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Small Craft Firepower in Vietnam
(See page 168, August 1965 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Alexander W. Wells, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired) (Lieutenant Commander Wells commanded several PT boats during World War II)—I have noted with interest the photo in the Progress section of the Proceedings showing the “marriage” by the Coast Guard of a .50-caliber machine gun and an 81-millimeter mortar. That this is under the title of Progress amazes me, for I fail to see it as “progress” when 20 years ago the U. S. Navy had a far better weapons combination.
In 1945, the commanding officer of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 38 mounted an 81- millimeter mortar alongside the barrel of the 40-millimeter cannon located on the stern of each of the squadron’s PT boats. This marriage made a beautiful combination; not only was the gun powerful and extremely accurate (due to having a pointer and trainer), but the mortar shell could be thrown accurately at night because all the pointer and trainer had to remember was the angle of the barrel of the gun to the horizon for range and point the gun. A one-man gun is not as accurate as a gun with both pointer and trainer.
The Coast Guard marriage of machine gun and mortar is supposedly a one-man gun but, of course, it is a two-man gun in that someone has to load the mortar (I assume the machine gun has belted ammunition).
Apparently this is the principal forward armament of the 82-foot Coast Guard boats. In a war zone it is ridiculous!
I realize that the 82-foot Coast Guard boats are a far cry from the 80-foot PT boats of World War II, the 82-footers having been designed for different purposes. However, the Coast Guard boat is being thrown into the breech as a combat vessel in a combat zone. We should arm the boats adequately to do the job. It should not take more than one week to remove the armament on the bow and stern of the Coast Guard boats and install 40- millimeter guns in both positions and “marry an 81-millimeter mortar to one of them- While the Coast Guard boat does not have near the speed nor maneuverability of the PT boat, I think the Coast Guard boat would be a more stable gun platform.
In another World War II experiment to improve the close-in firepower of PT boats, in the PT-525 we married two .50-caliber machine guns to a 20-millimeter gun for a really wicked weapons combination. At 100 to 200 yards this combination would tear up a ten-foot square area like an automatic shotgun. And, forward of this mount was a 37- millimeter cannon.
Now, with a need for effective weapons on the boats fighting in Vietnam, we are simply not using experience this country gained m small boat warfare during World War II-
Captain Warner K. Thompson, Jr., U- S- Coast Guard (Chief, Public Information Division, Coast Guard Headquarters)—Mr- Wells’ comments have been read with considerable interest, albeit some concern that possibly his scrutiny of our 82-footer weapons mix has been through the wrong end of the long glass.
The Coast Guard’s deployment of 26 Point-class patrol craft was in prompt response to the Navy’s request for a capability boost to MARKET TIME operations, the intei - ception of Viet Cong infiltration by coastal waters.
The boats were designed for coastal search and rescue purposes and their original armament was almost an afterthought to this configuration—viz., a single 20-millimeter gu° on the main deck, forward of the pilot house- Concurrently, the Coast Guard’s ordnance specialists noted the Navy’s adaptation of thc 81-millimeter mortar for small craft, chiefly* at that time, as an illuminating device f°r night rescue. The Vietnam commitment sparked the marriage of the ,50-calibeI
Machine gun and 81-millimeter mortar, the Work of Warrant Officer Elmer L. Hicks, S. Coast Guard, then chief of the Coast Guard’s Ordnance Technical Branch. A happy solution to the problem of limited deck sPace, the multifunctional weapon provides both high-rate, low-trajectory fire with a good ammunition mix for the mortar.
We are well aware that the offensive capabilities of these hard-working boats have limitations, and are equally certain that there have been, and will be, occasions when some beleagured commanding officer would welcome a little more wallop. However, ship armament is always a matter of compromise— deck space, magazine area, topside weight, and mount support each imposes its own limitation. Such operational assessment as has been made to date reveals that the 82-footers are well equipped to do the jobs to which they have been assigned.
After one operation a Special Forces detachment commander reported that the 81- millimeter high explosive and illuminating
fire in addition to the .50-caliber machine gun fire was, “in my opinion the turning point of the VC attack. At the time, the Coast Guard [USCGC Point Clear (WPB-82315)] started firing, the VC were on their final assault to the perimeter of the PF defenses. The Coast Guard placed effective fire into the VC while illuminating the area enabling the defenders to fire their small arms at targets.”
