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"The Credible Incentive”
(See pages 75-81, July 1964 Proceedings)
Captain E. J. Newbould, U. S. Navy (Commanding Officer, USS Elokomin, AO-55) —Captain Golden has courageously said many things about the naval career which have been left unspoken for too long.
Nevertheless, I cannot help but think that the exaggerations, the hyperbole, and the cynicism of the article were designed to shock officers into thinking about this subject rather than to present an accurate, top-side view of the current officer situation. For example, it is true that some administrative controls have been established over the retirement of captains. At the same time, however, it has been necessary for the Navy to obtain legislation to force 35 per cent of these over-worked “bus boys” to retire during the last five years and in the coming five years. If the incentive to remain in the naval service is so incredible why are statutory weapons such as these necessary?
Quite naturally the officer personnel problem—and no one will deny that there is a problem—is less concerned with the retention of captains than it is with the recruitment of junior officers who may aspire to be captains. Here Captain Golden has rendered a service in identifying some of the very real shortcomings of the present-day naval career. He is correct that: a service career is for almost all officers a foreshortened pursuit with an inglorious ending at the same time our civilian counterparts are in their peak earning period; there is an attitude of unconcern if not active distrust on the part of the Navy toward the preparation of officers for retirement as though this were a matter of a wholly private nature for a limited number of individuals; those who choose the Federal Government as an employer should be on guard that the terms of employment, including retirement benefits, are always subject to the vagaries of unpredictable political and economic factors; and long deployments are
Pejorative for the newly-married junior officer who is considering a naval career.
At this point, I am constrained to state that I consider it a distinct disservice to mock the professionalism of the naval officer. n addition to other characteristics, the rota- hon of officers, a proven system, is very sim- l ar t0 the executive training programs of the Clv’lian industries which appear to evoke so tauch of the author’s admiration.
After recounting some of the ills of a naval career, we are presented with the Golden rule °f increased pay as a solution. Survey after survey has amply demonstrated that the pay °f the naval officer is considered adequate if a°t generous by those considering a career ln the Navy. Despite this there is no reason to imply that the naval authorities concerned are not making sincere efforts to maintain Pa>’ scales at high levels and to forestall the erosion of inflation. In commenting on the ast significant pay raise given to the military, in October 1963 the Chief of Naval Operations stated flatly, “It is not enough.”
What the Navy itself can and should do for its regular career officers is to recognize that the majority of its officers for the foreseeable future will be “short timers” of 20 to 25 years and that any action taken by the Navy to prepare such officers for another career will be of both immediate and long-range value to the Navy. For far too long the Navy has maintained an aloof attitude toward the reality of officer retirement.
Administratively, the Navy, acting on its own initiative and showing the way for the other services, should embark on a postservice preparation program. What is needed here, initially, is the establishment of a policy which recognizes the need of the career officer to develop his skills for adaptation to civil life and to require command encouragement to assist him in attaining such developments. This is by no means against the interests of the Navy. On the contrary, since a policy of the type envisioned would of necessity in-
elude a greatly expanded extra-curricular education program, the immediate and long- range rewards to the Navy would be to raise the educational level of the officer corps. This is an investment in people. If it did nothing else, it would give the lie to those who believe that the Navy discards its officers like “slow halfbacks.” The benefits to the nation at large on a long-term basis are supported by the experience derived from the universally applauded GI Education Bill. And finally, such a program would undoubtedly help to overcome the primary objection which farsighted young men (of the type we need) have to the 20-to-25-year instead of lifetime naval career.
For its part, the Navy must also be alert to counteract the storm, now no bigger than a man’s hand, which is sure to erupt when steps are taken by the Congress to limit the current retirement benefits. That Congress will do so is as certain as that past is prologue unless the Services, in concert, commence a backfire now. An Armed Services Committee statement of principle to give some legal color to what is now but a moral obligation may be a means to retain one of our most elementary incentives.
