This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
History of the "Conn”
Captain Edgar K. Thompson, U. S. Navy (Retired).—The precise meaning of the word “conn,” with many variants in spelling, has confused mariners for years. Does it mean the authority to give orders to the helmsman or the location from which steering orders are given? Neither, exactly.
It is derived from the Anglo-Saxon word meaning skill. The word cunning, in its good sense, comes from the same root; so also does King, the skilled one, fit to lead and direct the nation.
Originally the word was cunn. To cunn a ship was to attend to the steering and direct the helmsman. This was generally done by an old seaman called a quartermaster but occasionally by the pilot, master, or captain. The quartermaster, in naval sailing ships, stood at the conn and watched the steering. In old Warships, with guns pointed in a direct line, or abeam, the shot was directed by the cunn or steering—a primitive-type of fire-control. If the captain wished to alter course a few degrees, he conned the ship’s head.
Conn means to direct the steering of the ship by giving orders to the helmsman. That it means a certain spot or location is improbable as the captain can conn from aloft or any other advantageous position. In Kane’s, The Grinnell Expedition, we read: “Our captain • . . was conning the ship from the fore-topsail yard.”
John Harris’, Lexicon Technicum, the forefather of all encyclopedias (London 1708), has this to say about cond: “Cond or conn, in the sea phrase, is to guide or conduct the ship in the right course. He that conns, stands aloft with a compass before him, and gives the Word of direction to the man at the helm how to steer.” The Gentlemans Dictionary (London 1705), does not carry the word cond as a noun but, to con, cons, conning, conned, to cond, conds, conding, to cun and cunning appear as words in common use in connection with steering a ship. Under the word, “quartermaster,” it is written: “They are also to keep their watch duly, in conding the ship.”
In Grose, A Voyage to the East Indies, 1766, are these amusing lines: “Such, for example, as the ship that came in one night from the Cape of Good Hope plump into the harbour of Goa, a distance of some thousands of miles, the Devil holding the helm, and the Virgin Mary at the cond in quality of quartermaster.”
Ark Versus the U. S. Fleet
C. J. Harriss, Wilmington, North Carolina. —In Wilmington, North Carolina, there is a floating restaurant named “The Ark.” This seagoing cafeteria utilized the hull of a World War I concrete ship. In its permanent berth at the foot of Princess Street, and at a point in the harbor where the North East and the Cape Fear Rivers join, the vagaries of the currents are such that the Ark has undergone some slight rammings and numerous near misses by harbor craft throughout the years. Prior to 2 October 1961, her most outstanding experience was suffered on 25 October 1955, when she was rammed by the U. S. submarine Cubera. On this occasion the
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy may be exchanged.
Ark was presented with a plaque distinguishing her as the only restaurant on record having been involved in a collision with a U. S. man-of-war.
On 2 October 1961, however, the Ark achieved the ultimate in being rammed, having become involved in a collision with USS North Carolina (BB-55). The fact that the Ark is still in business attests to the sturdiness of construction of the World War I concrete hulls.
The collision came about during the last stages of North Carolina's journey on the way to her permanent resting place in a slip in a State Memorial Park in Wilmington, North Carolina. It is indeed regrettable that the series of brilliant feats of seamanship accomplished in bringing this great ship to her berth should be marred on the verge of their
successful conclusion by this slight mishap- The owner of the Ark had been requested to move her from her berth temporarily in order to facilitate the docking of North Carolina but, for various reasons, this was not accomplished.
Ex-battleship skippers, who would rightly become nervous when the fathometer iO' dicated less than five fathoms under the keel, would certainly not have enjoyed the final phase of North Carolina's voyage up the Cape Fear River to her final berth. For the major portion of the journey up the 3l-f°°j' deep channel of the Cape Fear River, it lS estimated that there was less than five inches of water under the keel of North Caroling Rear Admiral William S. Maxwell, USN (Ret.), commented, “It seems a shame to sel the fuel off of this ship. ... If I could jus1
hap- d to rder but, offl'
htiy
in- the the the the pot' it is dies
lino-
JSN
sell
just
\ ■
j/’ep together that bunch of Tar Heels that ought her up this river we could take her 5 t for week-end cruises.”
