policy in his July commentary.

It is best that the Navyman learn early and ruthlessly, “If you owe, you must pay.” This is the way life is. There are two exceptions. One is a debt for non-essentials by a minor. He should be encouraged to get the assistance of the legal officer and return his purchase by registered mail and repudiate his contract. I have found that most Navymen will not do this. They know they have been cheated, but they feel they have an obligation to pay. The law about contracts is designed to protect minors and should be used when proper and possible. The other exception is when bank­ruptcy is advisable. I believe that debts of bankruptcy remain a moral obligation, but it is frequently useful to remove all legal obliga­tion and get the books balanced for a fresh start when the future appears hopeless and the sailor is completely demoralized and dis­couraged.

Despite protestations to the contrary, the Navy is a collection agency, and it is probably best this way. Each command must indoc­trinate its men in the habits of thrift and the pitfalls of easy credit. Each man must learn his own lesson; the sooner the better for us all.

We should not be obsessed by the “para­sitic credit corporation and the cheating loan company.” There are many legitimate dealers who have extended credit in good faith and have given good value. Frequently these firms cooperate with the naval or military com­mand and waive interest charges, etc.

In the meantime, I believe the Navy should stop all co-operation with publications which promote imprudent, no-down payment dia­mond purchases with lurid, full-page ads describing diamonds, not in terms of carats, but with pictures “enlarged to show detail.” If we mean what we say about leadership and about thrift and credit indoctrination, we should set an example at the policy level.

Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—Captain Blee’s article was as refresh­ing and as invigorating as a bit of salt spray over the bridge. To my good friend with the salty name of Ben Blee, a salute for a fine article.

Of particular interest to this reader was his commentary that “too many officers . . . had only a fleeting exposure to the basic leadership experience of serving as a division officer on board ship. . . . There is no better leadership school and, except for command, no more challenging or rewarding experience than ordering the daily work and dealing with the day-to-day problems of a division of blue­jackets.”

To this I echo: “Hear, Hear!”

I recall an article which appeared in the Proceedings a few years back entitled “Wanted—5,000 Middlemen.” It was au­thored by a chief petty officer* who cited the need for able and understanding junior offi­cers to bridge the gap between senior petty officers and senior commissioned officers. If ever there was a place where that gap was fully bridged, it was at the division officer level.

The division officer knew his men right down the line, from his leading petty officers to his lowest recruits—their abilities, per­sonalities, peculiarities, and characters. He was an administrator, a counseller, a discipli­narian, and a leader all rolled into one.

How completely correct is Captain Blee when he writes: “It is at that level and not in any school that an officer learns, if he is ever to learn, not only how to lead his men, but how to make petty officers lead their men.” And to that I might add how sometimes he can learn, from those same petty officers, some good lessons in loyalty—something no leader can do without.

The division as a school of leadership? The very best!

* J. M. Harrington, “Wanted—5,000 Middle­men,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1953, pp. 10-17.

"Don’t Give Up the Ship!”

(See pages 82-94, May 1965 Proceedings)

J. G. Colburn—Major Purcell’s article on the USS Chesapeake vs. HMS Shannon and the sad result to Lieutenant Cox covered the ac­tion well as far as it went, but there were some related events which should be mentioned.

Captain Broke had issued a challenge to Captain Lawrence and for this reason sent the Tenedos away from the scene. Actually, Captain Lawrence never received the chal­lenge, as it had been given to a Captain Slocum, who was then discharged as a prisoner. Instead of sailing into Boston, as was ex­pected, Captain Slocum proceeded to his homeport of Marblehead, from there plan­ning to forward the challenge to Captain Lawrence. By that time it was too late, as the Chesapeake had sailed.

A court of inquiry was held on the loss of the Chesapeake. The following are some ex­cerpts from the findings of the court, leaving out that part pertaining to Lieutenant Cox, which Major Purcell has already covered:

Second. Against Midshipman Forrest: that he left his quarters during the action, and did not return to them, and now assigns no reason for his conduct satisfactory to this court.

Third. Against Midshipman Freshman: that he behaved in an un-officerlike manner at Halifax, assuming a false name at the office of the commissary of prisoners when obtaining his parole, and was paroled by the name of William Brown.

