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In his article, “Is Business Developing the Right Kind of Manager,” Dr. Bernard J. Bienvenue equates “capability of corporate management to adjust to change” with “industrial survival,” and states that “all too many companies are still clinging to concepts and practices more suited to the relatively changeless conditions under which business was carried on in the past hundred years.” Similarly, Mr. Ralph Rudd, President, North American Aviation’s Los Angeles Division, noting an analogy to the old stick-and-wire airplane of barnstorming days and the modern jet, says, “The common sense approach was adequate in the ‘good old days’ but today we must instrument the seat of the pants.” Obviously, the Navy is not in business to turn a profit; it never was and never should be. Its product is measured in terms of overall contribution to national power, not on any system of corporate balance sheets. But, in a very real sense, just as in the case of any industrial corporation, how the Navy is managed today will determine its role for the future. Hence, “management” is not just a matter of abstruse theory and academic interest; it will determine the Navy’s continuing effectiveness, and possibly even its survival. No subject warrants closer attention from those of us who constitute the Navy— political appointees, and careerists in uniform or in mufti—than the competence of Navy management in which we all play a part.
Neither statute nor practice leaves any question as to who manages the Department of Defense today: Secretary Robert S. McNamara does. Very early in his tenure, Mr. McNamara established the mechanics for centralizing his control over the decisionmaking process and for administering the entire Department. This system, reflected in the Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, places management control of all the military services at the apex of the defense organizational pyramid.
Of the two lines of authority which the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act provided for the Secretary of Defense (i.e., the direct line of command to unified and specified combatant commands, and the line for administrative control of the military departments), it is the administrative or “management” channel that concerns us here. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U. S. Navy (Retired), in his testimony prior to the passage of that Act, said “ . . . (The Secretary of Defense] exercises his [administrative] control through responsible, civilian authorities—the Secretaries of the Departments ... I believe this is a good organization.”
Secretary McNamara appears to be using the Secretaries as Admiral Burke foresaw. In insisting that they “manage” their departments in strict conformance to the established programming system, he requires direct participation by each Secretary in any decision that affects his department’s interests in the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
The Secretary of the Navy, then, is the manager of his department, in exactly the same sense that Secretary McNamara is the manager of the entire Department of Defense. It is the Secretary of the Navy who must present, support fully, and defend all Navy proposals.
Fundamentally, the critical management decision on defense matters is: How much of this nation’s resources should be expended for what? This issue first must be faced and resolved within the Defense Establishment. Because only after the decision has been reached internally can appropriate supplications to the Bureau of the Budget and to Congress commence.
The mechanics by which the basic issue of “how much for what” must be resolved are the same, irrespective of who makes the decision. The process inevitably entails the reconciliation of two completely different and always conflicting sets of interests. Such interests can be classified in military parlance as Operations vs. Logistics; Requirements vs. Feasibility; User vs. Producer; Effectiveness vs. Cost. Regardless of the terms employed, the conflict always reduces in the final analysis to the economics of Demand vs. Supply.
In the “old days,” while still a “separately organized and separately administered” Department, the Navy itself made the decisions which reconciled these conflicting sets of interests. A former Secretary of the Navy, Mr. William B. Franke, has provided an ex-
and all hands to the Congress and to
the American public.
urthermore, during the final appropria- ®ns showdown in the halls of Congress, each
°f the
cellent description of how this was accomplished, through the functioning of the Navy’s long-established bilinear system.*
Before 1961, Mr. Franke noted, the Secretary of the Navy was in a position to settle, within the Navy, any differences of opinion. He listened to and worked with the Chief of ^aval Operations and the Commandant of 1 e Marine Corps as the operational “users” °n the one hand, and his Under Secretary as t e chief spokesman for the logistic “pro- ucers” (his specialized Assistant Secretaries ani stx Bureau Chiefs) on the other.
t he principal advantage of this bilinear Upe of organization is that it provides the over-all manager with a facility for resolving issues in achieving an acceptable balance e ween the two sets of opposing interests— Operational requirements of the combatant orces, and logistic capability for fulfilling °se requirements. The assurance of a co- eciual right to be heard at the highest level Presumably guards against either set of con- si erations being completely subordinated to beC other, and allows final determinations to ■i ,rnacH by the one individual who is response for both.
