Book Reviews and Book List

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Gunboats Down the Mississippi

By John D. Milligan. Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1965. 216 pages. Il­lustrated. $7.50. Member’s price $6.00.

Reviewed by

Dr. William J. Morgan

(Dr. Morgan is Head of the Historical Research Section, Naval History Division, Navy Department.)

Vicksburg, battered and torn by a pro­longed land and water siege, surrendered to Major General Ulysses S. Grant on 4 July 1863. President Lincoln could indeed rejoice that “the Father of Waters again goes un­Vexed to the sea.” And, the President con­tinued, “Nor must Uncle Sam’s web feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp they have been and made their tracks.”

Professor Milligan terminates his well- researched and informative book with the capitulation of Vicksburg. End of resistance at “Sebastopol of Rebeldom” was the culmi­nation of two years’ intensive Army-Navy operations on the majestic Mississippi and its not so majestic tributaries. The huge water artery, twisting, turning, and snaking its way through the core of the Confederacy, was in Union hands. The strategic implications to both combatants were immense. Captain

Raphael Semmes, hero of the celebrated Southern raider Alabama, summed up the loss of the Mississippi as “a terrible blow.”

Rear Admiral David G. Farragut’s stun­ning triumph at New Orleans in April 1862, had not only deprived the Confederacy of its largest and most important commercial city, but had opened the lower Mississippi to Federal warships. Meanwhile, on the upper river complex, shallow draft ironclads, tin- clads, and rams which were unclad fought their way ever deeper into the South. Be­tween these two Union forces stood Vicks­burg, the hard-shelled nut which had to be cracked. Gunboats Doum the Mississippi is the story of the northern arm of this huge pincers.

U. S. history prior to 1861 afforded some experience in the operations of a “fresh­water” Navy. There were lessons to be learned from the War of 1812, and from years in Florida and Georgia swamps during the Sem­inole Wars. The Mexican War also called for river warfare, but surely nothing in the national experience readied the Navy for the magnitude of inland water activity which would be demanded by the Civil War.

Professor Milligan reveals that naval offi­cers, trained to give battle in handsome frigates under billowing canvas on the ocean’s vast maneuvering board, found river war a novel and harrowing experience. Danger lurked around every bend in the murky snare-entangled waters. Confederate mines waited in deadly silence; plunging fire from heavy cannon high on the river bluffs wreaked havoc on the gunboats’ vulnerable upper works; a chance shot in a boiler could bring a scalded death to Yankee sailors. In this hostile and alien environment the river navy, initially under the War Department’s

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control, together with the irrepressible Ellets and their rams, achieved spectacular re­sults. General Grant, never known to be ovei lavish with his praise, acknowledged that without the Navy the assault on Vicksburg “could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged.” In the course of the many river actions one constant factor stands out sharply—victory or defeat rested on the delicate balance of personal relationships and the measure of co-operation between the responsible Navy and Army commanders.

The author has dug deeply into the sources to produce a fine account of building, man­ning, and fighting the river Navy. He under­stands sea power and clearly defines the key role played by mobile hard-hitting forces afloat on western waters. He has compressed a broad panorama of familiar combat opera­tions into a small container. His writing ^lS precise, sparing of words, but not always as dramatic as the stirring events would seem to dictate. The book is complimented by fascinating illustrations, orientation maps, and a comprehensive bibliography.

However, the author states in the preface that his purpose is “to tell this phase [the Federal fresh-water navy in the Mississippi] in its entirety.” As previously noted, he ends his work at Vicksburg which was unquestion­ably the high-water mark of the western campaign. Does this mean that the fall Vicksburg was the final curtain, and, with the Stars and Stripes flying over the Mis­sissippi bastion, the river war was at an end? Certainly not; sporadic and bitter fighting continued in the area for many months.

Professor Milligan does not tell us of Rear Admiral David D. Porter’s abortive but color­ful Red River expedition, of the falling waters, the trapped gunboats above Alex­andria, and their hair-raising escape through an improvised dam. He does not tell us of the stinging harassment by Confederate guerrillas who suddenly appeared at river’s edge to pu^£ the torch to unprotected shipping or to at­tack the gunboats, and just as quickly to melt into the countryside to strike elsewhere ³ type of warfare again faced today in Vietnam-

This is a good history, but the author would have done well to travel beyond Vicks­burg if he aimed to tell the story in its entirety-

Brassey’s Annual, 1965

Edited by Major-General J. L. Moulton (late Royal Marines), Brigadier C. N. Barclay, and Air Vice-Marshal W. M. Tool. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 368 pages. Illustrated. $15.50.

Reviewed by

Captain Paul R. Schratz, U. S. Navy

('Captain Schratz is a fellow in the Mershon Social Science Program at the Ohio State University where he is is also studying for his doctorate in political science. Previously he was in the Plans and Policy Section of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter­national Security Affairs).)