Insofar as long deployments are concerned, it is the Navy’s officers who in large numbers must suffer this corollary of going to sea in ships. A legal precedent has been established in the separation pay legislation and here I would agree with Captain Golden. Increase the separation pay to an amount approaching flight pay and force would be required to keep young officers ashore. This is uniquely and primarily a Navy problem, and it will be with us for as long as we maintain ships. Let then the Navy Department strive for this legislation.
I am confident that Captain Golden, by emphasizing the unattractive aspects of a
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication in these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
naval career, had as his object the sincere intention of generating ideas on how such a career can be improved. There is room for improvement. The methods outlined herein are, for the most part, within the capability of the Navy Department with modest increases in current programs. Efforts expended by the Navy in these areas would demonstrate to all officers and in particular to those on the brink of a naval career that there is continuing validity in the motto, “The Navy takes care of its own.”
Commander John D. Alden, U. S. Navy- Captain Golden’s article fans into flame the smoldering embers of 20 years of ups and downs; of wars and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson; the genesis and exodus of the “hump”; of former shipmates retired, resigned, selected out, or passed away in harness; of pay bills proposed and smaller pay bills passed; of good billets and some not so good; and of senior officers, inspiring and otherwise. It brings to mind letters of resignation mentally drafted in moments of wrath, but never written; of exploratory nibbles at the temptations of the civilian world; and vain tabulations of the monetary pros and cons. Like Captain Golden, I too conclude that the incentive is not really credible. Like him, I am still on active duty.
There are only two incentives which lead young men to enter the Navy, excluding the draft and not considering the reasons which impel enlisted men to seek officer status. These incentives are a true desire to serve in the Navy, which may stem initially from a multitude of real or imagined conceptions or misconceptions of Navy life, and the desire to get a free education. Not since the Great Depression has there been any real financial incentive for significant numbers of men to leave civilian for military life. If a man dislikes Navy life no incentive in the world other than an empty stomach will compel him to enter or stay in it. Nevertheless, every year young men who had enough motivation to enter the naval service become ensigns or second lieutenants with an inexorable period of obligated service.
The problem then becomes one of inducing these newly commissioned officers to remain for the duration of a Navy career.
Given these officers who presumably entered Service voluntarily, two forces are operating to keep them in the Navy. Those who have a frue love of the Navy need no other incentive. 1 le other incentive, whose strength we tend underestimate, is human inertia, or the ‘unate tehdency to avoid change, especially rorn the known to the unknown.
Opposed to these incentives is a legion of Pressures which literally compel those who °Ve the Navy, as well as those who like it Vvt‘H enough to stay in through inertia, to get uut. I think a majority of officers leave the ‘Navy because they are driven out; not because they are tempted out.
I can speak with conviction only regarding reasons of those men of whom I have Personal knowledge. I am sure other officers j'ull feel that other reasons are of greater “Uportance to themselves.
There are two things about the Navy which pan, for some, constitute real hardships. There ’f the problem of family separation: some men literally have to choose between the Navy and ‘heir wives; the other hardship can be finan- c‘al. The officer with only one or two young children, or whose wife is working, or who has an independent outside income, will not uecessarily understand this. Those who are attempting to support a large family, or put Several children through college, or contend j'uth a chronic illness in the family, can find ‘t impossible to make ends meet. The recent Pay increase loosened the pinch barely in time for many.
I would like to make a parenthetical comment regarding Commander R. T. E. Bowler’s remarks about the professional submariners of ‘he USS Dace (SSN-607) “ to whom the Navy’s Present incentives are apparently credible.”[1] As one who enjoyed an early career as a submariner, I agree that submarine service is challenging and has elite status. But I would )<; dishonest if I were to ignore the inducement of additional pay. After leaving submarine service for other fields my living standard took a noticeable drop. It is unrealistic ‘° rhapsodize about the esprit of submariners, aviators, and other elite groups without considering how far the extra pay goes toward lubricating the day-to-day financial frictions which beset many surface ship officers. That added money may not buy happiness or satisfaction, but it makes living easier.