“ former days, after the issues involving “\-erences °f opinion had been resolved, a avy position” was established, and the any spokesmen for the Navy could go for- Vvard as a body each year at budget and aPpropriation time to “sell” that position on , Very wide front and with diversified tactics:
, e Secretary to the Secretary of Defense, j., e bureau of the Budget, and the President;
lc Chief of Naval Operations and the Com- U'andant of the Marine Corps to the Joint , separate services found it important to ave the right “friends at court.” Partisan- ’P, pressure groups, lobbyists, popularity, Personality, sentimentality, log-rolling—all 0 the political gambits, with all stops pulled and no holds barred—were available to the Vari°us “salesmen” of a particular service P°sition as reflected in its budget.
U Franke, “Civilian Control of the Navy,”
• o. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1964, P- 106.
But what about today? Quite a few of the circumstances have changed. At budget time it is now the “Department of Defense position” that goes forward to the Bureau of the Budget, the President, and the Congress— not the Navy and the Army and the Air Force positions separately. The decisions as to “how much of the Nation’s resources should be expended for what” have been made by the Secretary of Defense, not by the separate service secretaries. And they have been made within the confines of the Department of Defense—not within the political arena or in the public forum.
What used to be characterized as “service rivalry” by many pundits and erstwhile critics of the military, when the Departments were each vying with the other in public, has now converted to a new kind of competition within the Department of Defense. This does not mean that parochialism has been eliminated, nor do the rules of the game necessarily imply that it should be. There is a proper place for parochialism, or service pride, or whatever one chooses to call it, inherent in the process of considering all possible alternatives before reaching a decision in programming matters.
Competition for the favorable decision in the Department of Defense programming process is keen and can sometimes be rough. The Navy must be able to prove conclusively that its military capability and ratio of cost to effectiveness in performing national security objective missions, is superior to that of its sister services. When the Navy can do so, a “favorable” program decision results. When it cannot, that particular competition is lost.
The implications of this “win or lose” situation are obvious: too many losses mean you are out of business. In the long run, the future of the Navy—as in the case of commercial enterprise—is a matter of competing or dying.
tet us take a cold, detached look at the j Navy’s record in competition for the “favorable” decision during the past four years. This sort of self-analysis requires the asking of some frank, soul-searching questions; and even more importantly, it requires a willingness on our part to come up with some honest and objective answers.
Has the Navy entered the competition fully prepared to prove its case conclusively? Have the cases been good, strong, sound ones which really warranted consideration in the first place? Has the Secretary of the Navy been able to present effectively a convincing body of evidence, in the current DOD language of cost-effectiveness and operations analysis, as to precisely why our proposal and our capability to meet a bona-fide need of the National Defense Establishment is superior to that of any other alternative for meeting it?
Unfortunately, the record shows that the Navy’s case has too often broken down under the intense light of operations analysis and cost-effectiveness scrutiny. Even more unfortunate has been the discernible tendency on the part of Navy spokesmen, when unable to prove a point conclusively, to try to argue it based on “military judgment” and appeals to tradition—a language which has proven less and less intelligible or acceptable to the Secretary of Defense since January of 1961.
Why has there been this initial lack of success when program change proposals have been submitted? One major contributing factor has been the failure to do all of the intricate homework required to prepare a case adequately. On occasions when a second or third or subsequent opportunity for re- clama have occurred, the Navy has sometimes proven its point to the full satisfaction of the Secretary of Defense. The clear implication here, however, is that more attractive and better substantiated alternatives did not exist at the time: hence the competition was not particularly rugged. Otherwise, the Navy might never have had a second chance.
Failure to do homework is evident also on those disastrous occasions when the Navy has gone forward with an ill-conceived or only partially though t-through proposal. Such cases can easily be, and have been, proven insupportable, as the Navy itself has found when forced to think them through completely. This type of traumatic experience certainly contributes nothing to enhance either our own self-confidence or the Navy’s image as an efficiently and effectively managed military department.
