It was during a time of stress, not unlike that of today, that Patrick Henry leaped to his feet before the Virginia Provincial Convention in March 1775, and emphatically declared, “. . . But as for me, give me liberty or give me death.”
With this dramatic challenge, which actually amounted to a plank in the U. S. ship of state, Patrick Henry also established a tradition of command philosophy which has served our country well and often: that subordinate commanders be encouraged to take action independently, without waiting for the slowly ground-out decisions from on high. Politically, this might be likened to our Federal system. The ship and the philosophy frequently have been subjected to crises; but they have prevailed through the efforts of strong leaders and determined people.
One might ask, “Why the importance attached to command philosophy?” The answer, of course, is that command is the most important facet of military life. It is, in fact, a way of life which leads to the capability of making military decisions.
The ability to make a military decision becomes the naval officer’s objective; command philosophy furnishes the means to achieve the objective.
The traditions, philosophy, and knowledge associated with command are especially important today. This year’s performance of the Soviet Premier at the Summit pointed up clearly—if such pointing were still needed—that the United States is faced with a vigorous, determined, ruthless challenger, one committed to a course of world domination.
The current problem intimately involves each individual in the United States. It must be handled, as in the past, by organizing human and natural resources to out-perform totalitarianism. Frequently people refer to this situation as the “Crisis of our Time.” A far better label and one more suited to the faith of our forefathers is the “Challenge of our Time.”
When Patrick Henry made his declaration, he met the challenge of his time and additionally established a philosophy for strong leaders and determined people.
Certainly today’s problems call for inspired, intelligent leadership, and sound command. The scene around us reveals rising nationalisms, exploding populations, rapid technological advances, and an ever-increasing Sino-Soviet challenge. It is a difficult situation. But the outcome will be in doubt only if we fail to act with firmness and decision, exerting those qualities of command as set forth by our forefathers.
The basic strategy is simple—“defeat the enemy.” The civic leaders must undertake the problem of uniting the population behind a coherent and purposeful national program. The military must undertake the problem of developing the necessary strength to win any War, large or small, hot or cold, that may be forced upon us. This can be accomplished only by developing a philosophy of command that is viable, responsive, and lasting. It must be a philosophy that recognizes the need now, as in the past, for the commander who is able to make broad decisions. The long lead time to produce these leaders versus the short time available to find them, once war strikes, becomes extremely significant.
The Danger in the Present Challenge
The danger in the present challenge is not any lack of capability on our part to perform the tasks before us, or any absence of dynamic leaders. The danger lies in being lulled by peace. Many years ago John Ruskin in a lecture on war stated, “The common notion that peace and the virtues of civil life flourished together, I found untenable. Peace and the vices of civil life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, and of peace and plenty, and of peace and civilization; but I found that those were not the words which the muse of History coupled together; that, on her lips, the words were peace and sensuality, peace and selfishness—peace, and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned the truth of the word, and the strength of thought, in war; that they were nourished by war, and deceived by peace, trained in war, and betrayed in peace, in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace.” Theodore Roosevelt also spoke some prophetic words on this subject when he defined Americanism as “The virtues of courage, honor, justice, truth, sincerity, and hardihood—the virtues that made America. The things that will destroy America are prosperity-at-any-price, peace-at-any-price, safety-first instead of duty first, the love of soft living, and the get rich theory of life.”
It should suffice to say that the era of peace is far more dangerous to our ultimate survival than a time of war. In war the problem is simple—survive and win. In peace, however, world and home politics exert tremendous pressures. The problems become complex indeed, beset with imponderables and lashed by the spirit of nationalism and the battle of ideologies.
The people, the leaders, the commanders, must be awakened to the necessity of the continued practice of the virtues of Americanism.
The Military Commander and General War
Never before have commanders been faced with such a rapid evolution of the mechanical tools of war, and never before have they held in their hands the weapons of race annihilation. Possession of these weapons and control of their employment place a fearful burden on the commander. It is a burden that calls for calm sensible leadership and moral courage. The higher the leader in the chain of command, the more reason, intellect, and insight must be exercised constantly. The following quotation is applicable in this situation, “The more mechanical become the weapons with which we fight, the less mechanical must be the spirit controlling them.” Genius is needed at the top, not just good leaders; yet the principal difference between the two is the speed with which they are able to make profound calculations leading to correct decisions. Genius must be developed, however, because this is an age of minutes and hours—not days and weeks. Our best leaders are trained to assume the pinnacle of command. This situation is ironical, however, because after achieving the pinnacle, the commander realizes that while he can pull the trigger and initiate an action, he can do very little about the course of action that he has started. He realizes that once the battle has been closed he is the least of all warriors.
Thus, it can be seen that the man at the top, the man who has spent a lifetime training and working to this end, is not without his frustrations. Actually these frustrations take the form of a feeling that he is not contributing to the victory, because his is the difficult task of contributing to war by preparing in peace. What has happened in effect is that the commander’s personality has been removed from the battlefield.
