A generation ago, in a time of earth-bound armies and gun-firing ships, the logical defense of Africa might have been limited to strong ground forces at Suez and suitable naval forces to command the waters around the continent, especially the Mediterranean. The narrow land bridge from Asia to Africa still has extraordinary strategic importance. And sea forces dominating the perimeter of Africa still could have highly important roles. But the real nature of the problem has changed greatly.
It has changed, in the first place, because Africa has become more important to the nations of the Atlantic region. Furthermore, new weapons of greater range, speed, and destructiveness call for defense in greater depth. And new techniques of political, ideological, and economic penetration call for equally novel defenses, beyond the limits of the strictly military.
There also are more concrete reasons for a new approach to the defense of Africa and to the uses of Africa in a larger defense problem. These center chiefly on political and military changes in the Middle East, around the pivotal Suez position. In the last dozen years. Great Britain has been obliged to yield up air and ground force bases in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan. It may find its position on Cyprus seriously impaired, either by political developments or by the exposed location of the island in an age of jet bombers and missiles. The greatest loss in this area was the massive Suez base. It was one of the biggest and most costly military stations in the world; and it was located at one of the two or three most crucial strategic places known to military geography.
Meantime, Egypt has moved over to a neutralist position in foreign policy and has incorporated Syria. Iraq has abandoned its pro-Western alignment. Ethiopia, although not unfriendly, has leaned more and more toward a neutral role. And the Sudan, the vast territory to the south of Egypt, has become independent. To the westward, across North Africa, nearly the whole region has become more or less estranged from the European or Western world.
As a consequence of these political and military factors, British defense planning has carved out a new role for Kenya, and for British East Africa generally. The Western allies as a whole have a major stake in Africa; and they are coming to think of East Africa as a bulwark. They need a shield for the mineral-rich areas to the south, in Rhodesia, the Congo, and South Africa. These are important sources of copper, uranium, gold, tin, diamonds, silver, cobalt, etc. They also need a place of security in which to mass reserve forces for defense in depth against assault through the Middle East. They need positions for deploying air power outside the vulnerable European theater, from which to strike into the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean. And they need facilities and forces along the East African coast if they are to give the Indian Ocean the new importance it should have in naval power. Finally, they need an ideological road-block, an enclave of political stability and pro- Western faith, in an unpredictable continent of turmoil and breathless change.
East Africa provides an answer, although of course not a perfect or complete answer, to all these needs. East Africa, it should be mentioned here, refers in this article to British East Africa, comprising Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika—plus the small but not insignificant islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, within sight of the Tanganyika shore.
Visiting all these territories, as well as much of central and western Africa about a year ago, I was deeply impressed by their great diversity, by the perils of generalizing about them as a package, and by the sundry geographic and political factors that combine to make East Africa in particular a potential position of strength for the West.
These British territories form a compact, irregular rectangle, between the Congo and the Indian Ocean. It reaches from about 4 degrees North latitude to 12 degrees South and covers about 682,000 square miles —rather larger than Alaska. The total population is roughly 21 million—nine million in Tanganyika, 6.25 million in Kenya, and 5.8 million in Uganda. Of the 21 million, around 90,000, or less than one-half of one per cent, are Europeans.
This is a region of extraordinary diversity and remarkable geography. Northern Kenya is hot desert, too arid for any real usefulness. The low coastal belt, narrow but extending 700 miles along the shore of the Indian Ocean, is mostly hot and humid—suitable for sisal and cotton where it is sufficiently watered. Most of the interior of Tanganyika is barren, semi-arid plateau country, which has been left to the tsetse fly—but could be reclaimed and used if water were brought in for irrigation. In western Kenya, most of Uganda, and some widely separated parts of Tanganyika, the altitude—4,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level—is enough to give a bracing, salubrious climate the year ’round. This is good country for coffee, tea, and cattle—the main crops—as well as pyrethrum and various subsistence crops for local consumption. Rainfall varies enormously, even over short distances, from 20 inches a year to 80 and more.
Geographic characteristics run the gamut from desert and high savannah to rain-forest jungle, from the sultry lowlands to the perpetually snow-covered peaks of Mt. Kenya and Mt. Kilimanjaro. Slicing through the territory are the two forks of the Great Rift, the largest faults in the crust of the Earth. And in the Rift Valley are numerous lakes, including Tanganyika, the deepest lake in the world. Nearby is Lake Victoria—except for Superior—the largest lake in the world. This is a country of geographic superlatives.
Unlike some other parts of the continent, East Africa is poor in mineral resources, although Tanganyika has rich diamond workings and may have other minerals yet undiscovered. It is essentially agricultural country and because of the lack of water, some of it is not even good agricultural country.