Why have we failed to do our homework and to prepare our cases adequately? Are we incapable of it? Of course not! Are we reluctant to do it, merely because we have never before been required to do so and therefore, in view of our proud history and excellent past record, consider it unnecessary or even an affront? Possibly so; but standing upon prerogative, or hoping against hope that all this will suddenly somehow go away, is in itself hardly worthy of the Navy tradition.
Genuine concern has been expressed in many quarters recently over “downgrading the military” in the Defense decisionmaking process.
It is not so much the question of who has the right to make the decisions which seems to perturb, because the principle of civilian control over the military is well established and accepted. Rather, concern usually centers on whether the opinions and advice of professional military men, based upon years of experience and proven competency in their fields of specialty, are being given freely, listened to, and accorded the full and objective consideration which is their due. In other words, the problem appears to concern the ability to communicate, not prerogative.
Under existing management practices, the direct participants in all final decisions concerning Navy interests in the Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program are the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. There is, of course, a continual interchange between the specialists in OSD and professionals within the Navy, and in some instances the myriad of details have all been worked out and agreed to prior to reaching the final decision-making level. In those instances where unresolved differences of opinion persist, however, it is important to note that in the final analysis, the military viewpoint of naval officers must be channeled into the decision-making process through the Secretary of the Navy.
The effectiveness with which these professional naval opinions are communicated at the final decision-making level will have direct bearing upon the degree to which professional advice is heeded. Further, the Secretary’s ability to communicate the professional naval views will depend largely upon how well and how thoroughly the Navy position has been developed prior to his presenting it to the Secretary of Defense.
Thus, the teamwork, co-operation, and understanding reflective of sound internal Navy management, assume paramount importance to the desired communication of the professional naval viewpoint.
Earlier discussion of Navy performance in today’s competitive environment has indicated the need for internal management ■mprovement. A review of the current situation, along with an assessment of the potentialities of the future, may help point the WaY to that goal.
There are, for example, those who feel that oe centralization of decision-making within me Office of the Secretary of Defense has re- uced the prestige of the secretaries of the ree military departments. From one point 0 view this may be so, in the same sense that
son to conclude that the prestige of the secretaries of the military departments has been enhanced, not derogated.
Most of the new DOD management facts of life have been apparent for almost four years. Some evidence that they have been comprehended by the Navy, at least on an intellectual basis, is to be found in various organizational changes resulting from the review of management of the Department of the Navy which was initiated in March of 1962.
Among the more significant of these changes was the complete restructuring of the old bilinear organization to assist the Secretary in discharging his new responsibilities as “the manager” of the Department of the Navy. Insight into the vastly changed role of the Secretary—from listener, adjudicator,
1 leir earlier removal from Cabinet status was a blow to the prestige of their offices. On ae other hand, the insistence by Secretary McNamara that the secretaries become the managers in fact of their respective departments, has affixed personal responsibility to a degree rarely seen in the past. They are eld responsible to the Secretary of Defense °r the detailed forward planning as well as ,'Jr the performance of their departments, hey are morally responsible to every in- •vidual within their departments—and to ae Nation—for the continued existence of the effective fighting forces these individuals c°nstitute. Such management responsibility sheds new light upon the authority which must be held by the individual who bears it. °° m another sense, there may be ample rea- and program-decision-maker (as described so aptly by Secretary Franke), to direct participant and final advocate of the professional Navy viewpoint in OSD program-decisionmaking—is reflected in the organizational changes directed.
The Secretary’s need for more personal staff assistance was recognized, and his appointed civilian executive assistants—formerly concerned with only the “producer” side of the Navy bilinear structure—were elevated to the top of the organizational pyramid. In this new position, each civilian executive assistant would be expected to function within a designated area of specialty, both: (a) as a policy advisor and staff assistant to the Secretary in helping him evaluate, reconcile, and settle any differences of opinion between
“user” and “producer” in developing the Navy position on proposed program changes; and (b) as an “alter ego” of the Secretary, and his executive assistant in supervising previously approved programs and policies.
A corollary to placing the Secretary’s civilian executive assistants above both the user and producer elements of the bilinear structure, was the establishment of the “single producer executive” concept. By this means, the vacuum created by removal of the civilian executive assistants from the producer organization would be filled by senior naval officers who could draw together, command, and speak for the “producers” in the same way the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps do for the “users.”
