The circumstances under which discipline is inculcated and enforced in the Naval Reserve Training Center is in several ways different from those circumstances which exist in the Fleet and the Navy’s two Recruit Training Commands. These differences must be comprehended by the petty officers and commissioned officers who exercise any measure of responsibility for the performance of Naval Reserve personnel during periods of inactive duty training. For the purposes of this paper, let us use the popular designations of “Regular Navy” and “Naval Reserve,” even though purists will be correct in pointing out that the active duty Navy includes Regulars and active duty Reservists. Naval Reserve discipline must be appreciated for what it is, and something must be known of possible variations in its application.
Once succinctly defined as “instant and willing obedience to orders,” events have so changed the nature of discipline in the Navy as a whole that instant must be supplemented with intelligent, and obedience must result in effective performance along the lines indicated by the order. In the Regular Navy, instant obedience is expected and generally can be obtained with or without willing compliance, but a desirable level of morale requires that men want to do what they are ordered to do, and that they understand why the order is given. In the Naval Reserve, willing compliance is essential and it must be based not only on understanding but also very much on the creation of active interest. The latter demands a particular kind of command technique which is somewhat different from that exercised in the Regular Navy and which may even be more difficult to accomplish.
Within the modernized definition discussed above, which is applicable equally to the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve, there are three phases in the disciplinary cycle. The first phase is the training designed to produce habitual reaction—consistent instruction, drill, and required conformance with established customs, traditions, and standards of performance. The second phase is the act of habitual reaction itself. The third phase is the enforcement of required conformance when the first two phases are resisted or are not responded to in a wholly willing manner. Of these three phases, the act of habitual reaction is a result to be achieved similarly in both regular and reserve commands, but the methods of training and enforcement are necessarily different in the Naval Reserve.
Although the governing principles remain fixed, discipline in the Navy is not the unchanging attribute which some people believe it to be. For example, the cat-o-nine- tails as a standard of enforcement disappeared along with sail and wooden hulls, and the high quality of discipline in a modern American warship could not have been envisioned in the 18th century. These changes have been brought about by new ships, new types of warfare at sea, and a new approach to human relations, but most significantly by the higher level of intelligence and education found among U. S. naval personnel, both officer and enlisted.
Discipline is always present in one form or another in the conduct of groups of human beings having a common objective and common leadership, but the level of discipline necessary for effective control of those being led by the leaders varies according to the existing circumstances and the type of individuals to whom it is applied. It is, in this sense, not unlike a sensitive rheostat, the use of which is a skill to be learned by practice.
Adjustment of the methods of training and enforcement to personnel participating in the Naval Reserve is determined by the extent of their experience on active duty, and by a marked variance in means of enforcement when compared to the Regular Navy.
Naval Reserve personnel with active duty experience have been uniformly disciplined so that their habitual reactions will be to some extent instinctive and unquestioned in the exigencies of war or emergency. By and large, their peacetime training takes place in surroundings and at duty stations that are in most respects identical to those in which performance will be expected in combat or crisis. Even for such cadre personnel, however, a lapse of six to 30 days between inactive duty drills inevitably causes a weakening of habitual reaction, and the longer they remain away from daily contact with the Navy the more they are likely to reassume a non-military attitude. The degree to which this deterioration takes place is in direct proportion to the number of years they have served on active duty. The less-than-two-years’ exposure to discipline experienced by the 2X6 reservist is hardly enough to produce anywhere near an indelible impression.
The totally inexperienced enlisted man, or junior officer, has had no opportunity to have ingrained upon his subconscious thinking the necessity for habitual reaction. His reserve training, except for brief periods of active duty for training, is conducted in the security of a training center. The actualities of service at sea exist only as he can imagine them. With the best of will, he can but simulate the reactions expected of him in the event of collision or man overboard, and even the make-believe combat experience of gunnery practice is beyond his ken. As a consequence, he does not and cannot fully comprehend the need to obey instantly and intelligently, when he knows that neither the training center, his fellow trainees, nor himself can possibly be in danger. The greatest hazard he knows is the displeasure of his commanding officer.