! in picture number 1, North Carolina is shown . I as the turn began into the prepared slip. ;e Ark is shown on her starboard beam, tde from the normal risk surrounding this it had to be kept in mind that had Carolina become lodged crosswise in the Fear River, the highly productive comport area north of this point would been cut off from the sea—not to men- the attendant flooding that would have occured in downtown Wilmington. As can be seen from the photograph, such an occurrence at this point of the operation was Well within the realm of possibility As can be seen in picture number 2 the Cape Fear River runs roughly north and south. It is also tidal. Bertram Burriss, Chief Pilot in charge of this operation, had planned bis turn into the prepared slip to coincide with
Picture number 2. Tugs churn, but North Carolina still puts the squeeze on the Ark shown at the top of the photo. Her bow is just entering the slip at this point.
a time when the tide would be at its maximum height and the current would be slack. It has been determined by the “Sidewalk Admirals” that actually this turn was begun when the current was still flooding. The ensuing events seem to bear out that theory. The bow of North Carolina came to rest against the north side of the prepared slip, and the stern started swinging Arkward despite the efforts of seven tugs (approximately 19,000 horsepower). Contact was made.
Picture number 3 is a close-up showing the stern of North Carolina and the starboard side of the Ark in firm contact. It might be mentioned that the Ark had become a choice vantage point from which to view the proceedings. Needless to say, just before this picture was taken, the Ark gained another distinction, it became the only restaurant to execute Abandon Ship—and what this maneuver lacked in seamanship it gained in speed of execution and sincerity of purpose.
of
tion to national defense? The Department
"Program Packaging”
(See pages 23-35, December 1961 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander D. P. Kirchner, U. S. Navy.—Interested observers foresee much opportunity and little peril in the program package budgeting concept. The potential of such a system for applying the nation’s defense resources in the manner specified by the Principle of Economy of Force offers great challenge to those responsible for determining the emphasis to be given each type of fighting force. Formal, thoroughly analyzed decisions on these matters can only be good. In such a program, however, there must be, as the authors point out, an element of judgment which can only be provided by those experienced in actual operations, and it is up to the military to provide that judgment.
It appears that the biggest peril in the program packaging approach is very closely related to the question of judgment. Operations analysis can give precise indications of probability if certain considerations are given certain mathematical weight. But formulas become vague when questions of quality arise. Who can give a numerical value to the stoicism of an Oriental infantryman? Is the post-attack survivability of the counterattack weapons systems one-tenth or five-tenths? How do you analyze the “can do”-spirit that gets one carrier’s strikes away on time, when the launch from another is delayed? What formula predicts that the side with fewer tanks can “Blitzkrieg” the side with more? Will equations show that some organizations react to stress faster than others, or that nicely-laid plans tend to collapse shortly after D-day? Will the formulas change when the weapons are manned by determined people—- or when they are manned by individuals fighting for confused reasons? Operations analysis—and battles—would be much simpler if numerical values could measure concepts.
Even so, operations analysis is a tool of great value, and through disciplines of this type the nation can indeed have better defense. But the point that there is no substitute for considered judgment is certainly a point well made.
Captain Thomas D. McGrath, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In “Program Packaging—Op
portunity and Peril,” the authors have stressed the opportunities without dwelling very much on the perils. They state that the concept can determine the future of the Navy and affect the careers of all naval officers- There may be some dangers not detailed.
The plan limits Congress to determination of over-all appropriation figures in set mill' tary categories. Will Congress, and especially the individual member, lightly give up the long-guarded right to pass on individual items? The plan visualizes shifting of authorized funds within categories. As long as the Congress and the administration are of the same party, it might be possible to accomplish this. But, with a Congress of the opposing party, the annual appropriation bill might be so loaded with restrictive amendments that the program would be unworkable.
There is reason for apprehension when the author of a concept is also the executor and the administrator. A reform as far reaching as this must be of sufficient intrinsic merit that there is a good possibility of its remaining 111 use after the departure of its author. The National Defense Establishment cannot afford major shake-ups with each change of per' sonality. Has the office of the Comptroller run an analysis on program packaging to deter' mine if its cost, in time, effort, and manpower, is justified by its potential contribu
Defense is made a separate category. Shouk not its contribution be analyzed and possibly prorated among other categories?
If competition among the many agencies can be directed to constant improvement ° the weapons systems involved in order to have better items to sell, the concept shorn succeed. However, if human beings, in th(‘ir perversity, choose to direct their ingenuity and energies to manipulating program pacK' aging to their advantage, the results could be worse than “interservice rivalry.” Also the packaging in time could become so neat that it would be considered fixed. Why change the package if it is selling well? Stultificati°n could result.
Functional fields of warfare, not general) considered as weapons systems, and with elc ments classifiable under several categories would not fit well into the new system- A1
defense, antisubmarine warfare, and mine Warfare could suffer unless they are more closely integrated than at present.
Since program packaging is a reasoned approach to getting the most for our money, there need to be no fear of the Navy being down-graded. Logic dictates that an increasingly larger proportion of our national defense be sea-based. Systematic analysis, which is the basis of program packaging, should bring out this fact at the highest levels.