In terms of military geography, East Africa has natural defensive features of great potential value. Indeed, it is completely surrounded by natural barriers of some sort. To the north of Uganda, in southernmost Sudan, are vast swamps where the White Nile loses itself for 300 miles on its northward course and then regains its unity as a river. Ethiopia is largely a very high, mountainous plateau. On the east, the sea forms a water barrier (a barrier, that is, for a nation that does not have sea command). There is formidable, undeveloped country at the south, where Mozambique begins. And all along the western boundary (with Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, and Nyasaland), there is a succession of lakes and mountain ranges, from the Ruwenzori mountains in the north to Lake Nyasa in the south. To the extent that mountains, lakes, rivers, oceans, and deserts still constitute obstacles in the nuclear-missile age, East Africa is well fenced.
In political terms, East Africa is markedly diverse. Uganda is a protectorate. Kenya is a colony. Tanganyika is a trust territory, formerly a German colony. All have been under British control for 45 to 60 years. All are moving rapidly towards independence, as is virtually all of Africa. Tanganyika gained internal self-government last year. Kenya is getting partial self-government, but may not be fully independent for five more years. Uganda defies prediction. It has many educated African leaders, but it is so split among forward- looking Western-educated politicians and conservative traditional rulers, like the Kabaka of Buganda, that it may take a few more years to find a formula for self-rule and final independence. There is conspicuous diversity also in the degree of white settlement. Kenya has 60,000 Europeans, including many settled on the land. They dominate the national economy. Tanganyika has a handful of settlers, who enjoy a good relationship to the Africans and pose no problems. Uganda has no Europeans on the land or with a real stake in the country—just business men and civil servants.
Despite all this diversity, however, the unifying factors are not negligible. One of them is language. All educated people speak English, which is used in legislative bodies, government offices, and business houses. Swahili, however, is more prevalent as a lingua franca in much of Tanganyika and some of Kenya, but this, too, is a unifying factor. Both languages serve an important purpose, in countries that may have 20 to 50 indigenous languages. Even when an indigenous language is widely used, as with Luganda in the greater part of Uganda, it has severe limitations as to abstract words, technical vocabulary, legal terms, and the like. Newspapers are printed in English, Swahili, and also Gujerati, this last the chief language of the bulk of Asians.
There is an element of unity likewise in the evolving political systems. It is too early to prophesy with confidence on this score. But it would seem that all three territories will have governments closely resembling the British legislative and cabinet system. Independence will bring changes, of course. Underneath the very British structure of parliaments and cabinets is the ancient substructure of tribal tradition and chiefly authority. But in any case, all the territories have in common both the new political system and the old tribal organization.
Another kind of unity has been imposed by the British in East Africa, despite the reluctance and distrust of many, perhaps most, of the Africans involved. Through the British East Africa High Commission, various common services have been set up for the whole area—some of them including Zanzibar. These services include railways, posts and telegraphs, currency, customs, and a great range of specialized research and technical services. This could be an enormous benefit. Where many of the new states of Africa are commencing to search for ways of federating or co-operating—to head off “Balkanization”— East Africa has the advantage of about 25 common services, including such things as locust control, leprosy research, statistics, fisheries, medical research, and agricultural experiment. Whether this measure of integration will stand the test of political independence, however, remains to be seen. In Uganda and Tanganyika, I found among African leaders considerable distrust of the High Commission, mainly because of the fear that it would be dominated by Kenya with its large European minority.
In another way, East African Airlines makes a contribution to the unity of the region. It provides a network of air routes within the territory, as well as services to India and to London. Some of the airfields are just grass strips, but there also arc some excellent international airports. The three main components of this region are linked in part by rail services and also by highways—not many of them hard-surfaced, however.
The story of the military forces in East Africa is quickly told. The principal force numerically is the King’s African Rifles—African troops with British officers, armed with light weapons and provided with motor transport. These are recruited mainly from a few tribes, such as the Kamba, in Kenya, whose men make particularly good soldiers. There are several Africans from the region now at Sandhurst, training for commissioned rank. At present, however, there are no Africans above the rank of Effendi, which is a special grade between non-coms and commissioned officers.
The King’s African Rifles add up to three battalions, one each in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, plus one company on Mauritius, 1,500 miles to the southeast, in the Indian Ocean. This is a territorial defense force— more than a police force, but neither armed nor trained for modern warfare as it might be in the 1960’s. In Kenya, there are also some special police, who constitute a paramilitary force adding something to the total of local defenses.