Thus, reaction to orders in the Naval Reserve is somewhat conditioned by a lack of vitality in motivation. What is natural to those men serving in the Regular Navy is not necessarily natural to the naval reservist.
Furthermore, regular naval officers and enlisted personnel, and reservists on active duty, are dependent upon their pay. Increases in pay, other than by reason of longevity, are predicated upon promotion or advancement and this, in turn, is partially determined by their attitude toward and acceptance of discipline. This attitude and acceptance is weighed with respect to their own reactions and conformance, their application of discipline downward upon those to whom they are superior in grade or rate, and their response to the discipline imposed upon them by those who are in authority over them. A constant process of evaluation causes them to be more amenable to and enthusiastic about discipline than would be the case if their livelihood were not so directly affected. Since their profession is one in which discipline is an essential way of life, they are more willing to seek their goal of promotion or advancement through conscientious conformance to the rules and regulations, and the traditions and customs of the service.
On the other hand, the pay of the reservist on inactive duty, if indeed he receives any, is usually a relatively minor supplement to his civilian income. It is unquestionably a welcome addition, but unlike the man or woman on active duty he is seldom dependent upon it to make ends meet. The reservist may use his pay as a means to raise his standard of living one notch higher, but this ordinarily is in terms of extras. (It has been my experience that about the closest the average reservist comes to economic dependence upon his Navy retainer is to budget it to meet an installment payment.) Consequently, participation in the Naval Reserve is commonly avocational and the attitude toward discipline tends to have a corresponding perspective. Promotion or advancement, while desired and sought, are not nearly as important to inactive duty reservists as to active duty personnel.
Economic control, therefore, is not an avenue to discipline in the Naval Reserve. As a matter of fact, reservists are to be complimented on their usually exemplary conduct and performance in view of the fact that they have so little either to gain or lose.
The Regular Navy has a host of punishments by which to enforce its will through a variety of courts, both judicial and nonjudicial processes. The threat of court- martial and the punishments that can ensue therefrom, and even so elementary a thing as deprivation of liberty, are powerful levers for the enforcement of discipline. For all practical purposes, these levers are not available to command in the Naval Reserve, even though the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMj) quite obviously stands over both components of the Naval Establishment. There has been only a handful of courts- martial proceedings originating in misconduct by reservists while on inactive duty training, and these prosecutions have ended in few convictions.
It is true that the reservist has sworn to obey the lawful orders of officers appointed over him, and that those so appointed have sufficient authority to enforce discipline, but the circumstances of the inactive duty drill are such that neither the oath nor the authority can be meaningfully brought into play as a means of implementing punitive discipline. In counterbalance, however, it is interesting to observe that flagrant violations of discipline rarely occur during the inactive duty drill, perhaps because the reservists’s commitment is so tenuous that it is easier for him to walk away from it than to face the disagreeable results of prospective disciplinary action. Certainly, it requires but little patience for him to defer a violation of military law until he has come under the more lenient civil law.
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine some of the violations of discipline which are committed by reservists during inactive duty training. Since the Court of Military Appeals has prescribed narrowly the circumstances in which a reservist is presumed to have entered upon naval duty, these violations are for the most part limited to those offenses defined in the UCMJ under Article 89 (disrespect); Articles 90, 91, and 92 (disobedience); Article 115 (malingering); Article 108 (loss, damage, destruction or wrongful disposition of military property of the United States); and, finally Article 121 (larceny and wrongful appropriation).
Disrespect has no counterpart among civilian felonies or misdemeanors. It is purely a military offense, because mutual respect is peculiarly essential to the discipline of a military organization. It is based on the customs of the service, more or less as unwritten law. Disrespect usually involves vile or obscene language, but it can also involve mute actions such as deliberately walking away from a superior while being spoken to, or by making certain gestures when a superior’s back is turned. Disrespect is a violation of discipline which must always be quickly noted and immediately acted upon, because like an infectious and endemic disease it can spread rapidly among men in a military organization by destroying regard for authority. This is not to say, however, that respect for authority can ever be created and maintained by punitive discipline alone; it must always be earned. The effect of an individual case of disrespect is proportional to the strength of overriding respect held by other members of the unit.