The publication of Brassey’s Annual is an ^event of significance to even the casual student of national defense. The vastly in­creased scope of military interests from outer space to Arabia or steaming jungle to strategic alert, from Communism to Castro- tsm, or deterrence to de Gaullism, increasingly emphasizes the vital need for a year-end re- ^Vlew and status report. Brassey's Annual, now m its 78th year, is ideal for the purpose.

The 33 essays[1] offer a fine potpourri of strategy, unification, recent developments, NATO and regional studies, the armed ser- ^Vlces, sea power, U.N. peace forces, and pro­fessional problems. Also included is the tra­ditional discussion of the “Statement on De­fence,” commonly known as the “White Paper,” which is presented to Parliament each year by the Minister of Defence. The current debates in Parliament set the theme of the text in the opening comment—-“let me state categorically that the defence forces of this country are seriously overstretched . . . the

Government will have to watch very care­fully to see whether it is possible to keep in the Far East such a large proportion of the total of our forces without increasing the strain to breaking point.” Reduction of commitments or reduction of the increasing cost of their support are current subjects for the “East of Suez” discussions with U. S. military plan­ners. It is suggested that progress in disarma­ment may offer the ultimate solution to both problems.

The White Paper calls for a revision of the strategic concept of NATO force deployments and the “development of an effective strategy and force structure within the limits of what the nation can afford.” The strategic issues, of course, have far-reaching effects on the Atlantic Alliance and directly affect the status of overseas bases such as Cyprus and Aden. These, in turn, have important political and economic repercussions with respect to Europe’s oil supplies.

An article of particular interest to American readers is a clear and outspoken review of U. S. unification by Colonel Robert D. Heinl, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired). From long personal involvement in the unification struggles, particularly for pres­ervation of the integrity of the Marine Corps, Colonel Heinl is an expert and speaks with authority. However, he is less persuasive, as a special pleader for a return to a two-service organization or for an unraveling of the closely woven layers of civilian authority cur­rently blanketing the Department of Defense. However much one may yearn for the “good old days” of authoritative control of theater operations, it is difficult to visualize Cuba,

The American full-rigged, ship Aristides painting by Mr. Robert Salmon which appeared on the cover of the April 1965 Proceedings is now available in full color as a large- size print {26" X22") suitable for framing. List price $5.00 per print. Member’s price $1.00 per print.

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Vietnam, or other crises areas under an ex­tensive degree of unitary control by a military service. The military, with a high level of professionalism, can survive the organization thrust upon it. The same level of profes­sionalism is also needed to be persuasive in policy councils and to capitalize on the set pieces of maritime war that Khrushchev, Castro, and Ho Chi Minh have handed the Navy and Marine Corps on a salt water platter.

Astronaut Gordon Cooper’s description of the final manned flight of Project Mercury provides an interesting chapter on space exploration. The pioneer flights, of course, comprise the first leg of the program intended to culminate in 1970 by placing a man on the moon. The following chapter, by Kenneth W. Gatland, is a highly relevant commentary on the Soviet space program with some compari­sons of U. S. and Soviet equipment and goals.

Of particular and current interest are two chapters on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy. Brigadier C. N. Barclay, British Army, makes a plausible case for the small, independent, national nuclear force in the over-all British strategy. He feels that such a force is within the nation’s capability to build and maintain as a necessary form of life insurance even though it must be paid for at the expense of a higher standard of living. Iⁿ justifying the British nuclear force for reasons other than national pride or prestige, there is a built-in assumption that a U. S. nucleai guarantee or alliance is no longer in existence. Brigadier Barclay admits this is “unrealistic) even fantastic,” but justifies his position be­cause other equally impossible events have come to pass.

The usual ground on which to develop ³ national nuclear force, as in the case of France, is prestige and status in the com­munity of nations. The proliferation of nu­clear weapons will rarely be justified by strategic considerations which dictate ac­quisition of a national capability. A plausible exception, where strategic considerations may justify such a position, is the case of the relatively small nation with world-wide inter­ests whose commitments may not always m future years fall in perfect tandem with existing nuclear alliances. This is the situation in which Britain sees itself today and, this reviewer feels, is a more plausible basis upon which to key its nuclear strategy.

Yet the ability to afford that strategy ^lS central to this and the succeeding chapter) “Living With the Bomb,” by Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, Royal Air Force. Sir Robert echoes the current treatment of nuclear weap­onry by the air power enthusiasts and follows the prevailing view that nuclear disarmament is hopeless. Few will disagree with the latter) yet a great many government officials see con­siderable hope for a less grandiose goal °f arms control rather than disarmament. Sim­ply because disarmament is hopeless is no reason not to strive for a lesser goal.

The “White Paper” and the views A British military spokesmen emphasize quite clearly the strategic dilemmas in which Britain currently finds itself. The answers the nation must arrive at require sincere soul­searching on the role it will play and the sacrifices it is willing to make to do so- America and its other allies are willing to assist—but they can only assist.