Lieutenant Colonel Clarence N. Kennedy, U. S. Army.—The weapon in the illustration on page 28 is described as a self-propelled antiaircraft gun. The photograph is of the 175 -mm. self-propelled cannon, which has no antiaircraft capabilities.
This weapon is the longest shooting Army cannon, has precise accuracy, is lighter, more mobile, more reliable, and possesses a greater operating range than any other known weapon of its size.
The Army no longer utilizes large caliber antiaircraft guns, but employs the Hawk and Nike family of surface-to-air missiles for air defense.
"The Vital Key West Agreement”
(See pages 34-41, September 1961 Proceedings)
Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps.—While warmly applauding Captain Beebe’s thesis (which is amply supported by our military history to date) that the primary responsibility for providing ready emergency expeditionary forces for the nation should be explicitly reserved for the Marine Corps, I must disagree with his assertion that the Marine Corps is in any way now restricted from such functions.
Relying only on the authority of the “Functions Paper”—which is, of course, subsidiary to the National Security Act—Captain Beebe suggests that the Marine Corps is limited to the conduct of “land operations . . . essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign,” and >s thus technically ineligible, at least within the terms of the Key West Agreement, to serve as a “global fire brigade.” He also says that the National Security Act would have to be changed to permit such a role, a statement W’hich is most certainly not correct.
In Section 206(c), the National Security
Act of 1947 as amended concludes its statement of the roles and missions of the Marine Corps with the short but intentionally encompassing phrase, “. . . and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.”
The inclusion of this language, which in fact dates back to the original Marine Corps laws of 1798 and 1834, represented—as the legislative history of the National Security Act plainly reveals—the intent of Congress that the Marine Corps as a service should always be flexibly available for any employment, anywhere, peace or war, which it might be able to perform. It is this phrase, either in the National Security Act or in the predecessor Marine Corps laws, which has provided legal sanction for the wide variety of expeditionary and other non-naval duties which the Corps has performed, and which has taken U. S. Marines to Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, to the gates of Mexico City and Peking, to the Rhine, and to the Chosin Reservoir and back. Whether the Functions Paper includes this broad sanction or not is immaterial. The law does, and that is what matters.
"Disarmament on the Great Lakes”
(See pages 69-73, December 1961, Proceedings)
Professor A. E. Sokol, Stanford, California.—Mr. Falk states that I credit the Rush-Bagot Agreement with bringing about “the demilitarization of the Great Lakes,” and that I describe it as “the single completely successful disarmament scheme of modern times.” His purpose is to use this as an illustration of popular misconceptions regarding that agreement and the feasibility of disarmament treaties in general. (See “Disarmament—Is It Possible?,” pages 57-64, April 1961 Proceedings.)
In answer, may I say that:
(1) My statement is based on the work of recognized scholars in the field, not on “myth.”
(2) Mr. Falk somewhat distorts my statement by saying that I credit the Rush- Bagot Agreement “with bringing about” the demilitarization of the Great Lakes, when actually I said that it “provided” for it. The difference may be small, but it indicates an
attempt by the author to change my statement so as to fit his theory, rather than to stick to facts.
(3) In my article, one short paragraph is devoted to the Rush-Bagot Agreement; in that limited space—all that was required for my purpose—it is, of course, impossible to go into great detail about the agreement itself or its effect. All I needed to do was to point out that there was such an agreement and that it proved successful over the years, and that is, in fact, all I claimed.
Mr. Falk himself says at the end of his essay that “When compared with the many abortive attempts in world history to reach disarmament agreements, the limitations of armaments along the 3,800-mile Canadian- American border can offer an impressive record.” I can’t see that this says anything very different from what I did.
(4) Most importantly, however, I still maintain that the agreement was successful, since for over 150 years it helped prevent wars between the two countries involved. That is all that anyone can expect from any disarmament treaty. If today we could reach such an agreement with the Russians, most of us would feel quite successful and happy, even if it did take some 50 years more before the need for all armaments would disappear. Disarmament, as we use the word today, covers not only “total and universal” disposal of all arms, but also their limitation and control, as long as they serve the purpose of lessening tensions and of making wars less likely.
Anyone who reads my article on the subject must realize that I do not expect too much from present negotiations, that I do not believe that reductions in armaments by themselves will cause the needed relaxation of all international tensions. But just as our government does, I feel that negotiations must be continued, even if immediate and complete success is hardly to be anticipated. All we can hope for at this time is qualified success, making major wars less likely, or at least less destructive, and the preparation for them less expensive.
It can hardly be denied that from that point of view, the Rush-Bagot Agreement— in force for over 150 years—may be considered a full success.
