Book Reviews and Book List

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Design for Survival

By General Thomas S. Power, U. S. Air Force (Retired), with Albert S. Arnhym. New York: Coward-McCann, 1965. 255 pages. $5.00.

REVIEWED BY

Captain Harold E. Shear, U. S. Navy

(Captain Shear served in the Strategic Plans Division oj the Office of Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1957, and was Director of Polaris Operations, Staff, Commander-in-ChieJ Atlantic, from 1962 to 1964. He now commands the USS Sacramento (AOE-1).)

This is a book by a distinguished general who believes in overwhelming nuclear supe­riority as a means of maintaining the peace. He states at the outset that “if the enemy were to strike today, he would find us well pre­pared, not only to strike back, but to destroy him utterly which has been the main reason why we have managed to deter nuclear ag­gression to this date. The challenge is to be able to say the same thing tomorrow and

throughout the indefinite future.”

This is the central theme of the book, and General Power takes a tough stand against all those, real or imagined, who oppose this posi­tion. General Power is one of the last of the “old school.” He knows where he stands and why, and if he appears to be a little inflexible at times, more power to him.

The basic manuscript was written more than five years ago and withheld from publica­tion in a famous “banning” incident. The age of the manuscript shows through in spots: For example, General Power seems to fail to recognize that the Soviet Union is maturing economically, industrially, and politically, and cannot stand the upheaval of a major nuclear war anymore than can the United States.

General Power

In 12 chapters General Power covers the lesson of Cuba, the nuclear revolution, the Communist threat, the one-world syndrome, the deterrent system—its principles and tools limited war, space, and the ultimate weapon.

Throughout, SAC, SAC, SAC is stressed, with little attention to other commands and other forces; Polaris is discussed in less than four Pages. But the Strategic Air Command was his “baby” for more than seven years, and he. has every reason to be proud of its record.

General Power is at his best in describing the principles of deterrence, the hard facts of °ur nuclear planning, how the plans are put together, and how they can be executed. He knows this well because not only was he Gommander-in-Chief of SAC, but he was also Director of Strategic Target Planning, a joint staff responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the National Strategic Target List and the Single Integrated Operational Plan for all G. S. strategic strike forces. The General’s description of this vital planning process is Probably the best that has been made avail­^able to the American people. I can state from Personal experience that he was fair and straightforward with all commands and "'capon systems while Director of Strategic

Target Planning. His relationships and co­operation with Commander-in-Chief Atlantic concerning strategic targeting were excellent.

The author is at somewhat less than his best in attacking what he calls the “one-world syndrome.” This portion of the book is really a minor tirade against anything and every­thing having to do with disarmament. This is not one of the better portions of the book. The United States has no intention of reducing its nuclear striking forces or of following a dis­armament plan which is prejudicial to its best interests. However, the nation cannot abandon the idea of disarmament without serious and harmful propaganda effects. It would indeed be unwise to reject the concept since it would leave the United States open to Soviet attack upon the American image as a nation devoted to the cause of peace.

Disarmament talks must continue even though such discussions appear fruitless and, at times, dangerous. In addition to the propa­ganda value, it is possible that the United

Design jor Survival: author and sym­bol. The former commander of Stra­tegic Air Command calls for over­whelming U. S. nuclear superiority and abhors all forms of disarma­ment in his study of defense in the nuclear era.

Flush Decks and

Four Pipes

By Commander John D. Alden, U. S. Navy

SEA POWER MONOGRAPH NUMBER 2

If there has ever been such a thing in the history of the United States Navy as a typically American class of ship, the flush-deck destroyers of World War I came closest to filling the bill. The second monograph in the U.S. Naval Institute's new Sea Power series tells their story from their entrance on the stage of war in 1917 until the last of them, ending her days as a Central American banana boat, was scrapped in 1955 • 110 photographs • Deck and accommodation plans • Data on all 273 flush- deckers • Bibliography • List Price $7.50 • Mem­ber’s Price $6.00

The aim of the Sea Power monograph series is to cover each subject dealt with as thoroughly as exist­ing records and illustrations will allow.

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States may be able to slow down the arms race to some extent and place restraints upon the United Nations member states to reduce the possibility of general war. Also, the mere fact that disarmament discussions are taking place permits easing of tensions. General Power seems to recognize none of this.