Disobedience of a lawful command or directive is not uncommon in the Naval Reserve, but its manifestations are ordinarily subtle and delayed. Direct and immediate disobedience is exceptionally uncommon, and it seldom occurs that commands issued by a superior officer are presumed not to be lawful. Here again, however, the three hours, once a week—or two days, once a month—exposure to military discipline experienced by the inactive duty reservist presents an extraordinary problem. The time lapse between drills provides the reservist with a convenient opportunity to fail to remember an order, and to devise a number of excuses based on the intervening civilian life which the commanding officer cannot easily disprove and which he must accept at face value. Just as in the Regular Navy, the gravity of the offense of disobedience is not found so much in the act of refusing a lawful command but rather that it represents defiance of authority. The question of intent is paramount. The principal deficiency in Naval Reserve discipline is an unconscious tendency to place a personal interpretation upon compliance with an order, and this usually arises more from the heart than the head, more from a lack of knowledge and training than from intent, and from uncertainty as to the meaning and sincerity of the order. It therefore behooves every commanding officer to be sure that all orders and directives are so plainly and emphatically delivered that ignorance of their existence and purpose cannot be a defense by any offender.
Of all the results in discipline to be sought in training, obedience is the most important because it is the psychological pathway to desired habitual reaction.
Malingering is based upon laziness and an unwillingness to perform, and it is normally accompanied by a vague complaint of physical disability which cannot be medically substantiated. The non-existent backache and headache were not first invented in World War II. As a matter of historical record, some of the most ancient laws governing military organizations dealt with the conundrum presented by the individual soldier or sailor who manufactured excuses not to work. Malingering is an escape mechanism practiced by the few to the considerable disadvantage of those whose complaints are genuine. The reservist who departs early from a drill on the rationale of a fabricated pain, not infrequently after being credited with attendance for pay purposes, may well cause others to attempt the same ruse, and he certainly tears the cloth of unit morale. For this reason, malingering is a thorny disciplinary problem. Fortunately, it is not prevalent in the Naval Reserve.
A far more frequently encountered cousin to malingering is the matter of simple “goofing off.” This is more a lack of performance than a violation of discipline; but it should be curtailed because eventually it will contribute to the breakdown of discipline.
Absenteeism on the part of the inactive duty reservist is not an offense which results in punitive disciplinary action as does absent without leave in the Regular Navy. The Naval Reservist participates voluntarily, and can in the same sense decide not to participate. He is completely free to discontinue his affiliation with a unit permanently without prior notice, or to absent himself from any drill or series of drills. He does not by the former remove himself from the Naval Reserve if he has a continuing legal obligation to serve; he merely places himself in another category that is well defined by law. While not lessening any otherwise legal liability for mobilization, he does impose upon himself deprivation of pay and he may jeopardize his opportunity for promotion or advancement. There is a provision of Federal law which permits the Navy to recall or assign to 45 days active duty involuntarily any member of the Ready Reserve who fails satisfactorily to perform inactive duty training, but the Navy so sincerely desires to maintain the Naval Reserve as an organization comprised wholly of volunteers that this type of disciplinary action is not extensively used. It is sometimes applied to pre-active duty personnel below the rank of petty officer, providing such orders to 45 days active duty (or immediate assignment to two years of active duty under the 2X6 program) do not remove the young sailor from high school.
Loss, damage, destruction or wrongful disposition of government property occur as a result of carelessness, and they happen as often as carelessness itself affects a situation where government property is involved. These are not disciplinary matters unless they are intentional rather than negligent. When a reservist in a sudden fit of temper kicks a hole in a Training Center bulkhead or smashes expensive equipment, he is perhaps also guilty of disrespect. Psychiatric examination might be indicated but would be highly impractical. The unit commanding officer would do well to consider an administrative discharge, but at the same time it would be appropriate to examine closely the events which produced such a loss of self-control.
Larceny, like carelessness, is always with us. The case of the purloined wallet is constantly a military aggravation, but then it is similarly a concern in a camp for pre-teenage girls. In general, where reasonable investigation does not reveal the culprit, it is wiser for the unit commanding officer not to institute a search for the “strawberries” in the fashion of the notorious Captain Queeg. A culprit discovered is better turned over to civil authorities! In either case, re-instruction for all hands in the security of personal property is in order.
