The advent of multi-megaton weaponry has not altered the primary mission of warfare. If we are to impose our will on the enemy, our ground forces inevitably must close with, and destroy, his. The foot soldier or Marine with the fixed bayonet is still the method by which direct pressure is brought to bear on the enemy. Missiles, bombers overhead, carriers off the coast, economic sanctions, and political maneuvering, all make our desires known to an enemy, but the personalized persuasion of a “bayonet in the belly” is the most positive form of expressing our will. The amphibious assault is one method by which the infantryman and his bayonet arrives with the equipment and support necessary to carry out his mission.
This writer concurs with those who claim that the techniques of amphibious assault require modification. The conventional amphibious operation of World War II and the Korean War leaves much to be desired and could in modern times result in disaster if a landing were resolutely opposed.
One inherent weakness of the “classical” assault lies in its dependence on small landing craft to land the bulk of the assault troops. This reliance on small craft limits the selection of the landing site. On the steep gradient coasts of the world, towering cliffs, high surf and ’long shore currents restrict the landings to protected coves which the enemy can also recognize and possibly defend. Flat or shallow gradient coastlines have offshore sandbars or coral reefs which present additional problems. Weather, sea conditions, and surf are critical and can cause perilous delays. Too, adverse seas often result in putting the troops ashore seasick and wet, their fighting effectiveness impaired.
Another argument against small boats is their requirement for specialized transports which must anchor in the objective area with in a few miles of the beach long before “H- hour” in order to launch boats and boat troops.
The boated troops are virtually defenseless en route to the beach. True, massive air and shore bombardment provide some protection to both the small boats and the transports at anchor, but the time delays incident to this conventional landing and the degree of air and naval gunfire preparation required virtually eliminates the element of surprise. Worse, it pinpoints the landing area, and permits the enemy to reinforce his defenses in depth. To nullify the enemy’s “counterpunch,” we must divert strike forces from other vital missions such as isolation of the battle zone, cover and deception, etc.
Today we have no battleships and no small rocketships in the active fleet and only a few in mothballs. Our reduced cruiser force and our destroyer types are being converted to anti-aircraft missile ships, a necessary improvement if we are to contain the enemy air threat. This reduction in shore bombardment capability places new demands on our air arm.
Still, with all its limitations, the conventional assault is still feasible, provided we acquire a high state of training, a complex control organization, and a fair share of luck. Most important, we must remind ourselves that amphibious warfare is an art, to which we have devoted a great deal of thought and skill in the past and, in mastering it, have been amply rewarded. But we dare not allow ourself the luxury of laziness. The United States is presently the world leader in this demanding art because we have eliminated our competition in two wars. If we are to retain our effectiveness, we must regain the sense of urgency which once spurred us. It is time to modernize the amphibious operation. Increased speed, more flexibility and greater striking power must be achieved.
In the classical assault, the LVT (Landing Vehicle Tracked) is utilized in the initial waves. These massive, armored, personnel carriers are launched well to seaward and they swim in from the launch area consuming large amounts of precious gasoline. They are big and cumbersome with little maneuverability when water-borne and, again, the troops are prone to seasickness during the long, slow swim to the beach. Admittedly, there have been some improvements in recent years. One innovation has been the introduction of the helicopter and the Marine Corps’ “Vertical Envelopment” technique. This still-to-be-battle-tested concept has progressed to the point that the proposed amphibious force will be composed of many Amphibious Assault Ships (LPH), essentially helicopter carriers, and Amphibious Transports Dock (LPD), which will carry a limited number of landing craft to augment their helicopters.
The introduction of the helicopter lends greatly needed flexibility to the amphibious operation by minimizing terrain features. High points of land and key defense features relatively inaccessible to ground troops can, with careful preparation and good timing, be taken by vertical envelopment. The helo lift is the quickest means of delivering small quantities of high priority supplies, of vacuating wounded, and of deploying reserve troops. However, an assault predicated on the use of large numbers of helicopters to land a sizable portion of the initial assault troops is a most hazardous undertaking. This vehicle is probably the most vulnerable ever developed for the transport of troops, particularly against defended positions in flat terrain. The helicopter is easy prey to anti-aircraft fire and small arms. A damaged helicopter or one with mechanical troubles represents a significant loss in over-all capability. Night and low visibility operations by helicopters are still hazardous. In summary, the helicopter has a definite role in modern amphibious warfare but, as a primary vehicle in direct assault, its extreme vulnerability must be considered.