General Power stresses the need for a mixed bag of nuclear weapon delivery ve­hicles. He also emphasizes the importance of reliability. He advocates the continued use of manned bombers as one of the delivery sys­tems, but soft-pedals the penetration prob­lems of aircraft. He talks of the myth of over­kill and feels that there is a tendency to cut down on the total number of weapons re­quired to do the job. There are no real differ­ences in his goals and those of the Depart­ment of Defense. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s testimony to Congress in Febru­ary 1965, makes this point clear. This testi­mony stressed that the strategic objective of our general nuclear war forces is to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker, even were that at­tacker to strike first. Mr. McNamara made clear that this calls for the capability to de­stroy the aggressor as a viable society, even after a well planned and executed surprise attack on our forces.

General Power also advocates the use of SAC bombers carrying conventional weapons in limited war. While not advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited war if it can be at all avoided, he makes the point that “regardless of any prevailing moral con­cepts, new weapons never remain unconven­tional for long.” In this latter view, he may be neglecting the force of world opinion. He sup­ports the Navy’s requirement for nuclear- powered aircraft carriers and the Army’s aviation role as long as there is “no unneces­sary and harmful duplication of the tactical air mission of the Air Force and Navy.” He takes a crack at the level of our anti-missile missile and antisubmarine effort and says that we are not spending enough. On this point many would agree. Also, in his view, “we need a more rigorous military space effort.”

The author is concerned over the marked tendency toward increasing centralization of

operational functions within various Defense staff offices. “This assumption of operational functions has lessened the authority of the commanders in the field without lessening their responsibilities and has adversely affected both their effectiveness and prestige,” he Writes. Many would agree.

General Power has not produced a literary masterpiece with this volume. However, he has developed a solid thesis for the impor­tance of a strong U. S. nuclear deterrent Posture. He need have no great fear. There is uo real indication that our civilian superiors are taking any other course. His critics will likely take passages out of context to hound him, and one can find specifics here and there with which to find fault. But in general, the author is on solid ground and what he is say- mg is well worth the while of the average American to ponder. We could use a few more professional military men of his caliber Who are willing to stand up and be heard.

An End to Arms

By Walter Millis. New York: Atheneum, 1965. 301 pages. $5.95.

Reviewed by

Rear Admiral James Calvert, U. S. Navy

{Admiral Calvert was Head of the Europe and NATO Branch of the Politico-Military Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from July 1962 to July 1964, and is now Director of the Division.)

As almost every Pentagon veteran knows, the ability to discuss arms control in objec­tive, realistic terms is almost a requirement tur today’s professional military officer. The trouble is that there is so much non-objective, Unrealistic talk—as well as writing—about the subject. Walter Millis’ new book, while not flawless, is an interesting contribution in an Urea where good books are hard to find.

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He starts his attack on the subject on ground which will be familiar to readeis who have encountered Mr. Millis before: The world social-political-military system which has evolved over the centuries is no longer suited to the complex, technology-laden, world of today. The author traces the histoi \ of the nation-state from about 1600 and postulates the no-longer-unique suggestion that modern technology (particularly the nu­clear warhead) has destroyed the usefulness of war as a means of settling disputes between these nation states.

Recognizing the difficulty of resolving a genuine dilemma unless its frame of reference is changed, Mr. Millis attacks the conceptual manner in which most of us see the interna­tional politics of today. One of his main tar­gets is the terminology of the Cold War. He sees the international picture as consisting of a power struggle among the nation-states with most of the significant power centered in four areas: the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. Mr. Millis claims that attempts to interpret all world affairs as manifestations of the struggle between the United States and Russia, or between democ­racy and Communism, is to “stultify one’s whole approach” to power issues which are infinitely more subtle and complex in reality.

Mr. Millis goes on to state that there is no reason why this power struggle could not con­tinue in a world in which the possibility of a cataclysmic nuclear exchange had been eliminated. To reach his goal, Mr. Millis leads us through a complex and, at times, hard-to-accept labyrinth of reasoning. He acknowledges the fact that today’s social- political-military world system is working reasonably well in its task of ordering the affairs of the planet. However, he suspects that only the fear of nuclear war has pre­vented another world conflict and states that, although he sees little likelihood of a direct confrontation between any two of the four major power centers, he believes there are three possible sources of a nuclear catastrophe in the present situation: (1) accidental war, (2) threatened internal collapse of the govern­ment of one of the super-powers, and (3) war­fare involving the developing or neutral na­tions in which one or more of the super­powers becomes entangled. To Mr. Millis the answer is clear: the arms, and particularly the nuclear arms, of the super-powers must go.