This situation is unique to our era. In the days of hand-to-hand fighting, the commander stood in the front line, his head bare, his knuckles flashing. In the days of the first muskets he frequently led the charge and in so doing turned many near defeats into victories. However, as the technology of weapons and tactics advanced and the size of the forces increased, the very length of the battle precluded the supreme commander from remaining constantly on the front line. Technological complications in warfare have pushed the commander to the rear, forced his use of increased numbers of component commanders, and provided him with a staff to furnish the necessary details for his decision making. While the value of the leader’s appearance at the front is recognized, the facts of life in this age of missiles and vertical envelopment are that he will not so appear. In order to retain the flexibility necessary for strategic over-all control, he must be removed from the battle. Thus, he must depend on the initiative and wisdom of his independent commanders.
The battles will be fought by independent groups, perhaps widely separated, but all contributing to the over-all effort. The outcome of the struggle—the ultimate victory will be achieved by a lot of people up and down the line, acting in accordance with the way they have been trained, or acting on their own initiative.
In general war, except at the beginning, the high command could be eliminated and very likely will be. If not physically eliminated, loss of vital communications will render direction by the high command ineffective. This is the contingency we must train for. Although the first battle or interchange in general war will assume tremendous importance, the balance wheel of victory will be tipped by the ability and capability of the independent component commanders to utilize such assets as remain to carry the battle to the foe. In reality, after the first furious nuclear exchange, the battle will resolve itself into what we now call limited war.
The Military Commander and Limited War
While limited war, as differentiated from general war, is fought with limited forces, weapons, and national effort, the forces engaged in fighting could not consider it limited. It presents to them the requirement for maximum effort and possesses all the danger attendant to general war. The individual warrior knows that a well placed bullet produces the same result as being at “ground zero” in an atomic attack.
Limited war is truly a soldier’s, sailor’s, and airman’s war. It is the struggle of independent men and independent units, not only with the enemy using the fighting equipment on hand, but with their own souls. It is the ultimate struggle wherein the victor gains life and the loser death. It is the base struggle which pits man against man, and he with the greatest courage, the most creative mind, and the best physical condition will possess the keenest blade.
It is a well-known fact, of course, that courage and physical fitness are wonderful assets to the fighting man. Yet, if we consider a theoretical case where we have numerically equal opposing forces possessing the same basic weapons, the battle would be stalemated if these two characteristics were the only consideration. Of far greater importance is, which side has the greater number of creative minds.
It has been proven through battlefield interviews in World War II that only about 20 to 25 per cent of the infantrymen engaged in a battle actually fired their guns at the enemy. In essence this means that 75 per cent of any force, although they may be physically fit and possess some courage, will not press to attack unless they are being properly led. Additionally, the leaders must possess creative minds to lead their forces properly through situations not covered by textbook, field manual, or regulation.
It is true that victory in battle hinges on the small intangible things. Training, tradition, and pride are extremely important. To an infantryman, the knowledge that his buddy alongside would never leave him is significant, for with this knowledge it may give him the courage to fire the deciding shot. To a sailor, the tradition and knowledge, that the “old man” will never give up the ship nor desert him, stiffens the weakest of backbones. It is the knowledge of these intangibles that the intelligent commander makes use of in creating the victorious force.
Today, however, a serious obstacle has arisen that threatens the role of the commander. Basically, it may be tabbed as “overcontrol.” As might be expected, the growth of the evil has paralleled that of improved communications. Reliable world-wide communication nets have resulted in bringing the high commander to the trouble spot or to the battle front. This has the effect of tempting the high commander to make decisions for his subordinate commander, or at the very least to make his presence felt to the extent that the trouble-spot commander will feel the necessity for continually asking advice instead of taking action. Initiative is destroyed, and the high commander’s staff will have to be increased in size in order to assume the new burdens. Overcontrol, if allowed to grow, will take root like Jack’s beanstalk, spreading its branches from earth to heaven; its harvest will be papers and more papers. Overcontrol will not only rob the commander of initiative, but will have the effect of removing him from the battle, just as the high commander has already been removed. Slowly, but surely then, overcontrol will rob the rank and file of their much-needed leaders. Small projects will become large projects as they are referred to the top. Small decisions will become large decisions as staffs add new conditions. Requests for additional information will become more numerous as more uninformed people are introduced to the problem. Inevitably, the decision-making wheels will grind slower and slower as the machinery gets choked with nonessential facts, figures, and details.
It is crystal clear that to be effective in limited war, the commander must have the authority to make uninhibited decisions and the moral courage to do so. He must have a trained force steeped in tradition and pride, and he must have sub-commanders with creative minds to cope with unexpected circumstances.
The high commander’s main role in preparing for limited war is to insure that his forces are trained for battle. Once an individual battle is engaged, the high commander is useless.