In the current year of decision, Brassey 5

Annual is particularly important on both sides of the ocean, both for the policy-maker and the practitioner. Yet even the casual reader interested to any degree in the prob­lems of national defense will find a reading of the volume highly rewarding.

Strategic Mobility

By Neville Brown. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 256 pages. $5.75.

Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age

By Otto Heilbrunn. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 164 pages. $5.75.

Reviewed by

Lieutenant Commander

John E. Withrow, Jr., U. S. Navy

(Commander Withrow attended the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College in 7964-7965, at which time he also received his M.A. in international affairs from the George Washington University. He is now in the Communications Plans and Policy Division of the Office of Naval Communications.)

The advent of a partial stalemate in nuclear deterrence between East and West has caused a revived interest in the various forms of con­ventional warfare. What the late Sir Winston Churchill referred to as “the balance of terror” has required military planners to re­evaluate their various contingency plans in the light of a spectrum of possible conflict which ranges from the very limited to nuclear Armageddon. The two books under con­sideration reflect this trend in military thought; however, they each deal with en­tirely different aspects of the problem posed tn fighting conventional wars with the threat of nuclear weapons poised in the background.

Of the two, Neville Brown’s Strategic Mobil­ity is by far the more comprehensive, being truly a wide ranging work which covers many facets of current and future military operations. Mr. Brown advances the theory that one of the major problems now facing the Western powers is the requirement to deal expeditiously with limited threats to peace with which may occur throughout the world. This problem is complicated by the attendant need to avoid heavy concentrations of mili­tary resources overseas due to political and economic limitations while at the same time maintaining the capability of rapid reaction to nip threats to peace in the bud before they blossom into crisis involving an East-West confrontation of major proportion.

Strategic Mobility is largely devoted to an examination and analysis of the various forces and equipment which the Western nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States, have developed or are planning for this purpose. Through a survey of such recent limited crises as Kuwait, Suez, and Lebanon, and by inspection of the areas in which further trouble may be anticipated, e.g., the southern NATO flank, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, it is shown that the greatest probability of threats lies in areas which do not contain major resident Western forces. Further, these threats may also occur at great distances from the centers, of Western power and, in most cases, there will be a need for haste in order to stabilize what may prove to be a rapidly deteriorating situation. The technique whereby these ends are realized is termed “strategic mobility.”

In a technically correct and highly read­able account, Mr. Brown describes and evaluates the two chief forms that strategic mobility takes, i.e., sea and air. His chapter on sea mobility includes a discussion of the ad­vantages and the problems associated with amphibious operations and the employment of fast carrier task forces. Also discussed are such other aspects of sea mobility as port capacities in the probable areas of deploy­ment, the use of commercial shipping to aug­ment naval forces, and a highly interesting review of new developments including hydro­foils and hovercraft. Additionally, the con­tribution which nuclear power makes toward the achievement of strategic mobility is em­phasized in a revealing fashion.

The section on air mobility deals with such matters as the capabilities of the U. S. Strike Command and the British Army’s Central Strategic Reserve, including their air lift forces and the multitude of problems en­countered when deploying military power by this method. The future role of the helicopter in this type of warfare is investigated as is the increasing difficulty in providing suitable air support for limited operations. Another chapter deals with the changes made in the ground forces themselves to fit this new en­vironment. The work concludes with a pre-

diction that limited threats to peace will continue as the nuclear stalemate deepens and that both sides will of necessity devote an increased portion of their military resources to the attainment of strategic mobility.

Whereas the above book deals with limited war on a global scale, Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age is concerned with general war in NATO Europe. The author, Otto Heil- brunn, who is best known for his previous works on irregular warfare including Partisan Warfare (1962), discusses the problems facing NATO in planning for a European war in which the initial attack may be either nuclear or conventional. The dilemma posed lies in the need for answering a conventional threat with adequate defense measures without re­sorting to nuclear weapons so as to avoid escalation into global nuclear war. On the other hand, deployment of forces for the possible use of nuclear weapons (which varies significantly from that required for conven­tional war) is mandatory in the event tactical and possibly strategic nuclear weapons must eventually be used by those forces.

These requirements place definite burdens on the defense. The increased mobility of the attacker and the necessity of avoiding fixed positions which may invite nuclear attack has obliged a change to a concept of mobile de­fense. As described by the author, this typ^e of defense requires near equality with the attacking forces if it is to be effective. How­ever, the defense forces must still avoid heavy concentrations which would make them a profitable nuclear target and therefore exten­sive deployment over a wide area is required- This in turn raises two further questions: How then is a heavy conventional thrust to be contained by forces which are widely scattered without resorting to nuclear weapons? Secondly, how is the defense to bring about a parity of effectively engaged forces vis-a-vis the attacker without concentrating?