To put his proposals in as concrete a frame­work as possible, Mr. Millis undertakes to predict the world events of the next 20 years and includes his proposal within this context. The relative power positions of the four great powers remain essentially unchanged in his scenario until 1979 when a United Nations Assembly resolution is adopted which sets up a commission to prepare a draft constitution for a demilitarized world. The draft, which is, of course, Mr. Millis’ proposal, consists of three main parts: (1) the laws which must be accepted by all nations of the world, (2) the arrangements to enforce these laws, and (3) the arrangements necessary to deal there­after with the problems of power in a society “from which organized war and its massive armaments have been eliminated.”

The laws are simple. War is prohibited and the territorial limits of every state are invio­late except as they are changed by non-mili­tary means. Disarmament to the police-force level must be attained within a “reasonable term of years.”

Enforcement will be by a supra-national authority composed and elected in the same way as the U. N. Security Council except that no veto will be permitted. The authority will be subject to the decisions of the World Court in cases where claims are made that it has exceeded its constitutional authority. There will be a global police force responsive to the authority. Its main function will be to detect any clandestine rebuilding of weaponry and to intervene as necessary in local wars and chaos.

In the Millis’ scenario, the new world con­stitution is finally ratified and proclaimed by 1984. He ends with the reasonable position that if the reader does not like the prophecy set forth by the author he can project his own for the next 20 years.

Walter Millis is a longtime, respected stu­dent of the American military. His Arms and Men (1956) stands as one of the classics in the field. Still, he is not, and never has been, at sympathy with the military ethic. He sees arms as intrinsically evil, as causes of war in and of themselves, and often twists history a bit to illustrate his viewpoint. He has pre­sented here a far more realistic world govern­ment and disarmament scheme than has been

set forth by most of his co-workers in the field.

But for me it is hard to accept Mr. Millis’ attempts to minimize the differences between the totalitarian states of the world and demo­cratic states of Western Europe and North America. While it may be true, as he claims, that a police state is a comparative and not an absolute, form of government, it is also true that there are many forms of evil which are comparative rather than absolute. The concepts of human liberty and individual free­dom as well as other tangible ideals of West­ern democracy are swept under the rug too casually for my taste in the author’s attempts to clear the way for his commendable goal.

If the day ever comes when all of the na­tions of the world will be willing to ratify a constitution such as the one that Mr. Millis proposes, then a happier day may well have dawned for this planet. In the meantime, we are well advised to keep our powder dry and avoid acting as though the day for which we are working has already arrived.

The Navy from Wood to Steel:

1860-1890

By Captain Daniel J. Carrison, U. S. Navy.

New York: Franklin Watts, 1965. 186

pages. Illustrated. $5.95.

REVIEWED BY

Robert O. MacBride

{Mr. MacBride is the author of Civil War Ironclads,

a description of ironclad development in the U. S. and

Confederate navies.)

The story of the U. S. Navy’s transition from wood to steel is a fascinating subject, and one which has been rather neglected in recent years. It is reasonable to suppose that valuable lessons and insights applicable to the present era of transition might derive from the ex­amination of the period from 1860 to 1890. However, in spite of its title, this book does not deal with the subject. Instead, 168 of the 178 pages of text deal with the operations of the Union Navy in the Civil War. The remaining 25 years of the period are summarily covered in the final chapter.

Although the Union Navy’s exploits have been reported rather adequately in the past few years, Captain Carrison supplies a me­ticulous and thoroughly professional view­point. The staff work and preliminary plan-

^mng which distinguished such leaders as Farragut and Porter is examined with dis­cernment, and the larger implications of the small successes or failures are noted. We learn of the effects of plunging fire on river gun­boats, and the lesson the Confederates learned from it, the good reason for Farragut’s lashing his ships in pairs at Mobile Bay, and many other fascinating and pertinent facts which professional historians, with their pre­occupation with people and spectacular events, often neglect to mention.

Its technical approach notwithstanding, the book is written in an easy, informal style, and ^ls especially suitable for younger readers.