"America’s Undeclared Naval War”
(See pages 74-75, October 1961 Proceedings)
Captain Roland E. Krause, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In addition to Columbus, the following German merchant ships were lost under circumstances similar to those described in Mr. Deac’s article in January 1940: Araucas, La Plata and Wangoni. In addition to Idarwald (sic), Phrygia and Rhein were similarly lost in November 1940. According to the German records, all three were scuttled to prevent capture.
The Germans did not consider an Egyptian steamer to be a neutral, as evidenced by the statement of the Commander in Chief, German Navy, to Hitler on 22 May 1941, “It is inexcusable of the U. S. Government to allow American citizens, including women and children, to travel on ships belonging to belligerents.” At the outbreak of war, Egypt did sever diplomatic relations with Germany but did not declare war. She was, however, i° alliance with Great Britain; the country was an important strategic center and the base for large British forces. Egypt herself, became, involved in operations in her northwest territory. Alexandria and Cairo were repeatedly raided by Axis planes. Although Morison, i° The Battle Oj The Atlantic (page 63), subscribes to the term “neutral” with regard to the Egyptian steamer, its accuracy is certainly debatable.
At about the time of the Robin Moor case* there were further limitations placed on at
tacking American ships, so I am unable t confirm that the U-boat commander “disregarded Berlin’s instructions.” Nor do I fin hint of censure for him. According to the German records, the U-boat did conduct “visit and search” and found that Robin Mo°r was en route to South Africa with a cargo ° contraband. According to Morison, “. . • the Neutrality Act ensured that Robin Moor was neither carrying contraband nor destined f°r a war zone.” The U-boats did have instructions to avoid provocative incidents with the United States, so it seems probable that the U-boat commander made sure he was war ranted in sinking Robin Moor.
Although the Commander in Chief of t e German Navy “welcomed” the sinking 0 Robin Moor as a warnine to the United States;
he nevertheless issued instructions as follows: “No attack should be made on U. S. naval forces and merchant vessels. Prize regulations are not to be applied to U. S. merchant ships. Weapons are not to be used, even if American vessels conduct themselves in a definitely unneutral manner. Weapons are to be used only if U. S. ships fire the first shot.”
These restrictions applied only outside the closed area; within the blockage zone, the U-boats could sink all ships without warning. By the Neutrality Act, U. S. merchant vessels Were forbidden to sail in those waters; for the same reason, the Germans expected U. S. naval ships to keep out of this area.
But this was not to be; at any rate, according to the reckoning of U-203, Texas and her escort were sighted inside the closed area. The following account taken from the German records is somewhat at variance with Mr. Deac’s narrative and in general amplifies it. Admiral Raeder’s presentation to the Fuehrer states as follows: “The ships [USS Texas and a U. S. destroyer] were sighted about ten miles inside the boundary of the closed area; U-203 chased and attempted to attack them as far as about 140 miles to the northeast, and
then back within the closed area; then the ships left the area on a southwest course. No opportunity to attack occurred on account of zig-zag courses and unfavorable weather.”
To avoid controversy as to whether one is within or without an ocean area, Raeder proposed “a 50- or 100-mile strip inside the boundary of the closed area, inside which attacks on U. S. warships should be avoided.” Meanwhile, immediately following the Texas incident, Admiral Doenitz, with the advice of the Naval War Staff, gave his U-boats orders stating that “operations against U. S. warships are permitted only when they have passed over the western boundary of the blockade area by 20 or more miles to the east.”
Raeder and Doenitz were thus prepared to limit their naval operations within the blockade area in order to avoid incidents with the United States, but Hitler went all the way to avoid any attack on U. S. warships regardless of how far within the blockade area they might be operating, and regardless of the handicaps this order imposed on the U-boats in making sure that a target was not a U. S. warship before launching an attack.
" 'Sara’ in the East”
(See pages 74-83, December 1961 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral R. W. Christie, U. S. Navy (Retired).—When “Sara” arrived in Fremantle, home port ofU. S. Submarines, Southwest Pacific on 20 March 1944 in passage to join the British Eastern Fleet, we discussed with Captain Cassady and Captain Smith the feasibility of striking Lombok and Soerabaja on our return to Fremantle from Trincomalee. Increased antisubmarine activity against our submarines in Lombok Passage was a matter of concern. We had used Lombok since 1942 with little opposition, but in 1944 our submarines proceeding north to patrol areas in the South China Sea were meeting sharp harassment. Passage northward was necessarily made on the surface in the dark against a strong current. Homebound, it was “downhill” and could be made submerged.
We had no air forces in West Australia capable of striking Java. “Sara’s” presence afforded a grand opportunity to give the enemy an unpleasant surprise and at the same time give our Dutch friends in Java a little encouragement.