Fourth. Against the crew generally: that they deserted their quarters, and ran below after the ships were foul, and the enemy boarded . . . The persons whom the court are able to designate by name, as deserters from their stations, are William Brown, bugleman, Joseph Russell, captain of second gun, Peter Frost, and John Joyce, seamen. The court fur­ther find, that the following persons entered the British service at Halifax; viz. Henry En­sign, Peter John, Andrew Simpson, Peter Langrun, Magness Sparring, Joseph Gella Martin Anderson, Francis Paris, John White, boy, Thomas Arthur, Charles Reynolds, John Pierce, jun., Andrew Denham, Thomas Jones, Charles Goodman, Joseph Antonio, Christo­pher Stephens, Charles Bowden, Charles Westerbury, Joseph Smith, George Williams, and George Cordell.

The court further find and report, that Wil­liam Wainwright, William Worthington, and

James Parker, the last of whom was born at Salem, Massachusetts, were claimed by the enemy as British subjects, and sent on board of the enemy’s ships of war.

I do not know the fate of the various men mentioned above, with the exception of Wil­liam Brown. In his case the court-martial found “William Brown, bugleman, guilty of cowardice, and sentenced him to receive 300 lashes.” This, of course, was tantamount to the death penalty.

That Captain Lawrence had no business taking the Chesapeake to sea is obvious. Various arguments have been put forth to explain why, but the two most widely circulated are that it was in response to Captain Broke’s challenge, and the second that he was under orders to take command of the Chesapeake and Put to sea immediately.

The first is easily disposed of since Captain Lawrence never received the challenge. The second is quite true. Captain Lawrence was ordered to put to sea at once, but captains ^were allowed leeway in carrying out their orders. They had to make allowances for the disposition of the enemy, the weather, condi­tion of their ship, etc. In Captain Lawrence’s case the state of the crew was such that he ^would have had a hard time beating a sloop- of-war, much less a frigate, and I feel that much of the blame for the loss of the Chesa­peake should be laid at his door, and not on his officers and men.

Command of the Navy Supply System

Captain Lawrence Lovig, Jr., SC, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Depot, Newport, Rhode Island)—An unex­pected and unusual organizational anomaly has developed in the process of implementing the Navy General Orders No. 5 and 19, effec­tive in January 1965. This particular anomaly derives from the decision enumerated in tlpNav Instruction 5400.24 of 29 December 1964, which, among other assignments, desig­nates all naval supply centers and depots as Class II shore (field) activities within the Chief of Naval Operations chain of command, ^as elements of the Navy’s operating forces.

The unusual and unexpected aspects of this decision are several. The missions and func­tions of naval supply centers and depots, al­though often varied and complex, are indus­trial in nature and fundamentally grounded in the warehousing and furnishing of supplies and materials. Such missions and functions fall naturally within the span of responsibili­ties assigned in General Order No. 5 to the naval material support assistant, the Chief of Naval Material.

The paragraphs of the General Order which describe the responsibilities of the naval executive assistants are not ambiguous in this regard. The CNO’s specific material responsi­bilities are “to plan for and determine the material support needs of the Operating Forces of the Navy. . . . This responsibility includes the determination of the naval characteristics of and priorities for things to be developed or pro­cured, and the determination of the order in which ships, aircraft, surface craft, weapons or weap­ons systems, and facilities are to be acquired, constructed, maintained, altered, repaired, and overhauled.” [Emphasis supplied.]

But, in assuming command authority and responsibility over industrial functions and industrial-type shore activities with material- support oriented missions, the CNO is in reality saddling himself with a workload which can only serve to detract from the efforts he is able to apply to his more funda­mental responsibilities, and with no discern­ible offsetting gain. This fact is especially pertinent in light of other guidance accom­panying the implementing directives which made it clear that operating force com­manders assuming command of shore (field) activities cannot expect additional staff re­sources to assist them in exercising their new responsibilities. This being so, a prerequisite to assuming such new command responsibili­ties should be some significant and tangible gain in capability by the CNO in the per­formance of his fundamental mission. It is difficult to see how such a gain can result from incorporation of the tidewater supply centers and depots into the Navy’s operating force structure.

What is needed is acceptance and imple­mentation of a truly functional organization in the Navy’s shore establishment, an organi­zation which reflects both accurately and con­sistently the division of authority and respon­sibility of the naval executive and professional assistants to the Secretary of the Navy, as de­lineated in General Order No. 5.

At a minimum, it is believed that naval supply centers and depots within the United States should be explicitly identified as compo­nent parts of the Navy Supply System and reassigned from the status of shore activities of the operating forces to the naval material support establishment in order that the Chief of Naval Material may, in fact, implement his mandates to meet the material support needs of the Navy and to develop and operate the Navy Supply System.