Captain Golden makes a fair comparison of the usual incentives and concludes that the balance is in favor of the civilian side. I agree. In such matters as family separation, work hours, prestige or status, difficulty of work, frequency of dislocation, fringe benefits, and the perquisites of higher rank, I think private industry can and does outdo the armed services. The general public apparently does not realize that officers pay income tax, pay for their own insurance, contribute toward Social Security, buy their uniforms, take their chances on dependents’ medical care, and in general do not get anywhere near as much out of their fringe benefits as is generally thought.
Perhaps the publicity devoted to making our incentives seem credible is responsible for the fact that they are more credible to outsiders than to us.
There are at least two facets of a Navy career which the public considers as benefits but which I think have been significantly misrepresented. The first is job security. Officers in the armed forces do not have anywhere near as much as is generally thought. No industry in this country operates on the Navy’s up-or-out promotion policy, practices forced attrition of its management and technical personnel, or throws so many of its people out of work between the ages of 40 and 50. This, in turn, leads directly to the other overrated benefit—retirement. The idea of going onto half pay just when the children are ready to start college seems more like losing one’s job rather than being rewarded. Since when is it so easy to start a new career after 40? The very word “retirement” connotes a relaxed life in Florida, except when it is applied to a man pushed out of his job at the peak of his family’s requirements. Retired pay is a nice anchor to windward, but will not support a growing family. If a man really wants job security and comfortable retirement he is better off working at a steady civilian job until he is 60 than shifting from a military to civilian career at 40.
I do not see how the Navy can ever compete with private industry in the types of in-
96
centives discussed by Captain Golden. Instead of attempting to fabricate illusory incentives, I think the Navy would do better to mitigate the pressures which are driving its officers out. The Navy cannot increase its own pay, but it could make its people’s work less onerous for the same pay. Officers get tired of being constantly driven to work a little harder, operate with fewer men and maintenance funds each year, and keep the ship deployed a little longer. It is all very well to blame outsiders, but I believe that most of the pressures originate within the Navy. Too much weight may be given in the selection process to the hard driver who is successful at squeezing that little extra performance out of his command. Is he perhaps using his subordinates as mere stepping stones to further his own career? A study of the personnel attrition rate associated with some of our better publicized “crash” programs might be quite illuminating.
The Navy could also be less grudging about its benefits. As Captain Golden points out, our departmental staffs seem more interested in
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finding ways to deny us little benefits which could legitimately be granted than in trying to improve the incentives to stay in. There are little annoyances like the bills for overweight household effects (what if you need furniture for a big family?), quibbling over per die® and taxi fares, endless waits at poorly organized family clinics, and exchanges that make no effort to serve the customer. Improvements in these areas are within the Navy’s own power to change.
The Navy could also be more solicitous in seeing that its people get the leave to which they are entitled (or is it privileged?). Policy statements about taking afternoons off for exercise have been a big joke, since they are coupled with enough work to keep a man busy a full seven days a week. The Navy could do more than it does to protect its people fro® the consequences of just one bad break, one clash of personality with a commanding officer, one mismarriage of man and job, one unjust fitness report.
Finally, there are the attacks from outside. There is the constant harping by a few columnists and politicians about “brass hats,” “the military mind,” “armed service waste and inefficiency,” “interservice bickering,” and the like. There are the perennial efforts to take away some of our benefits, to close our installations, to cut back our appropriations, to turn all shore jobs over to civilians. It is bad enough to hear these things; it is worse that voices are rarely raised in our defense. Studies to reduce our benefits are originated by our own leaders, some in the Navy Department, some in the Department of Defense, some in Congress—all by people we are sworn to serve. The case for the serviceman is presented only by a few civilian publications like the Navy Times, or the columns of Hanson W. Baldwin in The New York Times, or in the Naval Institute Proceedings. I regret to say that I have seen very little evidence of the fine old concept of loyalty down for a good many years.