Our plans were simple. “Sara” was to refuel at Fremantle as scheduled. This was, no doubt, well known to the enemy. On departure, however, “Sara” was to turn north instead of south and steam to striking position off Java. We planned to give her the support of submarines returning from patrol and leaving for patrol, a total of seven stationed at various positions off Lombok, Bali Strait and the Baring Islands. The task of these submarines was to protect “Sara” against possible raiding forces and also to act as “lifeguards” for her planes. Not a single word needed to be put on the air.
When our plan was presented to Commander Seventh Fleet, he forwarded it to the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet with the recommendation that a heavy ship or two from Admiral Somerville’s force join up. And
Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, takes over his command. He was enthusiastic over Saratoga joining Somerville’s fleet for the offensive action against Java.
Imperial War Museum
so it came about that our simple little operation involved not just “Sara,” three destroyers, and seven submarines, but in addition, the entire British Eastern Fleet. Admiral Somerville—of World War I fame—in Queen Elizabeth proceeded to Exmouth Gulf with Saratoga, Illustrious, Renown, Valiant, the French battleship Richelieu, the British cruisers London and Suffolk, the Dutch super destroyers Tromp and Von Galen, plus 13 Allied destroyers and six tankers.
To receive this great force in Exmouth where no deep draft ships had ever been anchored, I sent Captain Freddie Warder with Commander “Spittin’ Dick” Hawes in our submarine rescue vessel Chanticleer to sweep and mark anchorages. This little known Gulf can accommodate all the fleets of the world. It is also teeming with game fish but is rather remote for the weekend fisherman. I had the pleasure of delivering a fine tuna to the flag mess of HMS Queen Elizabeth caught on the way across the Gulf.
After the operation, I received a handwritten letter from Admiral Somerville which said, in part: “We achieved the object which was to give the enemy a kick on the behind and give him no chance to kick back.” stressing the co-operation and fine spirlt among the Allied navies, he said, “I’d like to thank you, Admiral, for all you’ve done to help us—you’ve treated us like brothers and we all appreciate it so much. Everything the top line each time we got here. ‘Sara and the destroyers make a grand party an our men gave them a real good cheer as they steamed by.”
"Practical Leadership”
(See pages 83-88, November 1961 Proceedings.)
Captain Thomas Moriarty, U. S. Navy— In his stimulating article Lieutenant Commander Kiernan, like many other writers in this field, starts with the assumption that the Navy does not now have leadership, at least not “practical leadership.” In this respect it is interesting to note the similarities in his premise with that enunciated by Lieutenant Commander Angas in the October issue of Armed Forces Management. However, each reaches radically different conclusions.
Having divided the “leadership experts” into (a) those who believe that all leaders are born, not made, and (b) those who claim that anyone can be made a leader, it is easy to dispose of them and proceed to the one technique of leadership, whether it be roleplaying or “practical leadership.”
The fact of the matter is that the Navy has never been without effective leaders, and probably never has had enough of them. To imply that the retirement of those who led us to victory in World War II left us leaderless is to encourage the inference that these leaders were not effective enough to have created followers. This in itself is a denial of the value of practical leadership, which Mr. Kiernan should be among the first to deny.
However, in order to avoid this conclusion, Mr. Kiernan finds his antagonists in (a) the intrusion of civilian educators into the military training field, and (b) the current “socialist trend,” which allegedly is subverting naval leadership which does not exist in the premise.
During the past two years I have had opportunity to observe Petty Officer Leadership Seminars in session each week, operating Under BUPERS guidance. Far from a study of Freud, or any of the more modern psychologists, the seminars are directed almost exclusively toward emphasis on moral responsibility and the chain of command, and through them the creation of combat effectiveness. In the deference paid to the prin- ciplcs of natural law, it would appear that Aquinas has precedence over Freud.
As far as the “trend to Socialism” is concerned, it seems to me that the thing to be leared is the possibility of a deliberating cqualitarianism, in which seniority would be supreme. Doesn’t “pro-pay” which Mr. Kiernan abhors, tend to recognize the greater value of some individuals? Certainly, we of the military should be the last to fear a caste system, if the system is based on professional competence. To paraphrase a recent statement by Hanson Baldwin, “an elite is the yeast of the Navy.” To be intolerant of economic incentive would seem to imply a basic suspicion of an economic system which is both a hallmark of our political forms and an incentive to greater competence. If we were capable of consistent response to spiritual values, material reward would not be necessary, and Socialism might work.