The naval forces of East Africa are smaller and more elementary. They consist of three vessels—two minecraft and one patrol boat— with suitable complements of African enlisted ranks and British officers. With its main base at Mombasa and a secondary one at Dar-es- Salaam, this is essentially a training force. There are plenty of potential sailors along this coast, however, for Zanzibar, Mombasa, and Dar-es-Salaam have been the chief southern terminals of the traditional trade in sailing dhows—mainly between the Persian Gulf ports and East Africa. Looking at these small sailing craft, and recalling the vagaries of the monsoon climate, one cannot ignore the skills represented by this ancient trade. After centuries of this colorful traffic, however, the dhows are disappearing. Steamers and diesels can carry black dates and dried fish cheaper than the picturesque, clumsy-looking sailing vessels built in Kuwait and Basra.
Such are the territorial or local defense forces. More important are the British forces. These are stationed in Kenya only, chiefly in the Nairobi area. And they are there in conformity with the strategic plans of the Commonwealth, not for any local purposes. Usually, two battalions of British army forces are stationed at the big cantonment near Nairobi. And at Eastleigh Air Base, in the same vicinity, a few squadrons of jet fighter aircraft are customarily assigned. For any large conflict, these are token forces and nothing more. But having them there serves to familiarize a substantial number of personnel with the area. And it also provides some force for a genuine emergency. Additionally, it maintains a military posture, not only for Britain but for the Western alliance, by the mere fact of keeping ground forces and air units from Europe at this strategic point in the heart of eastern Africa. The highlands around Nairobi are particularly suitable for the purpose, since the climate at all seasons is not only acceptable for Europeans but invigorating. Furthermore, the weather is good for flight operations throughout the year, and the altitude is sufficient to avoid the extreme heat which hampers jet operations in some parts of the tropics. Nairobi International Airport, normally used almost entirely for commercial aircraft movements, is a major military asset as well. International Airport at Entebbe, Uganda, is also in high country with similar natural advantages.
Nairobi, it should be noted, is not just a crossroads in an African wilderness. Neither is it merely a place from which white hunters set off with rich Americans to shoot elephants and rhino. It is a very modern city of nearly 250,000 population, linked by rail and all- weather highways, as well as air services, with the rest of East Africa. It has hotels and banks, public utilities, schools and hospitals, newspapers, cartographic services, warehouses and factories. These are civilian facilities, it is true. But they have a large potential military value. As we found in World War II, in many parts of the world, it entails a lot of extra trouble, expense, and delay to create the housekeeping and logistical facilities for large concentrations of military forces in remote islands or tropical jungles. In a war of any dimensions and duration, it is quite an advantage to have the installations and services of a modern city at the point from which major forces are to be deployed.
What then is the strategic role of this Nairobi complex? One can think of it as the point of a long arrow, aimed towards Suez and the Persian Gulf, with the split tail of the arrow reaching back in two segments— one by rail and road to Mombasa and Dar- es-Salaam and the sea, the other by air to West Africa and the whole Atlantic region. Kenya is a reasonably secure and certainly spacious place in which to assemble forces and the means of sustaining them. Yet it is closer to all Middle Eastern positions than are the British Isles. All three countries of East Africa are productive. Kenya especially is in a position to provide a large share of the meat and other foodstuffs required for a sudden increment of forces—which would not be the case with a primitive country.
In the case of a serious movement by enemy forces into the main body of Africa south of the Sahara, Kenya could be made a strong forward position. In the case of a movement against the Middle East, after grave initial damage to Western installations in Europe by surprise attacks, Kenya could be a backstop of some value and a sturdy peripheral base from which to mount operations.
On the naval side, there is no way of judging in advance just how important the Indian Ocean might be in a future conflict. It seems safe to say, however, that it would have a far greater importance than it has had in any major war in the past. India is the greatest of the uncommitted nations, and the greatest prize of Soviet aspirations. Pakistan is emerging as a key nation in the Western alliance system, for all its own internal difficulties. South Asia generally has an enormously increased importance in world politics. This no doubt will be heightened as the power and aggressiveness of Red China are redoubled.
The Persian Gulf has not been stripped of its singular importance in military strategy, despite the onset of nuclear power or the fabulous oil discoveries in the Sahara. If Suez is closed, or is too shallow for numbers of super-tankers, Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam are ideally located on the flank of the sea communications lines leading from both India and the Persian Gulf to the Cape and on around to the Atlantic world. There would be no better places from which to maintain a close surveillance of these routes. Both ports are reasonably secure against seizure from the land side, given the natural geographic defenses of the East African quadrangle.
In a quite different way, East Africa could be a strong point of political or ideological defense. The threat to Africa is not simply military. Indeed, it probably is not even primarily military. Such penetration as already has taken place has been ideological, commercial, and political. Certain danger spots can be singled out, either as places where Communist influence has been established, or as places of rising tension and disorder in which Communist penetration would be tempting, easy, and mischievous.