Captain Golden and I cannot seem to find a credible incentive, yet we both continue to serve. Many civilians do not hesitate to opine that it is because we are stupid, lazy, or afraid to face the challenges of civilian life. We certainly are not serving for the pay, prestige, or other emoluments. In looking
ack at the friends and acquaintances who ave yielded to the pressure to leave the Navy, can only say “There but for the grace of oc* go I.” In situation after situation just *‘nc little push more could have made the merence. The public no longer considers it Very credible for us to claim that we are paying in for patriotic motives or because we °Ve the Navy. They think such reasons are unbearably corny. I fear that for many of us ne only reason is that we have not quite been driven out—yet.
Editor’s note: Commander Alden has informed Us that since this letter was written he has submitted ls request for retirement, having failed to be selected 0 the rank of captain on 13 August 1964.
Rear Admiral, C. R. Welte, U. S. Navy | Retired)—Captain Golden’s article seems to e an exceedingly superficial and short- Slghted view of the incentive that is needed.
The officers the Navy needs can only be ud if freedom for creativity and initiative is allowed them in all grades. It is the incessant how of directives from above and the “personal” command of commanders who ignore their huge staffs that rob officers of a sense of accomplishment. No pay legislation is going t° make up for that.
Captain Stephen B. Lee, SC, U. S. Navy- Captain Golden’s article is most stimulating aud disquieting. It could provide a springboard for action to provide personnel programs which can infuse new vitality into the Oiilitary services and particularly the naval service. It is time that the problems of our human hardware” receive adequate consideration in comparison to the problems of °ur machines and material.
I found the article of particular interest Primarily because of a long-term conviction that the Navy, as an organization, must be Olore concerned with the motivations and incentives of its membership and, to a lesser degree, because of the recent educational experience of attending the 45 th Advanced hfanagement Program at the Harvard Business School.
At that course I served as a member of a study group on executive motivation. In presenting the group’s findings to the membership and faculty of the Program, I cited my own formula for motivation as consisting of equal elements of ambition (personal drive toward the goals we set for ourselves), leadership (as exerted on us and by us on our subordinates), follow ship (the disciplines we accept), and fellowship (including certain inhibiting factors of responsibility to our fellows as well as a sense of competition with them). Incentives, on the other hand, were treated as the material and financial factors which formed the framework within which motivation could be effective.
The conclusions of our study group, and those of the members of the program as a whole, were surprising. We found that a desire for financial rewards of various sorts must yield at least co-equal status to a desire for personal satisfaction, the evidences of personal excellence, and the attainment of personal goals. Intangibles, in other words, bore at least equal rank with tangibles. The ancient Greek ideal of “exercising one’s vital powers along lines of excellence in a life affording them scope” overrode material considerations.
I might add, somewhat ruefully, that while indulging in this spate of altruism I was personally suffering slight pangs of envy when I considered the incentives enjoyed by my civilian contemporaries at Harvard: Their pay and perquisites, their expense accounts, and their bonuses were beyond comparison with service equivalents, if any. However, all discussions were premised on a reasonable income as the point of departure. And I believe a Navy income is “reasonable” in most respects, except possibly by comparison.
Being relatively basic, I think that public service as a whole—be it teaching, the clergy, or the civil or military service—constitutes a series of occupations which by their very nature cannot command compensation equal to that of industry or the accepted “professions.” And, therefore, to offset the shortcomings of compensation, we of the public service must have adequate motivation. I fall back on my formula for motivation—ambition, leadership, fellowship, and fellowship—- as the personal offsetting element.
In the Navy, motivation must be higher than in other services because of our longer family separations and lesser family facilities. Indeed, within the Navy our motivation must be very carefully graduated because of certain pay and rotational advantages which are afforded to specialists.
But all of this is not incompatible with Captain Golden’s paper. Rather, it serves to point up some specific steps which could be taken to improve the naval service through emphasis on motivation as well as incentive factors.
Perhaps the most telling point Captain Golden makes is the “temporary” nature of our calling. Our enlisted men are, generally, thoroughly indoctrinated to the 20-year cruise as optimum. The selection processes, including “hump” provisions, cause most “career” officers to retire or be forced out at approximately age 50, at the peak of their experience. This leaves the relatively few who remain to fulfill a “normal” career. Such will be the way of life in the Navy for the foreseeable future.