Certainly every citizen, as well as every naval officer will endorse Mr. Kiernan’s statements concerning patriotism and discipline. It is true, of course, that young men in large enough numbers do not elect a military career. It is not necessarily true that their patriotism is, as a consequence, indited. We have never had as many effective leaders as we would like. Our tradition has been to rally round the flag when the shooting starts, and go home when it is over. Washington’s army left to tend the fields; in Lincoln’s day, some legally bought the services of military substitutes. Because we now face a threat of a different nature, we need a greater degree of dedication, not only in the military but in all the nation, but patriotism is not, and never has been, the monopoly of any one group.
In the main, however, Mr. Kiernan preaches an orthodoxy with which many of us can agree, if with reservation. His fear, or hope, of exposing heresy is not realized until the unfortunate quote from General Puller. There never was a time when esprit de corps should have meant more than love of country. To subordinate the whole to the part is to do disservice to both. To subordinate religion (God) to esprit de corps is to deny the values on which the country is built. If moral responsibility and self-discipline mean anything, they mean subjugation of self to a reasoned code of right and wrong and to the direction of legitimate authority. If moral values are our support in this world they will not be values which we call into existence for our temporary advantage, but eternal values to which we have traditionally given our pledge.
Rear Admiral Richard Lane, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Commander Kier- nan’s article, plus earlier related articles, brings to mind the subject of officer-enlisted relationships in leadership. Most of us have observed how some officers can practice a relatively close camaraderie with their men without the loss of any respect, while other less experienced officers, in attempting familiarity along the lines of a supposed democratic ideal, sacrifice command effectiveness. I was impressed with the following observations by my father, Rufus H. Lane, Sr., when he was a Marine Lieutenant Colonel on duty at the Naval Attache’s Office in London during the early days of World War I.
The relation of the British officer to his men differs from that obtaining in the United States. The understanding and sympathy between them seems to be more complete, although the officer holds himself more aloof. The immediate training is done by the non-commissioned officers, under the general supervision of the commissioned officers. The relative positions of officer and men seem to be in harmony with the social conditions of the country and are more naturally accepted than they are in America. The officer is expected to be the aristocrat, and probably if he associated himself as actively and intimately with the men as the American officer does, he would lose some of their respect and loyalty. The system seems to be well adapted to their social habits, and serves to develop a happy coordination between officers and men. The discipline exercised by the officers is more natural and less artificial than in the United States.
One of the primary objects of training in the British service is to develop a soldierly spirit in the recruit. As stated in the training manuals, the object is to help the soldier to bear fatigue, privation, and danger cheerfully; to imbue him with a sense of honor; to give him confidence in his superiors; to increase his power of initiative, of self-confidence, and of self-restraint; to train him to obey orders; to produce a high degree of courage and disregard of self, etc. As soon as the recruit joins he is brought under such influences as would tend to produce and increase such a spirit, and it is made the duty of all officers and non-commissioned to assist in the attainment of this object by their conversation and example. The soldier is instructed in the famous deeds of the army and is given simple lessons in military history. It is endeavored to impress on him the privilege he inherits as a British subject, and the
honor which is his in serving the King and country; and is taught pride in his uniform.
Whatever the method, the success of the British in binding mediocre individuals into splendid fighting organizations is quite remarkable. The average British soldier, and especially the recruit, is unimpressive. There appears to be a lesson for Americans in this, the value of reaching the spirit of the men, and of elevating it according to the American genius, with a view to self-effacement of the individual, and his subordination and absorption into the spirit of the organization to which he belongs. It would seem that the training of the mind and hand has been pursued to the exclusion of the elevation of the spirit and character. Greater effort might be given to the development of patriotism, and of the honor of supporting and defending the privileges assured to us by our form of government. There is no concrete object in our government to which the ideal of loyalty can be attached, such as the British King, and the flag should therefore be emphasized as a symbol of our ideals.
These remarks seemed particularly *n' teresting in view of the later combat history of the British forces and of our own Marines. Since my father was Adjutant and Inspector General of the Marine Corps from 1923 through 1934, it seems reasonable to suppose that he had some influence on the indoctrination of Marines.
Commander G. B. Lovejoy, U. S. Naval Reserve—Lieutenant Commander Kiernan has put into words the thoughts I have long wanted to write. His article is timely, lllS thoughts are well considered and his words are well chosen.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice ant other emasculating concepts in the modern military—such as the popular desire to t>e known as a “good guy,” the coddling of the rank and file, the “personal attention” bur' den placed on command, the administrative volume solely concerned with covering one s number, and the political fear of having thc courage of one’s convictions—all tend to favor those with the least leadership c°n' science and leave the new recruit with lHtle of value to strive and work for. RHIP n°" means “Rank Has Its Problems” except in the Marine Corps, which alone among dK U. S. services has maintained its traditiona discipline (insofar as is possible under cur rent directives), and consequently, it retains its enviable esprit de corps and true military standing.
