“Freedom of navigation is an important objective of American foreign policy.”
Cavendish W. Cannon*
In our grave concern over the military subjugation of the Satellite States, it is easy to overlook another dangerous and related Soviet objective—the establishment of satellite seas. Just as the Soviet Union is striving to cut off large non-Russian land areas from the Free World, so is it aiming to make the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the Sea of Japan into Russian lakes.
The closing of these international highways would mean a blow to non-Communist economies, a lowering of morale in the restive Satellites, and a strategic naval loss which would significantly alter our military posture.
The Danube Lesson
We know what it means for all concerned when the Communists seize a land area. The lost personal liberties, the warped economies, and the increased military and political tensions need no elaboration here. Since the results of Soviet control of strategic waterways have received less attention, it will be instructive to view a laboratory case—the Danube River since World War II. For nearly a century (1856-1948), this great cultural and commercial artery was managed by an international commission. Under this arrangement, the Danube benefited the riparian states and the entire civilized world much as do the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Panama Canal. Once Soviet Russia became paramount in the Balkans, however, it ended the liberal and intelligent regulations and began a narrow, discriminatory rule of this important waterway.
Although the Soviet Union could not give its actions the force of legality, it did provide them with a screen of formality by going through the motions of an international conference at Belgrade in 1948. To this meeting, as chief Soviet delegate, came no less a personage than the Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky. This was at once an indication of the importance which the Soviets attached to the Danube and an indication of the results which could be expected from the conference. The United States designated its ambassador to Yugoslavia, Cavendish W. Cannon, as its principal delegate. The Satellite regimes and Yugoslavia sent dutiful and well-rehearsed Communists. In refusing to adhere to the Soviet-drafted treaty, the U. S. representative said:
The meetings of the conference have been characterized by Soviet dictation. The unhappy subservience of the Danubian peoples was never more clearly manifest than at this Conference. The statements and voting of the representatives of the Danubian states reflected their lack of freedom of choice on matters of vital concern to their peoples.
During the same speech, Ambassador Cannon accurately predicted the fate of the formerly free Danube in these words:
The actions of the Soviet Delegation have made evident the determination of the Soviet Union to perpetuate its economic and political enslavement of the Danubian peoples. Its refusal to accept provisions assuring genuine freedom of commerce and nondiscrimination shows that it intends to maintain vested interests which it has established for its own benefit through extortion from governments imposed by force against the will of the peoples of its Satellites.
The lesson then is clear. If the U.S.S.R. ever gains full control of an international sea, we can expect a repetition of the Danube story. With this admonitory experience in mind we should consider the significance of Soviet military and political actions relating to the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan.
Soviet Tactics to Achieve Naval Dominance
Russian Communist moves to achieve control of all three seas have ranged from direct military operations to subtle, almost concealed, diplomatic maneuvers. Underscoring the role of force in achieving domination of these seas are the Soviet attacks on U. S. planes, as well as those of other nations, made outside of territorial waters and in clear violation of International Law. At the other end of the spectrum of Soviet instrumentalities are diplomatic chicanery and propaganda. Communist expressions such as “sea of peace” and Soviet-sponsored measures to extend territorial waters are best explained by a Kremlin drive to control three traditionally international water highways.
The Baltic
In the Baltic, the Soviet Navy has developed a strong fleet with supporting shore- based air. These naval forces operate from numerous excellent bases along the north, east, and south coasts from Finland to Germany. Many of these bases are sufficiently ice- free to be easily negotiable with the aid of icebreakers even under the severest conditions.
Most significantly, Russia shares naval power in the Baltic only with Sweden, whose navy, although vigorous and progressive, is not large. Germany’s defeat in World War II created an inviting opening for the Soviets. And, as has become evident, the Communists are quick to fill a power vacuum, be it on land or sea.
The Soviets give no indication of being satisfied with their vastly improved military position in the Baltic. They continue to employ their international political machine to increase their relative strength by attempting to weaken their neighbors. In doing this, Moscow has shown its versatility and flexibility by skillfully alternating between the economic carrot of trade agreements and the propaganda stick of atomic threats. The Soviets have also made strident calls for “peace zones,” on Communist terms, of course.