Dr. Heilbrunn suggests that a solution to these problems lies in the use of the enemy rear as an additional theater of operations for the defense force. He advocates the deployment of heavy mobile units to this area with sufficient staying power for continued

action. These should be regular forces al­though they may receive support from ir­regular and partisan forces if such are avail­able. Although partial deployment by either air drop or helicopter is feasible, the require­ment for heavy equipment and staying power Presupposes the introduction of the majority °1 these forces into the rear area by ground deployment.

Such a concept has several advantages for the NATO forces. First, it reduces the heavy limitation now imposed on these forces due to the lack of defensive maneuvering area in NATO Europe. Second, it carries the battle mto the enemy’s territory where the attacker Would be reluctant to use nuclear weapons tn the event of escalation to that stage of conflict. Third, it reduces the concentration °f defense forces at any one position while still permitting the attainment of parity against the attacker. This also permits the extended deployment necessary for possible nuclear operations while enabling effective Pressure to be brought to bear on a strong conventional thrust from both the front and the rear. Finally, such a concept may force the attacker to withold units to protect his hnes of communication and supply and thus lessen the effect of his initial advance. Dr. Heilbrunn’s theories are most interesting, and they are presented in a clear and non­technical manner.

Tower and Human Destiny

By Herbert Rosinski. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 206 pages. $5.95.

Reviewed by

Dr. Clark G. Reynolds

{Dr. Reynolds is an assistant professor of history in the English, History and Government Department of the Naval Academy.)

Herbert Rosinski completed his study of Alfred Thayer Mahan in Brassey's Naval Annual of 1941 by noting that to reap the full benefit of Mahan’s heritage during the Present century would demand “an intellec­tual effort of the very first magnitude.” Twenty years later, after the problems posed hy Mahan had been swallowed up by the larger issues of a more complex age, Rosinski himself made such a supreme intellectual effort, attempting to understand the meaning of power in human experience. Writing in his native German to ensure the clarity of his ideas, Rosinski formulated the basis of his philosophy before his death in 1962. His friend Richard P. Stebbins of the 20th Cen­tury Fund has performed the Herculean task of translating, editing, and shaping the last draft of Rosinski’s constantly revised manu­script. The result is dramatic.

“The problem of power,” Rosinski be­lieved, “is really the fundamental problem of our time and will remain the basic problem of all future history, no matter what the out­come of the present international struggle.” Power, he contended, is eternal, an unending process as continuous as history itself. Unfor­tunately, people have been conditioned by a long historical tradition in which power was limited and regarded as unnatural. When the industrial revolution altered society from its agricultural base and turned nature against man who had conquered it, some sought, un­realistically, to destroy power relationships. Karl Marx blamed capitalism even as a democrat might blame Communism, but both philosophies are only single expressions of power.

War appears to man as a great evil, but Rosinski offered a brilliant analysis of its place in history and its uselessness in today’s world. And, well-qualified he was to discuss war, having lectured at Nazi German and American staff colleges and defense institu­tions, as well as being an authority on the writings of Karl von Clausewitz and on many military and naval subjects.

Land, observed Rosinski, was the basis for political and military power for the 7,000 years prior to 1814. After the Napoleonic Wars, the industrial revolution altered the surface of society and seemed to outmode war, but the framework of political and military systems remained intact, due in large part to the Pax Britannica enforced by the Royal Navy. Then the First World War obliterated the old society, and disarmament was at­tempted in order to eliminate the evil of power and war. The Second World War showed the folly of this attempt.

Nuclear weapons have brought the real change in human society, requiring “a funda­mental rethinking both of the questions of

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war and peace and of the whole problem of power and its uses.” The practical impossi­bility of resorting to war in the nuclear age did not become apparent for about ten years, or roughly from VJ-day to Sputnik. “Where popular reaction tends to go astray is in its insistence on isolating the problem of nuclear weapons from the general evolution of industrial civilization,” he wrote. Our tradi­tional view of war as an evil tool of evil governments is a psychological barrier to ac­cepting and coexisting with power, but ac­cept it we must if we are to survive. Power, as a result of increased knowledge, will create more tensions until the entire world is trans­formed. The problem of power “will not come to rest, but will force itself more and more urgently upon us. . . . By the year 2000 it will be the dominating public problem.” Rosinski’s solution to the problem of power was control, his discussion of which offered important intellectual insights into coexistence. “The tension between the crea­tion of power by man and the question of his control over this power . . . [is] in this indus­

trial age . . . the basic problem of all human development.” But control is not simply or even primarily a matter for governments or new political organizations, the creation of which is the “favorite panacea of our time.