In the northeast, Egypt and the United Arab Republic as a whole have been playing a complicated and venturesome game, getting military weapons and supplies as well as other aid on a large scale from the Soviet Union and other Iron Curtain countries. In West Africa, independent Guinea has welcomed Soviet assistance increasingly and has shown an alarming affinity for Communist ideas as well as Soviet economic help. A number of other countries, just now coming to independence, are going to be in the hands of leaders who believe their best bet is “positive neutralism”—which often has meant a policy more pro-Soviet than pro-Western. In South Africa, the intransigent commitment of the dominant Nationalist faction to a white supremacy program is creating a fearful antagonism between the three million Europeans and the 11.5 million non-Europeans. If no conciliatory middle course is found, this rising cleavage of races would seem certain to produce the bitterness and disorder that make Communist penetration an easy business. Farther in the future, one can envision readily the possibility of similar tensions and similar strategic dangers in Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
As the raw violence and indescribable confusion of the last eight months confirm, the (former Belgian) Congo is a present and future area of danger in the world. Premature independence found this unhappy land entirely without native leaders of ability and experience, with a maze of meaningless political parties, totally lacking in technical skills, and deeply divided by tribal loyalties. Only the intervention of the United Nations has prevented the Congo from falling into such chaos as to be an easy mark for Communist seizure. There is still a very serious danger that the country may wind up an outpost of Soviet power.
In short, Africa is a continent of political uncertainty, in great part; and East Africa is an enclave of considerable stability in this troubled and turbulent land mass. Uganda has no white settlement, no racial problem. Its African leaders may quarrel among themselves, but they are sensible, conservative men, long accustomed to the procedures of self-government. By a kind of osmosis, they have absorbed the British notion of temperateness and gradualism. Tanganyika has such a tiny group of Europeans settled on the land— maybe 1,000 or 1,200—that they are quite willing to make themselves an acceptable minority in a country of nine millions. And in Julius Nyerere, the Africans have an intelligent, moderate leader for whom all elements of the population have the greatest respect.
Kenya, although the most important unit economically and strategically, is not quite so sure of escaping political instability and disorder. There have been and still are some antagonisms among Africans, Asians, and whites. But thus far the moderates have called the turns, among Africans and Europeans alike. There is a very good chance that Kenya will evolve in the next five years as a multiracial state in which six million Africans, 175,000 Asians, and 60,000 Europeans will all make appropriate contributions.
Given these elements of stability, East Africa should be a strong bulwark against Communist penetration, whether economic or political.
America’s policy and posture respecting Africa are not the main concern of this article, but one observation follows from the strategic and political problems considered above. While Africa was .almost entirely a continent of colonies, the United States had a minor role. Then, when nationalist movements got under way, the United States encountered a troublesome dilemma, torn between its basic belief in self-determination and its loyalty to the mother countries in Europe—its allies. But now that virtually all of Africa is either independent or moving into independence in a few years, the United States has both an obligation and an opportunity. It has an obligation to co-operate with new nations that want to step into the 20th century as free and democratic states. It has an opportunity to weld these countries into the main body of the Free World. Especially in technical and economic assistance, in aid to education, and in capital investment, the United States can have an enormous and constructive role. As it changes its consulates into embassies, America has a new and direct access to these countries and their native leaders, many of whom have studied or travelled in the United States. This is particularly the case with East Africa, where English is the language of the native elite.
By way of summing up the matter, there is no way to determine just what the value of East Africa would be in a showdown—or even what its value may be in the business of preventing a showdown by a deterrent posture around the world. We don’t know that much about the nature of the threat to this continent of dynamic change. We don’t know enough about the risk of ideological poisoning in a society moving from old, primitive, tribal ways into a modern, literate, urban, industrial civilization. But it seems safe to work on two premises. First, East Africa has the characteristics for a defensive position of some strength. Second, with a carefully planned policy of generosity well tinctured with realism and discretion, the United States can contribute largely to the creation of such a position of strength. Whatever we can achieve in this area will serve to buttress our own security in a world that has become distressingly small.
“ ... to pin an opponent is the vital prelude to a decisive maneuver; this dual act gives a double meaning to the old maxim—‘divide to conquer'."
B.H. LIDDELL HART
A graduate of Ohio Wesleyan and the School of Military Government at Columbia University, Mr. Hessler served as an information officer with fast carrier task forces and at CinCPac Headquarters during World War II. Since the war, he has had frequent assignments with U. S. Armed Forces overseas as a civilian correspondent and writer on military matters. Three times winner of the Naval Institute Prize Essay contest, author of Operation Survival, a study of American military policy, and Our Ineffective State, as well as numerous articles in national magazines, Mr. Hessler is a foreign news analyst on the staff of the Cincinnati Enquirer.