Thus, the new organizational pattern provides, in theory, for centralized policy direction and control (i e., by the Secretary, as aided and assisted by his civilian executive assistants), and decentralized execution (i.e., by the Naval Executives—CNO, CMC, and the single producers).
Although the organizational changes outlined above were directed a year and a half ago, their implementation still remains to be achieved fully. Many of the implied changes in relationships are as profound as they are fundamental, and they will require time and a greater depth of understanding in order to develop their effectiveness. This can con-
A craduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1935, Captain Cline served at the U. S. Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa, from 1941 to 1943, when he was assigned to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. He then served in Japan on the stafT of COMNAVFE from 1945 to 1947. He performed supply and/or fiscal duties at MCAS, Cherry Point, N. C.; in the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42); and at SHAPE Headquarters in Paris prior to attending the National War College from August 1955 to June 1956. He was subsequently assigned to the Military Clothing and Textile Supply Agency; the Joint Staff, CINCPAC; and as Assistant Chief of Naval Material (Procurement) from July 1960 until August 1964. He is now a Special Assistant in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy.
ceivably be expedited through further consideration of the theoretical advantages offered by the new structure, and by some reflection upon the available tools with which to work toward achieving better internal management.
By no means least among the Navy’s tangible management assets is its long-standing practice of decision-making in a bilinear structure. Intimate knowledge and experience in the processes of resolving issues between user and producer is invaluable in today’s Defense management climate. As noted previously, these processes still constitute the fundamental basis upon which decisions are reached in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Navy management is at least completely familiar with the tools of the trade.
Next, the topside restructuring of the Navy’s management organization during 1963, provides—at least on paper—a very substantial increase in management capability and staff assistance available directly to the Secretary in discharging the tremendous responsibilities of his office. Further, the broadened and strengthened channels of communication thus provided, between operational users and the Secretary or his civilian executive assistants, afford a valuable safeguard against the possibility of future “down-grading of the advice of the military.”
And, finally, in the category of major assets, are the career people—both military and civilian—who constitute the rest of the Navy management team. No people, certainly, are more knowledgeable of the capabilities, the limitations, the achievements or the problems of the Navy than are the careerists.
But, irrespective of the intrinsic value of the assets readily available to the Navy management team, the fact remains that unless these assets are employed to the best advantage their combined potential can never be capitalized upon.
Since “management” means getting things done through people, and since the real crux of the matter is how Navy management can be improved upon, let us try to assess the combined potential of Navy management assets by taking a closer look at the team currently available to assist the Secretary of the Navy in managing the Department of the Navy.
Immediately available to the Secretary, of course, are the Under and Assistant Secretaries who can serve as an extension of his own personality by attending to details and advising on matters for which the Secretary personally could never hope to find the time. He has also the principal operating or “user” executives—the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps— to advise him on the military requirements for increasing the Navy’s combat effectiveness, nd, completing the team, he has the “pro- ucer” executives, primarily the Chief of aval Material, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Chief of Medicine and Surgery, who a vise on technical feasibility and costs.
I hus, the three main elements of the Secretary s management team reflect very clearly e Navy’s bilinear organizational structure— 1 e Secretariat at the top, joining the user and the producer organizations on the next cnelon below. The rest of the management team falls into place in one or the other of ese three key spots, and each is worthy of a °ser look when we are considering the entire eam and its backup support.
Secretariat: The Under and the Assistant. Secretaries, like the Secretary himself, are Politically appointed. Each has an area of responsibility within which he is expected to concentrate his management efforts, and to oieve the same degree of understanding aad knowledgeability in that area as the cretary himself would achieve if any one lnan could do all things alone.
l he areas of responsibility of three of these Clvilian executive assistants encompass the nianagement of the four areas into which the ! avy has classified its resources, per se (i.e., NSECNAV—Personnel; ASN(l&L)—Mate- as well as Facilities; and ASN(R&D)—- csearch and Development). Since any proposed Navy program will involve a commit- ",K‘ru of one or more—frequently all four—of e‘sc resource categories, each civilian execu- e assistant concerned needs to obtain a complete understanding and knowledgeabil- % of exactly what each proposal involves in rrns of the resources which he manages, ms means understanding and appreciating considerations of military effectiveness, as "’HI as the aspects of technical feasibility and cost. He can achieve this sort of understanding by working directly with the career specialists in his area of responsibility, who are situated within both the user and producer organizations. Thus equipped with an intimate knowledge and appreciation of the situation—and it should be stressed, only when so equipped—the civilian executive assistant is in a position to contribute the kind of meaningful staff assistance and advice needed by the Secretary of the Navy.