Of intellectuals and educators, Rosinski demanded a new attempt “to gain a general perspective over the whole development of mankind,” which has been done in limited form in his book. He called for a stop to the surrender to the seemingly incomprehensible forces that shape modern society, the “widen­ing gap between reality and our capacity f°^r understanding it.” Our unthinking accep­tance of the apparent mechanical forces of our age is “the real root of present-day con­formity and political apathy.” Education, which now is for “private cultivation and the specialized development of the individual, needs to return to its original public func­tion . . . [and be redirected] toward the incul­cation of a spirit of dynamic responsibility-

Of individuals, Rosinski asked for flexibil­ity and open-mindedness and a willingness to face the realities and problems of our time- We must be willing to throw off our emo­tional inhibitions drawn from history and be prepared for long-range programs, including the acceptance of power and of the existence of alien political philosophies. The individual should not regard himself as lost to the power of the machine, nor should he regard tension as an “unavoidable evil.” Tension, between body and soul or between power and respon­sibility, which is the counterforce of power, ^,s a source of human strength; it is in fact “th^e necessary condition of the further develop­ment of human existence.”

Rosinski’s over-all tone was optimistic, chc- tated by patience, erudition, and the dynamic responsibility which he preached so forcibly- Every individual interested in catching ^a glimpse of the totality and the reality things should read this book.

Problems of power, of exploiting natural resources, of exploring outer space, of all international relations are the concern “the collective humanity that is now in pr°" cess of formation.” For unmistakably, notes Rosinski, “the peoples of the world are be­ginning to respond to the feeling that in spd^e of every obstacle they are in the process of bringing about the unity of mankind.”

Professional Reading

■y.

Compiled by Robert M. Langdon

Activities of the Joint Committee on Defense Production

U. S. Congress. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. 419 pp.

This 15th annual report covers in detail the activities of the Congressional committee which is responsible for making a continuous study of the programs authorized ■n the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended; this constitutes a vital check on national defense matters concerning U. S. government agencies other than the Department of Defense.

African Battleline: American Policy Choices •n Southern Africa

Waldemar A. Nielsen. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. 195 pp. $3.50. ($1.95 paper).

An American authority on Africa summarizes the issues and choices facing the United States in southern Africa. He also evaluates reasonable pathways to the future in terms of the over-all considerations of American policy.

Age of Great Guns

Frank E. Comparato. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1965. 386 pp. Illus. $11.95.

A history of the industrialization of cannon manufac­ture and the development of field artillery gunnery from the time of Napoleon to the present. Naval ordnance receives appropriate attention.

American Defense Policy in Perspective

Raymond G. O’Connor (Ed.). New York: Wiley, 1965. 377 pp. $7.50 ($3.95 paper).

A useful edited collection of 50 selections from books, articles, official documents, and speeches which the editor believes “best reveal the nature of America’s de­fense problems from colonial times to the present.”

American Foreign Policy

Donald Brandon. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1966. 295 pp. $2.95 (paper).

An American political scientist’s summary of major issues and events of contemporary American foreign policy and recent diplomatic history; worthwhile coverages of such developments as the Communist chal­lenge, the Atlantic community, and the emergence of the new nations.

America in World Affairs

Charles Lerche, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 128 pp. $3.50 ($1.50 paper).

A brief survey emphasizing the major trends, forces, and concepts which have influenced the course of cur­rent American foreign policy.

Anders Lassen

Suzanne Lassen. New Rochelle, N. Y.: Sportshelf,

1965.    244 pp. Illus. $9.25.

A biography of a courageous Dane who became a British commando during World War II and was awarded the Victoria Cross and three Military Crosses for heroism. Anders Lassen’s exploits in the eastern Mediterranean, including the almost single-handed liberation of Saloniki, make fascinating reading.

The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964

Malcolm Kerr. New York: Oxford University Press,

1966.    139 pp. $1.70 (paper).

A brief coverage of inter-Arab affairs since the 1958 creation of the United Arab Republic. Deals with the complicated shifts in alignment, the civil war in Yemen, and the two Arab summit conferences.

JOHN

ROACH

MARITIME

ENTREPRENEUR

By Leonard A. Swann, Jr.

John Roach, a leader in the maritime industry during the years 1862-1886, built the first steel warships for the U. S. Navy. 303 pages. Illustrated. Ap­pendixes, Bibliography. Index.

Artillery Through the Ages

Major Phillip H. Stevens, U. S. Army. New York. Watts, 1965. 197 pp. Illus. $5.95.

A light but useful “once over” of the development and role of artillery from ancient war engines to modern missiles.

Australia’s Defence

T.   B. Millar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965. 198 pp. Illus. $7.00.

An Australian international relations specialist ex­amines the external threats to Australia, the forces and the organization needed to meet them, and the role ot Australia’s allies, especially the United States and Britain.

Benjamin Franklin Isherwood:

The Years as Engineer in Chief, 1861-1869

Edward W. Sloan, III. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1965. 299 pp. Illus. $7.50 [Member’s Price $6.00].