What then is the solution? A multi-billion- dollar crash program? No, rather a more efficient utilization of the tools at hand, a reasonable building program toward a thoroughly balanced, effective, hard core amphibious force which can rapidly be expanded in the event of emergency, using our operating merchant fleet. More imagination, initiative and constructive thinking, in other words a little more time, effort, and money and less neglect and complacency concerning matters amphibious. Our amphibious capability may not have the glamour of our space program, but is may well prove to be our most potent weapon in the global arena of cold war conflict and local aggression. If you disagree, ask yourself how much impression our missile muscle has made on Dr. Castro.
As to the utilization of the tools at hand, speed, flexibility, and striking power are the goals, and the LST/LVT assault can help us attain all three. This LST /LVT assault, augmented by helicopters and backed up by LSD, LCU, APA, AKA, and the American Merchant Marine provides the speed, flexibility, and striking power essential to a successful amphibious assault. Most of the “tools” for the type of assault which will now be described already have proven their versatility and reliability. There remains only their integration into a total concept with the provision of sufficient funds to improve on certain minor elements which are missing or incomplete.
An LST/LVT assault is nothing more than the direct delivery of LVT onto a beach by LST. (Let me anticipate the most obvious argument against this concept by stating that the LST is no more vulnerable when beached for a few minutes than when it is anchored 4,000 yards off the beach for a few hours.)
An amphibious assault conducted in this manner is fast. This haste without waste, coupled with the unbroken momentum of the assault, results in a degree of tactical surprise not attainable in the conventional assault.
Advance Force operations for this assault must be rather limited and so designed as to deny the enemy knowledge of our intended invasion site. Essentially they will consist of:
(a) Surveillance by Underwater Demolition Teams of the objective area beaches including mine detection and countermeasures activities. UDT’s operating out of submerged submarines will survey the approaches and select mine free channels to be marked by delayed rising buoys or where necessary, delayed action explosives may be laid to countermine those mines that cannot be swept or avoided. These operations may take several weeks, but by operating submerged, chances of detection will be greatly reduced. An efficient underwater swimmers’ propulsion unit will require development, and hand-carried sonar or underwater television with light amplification improved.
(b) Air operations to isolate the battle zone (concentrating on elimination of enemy missile sites and airfields), and to provide necessary photo reconnaissance.
(c) Gunfire support ships used in cover and deception roles to cause reduction in enemy strength in the immediate objective area and dispersal of the enemy reserve force.
The beach preparation by naval gunfire will consist of the massed fire of an initial assault wave of IFS/LSMR-type rocket firing ships. These can approach the beach at good speed, turning away to take stations on the flanks of the assault lanes and continuing their fire as the second wave of LST’s make their approach and beach out. We have some Landing Ships Medium (Rocket) and one Inshore Fire Support ship in our mothballed fleet. Reactivation of these ships will not only give us their gunfire support capability, but would also provide much needed small command experience for the young lieutenants.
The assault troops would be carried in the Landing Vehicles Tracked (LVT), which would be in the tank decks of the Landing Ships Tank (LST). An LST could steam in from seaward at high speed (14-17 knots) preceded by the rocket-firing gunfire support ships. Each LST would be ballasted down forward in order to insure beaching out by the bow. With bow doors open and ramps at a 45-degree angle to provide protection against direct fire from the beach, ramps would drop quickly on beaching.
Each LST would beach out and rapidly discharge the embarked LVT’s loaded with 350 to 600 troops and supplies as required. In less than five minutes after touching down, an LST can disgorge 17 LVT’s and be scurrying away from the beach. The LVT’s, with their tracks on firm ground, can proceed inland at speeds up to 30 miles per hour—a truly fast armored column movement.
Some of the advantages of this LVT assault are:
(a) No delays in the landing—the assault force can be from 30 to 50 miles at sea at a time when the conventional assault force would have to anchor off the beach in order to off-load boats and troops preparatory to assaulting the beach. The approach to the beach is rapid, smooth, and quiet, and the LVT can proceed inland with no break in the momentum of the assault.
(b) Weather is no longer such a critical factor, for the LST can beach in relatively bad weather. Darkness or reduced visibility presents no appreciable problem to the beaching LST.
(c) We will have the option and the incalculable advantage of beach selection. Even if the LST beaches on an offshore sand bar or on a mud flat, the tractional power and amphibious character of the LVT insures forward progress. The only major consideration in the selection of the landing site is that the LVT and embarked troops must have ready access inland. Thus, many sections of a coastline unsuitable for small boat operations are opened up to over-the-beach assault.