We must all admit that our “incentives” have been compressed in recent years, particularly on a comparative basis with civilian pursuits. This is, to an extent at least, a normal process in a dynamic and developing society such as ours. That military incentives have not kept pace with civil service ones, specifically on the basis of comparative responsibility, is to be regretted, but this too, perhaps, will give a cue for future action.
As a first step in correcting the sad state of our motivations and incentives, I feel we must stop being reticent and apologetic. We must enlist our civilian superiors—at the presidential level as well as secretarial and Congressional—on our side, to sponsor us in being positive, aggressive, and forwardlooking in establishing a set of goals which are long-range, consistent, and firm. We have been shortsighted, inconsistent, and flexible in the past. We cannot afford to devote our time and energies to, and sacrifice our principles for, small victories—responsibility pay, donated swords, a return to first-class transportation, etc.—while the big issues slip away.
As a starting point for a firm set of goals, I would suggest the following. More can and should be added.
• Prepare a positive and well-thought-out program to ready officers for retirement to include, but not be limited to, opportunity for outside education with full credit for service educational experience, placement assistance, etc. It should also include provision, not denial, of opportunity to proceed into civil or foreign service careers (without forfeiture of retirement rights).
• Sponsor top-level recognition of the thought that there is what Captain Golden terms “rewardable talent” in uniform. This would involve conscious curtailment by the Congress and the press of the use of some of their favorite targets of opportunity. It also would entail some real and equivalent responsibility on our part to be thoroughly worthy. The commander who abuses his prerogatives should receive summary treatment. Conversely, the proper perquisites of authority should be encouraged unabashedly-
• Extend such kind remarks (and the attendant follow-up) as are frequently made by highly-placed politicians concerning the need for acquiring and retaining good civil servants to include the military. How much more important it is that we have a well-motivated, well-compensated citizen at the controls of a warship or aircraft than in the halls of the Federal Triangle, whatever their voting bloc.
• Tie the military in with each round of government pay raises and establish ground for equivalency of responsibility and pay- None of us in the service really resents our pay status, per se. It is when the civil servant who works for one of us (and is sheltered under our responsibility) begins to draw more pay, and enjoys greater leave benefits, pension and other perquisites, that things begin to seem inequitable.
• Give real recognition to the bright young (or old) men in the service. The five per cent early selection is inadequate and outmoded, as recent flag selections have demonstrated. On the other hand, some who have been passed over several times have continually and continuingly done excellent work.
• Sponsor, engender, and enforce teamwork and mutual respect with civilians who serve in temporary status. I can only believe the gap in civilian-military relations is caused by poor communications. Insist on good communications and on continued use of outstanding military men in the public service even if their means of communications with new and inexperienced civilian superiors should break down. Teamwork—not tolerance, not interference—is the keynote here.
In the light of my personal convictions of
0ng standing, and of my recent experience at Harvard with more than 100 business leaders of the world, I must conclude that cash rewards alone are of themselves insufficient to keep anyone in the Navy or in any °ther walk of life. A sense of personal dignity, a feeling of belonging to a fine organization, and a consciousness of achievement (however small or provincial) in the face of adversity 0r in routine situations are the elements that count and which we must emphasize to Present and future generations of Navy men.
The Roots of Russia”
®ee pages 40-57, April 1963 Proceedings)
C. P. Lemieux—The Russian-language ^°Prosi Istorii (Questions of History) in January 1964, published the following commen- [ary on Dr. Dobriansky’s article under the heading “An American Historian Falsifies the History of the U.S.S.R.”
& & &
The article in question was written by the Georgetown University professor, L. Dobrian- sky, who has the rank of lieutenant colonel in the U. S. Army Reserve. In the U.S.A. he is considered a “specialist” in the history of the y.S.S.R., since he is the author of many
Works” in that area. However, in the article examined, the reader will not find the slightest Sign of a professor’s scientific conscientiousness and erudition. Furthermore, one cannot help thinking that he is entirely unacquainted ''nth the topic of his research.