A well-written and thoroughly researched biography of one of the most distinguished names in naval engineer­ing, the man who served as Engineer-in-Chief of the

U.   S. Navy from 1861 to 1869; extensive bibliography-

A Brief Diplomatic History of Modern Japan

Morinosuke Kajima. Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1965. 216 pp. $4.50.

A member of Japan’s legislative upper house has pre­pared this concise, fast reading survey which provides for the Western reader an insight into Japan’s foreign policy problems and their background.

British Strategy and Politics, 1914-1918

Paul Guinn. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 359 p. $7.20.

A thoroughly documented study of the changing course of Britain’s war policy by a member of the Institute of Defense Analysis. Probably the leading up-to-date summary and analysis in the field.

The Captain’s Bridge

Commodore Donald MacLean. New York: Double­day, 1965. 228 pp. Illus. $4.95.

The autobiography of a Cunard Line seaman whose varied career included command of the Queen Eliza­beth and service in the Royal Navy during World War II.

The Debate Over Thermonuclear Strategy

Arthur I. Waskow (Ed.). Boston, Mass.: Heath, 1965. 114 pp. $1.60 (paper).

Thirteen American authorities express their views on what H-bomb strategy is and should be.

Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe, 1815-1945

Erich Groner. Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1966. 446 pp. Illus. 98 DM.

An outstanding compilation of statistics on German fighting ships by the late dean of German warship authorities; in German. Illustrated with almost 500 sketches—profile, plan, and cross section.

Disarmament and International Law

Allan Gotlieb. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Insti­tute of International Affairs, 1965. 232 pp. S3.50.

A Canadian foreign affairs official combines theory and Practice in evaluating basic questions concerning the Prospects for general and complete disarmament.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945

Department of State. Washington, D. C.: Govern­ment Printing Office, 1964. 1,035 pp. $4.00.

This final volume of a major documentary series based on the captured German Foreign Office files covers the period 23 June through 11 December 1941, and deals Particularly with the German efforts to bring Japan ‘nto the war against the Soviet Union and to isolate the United States in world affairs.

Fighter Aces

Colonel Raymond F. Toliver, U. S. Air Force, and Trevor Constable. New York: Macmillan Company, 1965. 354 pp. Illus. $7.95.

The story of all the great aces from World War I through the Korean War; covers the men, their planes, and their exploits. Particularly useful is the detailed listing of American and foreign aces.

The First World War

The editors of Life. New York: Time (distributed by Doubleday), 1965. 129 pp. Illus. $4.95.

A heavily illustrated volume based on a series of arti­cles which appeared in Life in 1964. One of the seven chapters is devoted to the war at sea.

Flotsam, Jetsam and Lagan

Captain Ernie Hall. Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1965. 397 pp. Illus. $7.50.

An “old sea dog’s” remarkable collection of nautical lore ranging from the origins of terminology and “firsts” to the author’s personal experiences and sea chanteys.

Flying Fortress

Edward Jablonski. New York: Doubleday, 1965. 362 pp. Illus. $6.95.

The story of the evolution of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, its role in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theaters of World War II, and a general description of heavy bomber warfare. Contains excel­lent illustrations, statistical data, and excerpts from the B-17 pilot’s manual. The development of the B-17 and its successors is traced to the efforts to develop a “flying battleship.”

From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy

Joel Larus (Ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. 556 pp. $6.96 ($4.95 paper).

A detailed examination of the concept of collective security as employed in the League of Nations and United Nations which reveals why it was superseded by what some call “preventive diplomacy;” spans the period from 1920 through the U. N. Congo Operation and analyzes such U. N. problems as finances, person­nel, and leadership.

Great Britain and the German Navy

E. L. Woodward. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964. 524 pp. $10.50.            .

A reprint of one of the most authoritative studies on the naval and maritime background of World War I; first published in 1934.

A History of Asia (2 Volumes)

Woodbndge Bingham, Hilary Conroy, and Fred Ikle. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965. Illus. $9.95 each volume.

Volume One examines the civilizations of Asia, region by region, as they existed before 1600 and the impact of the West. Volume Two embodies the major civiliza­tions of India, Japan, and Southeast Asia, discussing these cultures in the light of Western impact. Contains up-to-date maps, illustrations, and suggestions for sup­plemental reading.

International Law Studies, 1957-1958

Roland J. Stanger. Washington:              Government

Printing Office, 1965. 401 pp. $2.25.

Volume 52 in the U. S. Naval War College “Blue Book” series, dealing exclusively with “Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces.”

Inventory of the Logbooks and Journals in the G. W. Blunt White Library

Compiled by Charles R. Schultz. Mystic, Conn.: The Marine Historical Association, 1965. 60 pp.

A listing of 775 logs and journals with the vessel, rig, master, hailing port, destination, and dates of each; indexed.

The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I

Laurence Lafore. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965. 282 pp. $4.50 ($1.45 paper).