The fourth of the politically appointed civilian executive assistants is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management. His contributions to the internal Navy position formulation process, while different in character from those of the Secretary’s resource managers, are no less important.
Under his aegis, for example, the Navy comptroller organization enables career specialists within the producer organization to make cost estimates on proposed resource utilization, and to assess their implications to resource management. This Assistant Secretary is continually oriented toward budgetary matters, and he is attuned to the going temper of the financial situation within the Defense Establishment, because of his relationships with the Comptroller of the Defense Department. As a result, he is in excellent position to furnish the Secretary of the Navy with sound advice on many matters which might otherwise not come to his attention at the time Navy positions are being developed.
The User Executives: As stated earlier, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are the principal ad- • visors to the Secretary on the military aspects of their services. Specifically, with respect to programming, they advise him on what is needed to enhance combat effectiveness. Each has, within his headquarters, a series of deputies or assistants who specialize in the resource areas previously mentioned: Personnel, Material, Facilities, and Research and Development. In dealing with the producer organizations, these individuals are the spokesmen for the “user” in all respects—both in the planning- for and in the execution of the Navy’s programs. It is these military career specialists who, in collaboration with their counterparts within the producer organization, must impart to the civilian executive assistant who manages their particular resource areas, the essential knowledge and understanding of operational implications upon which a sound Navy position can be established. It is, fundamentally, upon these key people that responsibility rests for injecting the Navy’s “professional military viewpoint” into the program- decision-making process.
The Producer Executives: At present, the producer function for each of the four resource areas is centered, either wholly or in part, within the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery, the Office of Naval Material, the Office of Naval Research, or under the immediate supervision of the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary (R&D). Irrespective of organizational placement, career specialists engaged in the producer function must work very closely with their resource-user counterparts, both in executing approved Navy programs and in providing information on the economic and technological feasibility of proposed program changes.
The mechanics of joining requisite skills, timing, and co-operation to develop the co-ordinated teamwork so essential in a Navy management team, are complex and require the fullest attention and maximum contribution of every member of the team. No one or two members can do the job alone.
A brief description of how the Navy management team might handle an imaginary program change proposal will serve to illustrate the kind and degree of teamwork required. Let us start with the following assumptions about such a proposal:
• It involves a major improvement to a weapon system which professional military planners in the user organization believe will enhance combat effectiveness.
• Preliminary research and exploratory development have indicated that the improvement desired is definitely within the realm of technological possibility.
• Further and substantial operational systems development efforts will be required before the desired improvement can be made.
• Procurements, ranging from developmental type contracts through ultimate full-scale production in volume, will be necessary and will extend through a number of years.
• Operation of the improved weapon system will necessitate substantial changes to existing facilities, and may possibly require new ones. • Before the improved weapon system can be deployed operationally, extensive training of the personnel to operate and maintain it will be needed.
All four categories of the Navy’s resources are clearly involved in these assumptions, and the full Navy management team will necessarily be brought into play.
The Navy Program Planning Office, under the Chief of Naval Operations, has the task of preparing the proposed program change. The Director of that office turns to the deputies in the resource areas—DCNO Personnel, DCNO Logistics, and DCNO Development— for immediate assistance. In turn, these deputies collaborate with each other, with other specialists within OPNAV, and with their counterparts in the producer organizations— the Office of Naval Research, the Office of Naval Material and the technical bureaus, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and possibly the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Simultaneously, the civilian executive assistant in each of the resource areas is drawn into the picture and kept fully apprised of significant developments by both the user and the producer executives. This part of the teamwork is essential because it fosters and encourages two-way communication between the operating executives and the Secretariat, thus facilitating a better understanding of objectives and problems in an area of mutual specialized interest. Secondly, it gives the user executives an opportunity to convince the civilian executive assistants of the military desirability of the proposed program change, thus assuring an input of the professional military viewpoint. And, finally, it gives the civilian executive assistants the detailed knowledge upon which they can base their advice to the Secretary at the time the over-all Navy position on the proposal is being taken.