U-Boats Destroyed

By Robert M. Grant. London: Putnam, 1964. 172 pages. Illustrated. 42 Shillings.

Reviewed by

Admiral Robert B. Carney,

U. S. Navy (Retired)

(Admiral Carney was gunnery and torpedo officer of the USS Fanning (DD-37) when that ship captured the German submarine U-58 on 17 November 1917. He served ^as Chief of Naval Operations from 1953 to 1956.)

U-Boats Destroyed is good history in that the ^author has conscientiously sought to deter- uune the circumstances surrounding the loss °f every German submarine sunk, missing, or otherwise permanently put out of action dur­ing World War I. The bibliography is im­pressive, the indexing is thorough, and the various illustrative tables clearly point up the comparisons which Professor Grant cites.

Admittedly, the author did not have ac­cess to certain classified intelligence which might have shed more light on certain en­counters and results. It occurs to this reviewer that the U. S. Navy Department and the British Admiralty might make a contribution to history and available research material if an official revision of U-Boats Destroyed were undertaken to fill in data gaps due to informa­tion not available to Professor Grant.

The book’s Preface provides a good lead-in to the author’s subject. It gives an under­standing of the beginnings of submarine and antisubmarine warfare—not only the tech­niques, but also the fundamental military and political thinking concerning the use of sub­marines and the countermeasures to subma­rine warfare. It makes a good point concern­ing the problems of proof of destruction, and its acknowledgments enhance the authen­ticity of the research work.

To one who participated in the war against U-boats, the Preface and other parts of the book conjure up almost-forgotten scenes of wreckage-strewn seas, cold and monotonous watches, frustrating failures to ward off at­tacks, numbed survivors rescued from rafts and boats, and occasional jubilation over suc­cess. As a matter of fact, although U-Boats Destroyed is fundamentally a factual and sta­tistical record, there is drama everywhere between the lines—the drama of heroism, ingenuity, brilliant analysis, failure, and tragedy.

The author begins his study with a brief look at the 1900-1914 period during which

submarine technology advanced to the point of having new but unclear military possi­bilities. Political and military thinkers were groping both as to the use of the submarine and as to what countermeasures would be needed and feasible.

Nor had thinking been significantly clari­fied by 1914. Germany saw the submarine chiefly as a weapon against warships; opinion was divided on the matter of using the subma­rine against shipping. The humane conven­tion requiring investigation prior to attack shackled the U-boat commander. Political considerations had a powerful impact on German thinking, particularly in regard to possible United States reactions.

However, by 1917 many questions had been decided, some by trial and error, some by grim necessity. Germany had lost any chance of control of the surface of the seas and em­barked on an all-out submarine effort to strangle the Allies. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe saw Allied defeat if the submarine were not defeated. The Allies belatedly instituted the convoy system for shipping protection, and a massive mine-barrage effort was initiated.

From this point on, the book goes into a maze of detailed ship and operational sta­tistics important to the historian or student, but taxing the powers of retention of the casual reader. However, there is much meat in the observations concerning detection, countermeasures, and the relative effective­ness of mines, depth charges, mining in differ­ent areas, and the many ingenious—some­times desperate—devices invoked to meet specific problems.

When he comes to his conclusions, Professor Grant has been objective. He points out that the U-boat failed to cut the Allied supply lines, and she failed to prevent the arrival of American troops, therefore the submarine campaign failed. Furthermore, with the Dover Straits mined and the North Sea mine barrage becoming increasingly effective, future U-boat prospects were not good. On those bases, the author concludes that the campaign could not successfully have been revived. Finally, he states that ASW defeated the submarine in the last year of the war, and that German submarine morale was seriously affected by actual dangers and by publicized Allied reports of ASW successes.

However, the author is not carried away by the final success of ASW in the environ­ments of World War I. He recognizes the special parameters of the geography of the submarine warfare theater, the technical limitations of the ear, the circumstances that favored one weapon over another; in short, he writes, “the evidence of World War I is ambiguous.”

U-Boats Destroyed, then, has been carefully and painstakingly researched, it is temper­ately written although the concise text and statistical thoroughness do not obscure the drama and human side of the struggle, and it is frank concerning any unavailability of source material. It should be available to, and of value to, the historian and the student.