When all else fails, ask the operator!*
* The U. S. Navy has also adopted the combination .50-caliber machinegun/81-millimeter mortar mount for the 104 “Swift” fast patrol craft (PCF) being acquired for Vietnam operations.—Editor.
Surface Ship Overhauls
(See pages 26-33, February 1966 Proceedings)
Commander William C. King, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Madouse deserves great credit for presenting clearly many of the problems which the ship’s crew must overcome during a yard period. Being a veteran of six major overhauls—on board submarine chasers and carriers, in naval shipyards and private yards, on the East and West Coasts, as a junior officer and commanding officer—I strongly endorse his desire for reform in the many areas which he discusses.
His plea for decent living accommodations for the crew while in the shipyard is one of his most valid and important points. I recall, as an ensign assigned to a ship in overhaul, having had to walk the entire length of a Midway-class carrier from my bunkroom to the head! The noise, the dirt, the extreme heat (or cold), and the disruption of the basic requirements of everyday living cause conditions in many ships in overhaul to be intolerable. The ship is the sailor’s home. If she is rendered uninhabitable, other accommodations should be provided. The author’s suggestion of wider use of the YR is excellent.
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
If proper quarters are not available on board ship or in shore facilities, officers and enlisted men should be given per diem to permit them to find their own lodgings.
The most demoralizing thing the Navy does to its personnel is to send its ships away from their home ports for overhaul. Many ships deploy for seven or more months, have a few weeks in their home port, and then are sent to a distant location for a long overhaul. Then more time is spent away from home port because of refresher training. Perhaps the planners can justify the need for taking ships away for overhaul. Usually the reasons cited relate to distribution of work among shipyards and the need for maintaining a wide industrial base for ship repair work- But it is very difficult to explain this to the crew and their families. Instead of causing additional separation, the overhaul should provide a decent period of family reunion during a tour of sea duty.
Our most important asset is people, not shipyards. Our most pressing problem is to keep qualified people in the Navy. Family separation is a prime reason why both officers and enlisted men do not stay in the Navy and a significant contributing factor is the scheduling of ships for overhaul away from their home port. The commanding officer of a ship can motivate his men and even their families to accept the hardships that go with a long deployment. But he can never really justify the need for an overhaul away from home- We have come to think of the situation as a necessary evil. However, instead of passively accepting it, we should stoutly resist it at every level of command.
The situation is not beyond remedy. First, let us examine the cause. The naval shipyards are dispersed with scant regard to location of fleet operations or home ports. In the past this caused no serious morale problem. The two World Wars were fought in relatively short periods of time. In the long peacetime years the tempo of operations was slack. No'V the rules of the game have changed. We have been involved in the Cold War for 20 years and it will certainly continue for many more- Yet we continue to employ pre-1945 thinking in the matter of ship overhauls. The post-war pattern of fleet operations is now well established. It is time that the industrial com-
Plexes were reorganized and adjusted to support fleet units in their home ports. Otherwise we will continue to perpetuate the Present system indefinitely. It is time the merchant came to the customer.
The solution to the problem will involve s°me intelligent, long-range planning and some courageous fighting for a very worthwhile objective. In its essence the plan should call for a build-up of naval and private shipyards in the areas where the Fleet is home- Ported and the complete phase out of facilities ln non-Navy towns. The problems of such a Program are enormous, but it would result in
•ge dividends in improved morale for future generations of Navymen and their families.
Unneeded facilities could be phased out in an orderly manner in the interim period by assigning to them only major conversion work which does not require the presence of a Aavy crew. In cases where a commissioned ship must be overhauled away from her home Port the crew should be removed.
Aside from reducing family separation, other benefits would accrue from having the ship overhauled in the home port including ""Proved liaison between ship and yard, and ship’s personnel would not have required to toake long, dangerous automobile trips in order to spend weekends with their families.
Objections would be raised to such a major relocation of repair facilities. The loud protests which followed the announcement of shipyard closings last year would no doubt be "epeated. But the long-range objectives are Well worth the effort required to achieve them. What is needed now is a comprehensive Plan to bring about the desired results within *he next two decades. Failing this, in 1986 we Vv*H still be sending Norfolk-based ships to Boston for overhaul.
ASW—Are We Missing the Boat?”
(See pages 112-113, February 1966 Proceedings)
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Rear Admiral Turner F. Caldwell, Jr., T- S. Navy (Former Deputy Director, Office °f ASW Programs)—Lieutenant Flaherty has highlighted two important areas which require continuing attention in ASW: efficient Organization and manning of ASW ships, and effective training for ASW officers. The sta- hstics cited are interesting and are similar to
the results of an investigation conducted in March 1965 when it was determined that the ASW officer, although billeted as a lieutenant (j.g.), was at the time manned as follows: escort ships (DE)—42.4 per cent ensigns assigned, destroyers (DD)—24.2 per cent ensigns assigned, with a total Navy experience level of 20J months (median).
The Chief of Naval Operations has been concerned with this situation, and in April 1965, he requested that the Commanders-in- Chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets evaluate a new organization which would establish an Antisubmarine Department in lieu of the existing Operations Department in these ships. This new department would be expanded to include responsibilities for all ASW weapons and sensors. The department head would be a lieutenant. The evaluation of this organization has recently been completed. If this new organization is approved for Fleet use, changes in the present ASW officers course will be required and the Naval Destroyer School will be used to assist in training this new department head. [1]
With regard to training of officers assigned to ASW ships, it is agreed that the situation is not good enough. Over-all it is a compound result, one of the most important factors being the shortage of officers available in the second sea tour or six- to nine-year experience level. Because of the low retention of surface officers, it has been necessary to elevate younger, less experienced and less trained officers to positions of greater responsibility.
The Navy is examining ways of improving opportunities and methods, not only in general but with the respect to the change in equipments and methods which have come about in ASW ships in recent years. The ASW problem has changed rapidly from an “open- bridge-directed” operation to one almost taking place entirely “inside.” If suitable simulated inputs can be provided to the equipments, then much ASW training can take place in port. The only artificial aspect noticed by the students would be the absence of roll and pitch.
Lieutenant Flaherty’s interest and investigation of these vital elements in the ASW system is professional and to be commended.
"The NROTC Plight”
(See pages 64-67, October 1965,
and pages 102-107, February 1966 Proceedings)
Midshipman Robert B. Newlin, U. S- Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Smith has cited low academic qualifications of NROTC tn' structors as one of the problems of the NROTC program. It is my contention that the primary qualification for NROTC instructor duty should be that the officer be an oustanding leader. Leadership is not learned by rote, but from observation and application.
For many midshipmen the NROTC pr0' gram is their first contact with the military) and therefore it is of paramount importance that they be exposed to the finest leaders the Navy has to offer. From these officers the midshipmen form their first opinions of the naval service and motivation is provided f°* potential career officers. As one of the tenets of leadership it is important that the officer- instructor be willing to “take care of his own” and aid his men, guiding them along the lines that would best be suited for the midshipman and the naval service.
As far as academic qualifications are concerned, I do not think that it is necessary f°' the officer to have an advanced degree, f°r this is neither an indication of teaching ability nor does it automatically raise the status ot the individual instructor or the Naval Science Department among his university counterparts. The officer who has a bachelor’s degree from a civilian university (to better appreciate the academic situation of the midshipmen)) a superior command of the English language) the ability to organize his lectures for thoughtful presentations, and the practical knowledge acquired during service in the Fleet should be well qualified to give meaningful instruction to NROTC midshipmen.
" 'Captain Fox—
He Is the Navy Department’ ”
(See pages 64-71, September 1965 Proceedings)
Professor Ari Hoogenboom (Pennsylvania State University)—Although Admiral Haye® modestly declares that “a just appraisal 0 Gustavus V. Fox as a prominent figure in the Civil War cannot be attempted in an essa> of this sort,” his article is by far the best effolt to date. Fox has been obscured primarily because his jealous chief, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, hated to give others credit in his influential Diary of Gideon Welles. “What ls called history,” Secretary Welles preceptively and ironically mused, “is, I apprehend, hut a caricature of events as they actually occurred. Credit due to one, we know, is in °ur own time often awarded to another, and circumstances are sadly perverted and misrepresented.”
Admiral Hayes’s article helps to restore Fox to his rightful place. Admiral Hayes stresses that Fox, who functioned as the chief of naval operations (there was no such officer at the time), was largely responsible for organizing expeditions to capture Port Royal and New Orleans and selecting their commanders, Flag Officer S. F. DuPont and Rear Admiral Gavid G. Farragut; for ridding the Navy of old fogyism by slaying the “sacred cow of seniority”; for creating the admiral’s grade; Or abolishing the spirit ration; for transferring the Mississippi Squadron from the War Department to the Navy Department; Or committing the Navy to the monitor-type ironclad; for tracking down Confederate commerce destroyers; and for insisting that Charleston be captured irrespective of cost to 0r advantage for the Union. Viewing the last three as Union disasters, Admiral Hayes is convinced that Fox hurt the Union Navy despite his initial success. Fox lacked humility (“a necessary quality for greatness”), did not take advice, and by mid-1862 thought he was mdispensable, thus rendering himself useless.
I agree with much of this analysis. Fox’s role in running the Navy can hardly be exaggerated. To a great degree he was responsible for its successes and failures. Fox was indeed culpable, although President Lincoln and the North as a whole should share this guilt for concentrating on Charleston instead of on Wilmington and Mobile. However, we may learn from Fox’s error. Charleston was a symbol of the “rebellion” to Fox who earlier had attempted to provision Fort Sumter. Despite their convenience, symbols are dangerous, for they are imbued with more than their intrinsic worth. Fox’s irrational behavior over a symbolic Charleston should be instructive to a generation given to confuse symbolic and strategic values in places such as Berlin and Vietnam. Do we condemn Fox and then repeat his folly?
Admiral Hayes severely criticizes Fox for coming “under the spell” of John Ericsson and committing the Navy to the monitor system—ironclads with a low freeboard and two large guns mounted in a turret. Admiral Hayes castigates monitors as “hell to live in and . . . easy to drown in,” slow, and more to the point, lacking “rapidity and volume of fire.” Although they were designed for harbor and coastal defense, Admiral Hayes argues monitors were prone to run aground and fall an easy prey to the enemy. He states captured monitors could then defend Confederate harbors and break the blockade. The Navy really needed more armored broadside- type ships like the heavy frigate New Ironsides, which was “more effective, in service opinion,
than all the monitors put together. . . . Five million dollars were spent on the Navy during the war, but . . . the United States still did not have a seagoing battle fleet to match those of England and France.”
Quite obviously, Admiral Flayes has it both ways in his indictment of monitors. They are simultaneously worthless to the Union and invaluable to the Confederacy. Furthermore, Admiral Hayes has neglected the most important consideration for Union naval architecture—draft of water. The crying need was not merely for ships that would pack a wallop, but for ships that would draw ten or 11 feet of water and still pack a wallop. Neither complete successes nor absolute failures, the monitors represented an attempt in that direction. Perhaps a comparison with the vaunted New Ironsides would be instructive. Drawing about 11| feet of water compared to the New Ironsides'1 s 16 feet, the monitors were less apt to run aground. At seven knots, the New Ironsides and the monitors were equally slow, but the monitors were more maneuverable. While the New Ironsides threw more metal, she was open to descending shot, and an unplated stern left her rudder and screw vulnerable to a raking fire. Admiral Hayes’s charge that monitors were no match for British or French ironclads is true. But monitors were superior to any Confederate ironclad. Had the Union built extremely powerful vessels to match the French Gtorie (drawing 28 feet) or the British Warrior (drawing 26 feet) and Black Prince (drawing 23 J feet), their draft would have rendered them almost useless for coastal operations. Considering the need for “light draft and great ordnance power,” Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren thought, “the Department could not have been more judicious in preferring a number of monitors to operate from a heavy frigate as a base.”
Admiral Hayes also blames Fox for the loss of the U. S. merchant marine. He believes a strategy board of able officers would have succeeded in bringing about the destruction of Confederate cruisers where Fox failed. Given the dearth of timely information about the commerce destroyers, the shortage of suitable vessels that could be spared from the blockade, and the lack of overseas bases, it is difficult to see how a board could have improved significantly on Fox’s work. Furthermore, economic not military factors destroyed the merchant marine. Excelling in wood and sail not iron and steam, Americans would have ceased to dominate the carrying trade had there been no Civil War. When earlier, swept from the seas by two wars and an embargo, American commerce was resilient enough to cross back. In an age of iron and steam, the United States no longer possessed the decided advantage its forests had given it. Besides, the discovery that overland transportation was more profitable than overseas shipping converted merchant princes into railroad kings.
Finally, Fox probably would have had a nobler character and possibly been a better chief of naval operations if he had been more humble. But how does one differentiate between humility and self-abasement? How does one know when and when not to take advice? Humility is a fine possession, but so is self-confidence. And, I suspect, the world s great military leaders are more conspicuous for their self-confidence than for their humility. The big problem is to make the correct decision with, against, or without advice and to then adhere to it. As a decision-maker Gustavus Vasa Fox, despite his failings) made an enviable record for himself and for his beloved Navy.
"Notable Naval Books of 1965”
(See pages 124-132, December 1965 Proceedings)
Roger Pineau (Mr. Pineau served with the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan after World War II and assisted Samuel Eliot Morison in the writing of the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) ' Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—Japan's outstanding naval officer of World War II and one of the great naval leaders of all time was revered by his colleagues, adored by his countrymen, and respected even by his enemies. His life, achievements, and death were all remarkable and are worthy of a good book. Unfortunately, Mr. Potter’s book-^ Yamamoto, The Man Who Menaced America— does not fill the bill.
The author’s list of acknowledgements indicate his exposure to good sources of information. He has organized the story of Yama-
koto’s life into three apt sections entitled: “A Morning in December” (the Pearl Harbor attack, which was one of his greatest successes), “A Day in June” (the battle of Midway, his greatest defeat), and “A Day in April” (his death). The broad story is presented with some interesting sidelights and incidental tales. There are good classical analogies and some excellent analyses which demonstrate that Mr. Potter is capable of Proper evaluation and delineation.
Nevertheless, this biography of the extraordinary Admiral Yamamoto is flawed by a lack of polish and precision. I was surprised to observe the number of blunders the author had written and the editors had missed. There are simple errors in arithmetic, such as miscounting the number of months between the Pearl Harbor attack and the battle of Midway, and the duration of the battle for Guadalcanal. Time delineation in general is sloppy, confusing, and too frequently inaccurate. There are baffling statements (“They [codebooks] could only be captured if they sank with the ship” and “Below him [a Japanese pilot in the Pearl Harbor attack] he could make out Japanese submarine periscopes waiting hungrily for American ships to sail out of Pearl Harbor”) and grotesque misstatements (the aircraft carrier Kaga had ‘300-foot-high funnels on each side of her deck”). Some technicalities are mentioned Mthout explanation, others are explained illogically or inaccurately and there are misspellings of Japanese place and personal names. Even Yamamoto’s coded message to execute the Pearl Harbor attack was incorrectly rendered by the author: Nagata Tama Lahore instead of Nitaka Tama nobore. And, there are inexcusable errors in battle statistics and a number of inconsistencies.
While this list is representative and not comprehensive, one may say that these are small matters. Still, there is fundamental error m the appreciation of Admiral Yamamoto’s attitude about the Pearl Harbor attack. He did not calculate “that this below-the-belt blow was his only hope of victory.” Admiral Yamamoto knew and stated there was no chance of victory for Japan against the United States. Also, Admiral Yamamoto’s dismay at news that the attack had succeeded was not occasioned by the failure to find and attack the U. S. aircraft carriers; the fact that there were no carriers at Pearl Harbor was known to the Japanese before the attack planes were launched. Admiral Yamamoto was dismayed because diplomatic relations with the United States had not been broken before his bombs fell—as he had been promised. That is why upon hearing that the attack had been a complete surprise he said, “Nekubi wo kicha ikenai”—“One should not cut the sleeping man’s throat.”
Mr. Potter and his editors could have done better, but we are still indebted to them for this look at a memorable naval leader.
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Rear Admiral H. F. Pullen, Royal Canadian Navy (Retired)—There was a comment on Louisbourg: Key to a Continent, which I never thought I would see in such a reputable publication as the Proceedings. I refer to Professor Langdon’s statement that this “Gallic stronghold was taken by General James Wolfe with the aid of Admiral Boscawen.”