This brings us to the need to understand when a reservist is subject to the UCMJ. When a reservist enters upon active duty or active duty for training he is inescapably subject to the Navy’s standard methods of enforcing discipline. The law specifies that all other times he is subject to the provisions of the UCMJ only while he is (1) actually engaged on inactive duty training which has been (2) authorized by written orders which (3) state that he is subject to the UCMJ, and only when those orders are (4) voluntarily accepted by the reservists.
Actually engaged on inactive duty training does not include portal-to-portal transportation from his home to the place of drill or return therefrom. For all practical purposes, his liability to military justice commences when he has physically entered an authorized place of drill at the time of a scheduled drill and has become involved in some phase of an authorized training program, and it ceases when the unit is dismissed by the commanding officer or his designated representative. Not all reservists receive written orders to inactive duty training, but orders normally are written for those who train in one way or another with a pay or nonpay unit, or on appropriate duty. These orders usually provide for an endorsement denoting voluntary acceptance of the provisions of military justice; but whether or not the reservist endorses his orders to this effect, his act of engaging in the duty firmly implies such understanding and voluntary acceptance. Thus, the reservist on inactive duty training is under the disciplinary code of the armed forces only during the three hours of an evening drill or during carefully delineated periods of time during a weekend drill. At all other times, he is liable for his actions under civil law.
Even while he is subject to the UCMJ, the reservist is relatively free from any of the punishments specified in Article 15. It is extremely difficult for a unit commanding officer to submit a reservist to Summary Court Martial during a three-hour drill and his legal detention beyond that time is nearly impossible. The situation is not at all comparable to that which obtains in the Regular Navy whereby a reservist on active duty for training can merely not be released until the effect of arraignment for court martial has materialized. While a reserve unit commanding officer may have the lawful power to hold mast during an inactive duty drill, or to institute court martial proceedings, he is logically prevented from deciding to do so by the realization that such an action may well commit himself, his subordinate officers, and dozens of others to months of complex legal involvement. Administrative mast is not uncommon, but it amounts to little more than a “bawling out,” and should this be improperly handled the resulting resentment can lose the Naval Reserve another volunteer.
It is obvious, therefore, that the unit commanding officer must rely upon methods of training and discipline which do not call for the punitive measures set forth in the UCMJ. This is a fact of life in spite of that part of the U. S. Code which says that all laws applying to both regulars and reservists shall be administered without discrimination, and in spite of the fact that the commanding officer of a Naval Reserve unit is unequivocally charged by Navy Regulations with responsibility for the maintenance of discipline among the members of his unit on the basis of the UCMJ. In effect, discipline in the Naval Reserve is the art of the possible.
Regarding as negative discipline all forms of punitive enforcement and as positive discipline all forms of leadership, some of the resources available to the unit commanding officer can be examined briefly.
Negative discipline in the Naval Reserve is extremely limited, but not injuriously so. Usually the maximum punishment, if such it be, is the administrative discharge for unsuitability, unfitness, or misconduct. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It performs the function of continuous screening required by law to ensure the constant availability of the number of competent Ready Reservists judged by the Congress to be necessary for national defense, and it serves to eliminate trouble makers. At the same time, it complicates a perennially difficult recruiting situation and often takes so long to process that the effect of example is lost to other members of the unit.
Of even longer-range effect but perhaps least desired by Naval Reserve personnel is an unfavorable entry in the service record or damning with faint praise in a fitness report. Here, though, more often than not, the commanding officer is likely to place himself between a rock and a shoal, because in the Naval Reserve far more than in the Regular Navy such an observation is somehow a reflection upon his own leadership.
Keeping in mind that the best discipline is immediate discipline, some unit commanding officers use the time-tested device of disapprobation—in some fashion publishing the names of those guilty of minor infractions such as uniform discrepancies, tardiness, failure to pass examinations or to perform a duty correctly. This procedure often does not approach the severity of negative discipline demanded by more serious offenses, and if carried too far, flies in the face of the axiom: praise in public, condemn in private.