As to the book’s value to today’s profes­sional naval officer, this reviewer may not be the best critic; he found it interesting because it revived personal and pertinent memories. But there are not many of the World War I ilk left.

History is always a good foundation for an understanding of the present, provided that the facts of the past do not obscure the de­velopments of the present and the real trends of the future. There are analogies between the German and Allied problems of World War I and the problems posed by the modern submarine even though technical, social, and political horizons have widened immeasur­ably since the 1914-1918 conflict. The think­ing of the modern professional officer might well be sharpened by this review of the factors that shaped the beginning, the progress, and the culmination of the fight against Ger­many’s U-boats.

In any event, the current generation of sub­mariner and ASW practitioner should find U- Boats Destroyed interesting as an account of the beginnings of their respective trades and as a reminder that control of the seas is an essen­tial to survival and worth every effort and expenditure to preserve.

★

Professional Heading

Compiled by Robert M. Langdon

Admiralty Manual of Seamanship

Admiralty. London: H. M. Stationery Office (U.S.A. distribution by British Information Serv­ices, New York), 1964. 403 pp. Illus. $4.00.

Volume III; essentially advanced seamanship; in­tended mainly for officers.

The Aerospace Corporation

V. S. Congress. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1965. 62 pp. 25fi (paper).

Report of the investigation into the non-profit cor­poration created by the Air Force—which allegedly continually violated government policy.

Aircraft of World War II

Kenneth Munson. London: Ian Allan (U.S.A. dis­tribution by Sportshelf). 1962, 256 pp. Illus. $4.25.

Excellent, brief descriptions of all significant World Aar II aircraft; illustrated with drawings.

American Policy Toward Uornmunist Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1965. 136 pp. $4.50.

An excellent, essay-like summary by the prominent Senior Research Fellow of the Council on Foreign delations, presenting specific alternatives.

American Scientific Books 1963-64

Phylh_s B. Sleekier (Ed.) New York: Bowker, 1965. ²⁵⁰ PP- $8.00.

Ehis annual is the ideal means of checking the author, tttle, publisher, price, subject heading, annotations, ^ctc > of every major technical book published in the United States from April 1963 through March 1964.

The Book of Flags

^ ice Admiral Gordon Campbell, V.C., R.N., and O. Evans. London: Oxford University Press, ^l965. 124 pp. Illus. $5.00.

f ifth edition of an excellent directory.

British Ocean Freighters British Ocean Tankers

B. Moody. London: Ian Allan (U.S.A. distributor Sportshelf), 1965. 64 pp. Illus. $1.75 e^ch (paper).

Dimensions, particulars, and photographs.

The Cold War: A Book of Documents

Hans Tre/ousse (Ed.). New York: Putnam, 1965. 296 pp. $5.95.

Some 80 documents whose contents throw light on events between 1942 and 1964.

The Cold War . . . And After

Charles O. Lerche, Jr. Edgewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. 150 pp. $4.95.

A brief summary and prediction by an American University political scientist.

The Contemporary Middle East

Benjamin Rivlin (Ed.). New York: Random House, 1965. 576 pp. $7.95.

More than 50 articles by eminent Middle Eastern scholars and Western commentators, focusing on the cultural, social, and political atmosphere of the region.

Design and Development of Weapons

M. M. Postan, el al. London: H. M. Stationery Office (U.S.A. distribution by British Information Services, New York), 1964. 579 pp. Illus. $12.60.

The design, development, and production of British weapons (including aircraft and, to some extent, ships) in World War II.

Disarm and Verify

Sir Michael Wright. New York: Praeger, 1964. 255 pp. $6.95.

A stimulating proposal for disarmament.

Shipping in the Port of Annapolis 1748-1775

By Vaughan W. Brown

SEA POWER MONOGRAPH NUMBER 1

Every vessel that cleared customs at Annapolis between 1748 and 1775 is named, along with her owner, her master, where and when she was built, and where she was documented, in the first mono­graph in the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Sea Power series. These and other facts pertaining to that city’s Colonial maritime trade are supported by maps, illus­trations, and 15 pages of narrative flavored by the commercial enterprise, mutinies, political bunglings, greed, and tragedies of the period • 72 pages • Illustrated • Limited edition, no member's discount • Price $6.50

The aim of the Sea Power monograph series is to cover each subject dealt with as thoroughly as existing records and illustrations will allow.