Emphasizes the role of the Balkans and the “un­imaginative and miscalculating role” of the region’s statesmen.

NAVAL ENGINEER

By Edward W. Sloan, III

Isherwood exercised immense authority in controlling the design, and construc­tion of naval steam machinery which in­fluenced the creation of the Union Fleet. 299 pages. Illustrated. Bibliography. Index.

List Price $7.50 Member’s Price $6.00

(Please use book order form on page 193)

BENJAMIN

FRANKLIN

ISHERWOOD

The LSD—Landing Ship Dock

Commander Eugene E. Bracken, U. S. Naval Re­serve. Norfolk, Va.: by the author, 1965. 69 pp- Illus. $2.00 (paper).

An interesting survey of LSD development in photo­graphs, statistics, and notes. May be ordered from the author c/o 218 North Shore Road, Norfolk, Va. 23505.

The MacArthur Controversy

Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1965. 366 pp- $5.75 ($2.25 paper).

This revised and expanded up-dating of the same authors’ The General and the President (1951) examines the continuing repercussions of President Truman s controversial “firing” of General MacArthur during the Korean War.

In My Time

Robert Strausz-Hupe. New York: Norton, 1966. 134 pp. $5.00.

The wide-ranging memoir of one of America’s more perceptive geopolitical thinkers and writers. The author has contributed several articles to the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance

Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1965. 177 pp.

A bibliographic survey plus a comparison of Atlantic Alliance and Communist-bloc military strength and a synopsis of Soviet disarmament proposals from 1946 to 1963. (Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-66.)

Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs

Gardner W. Allen. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965. 354 pp. Illus. $10.00.

A reprint of a significant study published in 1905.

Problems of National Strategy

Henry A. Kissinger (Ed.). New York: Praeger, 1965. 477 pp. $7.50.

A book of readings consisting of statements by several U. S. political leaders and major essays by such strategy writers as Herman Kahn, Alastair Buchan, and T. C. ScheUing.

Program Budgeting

David Novick (Ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. 382 pp. $6.50.

Twelve authoritative essays on the Federal govern­ment’s decision-making process and major allocation decisions. One of the book’s three sections deals with Department of Defense program budgeting and sug­gests ways to adapt those concepts to other Federal government agencies.

Progressivism and Post War Disillusionment: 1898-1928

David A. Shannon. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. $4.95 ($2.95 paper).

A documentary survey of the political, diplomatic, and economic aspects of the first three decades of 20th century America.

Revolution in the Sky

Richard Sanders Allen. Brattleboro, Vt.: Stephen Greene Press, 1964. 232 pp. Illus. $9.95.

A full-length “biography” of those famous Lockheeds and the pilots who flew them; extensively illustrated, tncluding plans; bibliography; appendices of thumb­nail sketches of all single-engine Lockheeds.

The Russians At Sea

David Woodward. New York: Praeger, 1966. 254 PP- $6.95.

The British author of The Tirpitz (1960) and other naval works traces the development of the Russian Navy from Peter the Great to the present. A broad sur­vey designed for the general reader covering, with greater unity, the same area as the now out-of-print Soviet Navy (1958), but with less postwar material.

Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886-1896

C.    J. Lowe. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1965. 123 pp. Illus. $4.25.

A scholarly account of late-19th century British policies that led to the Mediterranean agreements and a shift of the balance of naval power in that region.

SchifFe und Flugzeuge der US Flotte

Stefan Terzibaschitsch. Munich, West Germany: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1966. 330 pp. Illus. 60 DM.

A German-language study of the ships and aircraft of the current U. S. Fleet in statistics, photographs, and drawings; also contains chapters on Fleet organization and commanders, and on shipboard weapons and elec­tronic equipment.

The Security of Southern Asia

D.    E. Kennedy. New York: Praeger, 1965. 308 pp. $7.50.

A Britisher’s cogent analysis of the security problems confronting the region stretching from Pakistan to Taiwan; particularly useful is his detailed appendix on “The Armed Forces of the External Powers and the Indigenous Countries.”

South: Man and Nature in Antarctica

Graham Billing. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965. 207 pp. Illus. $15.00.

A New Zealander’s thorough coverage of the land and life in Antarctica; contains dozens of superb photo­graphs, many of them in color.

Soviet Russia in China

Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1965. Illus. 121 pp. $4.50 ($2.25 paper).

A revised and abridged edition of President Chiang’s own account of his relationship with Communism from the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to the present era.

The State of War

Stanley Hoffmann. New York: Praeger, 1966. 276 pp. $5.95 ($2.25 paper).

A Harvard political scientist outlines the past, present, and likely future of international politics and foreign- policy decisions. One of his major themes is the impact of the nuclear age on traditional competition.

Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy

Arnold L. and Myron Rush. Santa Monica, Calif.: University of Chicago Press, 1965. 350 pp. $5.95.

A detailed study of Soviet foreign policy as it is in­fluenced by the peril that would confront the Soviet Union in the event of thermonuclear war.

