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The Power Vacuum
Lieutenant Commander Andrew G. Nelson, U. S. Navy—One of the less apparent facets of Navy life is the power vacuum, which is filled daily (usually unknowingly) by almost everyone in the Service (again unknowingly). An extreme statement? Then consider the following as we descend from the Navy Department to the individual level.
We devote appreciable thought to the problems that military decisions are being made by civilians. Although more apparent at high levels, the problem exists at all echelons ashore. To some extent naval officers can blame no one but themselves for its existence. The question arises, why?
Certainly there are many civilian assistants in the Navy, but only a few are in obvious policy-making positions. Many others are there for technical advice or for continuity. Ideally such individuals act as “staff” while their military counterparts perform “line” functions. But what often happens in practice? These civilian assistants, if too frequently called upon for general advice, become decision-makers. “Let’s ask George; he’s been around a long time and has probably seen this problem before.” Another small power vacuum has been filled.
Do naval officers sometimes criticize civilian empire-builders? Let the Navy first look to its own: such empires are as often built through military default as by deliberate planning. Do we sometimes complain about a built-in resistance to change in the Navy Department? If by default problems are referred in the name of “continuity” to someone who applies what happened in 1944, we are going to get 1944 decisions in 1962. “Gray Eminences,” as exemplified by Colonel House and Harry
Hopkins, are not confined to the presidential level. They will appear in any administrative organization where they are encouraged, either deliberately or by default.
Consider the Navy’s procedure for conducting surveys. More often than not these are done by civilian research concerns. Whether it is basic organization for national defense, ship modernization, or an analysis of training at electronic schools, military men seem content to have this vacuum filled by non-military organizations. Is this a tacit admission that those of us in the Navy can see neither the forest nor the trees?
It is strange that the United States Navy, with its resources of brainpower and ability— and sufficiently objective personnel to use both—cannot conduct its own self-analyses. Yet the Navy admits by practice that surveys of her own organization conducted by an “impartial, outside source” can be done (or at least sold to others) more effectively than those done by professional military men. But, you say, decisions resulting from these surveys will be made by naval personnel. Not so. Although naval officers may ultimately decide which recommendations to adopt, the groundwork will have been laid by someone else and the basic alternatives presented to the military planners. “Which of our recommenda-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy can be exchanged.
tions do you prefer?” Another power vacuum Vvill have been filled.
There is a better way to fill this particular vacuum. Instead of abrogating our prerogatives of self-examination, could not this be done by military personnel? Naval officers are experts in their own fields—why else a Navy? Are we to let our reputations go by default? At least one existing vehicle is already here: the Inspector-General. For organizational and administrative matters could not this Office be a tool for surveys and analyses? Can we not adapt other existing military components to this introspection?
Some power vacuums are created by nothing but the size and complexity of the organization. Decisions are there to be made. They can be made by a few individuals working with a full head of steam and knowing all ramifications of the problem area, or many individuals can nibble at the problem. The latter of course demands much less responsibility and willingness to fill the power vacuum.
If this seems a generality, ask yourself how many individuals in your command must chop your letter before it is sent out? Decisions must be made all the time in the Navy; inevitably the power vacuum will be filled. But is there not—even in the cold war struggle—a tendency to do this with large numbers of men working at standard speed rather than with fewer personnel, eager to accept responsibility, working at flank speed?
Another instrument filling the power vacuum is the specialist. Somehow a feeling exists, nationally and militarily, that the specialist is sacrosanct. His pronouncements cannot go completely unquestioned. But often this questioning is simply (1) the questioner trying to impress the specialist with his nodding acquaintance of the subject or (2) the questioner trying to impress others present with his knowledge of the subject. The result: decisions made by specialists.
To some extent this is natural and expected. But carried too far it produces a distorted picture—and perhaps distorted results. Specialists are human. And what can exceed the passion of the specialist for his specialty? It is only human for him to magnify the importance of his specialty and its problems. As the Arabs say, “Each man thinks his fleas are gazelles.”
Specialists are rightly used for decisions in their fields, but they must not be the only ones to make decisions if common-sense is to be maximized and the specialty is to be fitted into proper perspective.
Committee meetings and conferences are another vantage point to watch the power vacuum being filled. Few conferences are anything but a power vacuum waiting to be inflated. Conferences are almost the last refuge of the incompetent. Frequently conferences are called to hash over a problem rather than to discuss proposed decisions Is this because the members want to take refuge in a “group decision”? Napoleon’s maxim that councils of war never fight might be modified to “conferences never decide.”
A committee is nothing but a collection of individual brains. The few men willing to make decisions will be the ones to fill the power vacuum. This generalization becomes increasingly true the larger the conference or committee. Anyone attending meetings regularly (which means all naval officers) would do well to study the Casablanca Conference of World War II. American military leaders arrived, clothed in shining innocence, to discuss over-all military strategy. The English contingent arrived armed to the cortex with facts, figures, proposed plans in detail—even with a communication ship—to make decisions. Guess who filled the power vacuum.