In developing information necessary to substantiate the program change proposal, every resource element must be costed out. This is accomplished in the producer organizations, with the assistance of the comptroller and financial personnel (who come generally under the aegis of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management). At this point in the programming process, costing is an ancillary, not a substantive matter.
After all details and implications for each resource have been worked out, the informa- tlon compiled, and the program change proposal prepared in the prescribed format by the Navy Program Planning Office, the pCP” is ready for submission to the Secretary. At this point, the Office of Program Appraisal, an independent staff office working irectly for the Secretary, contributes an over- aJ, °bjective review and analysis of the cost- e ectiveness aspects of the entire proposal.
In evaluating the strength of the Navy posi- 10n, the Secretary employs his entire first earn: his civilian executive assistants, his top user executives, and his top producer executes. The proposal is looked at from every tl-N 6 ^he civilian executives who manage , e resource areas, thoroughly convinced of e soundness of the proposal through their Previous intimate collaboration with user and Producer counterparts, support it. The Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, aving reviewed the over-all cost-effectiveness aPPraisal in light of the financial climate currently prevailing within the Office of the retary of Defense, considers the prospects ^avorable. And the Secretary himself, having eviewed the complete body of evidence at and to use in convincing the Secretary of De- tjnse, decides that the Navy should go fora With its position, advocating a program nge for the improved weapon system, us ° COnc^uc^e this hypothetical example, let niake one final assumption: i.e., that the in <i.erte^ eh'°rts prove successful, and result th r? "favorable” decision for inclusion in e department of Defense Five-Year Force ^ ructure and Financial Program. Such a it '"iT011’ essenhal as it is, is not an end within ■ . *rom a Navy management point of view; j. ls °nly a license to begin. The difficult roes of budgeting and funding, develop- nt> procurement, construction, training, i^tmg, etc., all remain to be taken before the J)rovccl combat effectiveness resultant from ^ changed weapon system can be realized.
1 Is at this point in the Navy’s internal nagement process that the major advan- ge of the co-ordinated teamwork, necessarily ^ vf ■*°Ped during the pre-programming stage, gois to come into focus, because the same sCarn members who planned and justified the Parate parts of the integrated program, are
now charged with its co-ordinated execution. The team as a whole knows exactly where, when, why, and how it is going.
No one would hold that the Navy management teamwork described in the foregoing hypothetical example actually works that way today. Nor is there reason to believe that it describes the only way, or even the best way, for Navy teamwork to function.
Teamwork is more a matter of heart and of desire than of mechanics. Secretary James V. Forrestal once said, “Good will can make any organization work. Conversely, the best organization chart in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work do not believe in it.” How else than through desire and good will can life be breathed into an inanimate, theoretical “organization” to make it become a vital and living management team?
There are no obvious reasons for reluctance on the part of anyone within the Navy— whether careerist or political appointee—to want to join together in a spirit of wholehearted co-operation and teamwork to make and to keep this the best Navy in the world. It may be true that, by virtue of differing backgrounds and experience, career executives in uniform speak an entirely different language in some matters from that which appointed civilian executives speak. It should be crystal clear, though, that it is in the language of the latter that the views of the former must be expressed today. And it should be equally obvious that it is definitely to the advantage of both types of Navy executives that this be done well and effectively, because the decisions which affect the Navy’s role in the Defense Establishment of this nation today are being made by, and in the language of, the civilian executives.
Good teamwork without a common understanding and a united desire to make the team click is inconceivable. The closer working- together, and the type of continuous intercommunication suggested in the hypothetical example given, offer almost unlimited opportunities to achieve that sort of understanding, and to generate the kind of team spirit that proves unbeatable.
Can Navy management meet today’s challenge? Obviously, it will require the best efforts and the full support of all hands, end