In 1957, the Soviet Foreign Office issued notes to Denmark and Norway, bluntly stating that they were inviting certain destruction if they accepted U. S. missiles on their soil. Free Germany received the same treatment with the addition of promises and threats regarding eventual reunification.
Parallel with the threatening notes, the Communists conducted a propaganda campaign aimed at pacifists and wishful thinkers. This campaign opened in December 1957, when the Polish Foreign Minister, Rapacki, called for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. His plan, if carried out, would seriously weaken NATO and leave the Baltic open to Soviet exploitation.
Khrushchev has personally taken part in this propaganda campaign. Speaking in Riga, Latvia, on 11 June 1959, he proposed that Scandinavia and the Baltic be made a “zone free of atomic and rocket weapons.” Incidentally, this offer to turn the Baltic into a Communist “sea of peace” followed soon after the concluding of a 2-year Danish-Soviet trade protocol.
Nine days after the Riga speech, on 20 July 1959, Khrushchev attempted to disquiet his neighbors by cancelling proposed visits to the Scandinavian countries. Because there exists in Scandinavia what Moscow terms an “anti- Soviet attitude,” it is clear that the series of cynical and transparent actions by the U.S.S.R. has been correctly evaluated by the astute northern Europeans. These people have had long experience with the Russian Bear.
Russia may consider, however, that its programs have not failed completely, because our Scandinavian NATO allies have avoided the difficult questions which would be posed if atomic deterrents were located in their countries. In so doing they fail to achieve the maximum defense which their NATO membership could accord them. Thus the countries which are the northern bastion of NATO are resisting Soviet pressures, but the Baltic area remains in jeopardy since defenses there are weaker than they should be.
The Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean
The Black Sea, like the Baltic, occupies a position high on the Soviet list of military and political objectives. In comparing events relating to the Black Sea since World War II with those relating to the Baltic, one notices many striking parallels, along with a few interesting differences.
A large naval construction program in the Black Sea has made Soviet Russia virtually the single naval power in this area. Having acquired Rumania and Bulgaria as satellites, the U.S.S.R. is in complete control of the western, northern, and eastern shores of the Black Sea. It is perhaps in a more dominant position here than in the Baltic.
Another similarity is that the entrance to the Black Sea is controlled by a NATO ally. Just as Denmark is astride the Oresund and the Belts, so is Turkey in direct control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. In the case of the Baltic, Denmark gains support from the strategic location of Free Germany and Norway; while to the south, Greece occupies a key position in relation to the Black Sea approaches and can support its NATO ally, Turkey.
Because Turkey and Greece are necessary for full control of the Black Sea, they have been in the front lines of the Cold War since it began. In fact, the quarrel between Russian Communism and the Free World was brought out into the open as a result of Soviet moves against the Turkish Straits. And Cold War battle lines were drawn as a result of Soviet bloc support of the Greek guerrillas.
The pattern of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda on Black Sea matters has a familiar look when compared with that relating to the Baltic. Here again is the mixture of threatening notes and offers of “zones of peace.” In fact, the timing of the Soviet notes and speeches leads to the conclusion that for the Russians, the Baltic and Black Seas are part of a single question.
There is one important difference among the many similarities. The U.S.S.R. views the Black Sea and the Straits as an integral part of its drive into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East—a drive it has begun even before it has gained complete control of the Black Sea. To the Soviets, control of the Black Sea is the first step for achieving what appears to be their long-term goal of spreading into the Middle East. For this reason, the Soviets in June of 1959 included Italy, the Balkans, and the Adriatic in their proposal for a “peninsula of peace.”
There is no reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be content if it achieved its goal of turning the Black Sea into a Satellite lake. The recurring crises in the Middle East, the sale of submarines to Egypt, and the basing of submarines in Albania, all lead to the conclusion that the eastern Mediterranean would become the next body of water closed to all but “friendly” shipping and men-of-war.