It will be a sad day for our nation when we are educated into completely turning over our responsibility for time-honored, effective, practical, personal leadership to the efficient substitute of guided discussions, leadership checklists, correspondence courses, and leadership field teams.
Chief Radarman M. J. McHale, U. S. Navy—I have read the Proceedings for many years because its articles are interesting to a sailor.
But in all due respect to Lieutenant Commander Kiernan’s rank, I believe he owes an apology, not only to me, but to every dedicated sailor who serves in the naval service. I refer to his statement appearing on page 85.
He states, “With money as the only lure, the really smart men quit at the end of their first cruise and accepted the call of civilian fife. The military was left with only the second-raters, the civilian rejects, many of whom lacked the ability and/or the ambition to compete in the world outside.”
I for one do not consider myself to be a “second-rater” nor “a civilian reject.” I also do not appreciate such a statement coming from anyone who is supposed to lead me and Whom I am supposed to follow.
I believe all career men are due an apology for such a statement.
Lieutenant Commander L. J. Kiernan, U. S. Navy—Several readers have written to me concerning the sentence on which Chief McHale comments, all having missed my father subtle point. I did not intend to imply that any dedicated serviceman is a second- rater or a civilian reject.
This sentence should be read, “with money as the only lure, the really smart men . . .” etc. My implication is that career men are fftotivated by other things than money, namely patriotism, adventure, and the challenge of the job. The Navy is a poor place for anyone seeking monetary rewards; there are no millionaires in the service.
If the money-seeking individual is alert and smart enough, he gets out and competes in civilian life. If he is not, if he lacks self confidence or ability, he tries to stay in where he is assured of at least “three squares and a place to sleep.” This type seldom contributes much to his unit, seldom advances very far, and seldom stays for 20.
All of us have known some officer or man who left the Navy at the end of his obligated service. These men could not or would not meet the challenge of service life, or they thought the grass would be greener on the outside. For some, it was greener. Others found the competition too much for them, and tried to return to the “security” of the service. Many of these parasites lack both the moral responsibility and the ability to be much of an asset to the Navy.
Money alone is inadequate compensation for long sea duty tours, for frequent transfers, cold, dark midwatches, and the daily risk of life, limb, and career. What then keeps a good man in the Navy?
It is patriotism and the satisfaction of being a vital part in the most vital machine in the world. It is the daily challenge found in operating ships, in making decisions, in managing men and equipment, in being ready to go anywhere any time, in defending our country in cold as well as hot wars. These are pretty intangible rewards, true. Most service men cannot or do not express this feeling, but they all are aware of it. Civilians, and those servicemen seeking monetary reward, just do not understand it.
Many servicemen, househunting in a strange town with a car full of hot, tired, and noisy children, have wondered why they put up with service life. Many Navy wives, standing in a room full of boxes and barrels and tearfully looking at some small treasured item that was broken in shipping, have thought of asking their husbands to get out. The dislocation allowance cannot compensate for such inconvenience, but the challenge of new duty and the reward of meeting new friends and seeing new places does.
Those readers who understood my point need no apology. For those who missed my point, I trust that this explanation will clear up the matter. For those who still cannot understand my views, I sincerely apologize for my unintended slight.
of
Leadership may be defined in a variety
John Geddes, La Jolla, California—The article, by Lieutenant Commander Kiernan, was thought-provoking and surprising to me, because I saw myself being referred to in the Naval Institute for the first time. Normally, one should consider this an honor, but the ideas attributed to me in this article make it somewhat less than that.
Mr. Kiernan refers to me as the example of the extreme who believes,
Give me an individual, any individual, and with sufficient time, and proper application of acceptable psychological procedures and principles by trained educators, I can mold that individual into a great leader.
He puts this idea into quotes. I don’t know where he obtained these quotes, but most emphatically, he did not obtain them from my article. I will be most happy to supply him with quotes on the subject, though. They are,
Give me an individual who has been screened by naval selection processes and with sufficient time, and the proper application of acceptable psychological and leadership theories and principles taught by skilled teachers trained in these subject matter areas, I can shape this individual into a better leader than he would have been without this particular training.
If I had taught this individual the theories and principles of navigation, seamanship or gunnery, he would likewise have been better at those tasks than if he hadn’t received the training.
The individual faces the same problem, what and how to learn, when he studies leadership or navigation. The difference is that the pattern of ideas and behaviors which comprise navigation, for example, are relatively clear cut and easy to perceive. The individual, once he learns these ideas and patterns of behavior can solve his problems efficiently and clearly. He knows when he has solved them and they stay solved. The pattern of ideas and behaviors that comprise leadership are ambiguous, diffuse and very difficult to perceive in some situations. Most people only learn a limited number of really successful leadership responses and a greater number of moderately successful responses. The average naval officer solves his leadership problems by “ear or intuition.”