Dobriansky begins his article with a lament °n the “errors and mistaken concepts” exist- lng in the mind of the average American as to the contemporary structure of Soviet society and government, and on the fact that even Hss is known in the United States about the Past of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The mtention of the author to acquaint the reader wUh the actual facts of the history of our Country could only be welcomed. But on reading the article one becomes convinced that by the “regrettable errors” the author means certain entirely correct reasonings of the rank-and-file American re the Soviet State and its history, and the author’s purpose ls to foist on the reader a distorted concept of the U.S.S.R. Treating his historical facts very freely, he builds an idealistic and completely trumped-up scheme of the historical development of the Russian people from the 15 th century to our day. The basic thought which is consistently expounded throughout the article is the absence of any fundamental difference between the old tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. On the basis of his concept, Dobriansky advances the thesis that the development of Russia always took place in certain age-old, but essentially irrational principles, supposedly inherent in the Russian people: “the Russian imperialistic expansion and colonialism,” “the totalitarian despotism and tyranny,” “the messianic complex,” as the bases of successive forms of reigning ideologies. Dobriansky tries to put into the Procrustean bed of this concept. the entire history of our country for the past 500 years, and to prove that all that time was filled with the “expansion of the Russians” in three directions: west, east, and south. In the process he tries to pin the same label on both the tsarist policy, which he regards always as unilateral, and the foreign policy of the Soviet government. If one can believe Dobriansky, there were never any invaders or aggressive actions against tsarist Russia. He seems not to know that from the moment of the Great October Revolution the history of the Soviet State is filled with the struggle against aggressors and the preservation of peace.
The author strives to prove that the manifestation of despotism and tyranny occurred almost exclusively in Russia, whereas in fact they were characteristic of all medieval absolute monarchies. Similar acts in the time of Ivan the Terrible or Peter I were supposedly a manifestation of a peculiarly Russian style of rule. The thesis of the “age-old story of Russian tyranny and totalitarianism” is also used by the author as gross slander against Soviet democracy, declaring the Russian Communists to be heirs to the governmental procedures of tsarist officialdom.
In the field of economics, the author’s statements are no less absurd. According to his story, it was easy to make a transition to the collective rural economy, inasmuch as the commune was the traditional form of organization of the Russian rural population, and economic collectivism had always been characteristic of the Russians. Not only that, he sagely avers that “Peter the Great was the first Bolshevik,” well-nigh laid the foundations of general state planning; and Nicholas II supposedly thought up the elaboration of a “five-year plan.” Of course such inept analogies can have birth only in the head of an ignorant person.
Going on to “ideological problems,” the author first of all mentions the mystic and obscurantist White Russian emigre Berdyaev, citing his fabrication of the notion that “Russian Communism,” panslavism, and the theory of the “Third Rome,” at whose basis allegedly lie the ideas of Messianism, constitute the three forms of “Russian imperialism” which have succeeded each other during the past five centuries. Dobriansky consciously ignores the basic difference in the class nature of Marxism-Leninism and any forms of bourgeois or feudal ideology. He pretends that he does not know of the existence in the past in various feudal states, and even in our day in the capitalistic states, of theories having tendencies analogous to the preaching of the “Third Rome” or of panslavism.
Slandering the October Revolution and distorting the history of the civil war, Dobriansky tries to depict the matter as though during those years there was a struggle going on between the oppressed nationalities of the former tsarist Russia and “Russians in general, both white and red.” This concept, false from beginning to end, distorting historical facts, and based on the ignoring of the class structure of society and the essence of the struggle of forces of the new world against all that is obsolescent, is necessary to the author for the next falsification. The universally historical event, the creation of the Soviet Union of the great commonwealth of liberated friendly nations, is blasphemously characterized by Dobriansky as the “final conquest by the Russian bolshevik armies of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and of Turkestan,” and the rebirth of the “Muscovite empire.” What is the need for all these fantastic falsifications and fabrications?