(d) Troops landed by LST/LVT direct assault are dry, not seasick, and are protected against atomic fallout. The LVT has a full tank of gas and the light armor provides protection against small arms fire.
(e) The LST provides protection to the tank deck load of LVT’s en route to the beach. In the tank deck they not only have added protection from enemy fire, but are also protected from any atomic contamination of the water or air. The LST in turn is protected from fallout by use of clear internal ballast for cooling water and for washdown. The 3- inch, 50-caliber, rapid-fire gun mounts of the modern LST provide excellent direct counterbattery fire and some close-in anti-aircraft protection.
(f) Control of the LST in this assault is direct and vastly simplified. Mass action with dispersion, rapid exploitation of the shock effect of beach preparation, speed, relative surprise, flexibility and power, then, are the result of direct assault by LST.
In any assault operation, small numbers of men are required to seize key terrain features and important objectives, but their task should be limited to the number of troops which can be helicopter-lifted in one flight. The helicopter’s unique contribution to such an assault lies in attacking positions inaccessible to LVT. But helicopters should not be relied upon to the extent that their peculiar limitations would jeopardize the mission. Most important, helicopters should be conserved in order to make the most of their high speed capability in delivering the reserve element and urgently needed supplies as requested.
Following the LST assault waves, the LSD with LCU and LCM, preloaded with tanks and support vehicles, can enter the transport area and discharge support forces, and the supplies required to back up the assault. The use of amphibious vehicles such as the LARC- 5, when they become available, for such support will contribute toward the goals of flexibility and speed. Sandy beaches obviously will still be required for off-loading the vehicles from LCU and LCM.
Thus far, our discussion has been limited to the assault forces, which are essentially mobile-loaded. The LST’s in the initial over- the-beach assault were loaded with LVT’s in the tank deck. Main decks were clear for helicopter operations or loaded with amphibious- type ducks or LARC-5’s. The LSD carried vehicle-loaded LCU and LCM. These mobile forces along with the helicopter-borne troops constitute the assault echelon.
We have briefly examined the men and the machines—now, what of the materiel? The mass of additional supplies, heavy support (and reserve forces), required to sustain the assault arrive in AKA, APA, and merchant cargo ships. The problem arises from the need to off-load these mountains of supplies quickly and efficiently so that the cargo ship remains in the transport area a minimum length of time. In the past, this off-loading has been accomplished by small landing craft, LCU, LCM, and LCVP.
The development and perfection of the technique of bringing an LST alongside another ship at anchor has provided the capability of rapidly unloading transports and cargo ships. The APA, AKA, or merchantmen is at anchor (with a second anchor underfoot when adverse weather prevails). The LST makes a parallel approach about 300 feet out. The LST anchor is dropped when the bows of the two ships are abreast. The LST eases toward the larger ship—paying out anchor chain—until bow lines can be passed. Two 8-inch lines are required in heavy weather. The bow of the LST is then fixed by a taut anchor chain on one side and the bow mooring line on the other. The LST adjusts about the fixed bow until she is riding about six feet from the larger ship with her engines opposed. The outboard (ahead engine) is making from one or two knots more than the inboard or backing engine, sufficient to overcome the force of the wind. The rudder is positioned as required to twist the LST against the pull of the anchor chain. The bow being a fixed pivot point, the stern is under perfect control and the attitude alongside, as well as the distance, can be readily adjusted. A slight outboard list on both ships will help prevent the ships from hitting even if they are pitching and rolling out of phase.
The strain is on the anchor chain and the LST must be prepared to take in or veer the chain one link at a time until equilibrium has been established and there is a stable nest of two ships riding to a two-anchor moor. Two LST’s and four LCU’s can take the combat personnel and vehicles from an APA in less than three hours. Personnel are transferred in less than one-half hour and vehicles can be taken as fast as the transport can handle her gear. All hatches can be worked simultaneously if an LST is along each side, one forward and one aft. The transport can actually off-load to the deck of the LST faster than to a pier since the height of the LST deck is approximately the same as the transport’s. Offloading can be accomplished under adverse weather conditions, having been accomplished rapidly and smoothly in 25-35 knots of wind and five-to-seven-foot waves during periods when seas are too rough to permit use of LCM.
Vehicles and cargo that are palletized, in containers, or van-loaded, can be transferred rapidly and efficiently to LST. Loose cargo should be handled in LCU and LCM.
Once the transport has transferred the cargo to the LST/LCU, the ship is available for turn-around; her cargo has been further dispersed and is immediately available when called.