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The First Airplane Diesel Engine:

Packard Model DR-980 of 1928

Robert B. Meyer Jr. Washington: Smithsonian In­stitution’s National Air Museum, 1964. 48 pp. Illus.

The Smithsonian’s curator of flight propulsion tells of the first oil-burning engine to power an airplane.

Foreign Affairs Bibliography 1952-62

Henry L. Roberts (Ed.) New York: Bowker, 1965. 752 pp. 520.00.

The most thorough coverage in its field; fourth in a series.

The German Economy At War

Alan S. Milward. New York: Oxford University Press. 1965. 214 pp. $6.00.

A careful, well-documented analysis of the Third Reich’s economy; deals extensively with role of Albert Speer.

The German Officer Corps

Karl Demeter. New York: Praeger, 1965. 414 pp.

$10.00.

The role of the officer corps in German society and state, 1650-1945.

A Glossary of Ocean Science & Undersea Technology Terms

Lee At. Hunt and Donald G. Groves (Eds.). Arlington, Va.: Compass Publications, 1965. 172 pp. Sketches and diagrams. $5.95 (papers).

A most useful reference work defining the terms used in the fields of oceanography, oceanographic instru­mentation, underwater sound, ocean engineering, and diving physiology.

Government Operations in Space

Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Congress. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1965, 133 pp. Charts and diagrams.

Analysis of civil-military roles and relationships.

Great Battles of World War I

James AicNaughlon (text) and John Raymond (photos). New York: Citadel Press, 1966. 512 pp. $15.00.

Pictorial coverage with brief text.

Great Battles of World War II

E. At. Cole. New York: Citadel Press, 1966. Illus. $15.00.

A pictorial coverage with brief text.

The Great Debate

Raymond Aron. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 265 pp. $4.95.

A major French thinker’s analysis of the various theories of nuclear strategy.

A Guide to Naval Strategy

Bernard Brodie. New York: Praeger, 1965. 274 pp. $2-25 (paper).

A partial up-dating of what has been a standard work since 1942.

International Shipping & Shipbuilding Directory 1965

New York: de Graff, 1965. 616 pp. $16.00.

Lists the world’s ports, port facilities, ship owners, shipbuilders.

An Introduction to Strategy

General Andre Beaufre, French Army. New York: Praeger, 1965. 138 pp. $4.95.

D     ...

°y one of France’s major military thinkers.

The Liddell Hart Memoirs: 1895-1938

B- H. Liddell Hart. New York: Putnam, 1966. 434 PP- $7.50.

The first volume of the autobiography of Captain ®- H. Liddell Hart, whom many consider to be the 20th ^century’s most important military strategist.

Military Institutions & Power in the New States

William F. Gutteridge. New York: Praeger, 1965. '62 pp. $5.50.

A useful summary of the vital role of the military in the emerging nation by a former senior lecturer at

Sandhurst.

Mission With LeMay: My Story

General Curtis E. LeMay, U. S. Air Force, with WlacKinlay Kantor. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, '965. 581 pp. Illus. $7.95.

A famous airman’s autobiography containing con­troversial reminiscences covering four decades of 'nilitary aviation.

The Modern Army and Air National Guard

Major James C. Elliott, U. S. Air Force. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965. 178 pp. Illus. $5.95.

A brief coverage.

Modern Marine Engineer’s Manual

Alan Osbourne and A. B. Neill, Jr. (Eds). Cam­bridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1965. 1,184 PP- Diagrams. $15.00.

A thoroughly revised and enlarged edition of what has for two decades been the standard American handbook in the field.

The National Guard in Politics

Martha Derthick. Cambridge, Mass.:              Harvard

University Press, 1965. pp. $4.95.

An excellent background book about the political not military—history of the National Guard at the federal level, particularly its role as a pressure group.

National Oceanographic Program Fiscal Year 1966

Interagency Committee on Oceanography of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, 1965. 73 pp. Charts.

Highly useful summary.

The National Security Council •

Henry M. Jackson (Ed.). New York: Praeger, 1965. 311 pp. $5.95.

Senator Jackson’s Armed Forces Sub-Committee hearings on policy-making at the Presidential level.

The New Face of War

Malcolm W. Browne. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. 284 pp. Illus. $5.00.

A realistic, earthy view of Vietnam by an Associated Press correspondent.