The answer is given in the last lines of the article. It turns out that the author belongs to the category of American figures who cherish dreams of weakening the Soviet Union by sowing discord in the amiable family of Soviet peoples.
In conclusion, I would like to mention one fact indicating the ignorance of the author. Among the illustrative materials accompanying the article there is a reproduction of a picture by the famous Russian war-illustrator, V. V. Vereschagin. The subtitle says that it shows the defense of a village in Manchuria by Russian soldiers during the Russo- Japanese war of 1904—1905. In reality we are confronted by a reproduction of the picture “Psst ... let them go in,” painted by the artist in 1871, and the events depicted by the painter were taking place in Central Asia. Moreover, the “specialist” in Russian history should have known that V. V. Vereschagin died off Port Arthur on 13 April 1904, and the first battles of the Russian and Japanese troops in Manchuria did not begin until 2629 April 1904 *
"At Sea in a Monitor”
(See pages 164-166, April 1964 Proceedings)
Matt Hensley—Mr. Holbrook uses a few terms in his interesting Page from the Old Navy with which I am not familiar. I have been stumped before, even though my service goes back to July of 1911. However, I do not believe we wig-wagged with a searchlight in those days, and his description of the Aldis lamp appears to have been confused with the Ardois lights.
We used the Aldis lamp as a sort of blinker, whereas, the Ardois red and white lights made use of the old Myers code with the white light representing the number two (for a dash) and the red light was written one (for a dot). The lights were strung vertically on both the fore and mainmast on larger ships with an operating console in each bridge wing. The Myers code differed from the American and Continental Morse codes considerably.
When Navy radio shifted from the American Morse to the Continental Morse, the old Myers code went out. The signal bridge discontinued the Myers code in favor of the Continental Morse, so the signal boys would not have to learn an extra code.
As for the old Ardois, it became a casualty of World War I. The official reason was that
* The Proceedings, not Dr. Dobriansky, captioned all illustrations with the article and accepts the responsibility for the incorrect information with the disputed photograph—Editor.
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11 gave away the size and type of ship as far as it could be seen. This is probably true, but nobody wept. Those brass consoles were dillies to keep shined.
The old semaphore machines were junked for the same reason.
Francis M. Holbrook—Referring to the above comments by Mr. Hensley, I must admit that he is 90 per cent right, but the °dd part of it is that I am right, too.f
I well remember the console of this signal system. In the I si a de Cuba the console was niountcd on the bridge rail just to starboard °f midships. It was, as Mr. Hensley says, n'ade of brass and had to be shined and polished often. It had two little sliding doors °n the front of an enclosure about the size °f a binnacle. Inside was a small keyboard, niuch like a typewriter keyboard, and a small kght similar to a compass light. A canvas hood did little to protect the brass from wind and Wave. Score one for Matt Hensley.
As for the Aldis lamp, we had little or no training in its use, but I remember that it was luite different from the Ardois.
On small ships we did wig-wag signals at night with small searchlights; not often, as it Was cumbersome and slow. We did it because we had no other night signals. Incidentally, one of our quartermasters taught his fiancee to wig-wag by blinking her eyes. They often exchanged messages across the room to the bewilderment of everyone present.
In my original manuscript, I stated that the Miantonomoh was built in 1870. The article, as published, said she was built in 1882. Act Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Hensley are both right. We hereby apologize for the error in changing “Ardois” to “Aldis”—Editor.
cording to information from the U. S. Naval Personnel Research Activity, Navy Department, the Miantonomoh was launched on 15 August 1863, but was not commissioned until 18 September 1865. She was rebuilt in 1874 and placed in commission again on 6 October 1882.
I made an inexcusable error, however, when I stated that the only access to her upper deck was by the two bridge ladders. After the article was published I studied my model and found another ladder, from main deck to the overhang of the upper deck at the after end. Then it all came clear to me exactly as shown on my model. I had very good and pungent reasons to recall it in full detail.