One word of caution: do not be deluded by organizational diagrams, whatever the echelon. In theory the boxes run in descending sizes. In practice it is often the size of the man who fills the billet that counts, not the size of his organizational box. The diagram in practice does not equal the diagram in theory. It all depends upon who fills the vacuum.
Let’s go aboard ship and consider the captain-executive officer relationship. It is not uncommon to hear the terms “weak exec,” “strong captain,” and vice versa. There are only a certain number of decisions to be made daily aboard ship. Of necessity this power vacuum must be filled. Theoretically it is the exec inside the ship, the skipper outside the ship. But since naval officers are people with differing personalities, few ships in practice achieve this ideal. More often than not the individual relationships and temperaments will determine the specific boundaries of the
shipboard power vacuums.
At a simplified individual level there are the opposite “yes-man” and “no-man” types- Admittedly it is the “yes-man/can-do” man who improves the service. But his lesser “yes brother is often the most gaping hole in the power vacuum: this is the “forwarded, approved” pussy-footer. In such extreme cases one imagines an impersonal rubber stamp filling this power vacuum. Conversely, the “no-man” is forced to give at least some thought to any matter simply in order to say “no” coherently. This “no-man” variety ranges from the constructive conservative to the militant knocker. If naval progress through the ages has been slow, one reason might be traced to who—the yes-no types—' has most often filled the power vacuum.
Some say that even the use of “we” instead of “I” indicates a power vacuum in a military organization. No matter where they are used —in an official letter or on voice radio—there are two schools of thought on these terms. Some say that “we” connotes a group of individuals working together, welded into a team. Others say that “we” is a refutation of military responsibility and indicates a desire to be one of the boys. Which would you rather hear from your sister ship when the screen in reorienting darkened at night and things get a bit confused: “We are coming right with full rudder” (did they take a vote?) or “I am coming right with full rudder” (thank God someone over there is taking charge in a positive manner).
This discussion would not be complete without a moral. First, in order to do anything about the power vacuum, you must be conscious of its existence. Look about you and notice it on a day-to-day basis. The next step is logical: fill it. This should be a stimulating and worthwhile task for anyone. As you conclude each day, think to yourself, “Have I helped fill the power vacuum or have I been part of the void?”
"Whole-Man Concept”
(See pages 122-123, January 1962 Proceedings)
Lieutenant James C. Froid, U. S. Navy.— Commander Smith suggests that midshipmen should be exposed to a course in the fundamentals of management. It was interesting to note that he appears to restrict his remarks in
this regard to midshipmen at the Naval Academy. Also of interest is the fact that the ®anagerial course proposed by Commander Smith is almost precisely that which is given to all senior NROTC midshipmen. Although the NROTC course utilizes the second edition of Naval Leadership, the similarity between the individual situation and the Navy environment is emphasized.
The NROTC course is based on the three aspects of leadership set forth in General Order 21. It also includes instruction in the process of management as suggested by Commander Smith. However, the breakdown of the process of management into its basic functions differs slightly from his outline.
His separation into five major functions is the one used by Koontz and O’Donnell {Principles of Management, McGraw-Hill, 1949) and others. In the NROTC course the process °f management is divided into four functions: Planning, organizing, actuating, and controlling (Terry, Principles of Management, Richard D. Irwing Inc., 1956). The functions °f planning, organizing and controlling are similar in both.
The function of actuating, as presented in the NROTC course may be considered as the combination of co-ordinating and directing as suggested by Commander Smith. Actuating covers a wealth of material including human relations and executive development. Its study leads to class discussion of leadership and supervision with particular emphasis on the study of practical shipboard situations.
Within the function of actuating is also included a discussion of the theory and principles of communications, orders, instructions, and rules. Here also is included a discussion of discipline and the UCMJ as a means of carrying out the functions of management rather than as an unrelated negative form of leadership. Finally, the student explores the importance of the officer’s attitude in relation to success, and the development of desirable attitudes by his subordinates.
The senior NROTC course therefore has the effect of bringing into true perspective the total picture of management within the naval organization for it includes such topics as UCMJ, Ships Organization, reports, leadership, etc, as integral, rather than as unrelated subjects.
"The Leadership Council Works”
(See pages 58-65, March 1962 Proceedings)
Lieutenant C. J. Murrell, U. S. Navy.— Lieutenant Commander Matson’s appreciation of General Order 21 is undoubtedly sincere and I was in wholehearted agreement with him until he hit me with the leadership council bit.