The United States and its allies have stood firm in this area. Had we not done so, the Soviet Navy would now have bases on the Straits and in Greece, and the U. S. Navy would never again have visited Turkish Black Sea ports or, for that matter, have operated in the eastern Mediterranean.
The Sea of Japan
It may seem like a radical change to leave the Baltic and Black Sea to discuss the Sea of Japan. From the Soviet point of view, however, no readjustment in thinking is necessary; all three seas are part of one objective. The Soviet aim of forming satellite seas is global. While the Soviets were scheming late in the last war to form satellite states and satellite seas in Europe, they were also taking measures to do the same thing in the Far East.
As a result of the Yalta agreements, the U.S.S.R. was off to a running start in the Far East at the end of World War II. In August of 1945, in accordance with those agreements, it occupied southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Thus the Sea of Okhotsk was largely closed off from the outside world. The U.S.S.R. was much more concerned, however, about the Sea of Japan.
Welcoming the postwar instabilities and military voids, the U.S.S.R. proceeded to develop its naval and other forces in the area at an accelerated pace. By 1950, it felt ready to have one of its puppets seize South Korea and thus gain control of the Sea of Japan. It was stopped, principally by American determination, from acquiring this neighboring sea and using it as a sure means for subjugating Japan, the principal industrial nation in Asia. With Japan as a satellite, the rest of Asia would have been unable to resist further Communist encroachments.
The global nature of Soviet naval policy is well illustrated by the Soviet-provoked incidents relating to the Sea of Japan. In this area, too, the Soviets have attacked American planes over international waters. Moreover, they have resorted to crude diplomatic intimidation of Japan, just as they have with our naval allies in Europe. For example, on 15 May, 1958, the Soviet Union bluntly asked the Japanese government if the United States were basing nuclear weapons in Japan. It was undoubtedly more than coincidence that the U.S.S.R. launched Sputnik III on this same date.
Such Soviet tactics may seem barbarous and clumsy to the civilized world of the second half of the 20th century. On the other hand, to the pragmatic leaders of Communist Russia, such measures may seem a good way to give reality to the name of the principal Soviet city on the Sea of Japan. In the Russian language “Vladivostok” means “ruler of the East.” If we want more tangible evidence of Soviet intent, we can reflect on the Soviet statement of July 1957 that the vast bay leading to Vladivostok is closed.
Territorial Waters and Satellite Seas
So far we have examined specific Soviet measures designed to restrict Free World action in each of the three seas earmarked by the Communists for satellite status. Concurrently with these actions, the Soviet Union has been conducting a Cold War campaign which endangers all three seas and is therefore worthy of special attention. This campaign, which is both blatant and subtle, aims to increase the breadth of territorial waters from the traditional three miles to 12 miles. If the persistent Soviet efforts in this direction were ever successful, the world’s naval and shipping powers would lose some of their advantage in relation to land powers. The American striking fleets could be placed under a legal ban by neutrals and others against operating in strategically important areas. If this ever happens, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Japan will all be a step closer to Danube status.
Soviet Naval Strategy and the Drive for Closed Seas
For the Soviet Navy, the neighboring seas are a constant frustration. For one thing, Western naval power has kept the Soviet fleet from spreading the Russian version of Marxism. To date, Communism, an unnatural method of ordering man’s life, has taken hold only in the presence of Sino-Soviet military force. This force is now being checked by a world-wide coalition of maritime powers, a coalition occasioned by Soviet aggression, centered around the United States, and based upon utilization of the worlds’ oceans.
These facts take on great significance for the Soviet Navy, since the most tempting areas for Communist military expansion are related to bodies of water on which the Free World maritime coalition can dispose overwhelming power. The Baltic Sea would be more vital to the Soviets for a westward military thrust than would the north European plain. The Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean would have to be secure before the Russians could lunge into the Middle East. Japan is militarily secure behind its moat, particularly with the power of the Seventh Fleet in the immediate background. Thus when Khrushchev speaks of the limited utility of cruisers, he is reflecting the frustrations of the Soviet Navy. It is true that Khrushchev’s cruisers will be good for little more than diplomatic visits and salutes so long as the West maintains strong and balanced naval strength. If we lower our guard, however, the Soviet cruisers will be useful in spreading Russian Communism.