Louisbourg was taken by a military force under the command of Major General Jeffrey Amherst, who was ably assisted by Brigadiers Wolfe, Whitmore, and Lawrence. The naval forces in this successful combined operation were, as stated, commanded by the Honorable Edward Boscawen, Admiral of the Blue, Commander in Chief, North America.
Officer Personnel Management
Lieutenant Commander K. J. Simmons, U. S. Navy—The annual selection boards are completing their recommendations for promotion of the best qualified officers to the next higher rank. This is a joyous occasion for many of the officers who have been considered, but what is the reaction of the ones who failed selection? The officers not selected are confronted in many instances with a selfgenerated psychological adjustment of varying degree. This crisis is more acute when the failure was not anticipated. In this atmosphere, what does the officer’s commanding officer think? Was the commanding officer s judgment in error? Did the commanding officer fail in his responsibilities? Has the passed- over officer failed the commanding officer? What do the junior officers think if their senior fails a promotion? How does this observed failure affect the junior officer’s career motivation as he imagines himself in a similar situation?
The officer who failed selection must grin and bear the cross while the fancied or real reasons for his failure remain unknown to everyone except the selection board. On the occasion of failure to be selected, the officer is in need of warm personal sympathy. This personal relationship is lacking to some degree in every level of the organization. It is agreed that a substitute for promotion would not be fully accepted, but the Navy could profit if d would extrude a feeling of personal concern for the officer not selected. Positive efforts that bolster enthusiasum, loyality, and devotion to
duty benefit each and every one of us.
In an effort to better advise the officers involved, it is suggested that the Bureau of Naval Personnel develop procedures to inform officers of the reason or reasons for their failure to be selected. The information should be forwarded directly to the officer to assist him m determining appropriate corrective action. The selection board is the only group which knows the pertinent details, therefore it should Prepare a statement in general terms giving the reason for the failure of selection.
Typical statements by the board might include:
I- The officer’s over-all performance evaluation marks were below the average of those officers selected.
2. The officer’s qualifying speciality or education level was insufficient in relation to the higher grade responsibilities.
3. The officer has suffered physical defects that have hampered his effectiveness or assignability.
The benefits derived from being informed of the reasons for his non-selection would tend to improve the morale of the officer concerned and, in some instances, encourage him to correct certain deficiencies in the hope of future selection, or have him realize that the Possibility of his future selection and promotion would be, at best, a remote possibility.
Salute or Shoot?
Professor C. P. Lemieux (Head, Russian Division, U. S. Naval Academy)—The Soviet monthly naval journal Morskoi £bornik has now attained sufficient sophistication to print articles on consecutive pages entitled “The U. S. Imperialists, Wickedest Foes of Peace and Socialism” and “The Fundamental Concepts of Naval Ceremonial.” Perhaps the Word wickedest should be underscored in the first title, since the author, Captain 2nd Rank M. V. Rouban, outdoes himself in his compilation of atrocities committed by the U. S. military against representatives of the Red forces since the beginning of the October Revolution.
It seems that the U. S. military landings on the White Sea coast in 1918 were to set up “death camps” on the island of Mudiug. “Both in the north and east, where the
Americans helped the Japanese to help themselves to Russian territory, a network of prisons and concentration camps came into being . . . 52,000 Soviet citizens were imprisoned in this area, 8,000 faced the firing squads, and over a thousand died of illness between August 1918 and August 1919 . . . in the Soviet Far East the American interventionists committed even greater atrocities. The guerrilla fighters Bybur, Gul’, Koval’, and Shilo, for example, were taken prisoners and subjected to a monstrous reckoning. First they were tied, stripped of their clothes, and beaten with ramrods. Their bleeding wounds were filled with salt. Then the tortured men were flushed down with water and beaten again. Five-pointed stars were carved on their bodies, their nails were pulled out, they were slashed with daggers, their ears and nose were slit, and then the half-dead men were shot.” The authority cited for these many atrocities is P. S. Romashkin in Military Crimes of Imperialism.