Since first hearing the old story defining a camel as a committee-built horse, I have felt that committees or councils (the former being delegations and the latter assemblies) are a democratic tool in a military organization used to promote welfare and recreation activities and .to raise funds for charity. Lieutenant Commander Matson’s article has not changed my feelings. I am against leadership councils because they break the chain of command.
The improvement of the leadership, appearance, and performance of a crew by correct utilization of the petty officer evaluation sheet is undeniable, but the idea of using one person from the leadership council to inform the crew of the commanding officer’s policy of honest evaluation and corrective action of juniors is revolting. This policy should have been published and disseminated via the executive officer, department head, division officer and senior petty officer instead of by one emissary from the leadership council. Lieutenant Commander Matson’s “unique” method of solution to the evaluation sheet that did not generate in the wardroom should have! Or better yet, in the captain’s cabin.
So I fail to see what has been done by the council to educate the average sailor in our American culture and the Navy’s mission. The review of Major William E. Mayer’s tape on the conduct of American prisoners of war in Korea was quite good, but I am shocked that the suggestion for the tape had to come from a chief petty officer in a leadership council.
The statement by Lieutenant Commander Matson that “there is a point where normal correction procedures of petty officers, division officers, and department heads come to no avail” is very true, and this is the point where the corrective procedures of the executive officer and the commanding officer enter in. In my mind the old leadership guides of “criticizing privately and praising in public,” discussing minor and major deficiencies with
the juniors, observing the chain of command, setting high standards of performance and appearance are as effective in the nuclear submarine as they were in the old “R” boats.
It is absurd that it should take a council to recommend that a command get more people to leadership school. It is a responsibility of the commanding officer, through the chairman of the planning board for training, to utilize leadership schools. Each new commanding officer receives a personal letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel upon receipt of orders to command urging him to use the nearly 70 different leadership schools for officers and petty officers and to support their graduates.
The idea of four contemporary chiefs discussing Chief A’s inferiority complex in the presence of three officers is appalling. This council that was designed partially to “correct apparent deficiencies in the effective use of the chain of command” has defeated that part of its purpose. I question the degree of “asset to the organization” that was wrought in Chief A when he was assigned tasks commensurate with his abilities (tasks that had to be found) which did not involve direct competition with more competent juniors.
I wonder what kind of tasks were found for this CPO. Since a chief petty officer is basically a supervisor, it seems ridiculous that any chief should have to compete technically with his juniors. The first of the large “conversion” programs was initiated to change the rates of chiefs and first class petty officers in 1954 to provide personnel with supervisory experience in the higher pay grades because our technical enlisted personnel were making second class or first class petty officer during their first enlistment and leaving the service for more lucrative civilian jobs in their technical fields. There was a shortage of technicians at this time, but there was an even more acute shortage of supervisors in the technical fields. These chiefs and first class petty officers who have changed rates can be compared to the engineering officer with two years’ experience in his ship and his new commanding officer. The commanding officer may not know each detail of the engineering plant but does know what sort of engineering performance he wants from that plant and from the engineers who run it.
To quote from A study of those causes of the current low reenlistment rate which are within the control of the Navy, which was published as a result of a survey directed in October 1954 by the Assistant Chief for Morale Services and the director of the Personal Affairs Division of BuPers:
For emphasis it is repeated that the essential prerequisite to the rebuilding of chief petty officer prestige is a radical shift in emphasis from the chief’s present rate as technician to one as supervisor. All other measures, though important, are secondary. Having then been returned to his rightful position, the chief must be required to exercise sound leadership over his men, aided by precept and example from his officers. In the accomplishment of this task, there is no room for talk about ‘inferior chiefs.’ Any chief who, after having been given an opportunity to lead, and proper instruction and support, proves his lack of capacity should be reduced in rate.
I wonder how Lieutenant Commander Matson would react if the leadership council concept were upgraded so that his role as executive officer of a ship could be discussed by a board of contemporaries and seniors. Suppose his captain felt he was a poor ship- handler; should he call in contemporaries and seniors to see what they know about his exec so that collectively they might analyze him and eventually correct his deficiencies so that he could be given jobs commensurate with his abilities, but not in competition with his juniors, who are more technically proficient shiphandlers? I think not!
The impression that Lieutenant Commander Matson gives is one that would lead a reader to believe that the fact that Chief A was poor in performance and appearance was not known to’anyone in the chain of command until the “Sounding Board” leadership council advised the exec and commanding officer. I propose a solution to Chief A’s problems without use of the leadership council as follows: The division officer privately discusses Chief A’s deficiencies with him. The division officer explains the standards of performance and appearance which are desired from Chief A. If necessary the process would be repeated up the chain of command. If results were at the department head and executive officer level, then it would be time for
command action—disciplinary action.
As for Chief B, an honest evaluation sheet with high marks in professional ability, and low marks in morale, loyalty and leadership Would, I believe, cure his problem in time without the use of the leadership council’s analytical, logical, moral approach which circumvents the chain of command.
I suggest that the leadership council as described in Lieutenant Commander Matson’s article could be favorably replaced by the system outlined in NavPers 15928 “Five Steps to Effective Naval Leadership.”
"Anchoring Technicians”
(See pages 70-77, April 1962 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Lawrence R. Jacobs, U. S. Navy.—Commander Durtche in his article points up the problem of stability and, in the name of stability, advocates the abolishment of the present Career Enlisted Rotation System (SEAVEY/SHORVEY) and the Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) System. Neither of these systems has created instability. In fact, more progress has been made in getting the right man in the right job and keeping him there under the present system than was possible under any previous system of distribution.
An analysis was made of enlisted permanent change of station moves during two recent fiscal years and, of all the moves, only 8 per cent were required by SEAVEY/ SHORVEY. The largest percentage of moves Was due to separations, enlistments, and training. Since planned rotation increases morale and thus increases retention, the small amount of instability caused by rotation is indeed a small price to pay for the eventual benefits of increased retention.
The NEC system has been simplified, and since 1 December 1961, subjected to tight controls in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Accurate identification of complex skills using a simple 4-digit code is essential to accurate assignments. The problem has always been one of accurate identification. Through control, only possible through the use of machines, more accurate identification will be immediately available.
Men are not treated as just so many cards when they are considered for assignment. By using machines, more information is available to the control officer and he is thus able to give the man more individual attention. Enlisted personnel receive more consideration of their individual problems and desires than ever before. To discontinue the use of machines would mean a return to assignment by the numbers with no regard to individual desires.
Moves undoubtedly generate some emergencies, but many more requests for humanitarian transfers than requests for cancellation of orders or extensions are received in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Let us stop using SEAVEY/SHORVEY as the “scapegoat” for our enlisted personnel ills and start looking for cures to the real causes of these ills. From the statistics on permanent change of station moves, it is obvious that retention is a major factor in achieving stability. Only by increasing retention, through the active practice of leadership and full utilization of the many programs developed specifically to increase retention, can stability be achieved.
The May 1962 issue of All Hands magazine carries a complete and comprehensive article on the Career Enlisted Rotation System. I would recommend this article as mandatory reading for all commanding officers, executive officers, division officers, and men. It behooves us all to develop a clear understanding of the system and to use this knowledge to help our enlisted men better realize the benefits offered them by SEAVEY/ SHORVEY. It is the best system yet devised for equitably distributing a half-million people to consumers the world over and its inadequacies and injustices are invariably created by lack of knowledge of the system.
"Departmental Numerical Rating Personnel Lists”
Leonard A. Stoehr, Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.—The task of listing all men of one rate in numerical order, from the best to the poorest, appears to be a simple one for a department head. It continues to appear so until one attempts it. A conscientious department head, when asked to turn in such a list to his commanding officer, is practically forced to devote additional time to getting to know his men. Perhaps the simplest way for the department head to prepare such a list
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is to ask himself which of his men he would be least willing to lose on a straight rate-for-rate swap. It is generally much easier to separate the poor men than the superior ones. Once this list is prepared, it should be revised semiannually at the time when semi-annual performance grades are submitted. These lists can benefit all. The commanding officer will be better equipped to “hand out gravy” when such is available. The department head will have a clearer picture of the value of each individual. The men, who may not know that
such a list exists, will be conscious-of increased
officer interest in their performance.
In conclusion, we must take note that the acceptance of the necessity for good organization comes easily. The maintenance of such organization on a day-to-day basis is more difficult. The primary tool of good organizational maintenance is constant adherence to a well-promulgated and clearly understood organizational structure. Any technique which enhances the indoctrination, co-operation and understanding of the crew simultaneously improves the sort of organization without which a commanding officer’s best efforts can be frustrated.
★
Windy
Corner
During aircraft carrier training operations in the San Diego operating area, the big flat-tops are always “looking for the wind.” The light winds which normally prevail make operations difficult, while a spanking breeze is eagerly sought after. At night the carriers try to position themselves in the most favorable position for operations the next day, although upon occasion some other exercises are planned. The ships exchange wind information frequently, calling each other on the Fleet common radio circuits.
Recently, Don Homme Richard reported the force and direction of the wind at 2 knots from the south. Midway and Kearsarge reported similar findings hour after hour as they moved about the entire area one evening, while Ticonderoga kept reporting 6 knots from the north. Finally Bonny Dick called Big Ti for verification of their findings of the precious 6 knots and asked for their position.
Big Ti's reply: “We’ve got 6 knots all right, but we are anchored in Pyramid Cove at San Clemente.”
-------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Captain R. F. Farrington, U. S. Navy
{The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote accepted for publication in the Proceedings.)