All in all, the reserve unit commanding officer is left with positive discipline, and the keynote of all his disciplinary actions must be flexibility.
Among the techniques of positive discipline is training which insistently demands observance of traditional naval courtesy. Among other things, this includes the salute, the proper use of the salutation “Sir,” and rising when a superior enters a room. However, capable unit commanding officers are well aware that an over-snappy salute and an over-played “Sir” are apt to cover a multitude of sins of omission. Less snap and more dogged effort toward compliance with an order or meeting the needs of the unit may to some extent be an acceptable substitute for amenities. He would also do well to accept a high level of attendance as more of a demonstration of discipline and leadership in his unit than a perfectly executed close order drill. If it can be halted instantly by a simple order, harmless skylarking by enlisted personnel might be an indication of a happy, well-disciplined unit.
Because finality of form which cannot be made good in substance is not the language of the Naval Reserve, an attempt to achieve discipline solely by arbitrary command is usually destined to failure. There are indisputably occasions when the decisive, flat-out order is entirely appropriate and required, but reasonable firmness and obvious fairness in man-to-man dealings, loyalty to both seniors and juniors, and open, generously expressed appreciation for accomplishment and sincerity of effort should more often be the practice. Favoritism, inflexibility, inconsistency and poor sportsmanship are far more poisonous to Naval Reserve discipline than many naval officers suspect.
There are three rules by which positive discipline must almost invariably be implemented in a Naval Reserve unit:
• The superior officer—at all levels right down to the petty officer—must impose upon himself a rigid standard of meticulous self- discipline, and he must set an example of diligent, punctilious performance of duty. When this is firmly insisted upon and achieved the atmosphere surrounding all activities within the unit is such that the would-be laggard hesitates to become prominent by being different. One might say that this is the ultimate goal of unit command, but it is not readily attained. Much depends upon the character and capabilities of the junior officers and leading chiefs. In the Naval Reserve particularly, it is difficult to command prestige apart from either experience or performance, and the best discipline is produced by officers and men who are fortified against miscalculation by sure knowledge and self-confidence, and who can and will religiously maintain the required standards. The commanding officer must instill self-confidence in his officers and give them every opportunity to gain experience widely—for an unscheduled part of the training of both the petty officer and the commissioned officer is his gradual education through the spontaneous reactions of those over whom he exercises superior authority. The commanding officer who would achieve this element of positive discipline will be unrelenting in his demand for individual self- discipline and proper example.
• Each man in the unit must be an interested, willing participant in the activities of the unit. The reservist’s value abruptly ceases with the death of his interest or desire to participate. Every effort should be made to give each man—officer and enlisted—a responsibility at least equal to his present capabilities and as often as possible slightly above his present capabilities so as to offer a challenge. Pride in himself and in his unit is engendered when a man assumes a meaningful responsibility, and this pride reflects itself in the way in which he conducts himself.
• There must always be an atmosphere of sincere striving. In other words, the unit as a whole must have an objective, the achievement of which personally involves every officer and man. In order to be involved, all personnel must be as fully informed as good judgment allows.
The observation of these three rules combines to fulfill the reason why most men knowingly or unknowingly affiliate with a Naval Reserve unit—to be an active member of a smart military organization. If this is not an individual’s basic motivation, he is obviously out of place and should have taken his chances on receiving a Selective Service greeting. If it is his motivation, it must be nurtured.
Discipline in the Naval Reserve, therefore, is such that if the members of the unit are at odds with its management, or chafe under its restrictions, or dislike their superior officers— whether the fault lies in the management or in the restrictions or in their officers or in themselves—a reliance upon negative discipline and arbitrary command will tend to bring out the worst in them rather than the best, and to develop primarily their powers of deception and evasion. The lack of appropriate discipline in the Naval Reserve is an indictment against the quality of military command.
On the other hand, positive discipline, properly implemented, can- produce significant results in loyalty and achievement. Under all the circumstances that surround him with respect to discipline, the Naval Reserve officer who accomplishes these things has demonstrated the epitome of leadership.