Nuclear War

Neville Brown. New York: Praeger, 1965. 238 pp. $6.50.

The author ot Strategic Mobility (1964) presents an account of the available tools of atomic war and the current strategies governing their use; devotes par­ticular attention to nuclear weapons and NATO.

On Escalation

Herman Kahn. New York: Praeger, 1965. 308 pp. $6.95.

Analysis of options available in the Cold War by the author of On Thermonuclear War (1960)

Passenger Liners

Laurence Dunn. New York: de Graff, 1965. 495 pp. Illus. $20.00.

Dimensions and particulars of all the world’s passen­ger liners through July 1965 (2nd edition).

The Penkovskiy Papers

Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, Soviet Army. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 411 pp. $5.95.

The sensational secret memoirs ot a top Soviet in-

telligence expert who betrayed his country and furnished the West with invaluable material; authen­ticity of the book is being questioned by some au­thorities in the field.

Power and Human Destiny

Herbert Rosinski. New York: Praeger, 1965. 206 pp. $5.95.

A major summary of the strategic thinking of a rec­ognized leader, now deceased, in naval strategy.

The Principall Navigation Voyages 1588-89 and Discoveries of the English Nation

Richard Hakluyt. London: Cambridge University Press, 1965. 975 pp. Maps. $35.00 (in 2 vols.).

The first reprinting of the original Hakluyt collection.

Principles of Insurance

and Related Government Benefits

West Point Associates in Social Sciences. Harris­burg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1965. 224 pp. $3.50 (paper).

The 10th edition of what has been for nearly 40 years a handbook used at the service academies.

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East

George M. Haddad. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965. 251 pp. Illus. $6.00.

Background of military in Middle East area and in­depth coverage of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Rise and Fall of Stalin

Robert Payne. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. 767 pp. Illus. $10.00.

A full-scale biography; documents and photos.

Roster of Government Research and Develop­ment Contracts in Aerospace and Defense

Washington, D. C.: Bowker, 1965. pp. $20.00.

The R&D contracts awarded to 6,000 companies and to U. S. universities.

The Royal Swedish Navy

Bertil Erkhammar and Bengl Ohrelius. Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1965. 64 pp. Illus.

Sweden’s maritime defenses, 1965-1970.

Schools for Strategy

G. At. Lyons and L. Morion. New York: Praeger,

1965. 356 pp. $7.50.

A major work covering the outstanding U. S. defense studies centers, mainly in American universities.

The Soldier’s Load & the Mobility of a Nation

Brig. General S. L. A. Marshall, U. S. Army Re­serve. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1965. 128 pp. $1.50 (paper).

A superb operations analysis of the foot soldier’s pack and its consequences; probably Marshall’s most sig­nificant writing; first published in 1950.

Soviet Research and Development

Alexander G. Korol. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965. 375 pp. $11.00.

Deals authoritatively with organization, personnel, and funds.

The Story of the U. S. Army Signal Corps

Max L. Marshall (Ed.). New York: Watts, 1965. 288 pp. Illus. $5.95.

The growth and development of the Signal Corps from the Civil War era onward.

Strategic Air Command: A Portrait

Major Clifford B. Goodie, U. S. Air Force. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. 192 pp. $9.95.

A photographic record of the minute-by-minute story of how SAC maintains its complex world vigil.

Surface Effect Ships

James A. Higgins. Washington, D. C.: Maritime Administration, 1965. 30 pp. Drawings.

Paper subtitled “A New Era in Commercial Ocean Transportation”; Higgins is with the Office of Re­search and Development, Maritime Administration.

Tanker Directory of the World 1965

John Fordree (Ed.). New York: de Graff, 1965. 414 pp. Illus. $16.00.

Track of the Bear

William Bixby. New York: McKay, 1965. 309 pp Illus. $5.75.

A complete biography of the long-serving U. S. Coast Guard cutter Bear.

The Troubled Partnership

Henry A. Kissinger. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 266 pp. $5.95.

Based on a series of lectures delivered early in 1964, this volume focuses attention on the structural prob­lems of the Atlantic Alliance and offers thought provoking ideas for the rebuilding of United States policy toward the Atlantic Community.

Two Years Before the Mast

Richard H. Kemble (Ed.). Menlo Park, Calif.: Lane Book, 1965. 552 pp. Illus. $24.75 (in 2 vols.).