Bridging the gap between the LST beaching point and the high-water mark is the most serious problem remaining in our ship-to- shore movement of cargo. Operations over causeways, while entirely feasible, can be slow, awkward, and perilous. Of course, there are still many places throughout the world where an LST dry-ramp beaching is feasible and bridging problems do not exist. Once dry- ramped or married to the causeway, palletized or van-loaded cargo can be easily loaded by fork lifts into empty trucks run on board the LST from the beach for that purpose. During off-loading, the beached LST adds to the beachhead anti-aircraft protection.
Those LST’s configured to carry bulk fuel can supply about 250,000 gallons of bulk Petroleum Oil Lubricants until such time as offshore discharge points are established for conventional oilers. With the LST tanker beached, transfer of bulk POL is limited only by capabilities of the shore receiving facilities —again the LST is not limited to the protected sand coves.
Air defense and ASW protection of the task force en route to the objective area is no different from protecting any task force at sea. On arrival in the objective area, the defense shifts to area defense. The objective area must be denied to enemy submarines and enemy air. The friendly submarines that earlier operated in support of underwater demolition teams can now be stationed to seaward in order to capitalize on their long range detection capability. The N.E.L. type small boat sonar may prove useful for an inner defense barrier. A/S helicopters will assist in the detection and attack on enemy submarines as will the A/S aircraft. UDT’s will continue their mine location and destruction activities.
Area air defense is still a most pressing problem which the advent of our anti-aircraft missile ships will be of assistance in solving.
The gunfire support of troops ashore, penetrating rapidly inland has become an increasingly sticky situation as more and more conventional gun barrels are converted to guided missiles, and all battleships are mothballed. Obviously, much of the gunfire support must be taken over by air which also has to support and protect helicopter flights. Increased air support appears to be necessary. But can we hope for it? Probably not. Current development trends seem to be toward faster and faster aircraft with correspondingly reduced capability for close air support. Rocket- propelled conventional weapons, similar to the 5-inch spin-stabilized rocket of the IFS, but with much greater range, and, if possible, with an anti-aircraft capability would be most helpful.
Fortunately, the present LST is adequate for the LVT assault concept, though it has some limitations. Ideally, we should strive for a 20-knot LST with good ability to off-load vehicles and cargo over a dry ramp. Recommended design features which would give greater flexibility and usefulness to the LST would include the following:
Size should approximate the 1156-class and certainly should be no larger than the Suffolk County-class.
The bow should be fine to permit speeds of 22 knots in all reasonable weather. This will mean greater draft forward if we retain the convention 2 per cent keel slope. There should be a flexible ballasting system aft to permit increasing the keel slope to perhaps 4 per cent in order to raise the bow as high as possible even though this means increasing the draft aft. Many beaches throughout the world are sufficiently steep to permit a much greater slope than the 2 per cent possible in the present LST. Ability to ballast the bow down to at least 13 feet is required in order to provide good sea-keeping ability and to permit placing the ship on an even keel (raising the stern). This permits crossing over sand bars often found on shallow beaches instead of beaching out by the stern. The ballasting system must be such as to permit maximum flexibility in adjusting the trim of the LST to suit particular situations. A flume stabilization system should be included in this design in order to eliminate the excessive rolling which is otherwise a characteristic of these big, flat- bottom ships.
If we are to concentrate our energies on the problems of over-the-beach, rather than pier- side, operations, the present cargo hatch in the LST can and probably should be eliminated to increase main deck space.
A vehicle ramp, from the main deck which could furnish a rigid platform extending down to the beach or up to the tops of shoreline bluffs, would permit the use of many narrow beaches and parts of the coast line that can presently be breached by helicopters only.
As to the design of such a vehicle ramp, the Army tank-laid 60-foot bridge is a possible solution. Similarly, a method called “zipper tower,” invented and patented by a French engineer, appears to have possibilities. The bridging equipment should be capable of supporting up to 30 tons and will require research and development. It must be capable of recovery and repeated use by the LST.
Our problems are many and no one but a fool or a charlatan would pretend to possess all the final answers. However, the LST/LVT assault would seem to enhance greatly the capabilities of our present amphibious force, utilizing, as it does, ships and equipment that are with us now—not on a drawing board.
But, even were the LST/LVT concept implemented this very day, it would not be enough. Nothing ever is when the stakes are survival. There is grave danger in overemphasis of ICBM and thermonuclear weapons to the exclusion of progressive thinking about the tactics and techniques of fighting limited wars. Certainly, we must develop and maintain the capability of massive retaliation. But at the same time we must also be able to put out brush fires anywhere in the world.