"Dreadnought”

(See pages 131-133, May 1965 Proceedings)

Mr. E. R. Lewis—I have just put down my copy of Richard Hough’s Dreadnought after my first, but certainly not final, reading of it, knowing that little can be added to the fine things that have been said and written about this remarkable book. However, I cannot suppress a certain dismay over the fact that Mr. Hough continues to perpetuate—as did no less eminent an authority than the late Dr. Oscar Parkes in his magnificent work British Battleships[2]—what is perhaps the most curi­ously durable naval-military myth of the last 50 years: the belief that the 18-inch guns of HMS Furious ended up in the coastal defenses of Singapore.

Like other followers of military and naval events, I believed the story for many years, having been exposed to it from a variety of sources, some of which were unquestionably respectable. Several editions of Jane's Fighting Ships indicated this ultimate employment of the unique monsters from the Furious, as did a number of popular publications in the early years of World War II, when Singapore’s invincibility was a favorite journalistic theme. The notion even found its way into the Pro­ceedings on at least one occasion,f and it still continues to pop up in modern treatments of World War II.

It is difficult even now to trace with any certainty the events that brought about this widely held idea, the belief that the 18-inch guns conceived for Furious, then mounted on the monitors Lord Clive and General Wolfe, had gone on to a second life in which they rendered Singapore the world’s most powerfully armed fortress. And, it is especially difficult to deter­mine whether this myth resulted from honest but mistaken journalism, or whether it was deliberately fostered; and, if the latter, whether the culprits were British, American, or German.

In any event, one thing is clear: the story had its beginnings at least as early as March 1934, when the London Daily Telegraph pub­lished an article headed “Heaviest Guns in the World at Singapore,” which quoted an unidentified “official German service organ” as claiming that the new British naval base at the tip of Malaya was guarded by three mas­sive guns formerly mounted aboard the Furious. Calibers and other details were given, and from this point on the newspapers and magazines at least American ones—were off and running, spurred, no doubt, by such a well-founded and unrivaled superlative.

In a recent survey of the myth’s mention by American publications between 1938 and 1942, just about every leading news magazine was found to be represented, several of them dwelling repeatedly on the “giant guns.” Life, Time, Newsweek, and the Literary Digest were among the forerunners, with The Satur­day Evening Post of 18 June 1938, tracing the guns in detail back to the Furious. Even the National Geographic Magazine voiced the myth.

Perhaps the most amusing result of this bit of research was that in the week after Singa­pore’s capitulation the 18-inch caliber of the great guns had suddenly been reduced by Life to 17 inches, by Time to 15 inches, and by Newsweek to 14 inches (which could, I suppose, lead the right person to some profound ob­servations regarding differences in editorial policies of these publications).

The truth of the matter is simple, even if its discovery was not, involving, as it did, a wide correspondence with individuals not only in England, but also in Malaya, Africa, and Japan, as well as with a number of British government offices.

In addition to several medium and light gun batteries (9.2- and 6-inch), Singapore’s heavy armament consisted of five 15-inch guns in two widely separated batteries. Al-

though the guns were, indeed, naval weap- °ns, their origins were far less exotic than the t'urious, as they were nothing more than the ^standard 15-inch/42-caliber rifles of the type ttiounted on practically every modern British capital ship (except, of course, the 16-inch Nelsons and the 14-inch King George Vs). The Pteces mounted at Singapore actually came from among spare tubes for the Queen Eliza­beth class, probably those for the Valiant and the Barham.

As for the fabulous 18-inchers of the Furious, they simply went the way of most experimental ^and other unusual weapons. Following the ^Use of two of them in the monitors, the three tubes found miscellaneous employment at Proving grounds undergoing various tests. In the end, sometime during that quiet period between the two world wars, the three giant 18-inch guns—one of which had never even been afloat—were finally sold for scrap.

Thus, hopefully, ends the myth, laid to rest along with its American counterpart about the U. S. Navy’s 18-inch gun (the one that supposedly served as ballast in at least five battleships, three hospital ships, two carriers, and even a destroyer).

Rear Admiral Herndon P. Coloney, CEC, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Kirk’s review locates the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow. The German ships were interned there, but the surrender oc­curred, on Thursday morning, 21 November 1918, near May Island, Scotland. The ren­dezvous was off the Firth of Forth, being about Latitude 56°11'N; Longitude 1°20'W.

A signal sent by Admiral David Beatty was as follows:

NAVAL SIGNAL

From C.-in-C. Grand Fleet To Whitehall  System Main W-T

Date 21-11-18 Time 1040

The Grand Fleet met this morning at 0930 five batde cruisers, nine battleships, seven light cruisers, forty-nine destroyers of the High Sea Fleet which are awaiting intern­ment and are being brought to Firth Forth.