The Three Lives of Charles deGaulle

David Schoenbrun. New York: Atheneum, 1966. 373 pp. Illus. $6.95.

A well-known CBS correspondent’s popular bio­graphical account based on his own long-time, close observation of General deGaulle. The “three lives” refer to deGaulle as soldier, savior, and statesman.

The Twilight of Sailing Ships

Robert Carse. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965. 206 pp. Illus. $6.95.

A thoroughly illustrated popular account of the final days of many of America’s renowned commercial sail­ing vessels.

Underwater Acoustics Handbook

Vernon M. Albers. University Park, Pa.: Pennsyl­vania State University Press, 1965. 336 pp. Illus. $12.50.

The Chief Scientist of the Ordnance Research Labora­tory at Pennsylvania State University presents a wide coverage of the problems of hydroacoustics. The book’s four sections deal with basic concepts and definitions; problems of sound propagation in the sea; generation of underwater sound; and the techniques of detection and measurement.

Uniforms of the Royal Navy During the Napoleonic Wars

John Mollo. London: Hugh Evelyn, 1965. 44 pp. Illus. 63s.

United States Military Assistance

Harold A. Hovey. New York: Praeger, 1965. 306 pp. $15.00.

A documented, up-to-date presentation of the facts and figures of military assistance which, since 1950, has amounted to more than 30 million dollars to over 70 countries.

The United States Nuclear Navy

Commander Herbert J. Gimpel, U. S. Navy (Re­tired). New York: Watts, 1965. 199 pp. Illus. $5.95.

An elementary coverage, interestingly written, of the development and uses of the nuclear-powered ships and submariners of today’s Navy. This entire Watts series is referred to in “Notable Naval Books of 1965,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1965, p. 132.

PERIODICALS

Bulletin of the U. S. Antarctic Projects Officer

Henry M. Dater (Ed.). Washington, D. C.: History and Research Division, U. S. Naval Support Force, Antarctica 1965. 159 pp. Gratis.

This is the final issue of the Bulletin which first ap­peared in September 1959. This number completes the record of Deep Freeze 65. As of January 1966, the Bulletin and the National Science Foundation’s Ant­arctic Report were succeeded by the new Antarctic Journal of the United States which covers both logistic and scientific aspects and articles of general interest.

"Chunnel”

Frank P. Davidson in Foreign Affairs, January 1966.

An American engineer who has served as the U. S. participant in the study of an English Channel tunnel summarizes the background and current status of that engineering dream—which may well be fulfilled in the foreseeable future.

"Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos”

John C. Ausland and Colonel Hugh F. Richardson, U. S. Army, in Foreign Affairs, January 1966.

A careful review of the top U. S. organizational ar­rangements used to handle critical national security problems.

"Our Merchant Marine in Trouble”

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy (Retired), in The Reporter, 13 January 1966.

A cogent summary of the problems and perils particu­larly accentuated by the increased overseas commit­ments of the United States. Sets forth the reasons for and the consequences of America’s decline to 12th place among the world’s merchant marine states.

"Red China’s Seapower”

Frank B. Case in Military Review, December 1965.

A proposal that the naval strength of America’s Pacific allies be channeled into a Pacific Naval Defense Organization and thereby leave U. S. naval forces free to conduct ocean antisubmarine warfare campaig^ns and other major missions.

"Revolution in Latin America”

George C. Lodge in Foreign Affairs, January 1966.

A former U. S. Assistant Secretary of Labor for Inter­national Affairs asserts that the Latin American revolu­tion is both inevitable and necessary; he offers a six- point program for the United States to stress in formu­lating its Latin American policies.

"Social and Behavioral Sciences in Counterinsurgency”

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Hartness, U. S. Army Reserve (Retired), in Military Review, January 1966.

A strong plea for an intelligent program for winning over the population as a major counter to subversive activity of Communist insurgents. The author asserts that technical know-how is not enough and that sociological factors must be clearly understood.

"The Soviet Space Program”

Henry T. Simmons in Space Aeronautics, December 1965.

An American space scientist analyzes the Soviet space program and their alleged “14 consecutive failures m planetary probes.” He concludes that the Russians have sacrificed solid progress for spectacular successes ot ephemeral significance.

"Strategic Policy and American Government: Structural Constants and Variables”

Edward J. Kolodziej in The Review of Politics, October 1965.

An American political scientist analyzes the expressed fear that America’s reaction to its international respon­sibilities may result in an “independent military and a militarized state!” The author presents convincing evi­dence showing the growth of a sophisticated and ac­countable civilian-military relationship.

"United States Navy War Crimes Trials (1945-1949)”

George E. Erickson, Jr. in Washburn Law Journal, Winter 1965.

Deals extensively with the Navy’s Guam and Kwajalem trials of suspected Japanese and native war criminals, well documented.