Cumulative anthologies must tend to defeat themselves by the very massiveness of their unadulterated savagery. A thinking Soviet citizen can conclude for himself that such a consistent effort by the United States would have wiped out the Soviet republic in its infancy. This was not the case, and it is well known that rather than the astronomic quantities of munitions supplied to the Kolchak and Denikin forces, the American relief supplies in the postwar years did much to save the starving populations of Soviet republics. One still encounters Russians who remember those days.
Similarly, in his enthusiasm for the “hate” theme, Captain Rouban does overreach himself. We are of course familiar with the technique of ignoring all the complex factors of the American war effort on a global scale. For the Soviet writer there was no sea war, no Pearl Harbor, no convoy problem. American support to the Soviet ally is described as “always pushing the Soviet Union to the background,” assigning it only an insignificant portion of the material expended to this end (helping the Allies). Here the writer should realize that many Soviet citizens know better and that in Soviet Russia the unofficial version sometimes travels more effectively and quickly by word of mouth than
does the official printed version.
Having written such a workmanlike history of cruelty by the imperialist (i.e. American) society, Captain Rouban reiterates his lesson theme: “History teaches that you cannot overcome the enemy if you do not learn to hate him with all of your soul. V. I. Lenin emphasized the class character of the hatred of workers for capitalism . . . and we say: ‘Hatred for the imperialist vultures, hatred for capitalism, death to capitalism’.” Further, he indicates the various types of hate exercises appropriate for shipboard indoctrination—brochures with anti-NATO material, leaflets, “Pentagon plans for aggression,” with lectures on these and similar themes. This is the way to liven up the long cruises at sea and arouse a strong desire to fulfill assigned duties with greater zeal. Visual aids— cued to the victory over Hitlerite Germany, memorials to dead and living war heroes, stories of concentration camp horrors, visits to war museums—are well-nigh inexhaustible.
Turning the page from Captain Rouban’s article, we find a sketch of a Soviet cruiser escorted by two destroyers, and the title: “Basic Status of Naval Ceremonial.” The article in question is signed by Colonel P. D. Barabolya of the Soviet naval juridical service, and begins with a description of ship encounters during a Mediterranean cruise in June 1964. “All foreign merchantmen dipped their flags on meeting us,” writes the Colonel. “Not a single breach of naval etiquette by any foreign cargo vessels was noted. And then we met our first warships, three minesweepers. And would you believe it? They passed less than two cable-lengths away from us and gave no sign of greeting. What did it mean? Was this plain stupidity, or lack of knowledge of the most elementary norms of naval etiquette? Or was it a willful ignoring of the Soviet flag? The officers of our ship and correspondents of Pravda and Izvestia and Red Star discussed this on cruise and recalled examples from history, but could not understand the reason for such conduct.
“After all, the minesweepers were flying the flag of a nation which required strict observance of naval ceremony by other nations’ ships. Many naval traditions of that country have been adopted by other countries, and some are observed to this day.
“Later on our force frequently met American warships. These encounters did not always come off smoothly. The American frigate Mitchell [sic], for instance, correctly greeted the Soviet ships first but the U. S. destroyer Goodrich acted differently. She asked our cruiser, ‘Who are you?’ Of course such a discourteous question got no reply-
However, Colonel Barabolya goes on to indicate that the violations of courtesy were rare events in naval cruising. “Usually both merchant vessels and warships observe the practice of junior saluting the senior first. . . True seamen, at any rate, invariably follow this rule.”
The article includes a seven-page outline of naval courtesy: salutes of various kinds, solemn occasions, mourning, caution concerning the effect of shock waves vis-a-vis buildings ashore, official visits, answering calls, preliminary visits, receptions, general visiting in foreign ports, and order of departure from port after call. In conclusion, the author observes that he could only touch the surface of the status of naval courtesy. Such questions as use of calling cards, organization of various receptions, honors to heads of state and governments, ministers and ambassadors, participation in solemnities and holidays, had to be omitted for lack of spaceLooking at these two articles in Morskoi Zgbornik of September 1965, we can see that the Soviet naval writers agree in general with Sir Winston Churchill’s statement about military courtesy, which could be paraphrased as follows: “Just because we do a little ‘selective editing’ about you on ideological grounds, it doesn’t mean we can’t act like gentlemen when we meet.”
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