Particularly troublesome to Soviet naval thinkers is the thin belt of land satellites in Europe insecurely anchored in the Baltic in the north and the Black Sea in the south. Since the satellites may be defined as a militarily occupied group of states lying between two international seas, they are in contact with the outside world through the ocean highways. As a result, they are certain to remain dissatisfied. Perhaps Soviet naval strategists sometimes reflect wryly on the words of a Czar who laid the foundations of the modern Russian Navy. Peter the Great, when he founded St. Petersburg (Leningrad) in 1703 called it “a window into Europe.” As long as the oppressed peoples of East Central Europe can gaze out the “windows” of free seas, they will have hope. The Soviet Navy has the task of closing those windows.
The bordering seas and their defenses are purely naval problems for the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Navy has a number of tasks which would normally fall to the Army or another service in most countries. The long coasts of the Soviet Union are defended by naval coast artillery, naval infantry, and a naval air arm, in addition to naval forces afloat. These forces are large. In fact, in terms of manpower, the Soviets have the world’s largest navy. Despite this large and growing naval strength, Soviet Navy planners know they are responsible for inadequately defended borders. The lessons of World War II have not been lost on these realistic men who fully appreciate that Western military power can be brought to bear in overwhelming force wherever there are oceans. They also appreciate the flexibility of naval power which can support a guerrilla force, a police action, or conventional land and air operations of whatever size.
Soviet naval strategy, then, is directed against the Western maritime coalition centered around the United States and its Navy. It also seeks control of the strategic straits and narrows leading into the neighboring seas. If the Soviet Navy could plant coast artillery, naval infantry, and units of the naval air arm in the vicinity of the Danish, Turkish, and Korean Straits, it would no longer have to defend the long coastlines of the Baltic, Black Sea, and Sea of Japan. With the resources thus freed, the Russian fleet could make a great impact in new areas, particularly on the high seas.
The Tasks of Free World Naval Power and Diplomacy
The principal Free World naval undertaking in the three threatened seas should be to redress the military imbalance resulting from World War II. The defeat of Germany and Japan means that counterforces to Soviet expansion in the Baltic and the Sea of Japan have been greatly weakened. Soviet Russia is also relatively stronger in the Black Sea than before the war. To stabilize these areas, the Western World must give political and naval support to the free powers fronting these seas. Such support should include aid, training, and frequent naval visits.
Just as important, the Free World should never surrender any of its inherent sea power advantages through ignorance or lack of interest. For example, we must be on guard when Soviet diplomacy, in an attempt to restrict freedom of the seas, speaks piously of the rights of riparian states. Such an approach is doubly specious for the Soviets. Since they militarily dominate many of the bordering states, they speak only for themselves. Any sea is of interest to the entire international community, especially maritime countries.
We enjoy a sea power advantage in these three international seas because of Western naval strength and because Free World allies control the critical narrows in each case. We must never lose this advantage to Soviet bluffing. To do so would be to sacrifice our ability-to project our national power to the shores of potential aggressors. It would also be a necessary step towards opening the great oceans as attack roads leading to the shores and cities of the United States.
“No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.”
Horatio Nelson
A graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Captain Murphy served in USS Zane (DMS-14) and was Commanding Officer of USS Chandler (DMS-9) during World War II. Subsequently, he attended the General Line School at the U. S. Naval Academy and the Naval War College, Newport, R. I. Since 1953, he has done staff duty with Commander Sixth Fleet, Cin-CNELM, and Commander Carrier Division 18. He is at present attached to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
* From a speech by Mr. Cannon, the U. S. ambassador to Yugoslavia in Belgrade on 18 August, 1948 rejecting a Soviet-dictated treaty designed to restrict navigation on the Danube.