Mr. Kiernan further states that, “This school (of thought) is a civilian institution, typified by, . . . ” my article. I really don’t know who supports my ideas these days, but the civilian tag he hangs on me or my ideas is, I think, inappropriate. I detect a level of frustration in Mr. Kiernan’s article with which I can sympathize, because I’ve been over the same route.
Mr. Kiernan made the following comment about my article, “This article goes so far as to state that selection of leadership instructors should be made on the basis of skill in teaching rather than on the basis of leadership by example.” I think his statement indicates that he is thinking about one set of skills, knowledges and behaviors while I am thinking about another. How many of us have had professors in school who were famous because they wrote a well received book? We took their course with the highest anticipation of really learning something, but became disappointed when the teacher turned in a poor job of teaching, because all he did was read from his own book. This analogy lS used only to emphasize one point; that the skills and knowledges used in performing effectively in an operational situation are different from those used in a teaching situation in many ways. It is also true that a number ot similar leadership behaviors are used in teaching and in naval leadership. The characteristics of leadership and the personality traits of leaders will vary from group to group- A designated leader may be well qualified to perform important group functions under certain conditions and inadequately qualified under others. As group tasks change, the same leader may or may not be able to per' form in the new way.
ways. It refers to the process through which groups of people achieve both material and psychological goals. The group, a ship’s erevf for example, achieves the material goal 0 producing a clean fighting ship able to per' form effectively all tasks assigned to it. ^ achieves the psychological goal of providing many personal rewards to each individual- Two functions of leadership common to most groups are goal achievement and group maintenance functions. The goal achievement functions include originating actiofi keeping the group’s attention on the goals, creating plans, solving technical problems, evaluating behavior and providing high technical skill. The group maintenance functions include creating feelings of good will among group members, arbitrating disputes, giving encouragement and recognition, giving people a chance to express their ideas, stimulating self direction and strengthening the feeling of closeness with the group.
Here is another way to conceptualize the leadership process. The leader has first to perceive the situation as it really is. Next, he has to possess skill in diagnosing the dynamics of the group’s interactions. When the group is bored, angry, happy, etc., he should know it. When the members of the group tend to Want this or that goal, he should be aware of it. If there is something wrong with the group, he should be able to diagnose what it is. The next step is to select a leadership response from his repertoire of responses which can solve the problem. The individual is required to use both technical and social skills in his responses. The next step is skill in implementing the appropriate leadership response. One may select an appropriate response but implement it ineffectively. It is at this point that each leader has to recognize his own personality patterns for what they are and implement his responses in ways consistent With his personality. The sober or tense individual will have real difficulty in trying to emulate the leadership example of the jovial extrovert or vice versa. The next step is to monitor realistically with high diagnostic skill the reactions to your own leadership response. Then repeat this same cycle over and over again, modifying your behavior in order to achieve your group maintenance and group achievement goals.
The most successful leader is one who has high ability in both the group achievement and maintenance functions. Emphasis on goal achievement while ignoring group maintenance tends to make a group hostile and unhappy or “bitter.” Emphasis on group maintenance while ignoring goal achievement tends to make for a slack ship where life is “easy enough,” but there is really nothing to be proud of.
Please note, I have not told any naval officer how to run or fight his ship or build morale. I have only tried to tell him how psychology describes in precise and valid terms what is happening while he is acting out his leadership role. This information is waiting, available but not effectively assembled for his use, to help him be a better officer. To understand these theories and principles adequately, the naval officer needs the background in psychology which I recommended in my article. The intent of this background is not to turn him into a psychologist, but to give him greater insights into his leadership role as a naval officer.
I believe that any “civilian” who teaches naval leadership should be limited to teaching only the theories and principles such as I have indicated here briefly. If he tries to play “naval officer” and assumes the function of “expert” in these behavior areas, he is as much out of his area as the naval officer who tries to play “expert” in leadership psychology without proper training. I think Mr. Kiernan is concerned about the facts or possibilities, I don’t know which, of civilians assuming “naval expert roles.” If this is the case, I agree that this is wrong and should not be. On the other hand, trained educators have special skills which are valuable to the navy when used appropriately.
The lead picture in Mr. Kiernan’s article shows Admiral Halsey giving his juniors the word. I think this is a fine example of naval leadership. The goal of my educational leadership program would be to help officers and men see more clearly and understand more completely the gifts and skills of superior leadership such as Admiral Halsey’s.
★