For this, my only comment is, “No excuse, Sir,” not even after the passage of 58 years and a weak memory. So this time I have to haul back my main yards and fetch up all standing. I should be knocked galley west for East India. Just give me the deep six.
"The Forgotten Administrative Department”
(See pages 131-134, January 1964 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Howey, U. S. Navy (Former Administrative Officer, Patrol Squadron 26)—Granted that the underlying cause for Lieutenant Commander Stephan’s article is overwork, and further granting that his proposed reorganization might enable aircraft squadrons to cope with their administrative loads better, the article misses a major point.
Almost all operating units of the Fleet are overworked administratively by the proliferation of duplicative demands from organizational superiors. Let us therefore obliterate the disease, rather than nurse the symptoms.
It seems as if the requirements for information multiply proportionately with our administrative computer capabilities. Instead of providing information, analysis, and alternatives to command, the great statistical repositories ask more and more questions. Let us reverse this involuted perversion of direction, instead of bowing to its inevitability by adding personnel answering services. Surely every additional man engaged in administration must mean one less man directly supporting naval operations.
Let us not attempt to solve the problem by swelling the administrative department. Instead, every request for information, either reoccurring or sporadic, should be withheld until the interrogator determines that the facts are not available anywhere except from an operating unit. Every existing report, informational form, and administrative procedure now in existence should be searchingly analyzed, to determine if the information thus evoked is available from other sources in the Navy, or if such information can be supplied only by operating forces. And, the Navy’s support organization should develop better means of disseminating information internally. If one headquarters has certain sets of facts, let inquiries for these facts be directed to that headquarters, and answered by it, rather than going out to the operating units. Headquarters should talk to each other, and individual headquarters should strive toJurnish administrative information and procedures instead of requiring them.
The operators’ hands should be holding the sword, not the pen; and the support forces should truly support the Fleet, not the Fleet furnish grist for the supporters’ administrative mills.
"The Laconia Affair”
(See pages 130-131, June 1964 Proceedings)
Charles B. Burdick (Professor of History, San Jose State College)—Commander Hippie’s review is well done and useful. He concludes with a sentiment shared by numerous historians: “Perhaps someone with a recollection of that part of the incident will read this book and provide the information [concerning the U. S. plane which bombed the U-156 during the rescue] that will complete the saga.” Happily, that story is now complete.
In the March-April 1964 issue of the Air University Review is the article “Origin of the Laconia Order” by Dr. Maurer Maurer and Lawrence J. Paszek. The authors survey in detail the entire affair. They effectively set forth the account of the events which led up to the bombing of the German submarines engaged in rescuing survivors of the British liner Laconia. Their story indicates the everpresent difficulties of command decision in time of stress and uncertainty. The article is a service to history and to military men interested in the multi-facet issues of command.
OCEAN
The primary purpose of this book is r0 fill a noticeable gap between popu'af literature and highly technical works o’1 the subject of the ocean sciences.
Written by eighteen eminent men 111 selected fields of oceanography, r'ic chapters include the history of ocean' ography, physical properties, military oceanography, meteorology and clim3' tology, charts and maps, polar oceanog' raphy, marine biology, atomic and othef wastes in the sea, instrumentation and underwater vehicles, marine geology’ oceanography and government, NASCO’ fisheries and oceanography, and oceanog' raphy’s future.
Edited by Captain E. John Long, USN^ (Ret.), this volume will be of interest t° students, naval officers, and the genera' reader.
1964. Hardbound. 304 pages. Illustrated- Appendixes, glossary, bibliography, and index. List Price $10.00. A4ember’s Price $7.50.
Book Order Department
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 2140"
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Commander Robert J. Alexander, 17. S. Navy.
Charles L. Bretschn eider
• /y. Groverman, U. S. Navy
Captain E. T. Harding, U. S. Navy
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Gilbert Jaffe Bernard J. Le Mehaute
Donald L. Me Ken
John Lyman
^pilhalts Captain T. K. Treadwell, U. S. Navy
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I. Eugene Wallen Hi I Hi Walter I. Wittmann