Basic Command Principles
It has been concluded that the most dangerous period to our security is a time of peace. It is a time of challenge, for the instruments of war have reached new horizons in death-dealing capability. In the age of “missile blackmail” our leaders—our supreme commanders—must be freed from such controls as inhibit decision making. We must realize that these decisions require a concentration of all the strength of the leader’s mind and spirit, and thus he must be freed from the extraneous clutter of the non- essential. We must guard in establishing our staffs that they are maintained in trim, efficient shape and are not allowed to become Parkinsonian bureaucracies strangling the decision-making machinery and subordinating the commander to the staff. Each proposed addition to a staff should be viewed critically, for after its inception it becomes another cord fastening the commander to his chair, thus inhibiting his power of leadership. Above all, our supreme commander must insure that today’s policies and decisions are consistent and workable in today’s situation.
As Admiral Arleigh A. Burke has put it when speaking of command, “Able leaders who through boldness appear to exceed authority must receive counsel, not reprimand. While this may appear to invite insubordination, such is not the case. The strength and esprit de corps of an independent command hinges, for a great part, on the willingness of junior officers to take charge and take a chance on making a mistake, sometimes at the risk of their career. This is the melting pot that forms the great leaders. A commander who has never exceeded his authority has never had a task that his subordinates could not have accomplished without him.”
Additionally, this philosophy must be severe in trimming off dead wood as each “deadhead” can become a mere “veto machine” to stifle decisions. The Navy selection system takes into account, of course, that all commanders are not destined for the highest command. Subordinates who fail through unwillingness to exert the maximum effort must be stamped “rejected.” Those who fail in spite of the fact that they are continually doing their best must be rejected also, but with kindness and understanding.
In the first instance, it must be recognized that one can make a living in working forty hours a week, but not a career. The “clockwatcher” lacks the self-discipline necessary to submerge personal considerations in the interests of national principles and thus would be a liability in high command in peace or in war. In the second instance, consideration must be given to the possibility that “the earnest failure” was brought along too fast; the responsibility for his lack of success may rest with his immediate superior for placing him in a position beyond his capacity to perform.
Guidance for the subordinate commander is much the same as for the high commander, except that he must insure that his personality reaches the lowest echelons. He must strive to be a true leader. He must maintain a creative and open mind. Rigid adherence to dogmas, formulas, and studies must be avoided, as these are the antithesis of proper planning. Books and studies provide the successful commander with a trained mind only and one which he must keep flexible in order to act or react correctly to new or changing situations.
Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot in December 1958 commented on the Taiwan situation as follows: “The major lesson learned again during this period is that the primary function of the on-scene commander is the translation of political objectives and restrictions into military concepts and military tasks.” This lucidly illustrates the point of keeping an open, alert mind and remaining flexible.
Above all, the subordinate commander must realize that he will be center stage in the act of battle. He will be cut off from his director. He will be alone, and the success of his endeavor will hinge on his preparedness.
The military leader in command of a national force or a multi-national force must know and understand his subordinates and allied peers. He must know and determine how much credence to place in their reports, estimates, and recommendations and have experienced their conditions and situations, or else his direction can be completely unreasonable and unsuccessful. He must appreciate thoroughly differences in human capabilities, as well as material. A complete knowledge of ships’ characteristic cards, force tabs, or intelligence estimates is not enough. The leader must know his men and material from actual participation or experience, and he must appreciate that other forces may have different methods from his of achieving the same task.
For the junior officers who lead the troops, fire the torpedoes, or fly the bombers, the success of their efforts will be measured largely by their training and their sympathetic understanding of those they lead. The greatest weapon at their command is that of the spoken word. Unity of effort in battle is achieved by orders or commands which galvanize the desire to work together, to get something done. Without orders, even trained warriors are reluctant to act. Fear seizes the most courageous mind in periods of protracted silence. The warrior wants to perform courageously, but the herd instinct and fear of the unknown will override the desire unless he has a banner to rally to. The young leader must be this banner. His orders, “Commence firing” or “follow me to the top of that hill,” remind the warriors of what is required, and bring reality to the situation. This was the situation when John Paul Jones was asked to surrender and replied, “We have not yet begun to fight,” thus turning defeat into victory. This was the situation at Fort Donelson when General Grant returned to find his army in retreat. His first order was, “Fill your cartridge boxes quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so ... ” Again and again throughout the pages of history, examples of this type of command can be found. The banner of freedom is what we rally to as a nation, but in war it is the banner of the strong independent commander that inspires the victory.
Conclusions
To these ends we realize that constant vigilance, constant training, and constant study at all echelons are mandatory. These are necessary to uncover the true reasons underlying events and enable us to work out the chain of cause and effect, foresee future requirements, and prepare to meet them.
Personal self-sacrifice at all echelons is necessary, if the advice of our forefathers is to be heeded in meeting the challenge of our times.
“There is no retreat but in submission and slavery. Our chains are already forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston. The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring the clash of resounding arms. Our brethren are already in the field. Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear or peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”
A graduate of the Naval Academy in the Class of 1945, Lieutenant Commander Riley recently reported for duty at the U. S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, following a tour in the Politico-Military Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Following service in both destroyers and submarines, he commanded USS Raton (SSR-270) in 1955-57, after which he attended the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk.