Deep Selection
(See pages 46-54, March, 1960 Proceedings)
Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN (Ret.)—Vice Admiral Sabin’s recent article on deep selection is important, and the Naval Institute performed a useful service in publishing his thoughtful views. The article should be of interest to the Civilian Leadership for that is the echelon in which the concept was initiated.
We who have finished our active service should “sail away” and leave to our successors the management of things for which they, and only they, are responsible to their superiors and to the Country. So, five years ago, I shifted the problems of deep selection—and a host of others—to the broad shoulders of my own greatly admired successor. However, Admiral Sabin’s article indicates that the subject remains a source of concern to those who still live with it, and I decided that as long as the matter is being publicly discussed it might be useful to outline my understanding of its beginnings, and to re-state some Navy thinking which seemed to be relevant at the time. Whether or not it is still relevant is for others to decide.
The first mandatory deep selection occurred during my tenure of office as Chief of Naval Operations. It was specifically directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a precept to the Selection Board considering promotions from the rank of captain to that of rear admiral. Presumably, the policy had the blessing of the Secretary of Defense. In my view, and that of mature and experienced officers with whom I discussed the subject at the time, there were dangerous fallacies in this method of achieving the sound objectives of incentive and accelerated promotion for the very gifted.
There can be no quarrel, nor was there then, with a philosophy of rapidly advancing in the public interest an officer of truly unique ability and value. Quite apart from any theory of mandatory deep selection, the Navy recognized the fact that those chosen for High Command should arrive with appropriate experience background, and therefore real top-flighters should be groomed by advanced assignments as soon as their exceptional abilities are recognized. Sound accelerated promotion undoubtedly can yield more time for such grooming, and the acquisition of bona fide prestige, in assignments of importance. The fallacy in the mandatory deep selection theory lies in the assumption that there is a superman in every class or year group; history belies that assumption.
Initially, the Secretary of the Navy verbally outlined his wishes on this matter to the President of the Selection Board. When the Board submitted its recommendations, there were no deep selections of the sort desired by the Secretary; the Board, its members voting as individual professionals and each doing his sworn duty, came up with its best judgment but did not meet the Secretary’s wishes.
The precept was then re-written, the Board met again, carried out its explicit instructions, and a deep selection system was launched. The results produced a widespread reaction of bewilderment in the Navy. “What are the new ground rules for the competition for advancement?”
The theory that accelerated promotion should be possible in the case of an officer who is truly “head and shoulders” above his contemporaries is entirely sound; the public interest demands that the talents of such genius be given the fullest possible scope. However, these “head and shoulders” types do not appear automatically in every class and year group; and to create a synthetic “head and shoulders” label, by edict, cannot but engender discouragement and a distrust of Service policy.
Deep selection poses varying problems in groups of varying lengths of service and weeding out experiences. In the case of lieutenants, the material is all relatively unseasoned, untried, and unknown. It is true that the mark of success is sometimes discernible in the case of a very young officer, but the earmark of blue-ribbon quality must be labeled “potential” rather than “definite” because it is impossible accurately to forecast professional development, health, family and economic influences, the bodily processes of aging and deterioration, and other contributing factors which are only revealed by performance and the passage of time. To single out some very young officer, then, to be jumped over the heads of hundreds of his contemporaries, is likely to raise destructive doubts in the minds of those contemporaries, and also assumes a curious confidence in being able to penetrate the future.
In this age of incredibly swift technological advance, there are new promotion and morale problems which undoubtedly have tangency with the deep selection philosophy. Obviously, there must be worthy goals for sharply-focused specialists in vital fields of endeavor. In a mechanized, scientific, and highly automated fighting Service there must be specialists in many operational and technical fields. But who shall say that this or that young officer is of “head and shoulders” future value to a complex Service necessarily made up of command types, intellectual planners, the scientifically inclined, the hardnosed engineers of many branches, and other numerous and essential groups?
Deep selection, at its inception, was regarded by the Civilian Leadership as a morale booster and a means of improving Navy performance—a vehicle for quickly getting fine talent into key positions, and an assurance against the stultification of mere seniority preference. Those are basically good objectives—if the selection parameters are valid; but annual and automatic bestowal of the “head and shoulders” accolade, regardless of the availability of candidates truly “head and shoulders” above the best of their contemporaries, tends to cheapen the honor and could shake Service confidence in the High Command’s way of doing business.
It was my active-duty observation that Selection Boards found, over the years, that in each class or year group there was a small percentage of unquestionably superior officers, a small percentage not promotable for various reasons, and a large middle group of good sound people who could do a job in the next higher grade if vacancies existed. It was not an annual experience to find one individual so far outshining the other outstanding candidates as to dwarf them—or to dwarf the likely candidates of several preceding classes or year groups. If that pattern holds today, then the original Service reservations would appear to have been sound.
Admiral Sabin does not claim to have “the answer,” and there would be even less justification for thinking that I could supply it. To the discussion I really contribute only four thoughts: first, that soundly documented accelerated promotion is desirable; second, that the mechanics of selecting for accelerated promotion must be sound and not injurious to overall morale; third, that annual mandatory naming of individuals as “head and shoulders” does not accord with the actual incidence of such giants; and fourth, that faulty award of the “head and shoulders” accolade is harmful to the stated goals of the deep selection system.
A Navy career is only just so many years long, and more and more new knowledge must be crammed into the same old number of years. The Navy needs to bring its top leaders to their assignments well qualified by experience to lead not only in naval matters but also in joint and international affairs. And the selection method must ring true. Here, as in most things, it is a matter of balance.
Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, USN—Although my article on Deep Selection has been off the Institute’s press for scarcely a month, I have been deluged with letters from officers of all ranks, ranging from lieutenant to admiral and including those who are both active and retired. I have even received several letters from civilians. Not one of these letters has been unfavorable to my postulate that we face a serious situation with our present policy of deep selections.
I have attempted to answer each of these letters individually but this has become increasingly difficult. May I therefore beg the indulgence of your ‘Comment and Discussion’ section to answer three questions which have occurred with greatest frequency in the letters I have received? These questions are as follows:
1) Even if we accept the principle that a “head and shoulders” officer should be selected early, how does a selection board go about determining who is that “superduper” fellow?
2) Isn’t there a relationship between retention boards and early promotions and, if so, why didn’t I develop it in detail?
3) If wholesale deep selections are continued, why shouldn’t the relative seniority of such an officer be adjusted until he is junior to all officers subsequently selected who were formerly senior to him?
In so far as I know there are only two avenues of approach by a selection board to determine a “head and shoulders” officer. And each must be utilized. The one is through a searching examination of his entire record and a careful notation of all indications, both early and recent, of any capabilities above and beyond both his contemporaries and his seniors. The other is a thorough investigation and discussion of his Service reputation. And even these two avenues are not paved smoothly throughout. They are not fool proof. But I know of no other way to do it.
The answer to the second question is yes; there is a relationship between retention boards and early promotions. In fact, this is a problem-—and a big one—within itself. I had included a discussion of the retention problem in my original manuscript. I deleted it for several reasons, including space considerations. Following is an excerpt, shortened a bit, from my original manuscript:
“Related to the general problem of early selections is the situation involving those flag officers who each year are considered by a board of officers for retention. This is a process which is more painfully referred to throughout the Service as ‘plucking.’
“The law requires that any line flag officer who has completed five years in grade and thirty-five years of commissioned service and who is not selected for retention on the active list shall be involuntarily retired. The law also requires that all members of a retention board be senior to all officers who are under consideration for retention.
“The latter provision of the law can cause difficulty and, at least on one occasion, it did. When the class group of 1923 came up for retention in 1957, not one member of that board was senior in command precedence to two of the officers under consideration. Those two officers were the Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Only one member of the board, its president, was of equivalent rank. The board requested and received an interpretation of the law from the Judge Advocate General. He ruled, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, that seniority for this purpose was based on the original dates of permanent commission.
“That, of course, was a neat way to get around the difficulty. However, no officer who was formerly senior to an officer who is now senior to him has any illusions about where he stands, permanent date of commissioning to the contrary not withstanding. And if any officer on the active list of the U. S. Navy considers that, by any yardstick, he is senior to the Chief of Naval Operations, he ought to have his head examined.
“A second complication arises from promotion of officers to three and four stars prior to being considered by a retention board. The law allows a maximum of 75% of the officers eligible for consideration each year to be retained. A minimum of 50% must be retained. The Secretary of the Navy determines the percentage to be retained. Looking at the other side of the coin, between 25% and 50% of any group may be ‘plucked.’ Let us assume that twenty flag officers are eligible for consideration and the Secretary determines that 60% will be retained. Thus 40%, or eight officers, must be ‘plucked.’
“Let us further assume that of the twenty officers eligible for consideration, six are either three- or four-star officers; not an unlikely situation at all. Fourteen are rear admirals. It is a foregone conclusion that none of the three- and four-star admirals are going to fail to be retained. They must be retained unless we are prepared to indict the system and the judgment of those who have made them three- and four-star flag officers.
“What then do we find? We find fourteen rear admirals of which only six may be retained. Eight must be ‘plucked.’ Obviously, the rear admirals are behind the eight-ball and they know it. Instead of ‘plucking’ forty per cent of twenty, the board is forced to ‘pluck’ fifty-seven per cent of fourteen.”
In respect to the last point which suggests readjusting the lineal position of officers who are deep selected, I would be in favor of this only if we continue the practice of wholesale deep selections. But if we abolish this wholesale business of deep selection, which is what I think we should do, and promote early only the very few real hot-shots, then I do not believe the precedence of those few should be readjusted.
I am very grateful to all those who have written to me. These letters have served to fortify my contention that a problem of serious proportions exists and that we had best do something about it.
Rear Admiral J. W. Cooper, USN—This is my first letter to the Naval Institute, but I feel compelled, after reading “Deep Selection” in the March issue of the Naval Institute, to express my sentiments with regard to this timely article.
It is the finest work on the subject of selection that I have ever read. Each point that is made by Vice Admiral Sabin is valid and the thesis set forth is long overdue. It is hoped that this article will provide some encouragement to those who feel a trend toward fuzzy standards in selection which place all sorts of qualifications ahead of demonstrated ability to command.
I found it possible to disagree with the author in only one particular and that was in his statement that “he was not a writer.” Only a writer with a true feeling for his subject, as Vice Admiral Sabin surely possesses, could have put his ideas down in such lucid, succinct, and convincing fashion.
Vice Admiral Mahlon S. Tisdale, USN (Ret.).—In my opinion this article has been needed for some time to alert the Navy to the danger to morale—the very vitals of the Navy—implicit in the mandatory deep selection system.
I do not care how deep a board selects if, under their oaths, they believe that they should. We should trust them implicitly. They are men who have spent their adult lives in the Navy. Who better can judge the leadership needs of the Navy, and what is best for it, than dedicated men who have devoted their lives to this service in war and in peace?
If the board were given a free hand I doubt that there would be many “head and shoulders” or “deep selections” made. It must be a virtual impossibility to make such selections fairly. If this be true it is obvious that mandatory deep selections cannot always be made fairly.
If civilian authority disagrees with Vice Admiral Sabin’s premise, it would be interesting for a BuPers Board to make a study of how the officers who were promoted over many erstwhile contemporaries have progressed since selection. Was the selection worth the hurt to the morale of these contemporaries, and hence to the Navy itself? Was it worth the cost?
In my opinion this is a very important matter and Vice Admiral Sabin’s article is most timely. He writes from a wealth of experience as a member of numerous selection boards; hence with authority. It behooves us to listen and to think—particularly those in a position to do something about it.
Captain R. B. Lynch, USN—There is one facet to the subject of deep selections for flag rank that should be brought to the attention of your readers, and that is the operation of the law. The basis for the Navy’s personnel law is equality, with provision for insulating the officer population from the whims of any particular group of administrators, however benevolent they might be.
The law prescribes a five-year study to determine the selection opportunity which the officers in a selection zone should have for any particular year. This provides for a mandatory look ahead and a more gradual change to meet changing situations.
The approaching hump into the five-year studies will have one more effect on the Navy’s officers—it will dictate deep selections.
In spite of monumental attrition of officers in the hump (55% to captain and then five years later 35% non-continuation) there will be substantial numbers of officers in the hump-year groups. Since the five-year study in the law had been set aside temporarily by Executive Order, many, many promotion plans have been calculated in order to show the effect of the hump-year groups as they are promoted through the ranks of captain and admiral. These studies lead to the conclusion that the least damaging course of action now is to continue the deep selections, freely admitting that some of the early selections to flag rank are in fact due course officers as opposed to “head and shoulders” officers. Any other solution to the problem of promotion of officers in the hump to flag rank will heap additional inequities on this group of officers. It is understandable that one’s opinion on this subject depends largely upon one’s year group but if there is to be nominal equality between the hump-year groups and other year groups, deep selections have become a necessity.
Captain Thomas D. McGrath, USN—Vice Admiral Sabin discusses certain aspects of present promotion policies and points out undesirable features. Some remedial action is suggested, but it is doubtful if such action goes far enough. A more radical selection method is proposed by this contributor, one in which many of the disadvantages of previous selection methods are eliminated. For example, no officer would be passed over or fail of selection, each officer could determine if he is progressing or retrogressing, outstanding officers could be advanced as fast as considered advisable, and capable officers, even if not promoted, could be retained to meet the needs of the Navy.
Antedating all selection schemes for promotion of officers is the necessary utilization of a precedence list. Position on such a list used to be determined by length of service. Promotion from the top of such a list had certain advantages in that each officer knew where he stood and his approximate chances of promotion. However, determination of his position on this list by length of service resulted in stagnation and did not ensure that the best officers were promoted.
I propose that the precedence list method of promotion be reinstituted, but determination of position on the list be determined by a selective process. Selection boards for each grade should meet annually and establish a precedence list for all officers in each grade. Position on this list should be determined by performance of duty, as shown by fitness reports, restrictions imposed by law, and administrative instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy.
Promotions would be from the top of this list and eliminations, when needed, from the bottom. With such a system, outstanding officers would gain precedence faster than their contemporaries. Each officer would have a measure of his success in any given year by his gain, loss, or maintenance of relative precedence. After the initial period when the system was being put into effect, no officer would fail to be promoted as the result of action by one or two boards. Loss of seniority, with length of service for officers not gaining precedence, would be an incentive to voluntary elimination. Officers who do not reach the promotion zone and whose performance keeps them above the elimination zone would remain in grade, thus permitting the Navy to retain capable officers not proved to be best promotion material.
The problems posed to these selection boards should be no greater than under the present system and instructions from SecNav could reduce their number. Such instructions would have to provide that no officer be eliminated until he has sufficient time in grade to move out of the elimination zone; perhaps a period of two years.
The recommended plan appears to have merit for several reasons. No officer ever fails of selection. Promotion, retention, or elimination will result from the action of several boards, not just one or two. There will be a continuous indication of each officer’s progress contained in each year’s Navy Register. Capable officers, knowing of their progress, will tend to remain in the Navy, unsuccessful officers will have indications of retrogression and plan accordingly. Block promotions after fixed periods for junior officers can be eliminated. Reporting seniors, noting progress or retrogression of officers reported on, can more realistically appraise the fitness reports they submit. Since year groups would disappear, humps and valleys would no longer occur, being prevented by varying the size of the promotion and elimination zones. Promotions can be made as vacancies occur. Finally, since the precedence list would be the guide for duty assignments, it could eliminate any tendency to pre-selection of officers resulting from such assignments.
This proposal may seem brutal, administratively difficult, and tend to make senior officers in grade unhappy. But in the end it should provide a better system than our present one.
Lieutenant Harold H. Sacks, USN—It is not often enough that such a distinguished naval officer publishes his views on as delicate a subject in the Proceedings, so I am going to be extremely brash in reporting my own unsolicited and perhaps presumptuous sentiments.
Despite the fact that the “youth movement” might, in the long run, benefit me or my contemporaries with less directly injurious results to our group, than the year groups which were the particular, although not entire concern of the author, I view the philosophy of deep selection with almost equal distress to that obviously felt by him. The “accent on youth” program smacks of narrow comprehension of the real needs of the Navy. Superficially, there is the matter of matching up with the Air Force and Army. A cursory review of the comparative statistics of World War II, particularly regarding casualties versus objectives gained, would cause any mother, wife, or child to be very grateful indeed for the judgment of our “old” admirals.
A naval officer, knowing well the principles of pre-selection by assignment, which operate inexorably, and for the most part justifiably, spends his career getting ready for flag rank. By sedulously preparing himself to be a destroyer X.O., C.O., then major combatant commander, he has committed himself to career at sea. We should not contend that the professional expertness and knowledgeability about our stock and trade can be obtained in any other way. Of course, we need management control, quality control, personnel control, planning control, etc., but we’re out of business if we don’t spend the most energy on ship control. The point here is that the elder statesman-type flag officer affords the best leadership and guidance, as the direct result of wisdom and experience. Deep selection might better be replaced by deep pre-selection. This would allay the ill feelings engendered in the senior captain who has spent so much time on ships, or in other “tough” assignments, only to be cut off from the top when most primed, and apparently deserving of promotion. If more rigorous weeding out was done at the lower levels, while still ensigns and junior grade lieutenants, lieutenants and lieutenant commanders could be more carefully and accurately assigned to billets in which they would make their mark or stub their toes. For those who don’t measure up to assignment to “tough jobs” there are two consolations; first, a reasonable assurance of a twenty-year career in relatively less demanding (not intellectually, but in terms of family separation and nervous tension) assignments, and second, an opportunity to learn early in the game what the score is, and knowing this, to try and plan a more fruitful career.
Captain Harold Payson, Jr., USN—Admiral Sabin’s article has smoked out a ’possum. There is so much good meat in it, I hope it will be thoroughly digested by those in positions to improve our officer personnel selection methods. I am one of those who adhere to the principle that the basic element of a navy is ships and the foremost assignment, command. To relegate these to a status inferior to staffs and staff duty is sheer folly.
Even the most naive and optimistic could hardly expect to find young geniuses in every year group. If there be one every five years, the Navy will be fortunate, and when there is one, he will be so obvious it won’t be necessary for a selection board to pick him out. I wonder if the accent on early selection is not in the wrong place altogether? Why does age, old or young, have more than an incidental bearing on the matter? There are men of 60 in better physical condition than some of 40, and there are men of 40 who are more mature and experienced than some men of 60. One thing all services disregard, to their detriment, is the longer life span of men in this modern world and the consequent longer period of productive years to be expected of them. Instead of reducing our retirement age limit, we might have been wise to have raised it to 66. After the notable success of our sage old commanders in the last war, and with little since then to indicate the wisdom of shifting the burden of responsibility to more youthful shoulders, one is perplexed indeed by the policy of deep selections.
Commander John D. Alden USN—Vice Admiral Sabin has really put his finger on a sore spot.
Speaking as one who has never suffered in any way from the deep selection policy, I think I am in a position to point out more or less disinterestedly some other effects of this policy and the morale-destroying results of its current application.
This article does not mention the “white-haired boy” or “the rich get richer” aspects of deep selection, but the operations of this process are evident. Simply stated, the favored up-and-coming young officer gets assigned to a “good” billet. This makes him eligible for early selection. Having thus demonstrated his superiority, he is in line for another glamorous assignment, letters of commendation, awards, and so on. For the unfavored multitude, the only chance for competing with these “white-haired boys” is to happen to be in the right place at the right time, and since most of the “right places” are already occupied by pre-selected young trainees for flag rank, the opportunities for lady luck to strike are rather slim. It is also somewhat discouraging to the contemporaries of these pre-selectees to be unable, in many cases, to recognize those qualities which must be evident to the eyes of superiors to place some individuals in the charmed circle of “head and shoulders” men.
A related aspect of this system of selection is the many legal opportunities now available for pre-selection by unorthodox means. One of these is the “career pattern” method. Currently it is required that selectees for flag rank have had duty on joint or foreign staffs. It is apparent from Vice Admiral Sabin’s article that this policy has been in operation well in advance of its recent enunciation by the Secretary of the Navy.
An aspect of greater practical importance which should be more heavily stressed is the effect on the Navy of numbers of officers either passed over by a selection board or convinced that such passing over is foreordained. Are the services of these people worth the price paid in discouragement, disillusionment, and bitterness? If in fact flag rank is going to be reserved primarily for a few “head and shoulders” officers who are pre-selected early in their careers and groomed in the proper pattern to be ready for early selection, why go through the motions of carrying along the other 99.25%? It would appear that the realities of promotion as well as the strictures of the budget should dictate a narrower base to the pyramid with little more than normal attrition between steps.
Lieutenant Commander W. A. Steadley, USN—To me as a naval officer of sixteen years of service, twelve of which have been spent aboard ship, it was a rare pleasure to read such a frank, sincere, and illuminating article.
Vice Admiral Sabin certainly has captured the fears, thoughts and anxieties of myself and many of my contemporaries. In turn, it is reassuring to note that someone of his rank, experience, and status in our Navy is attempting to correct an evident fault and an unjust situation. I, as an individual, certainly salute him and hope that the efforts he has expended will not be lost in the middle of the “BMD.”
Articles of the nature of “Deep Selection” will certainly increase your reader population for it is dealing with a subject which is very dear and of major concern to every naval officer—that of promotion.
Captain John W. Higgins, Jr., USN—The Vice Admiral’s article emphasized one point which was particularly disturbing to me. He states “Deep selection is the practice” to select on the basis of youth more than on the basis of the “gifted few.”
It has been my understanding, and I believe the understanding of the vast majority of officers, that early selections were based on merit, not on youth—but with youth as a byproduct. If the actuality is that youth is emphasized and that merit is secondary, then the article is a real eye-opener. It may well be that a real morale problem will develop among officers when this new concept of selection (if it is one in fact) is fully understood.
Lieutenant Commander S. Turner, USN —Vice Admiral Sabin’s article concentrates on the bad effect deep selection has on the morale of senior captains. To correct this situation, he in effect recommends slowing down the pace of deep selection. Before accepting this recommendation, it is important to answer two questions: (1) Will such action actually solve the morale problem in the senior ranks? and (2) Will this solution create more problems than it attempts to cure?
The answer to the first question is that the roots of the morale problem Vice Admiral Sabin has cited go far deeper than deep selection. The real corrective actions are to let officers know earlier how they are performing relative to the competition, and to help them understand why deep selection does not prejudice an officer’s opportunity for flag rank. In the days immediately following Mr. Thomas’s letter establishing the deep selection process, flag billets which would have gone to year groups in or near the zone were arbitrarily designated for more junior groups. Those thus deprived were understandably bitter. Today, however, the process has been in effect for six years. The present senior year groups have been culled over for flag promotions three or four times before coming into the zone. For these captains, the opportunity for flag selection has come earlier, and been prolonged longer. The sum total of their opportunity has been as great as if there had been no deep selection, since approximately the same numbers per year group are being selected over the long run. No captain today can reasonably blame his failure of selection on the accent on youth. He, too, had his youthful shot at the target.
Even so, the article contends that when some officers are selected early for flag rank, others are faced with the embittered prospect of several years yet to serve, with no hope of further advancement. This is not a new situation. Even before Mr. Thomas’s edict, selection for flag rank generally came prior to an officer’s entering the promotion zone, and almost certainly prior to his second year in the zone. The present system makes selection in the zone less likely, but still possible. Deep selection did not create this problem, it merely accentuated it.
The real issue is that too many officers are led to believe, right up until the last moment, that they have an excellent opportunity for promotion to flag rank. No wonder we have many bitterly disappointed senior captains. Deep selection alone is not responsible for this situation. Our fitness report system, detailing policies, and hesitancy to give an officer a forthright evaluation of his standing have combined to produce these false hopes. What can We do about it?
There are at least four ideas, mentioned frequently, which could ease this situation without resorting to “pre-selection.”
1. Commence accelerated promotion of “head and shoulders” officers earlier in the game, on the lieutenant or lieutenant commander level, as Vice Admiral Sabin has recommended.
2. Require each selection board to realign the officers selected according to their relative performance. The superior officers would then be placed at the head of the new list, thus gaining precedence on the basis of their performance since the last selection. It would be simple to assign precedence within each group according to the previous relative lineal standing of the officers concerned. Under this system, over the years the consistently better performers would gravitate upward. This process would have the combined advantages of letting an officer know where he stands, providing incentive to a wider range of officers than are affected by deep selection, and furnishing detailing officers with the opinion of an objective statutory board to assist in making assignments to highly competitive billets.
3. Have the Bureau of Personnel periodically furnish each officer with a forthright evaluation of how he is doing in comparison with his contemporaries, where his weaknesses lie, what type of assignments he needs to round out his career, and any other suggestions for improving his performance. Today an officer does not normally see his fitness reports when submitted, let alone have access to any objective gauge of how his performance compares with others. Such appraisals are, of course, made regularly by detailing officers, but in strict secrecy from the man most concerned. If furnished such an evaluation midway between promotions, many officers would seek to improve performance in order to ensure their next selection.
4. Utilize the Line Officer Personnel Newsletter, or some other such vehicle to give wide publicity to the results of each selection board. An officer should not have to buy Navy Times to obtain a breakdown of selection statistics, i.e., how many were selected below the zone, what was the percentage by designators, etc. These figures easily could be assembled in BuPers. They are facts which every officer is entitled to know. Moreover, they are facts he must have to form an intelligent opinion of the selection process rather than accept unfounded rumors. A good place to start would be with a factual, statistical summary of deep selection over the past six years to show clearly who has been hurt, who has not, and where we stand now.
Each of the foregoing recommendations is designed to provide additional incentive for an officer to better his professional performance. The adoption of any or all of them would, in turn, lead to improvement in the over-all performance of the Navy. In addition, these four suggestions would at least strike at the basic cause of the morale issue, whereas any attempt to correct the problem through manipulating the selection process would only create additional morale problems. This conclusion, of course, depends largely on whether one accepts Vice Admiral Sabin’s thesis that ten years, or 25% of an officer’s maximum career, is sufficient time in flag rank. From the point of view of statistics ten years is generally adequate to fulfill the needs of the Navy. In those few instances where an officer is headed for such top billets as CNO, Fleet or United Commander, it certainly is not. Nor is a ten-year flag span adequate to uphold the Navy’s position within the Defense establishment.
A ten-year total allows only two years each in the grades of rear admiral (upper and lower half), vice admiral (hardly enough for a tour afloat and ashore in each grade) and one usual four-year stint as a full admiral. If experience is so prerequisite to selection for rear admiral, it is hardly logical to contend that it isn’t equally important to advancing through the flag ranks. This is particularly true today when there is such a breadth and variation in flag officer billets, many of them quite specialized. In addition, we must consider the possibility that it would be desirable to have some officers prepared to fill more than one four-star billet in the course of a career as, in fact, many of our four-star officers do today.
Further military unification is coming inexorably upon us. The top military billets, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Unified Commanders, are going to be assigned by the Secretary of Defense on the basis of ability rather than Service affiliation. The Service that can nominate officers with records of high accomplishment will stand to gain much. It would be nearsighted to groom our best officers during thirty years just to run through a six-year cram course followed by a four-year sprint to the finish. Industry would not accept such a poor return for investment. The Navy should recognize that ten years is far too little for the services of its top flag officers. Instead it should aim for something in the neighborhood of 14 to 16 years. At the same time this would mean more stringent “plucking” to prevent officers from stemming the promotion flow by stagnating as rear admirals.
The answer to the second question, then, is that de-emphasizing accelerated promotions could hurt the Navy’s position for the future. This is not to say that deep selection doesn’t raise problems. It does. Vice Admiral Sabin has pointed to the belief that many officers are being promoted faster than their experience warrants, i.e., no major combatant command. This is basically a problem of detailing. It is one which will in some measure solve itself if deep selection and the realignment of seniority processes take hold at early stages in the selection process. There is also the issue of whether the deep selectees today are really “head and shoulders” material. If they are not, it reflects a basic unrealiability of our selection process. The number of officers selected well below the zone has not been greater than the number of “head and shoulders” men one could expect to find in each year group. In short, the problems of deep selection are less serious than the problems it is helping to resolve.
The crying need today is for a clear understanding throughout the officer corps of what the personnel needs of the Navy are and how they are being met. In addition to the points mentioned above, it would be worthwhile to provide each officer in the Navy with a personal copy of a blueprint of the promotion system in general. This should include an outline of the intended promotion flow, the reasons why various periods of service in grade have been selected, comparisons with the other Services, explanations of the basic provisions of law, including that for accelerated promotion, etc.
An officer’s career in the Navy has never been more challenging and attractive than today. Perforce it is going to be more, rather than less, competitive. In this atmosphere, giving officers the facts, rather than shielding them, is the way to build confidence and morale while still pursuing what is best for the Navy as a whole.
Louis Morton, Hanover, New Hampshire.—Vice Admiral Sabin’s thoughtful and forthright survey of the problem raises fundamental questions about any personnel system that provides for orderly advancement through the ranks on the basis of seniority and fitness. But all these questions can be reduced to one large and central question. Should more weight be given to seniority and experience than to ability and youth? For the military profession this is the old and oft-debated problem of the relationship between age and high command.
Number of Present Three- and Four-Star Officers Remaining on Active Duty, 1 Jan 60-1 Jan 70 Inclusive
Year | Navy | Marine Corps | Army | Air Force | ||||
3 Star | 4 Star | 3 Star | 4 Star | 3 Star | 4 Star | 3 Star | 4 Star | |
1960 | 28 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 29 | 7 | 28 | 11 |
1961 | 25 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 23 | 7 | 28 | 11 |
1962 | 24 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 19 | 3 | 28 | 10 |
1963 | 20 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 27 | 10 |
1964 | 17 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 27 | 9 |
1965 | 10 | I | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 9 |
1966 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 9 |
1967 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 7 |
1968 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 5 |
1969 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 2 |
1970 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 |
Command of men in battle is an art and, like most arts, consists of a variety of skills, some definite and concrete, and others so intangible as to evade definition and defy measurement. The age of a commander, as well as his health, height, and habits, is of the first type; it can be measured, compared, tabulated, and filed. And, like most statistics, it can be used to demonstrate whatever thesis seems desirable at the moment. Vice Admiral Sabin is well aware of this, of course, and with admirable objectivity has furnished statistics that may be used to support the arguments for maturity and ripe experience as readily as those for youth, physical vigor, and unbounded self-confidence.
Juggling figures can be fascinating sport, but it cannot tell us whether the prize should go to age and experience or to youth. Certainly, when the elements of greatness are present, none of the usual standards apply. Genius knows no bounds and a Hannibal or an Alexander cannot be measured as other men. But few men possess the divine spark; the rest, even those who aspire to flag rank, must make their way up the ladder at a slower pace. Even near the top, it is hard to separate the best from the better. There is a real danger that in the long run, seniority will win out, for sheer survival possesses its own merit. The danger is greatest during long periods of peace; and history shows that superannuation in military leadership has been the rule. Only forced retirement and ruthless selection can prevent this. It is a cruel system, destructive of the morale of those passed over, as Vice Admiral Sabin points out, but perhaps a necessary one.
Has age by itself any value as a criterion for command? It should be possible to derive some general rules from a study of the age of flag and general officers. World War II is perhaps the best for our purposes.
More American officers attained flag and general rank in World War II than in any previous war. By mid-summer of 1945, there were 785 admirals and generals (exclusive of one-star rank) in the armed forces. Of this number, seven wore five stars. Three of them, two of the fleet admirals and one general, were in the 65 to 69 age bracket; two more, an admiral and a general, were in the next lower age group, 60 to 64; the single Air Force five-star general was 59 years old. The average age for the Army five-star general (including Air Force) was 60.5; for the Navy admirals, 65.
Four-star rank offers a wider field of examination. Thirty-one men held this rank in the summer of 1945, the majority of them in the Navy. Even excluding the one Marine general who was 58 years old and the Coast Guard admiral of 59, the Navy still had 16 men of four-star rank as compared to ten for the Army and three for the Air Force. Again, the age of the flag officers was greater than that of the others, averaging 63.6. Twelve of the 16 admirals were over 60 and two were more than 70.
The age spread among lieutenant generals and vice admirals was narrower than in the higher ranks. Not counting the one Marine Corps lieutenant general who was 63 years old, the average age of the Navy’s 46 three-star officers was 59.6. The Army had 37 lieutenant generals, averaging in age 56.3. The Air Force average was lower than either the Army or the Navy.
The service with the highest age average in the two-star rank was the Coast Guard; its 16 rear admirals averaged 59.9 years. The lowest was in the Air Force with an average age of 49.7. The Navy averaged 55 and the Army 54.3. If the one-star rank were included, the results would be even more striking, for the Air Force had at the time four brigadier generals between 30 and 34 years of age and one still in his twenties! More than 36 per cent of the Air Force major generals were less than 50 years of age as compared to 16 per cent for the Army and about 18 per cent for the Navy and Marine Corps.
Can we draw any conclusions from these figures? The higher the rank, the higher the average age of the officer. One can conclude also that the age of admirals of the Line is generally higher than that of general officers in the other services. In World War II (1 May 1945), the average of Navy flag officers was 56.4 as compared to 52.5 for the Army and 46.9 for the Air Force (including brigadiers). Fleet admirals averaged four years older than generals of the Army. Four-star admirals were on the average six years older than Army generals and ten years older than Air Force generals. Further comparisons in lower ranks show the same relationship, but do they prove anything? They do indicate a trend, and, since there must be rules to govern selection to high rank, the experience of World War II may provide as valid an answer as any.
Modern war imposes tremendous strains on commanders, and demands a high degree of vigor and elasticity. These qualities are associated with youth, but generalship requires also judgment, maturity, and experience—the wisdom that comes with ripe years. Where do these two sets of criteria meet? At what age does a man attain sufficient maturity for senior command while retaining the vigor of youth? The answer to this question bears a close relation to our national security and should be made in terms of national interests and the requirements of warfare in the nuclear age rather than the traditions of any single service or the morale of officers passed over for promotion.
Editor’s Balance Sheet of Flag and General Officer Statistics
Admiral or General
Date | Navy | Marine Corps | Army | Air Force | ||||||||||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
1 Jul 41 | 4 | 61.8 | 39.8 | 7.0 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 44 | 6 | 61.7 | 39.8 | 6.7 | — | — | — | — | 2 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 47 | 11 | 59.3 | 37.6 | 5.6 | 1 | 60.0 | 38.0 | 7.0 | 7 | 56.4 | 34.1 | 6.6 | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 51 | 5 | 55.4 | 35.0 | 8.8 | 1 | 58.0 | 30.0 | 9.0 | 5 | 57.6 | 35.2 | 9.8 | 4 | 56.5 | 31.5 | 9.5 |
1 Aug 55 | 6 | 59.0 | 38.2 | 12.3 | 1 | 59.0 | 38.0 | 13.0 | 8 | 56.3 | 35.8 | 12.8 | 9 | 52.8 | 30.0 | 12.2 |
1 Jan 57 | 7 | 58.0 | 36.6 | 11.4 | 1 | 58.0 | 35.0 | 7.0 | 8 | 56.1 | 35.1 | 13.2 | 8 | 53.0 | 31.7 | 13.7 |
1 Jan 58 | 7 | 58.5 | 37.3 | 12.2 | 1 | 59.0 | 35.0 | 8.0 | 8 | 57.1 | 36.1 | 14.3 | 11 | 53.8 | 31.0 | 13.9 |
1 Jan 59 | 8 | 58.3 | 37.1 | 12.1 | 1 | 60.0 | 36.0 | 9.0 | 8 | 57.9 | 36.3 | 15.2 | 11 | 54.9 | 31.8 | 15.4 |
1 Jan 60 | 8 | 59.0 | 37.5 | 11.5 | 1 | 55.0 | 33.0 | 6.9 | 7 | 58.0 | 35.8 | 15.7 | 11 | 54.6 | 32.1 | 16.3 |
Vice Admiral or Lieutenant General
1 Jul 41 | 3 | 59.7 | 38.7 | 5.0 | — | — | — | — | 7 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 44 | 24 | 58.9 | 37.5 | 4.2 | 2 | 60.0 | 35.0 | 4.0 | 20 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 47 | 28 | 55.8 | 34.2 | 4.5 | 3 | 59.0 | 35.0 | 4.0 | 21 | 56.8 | 32.8 | 5.8 | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 51 | 24 | 56.8 | 35.4 | 8.5 | 3 | 57.0 | 34.0 | 9.0 | 25 | 58.6 | 35.3 | 9.3 | 17 | 51.9 | 28.4 | 8.6 |
1 Aug 55 | 21 | 58.2 | 37.0 | 12.1 | 5 | 59.0 | 35.0 | 10.0 | 27 | 58.6 | 34.6 | 11.3 | 20 | 51.3 | 28.5 | 11.0 |
1 Jan 57 | 26 | 56.2 | 34.1 | 10.6 | 5 | 57.6 | 35.6 | 9.6 | 30 | 56.8 | 34.6 | 11.4 | 23 | 53.3 | 30.3 | 12.2 |
1 Jan 58 | 27 | 56.7 | 35.1 | 9.8 | 5 | 55.4 | 33.4 | 7.9 | 27 | 56.2 | 34.0 | 12.8 | 24 | 52.4 | 29.1 | 8.5 |
1 Jan 59 | 25 | 56.7 | 34.9 | 9.0 | 5 | 56.8 | 34.4 | 8.9 | 28 | 56.7 | 34.2 | 11.9 | 25 | 52.7 | 29.3 | 13.2 |
1 Jan 60 | 26 | 56.9 | 35.1 | 8.7 | 5 | 54.8 | 32.0 | 6.8 | 29 | 56.9 | 34.3 | 11.9 | 28 | 53.1 | 29.6 | 13.5 |
Rear Admiral (Lower Half) or Brigadier General
1 Jul 41 | 35 | 56.7 | 34.9 | 1.6 | 14 | 58.0 | 35.0 | 2.0 | 176 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 44 | 82 | 51.2 | 29.1 | 1.6 | 38 | 50.0 | 27.0 | 2.0 | 613 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 47 | 84 | 50.0 | 28.5 | 3.4 | 28 | 52.0 | 28.0 | 4.0 | 238 | 51.0 | 27.5 | 3.6 | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 51 | 97 | 51.6 | 29.4 | 2.2 | 30 | 53.0 | 29.0 | 3.0 | 211 | 53.7 | 29.9 | 3.8 | 160 | 46.9 | 23.2 | 2.8 |
1 Aug 55 | 106 | 51.6 | 29.4 | 1.8 | 32 | 51.0 | 28.0 | 2.0 | 291 | 50.7 | 27.4 | 1.9 | 227 | 46.5 | 22.3 | 2.4 |
1 Jan 57 | 106 | 52.0 | 29.6 | 2.3 | 33 | 50.4 | 27.0 | 1.4 | 253 | 49.3 | 25.8 | 1.7 | 239 | 47.7 | 23.1 | 3.1 |
1 Jan 58 | 107 | 51.9 | 29.4 | 2.1 | 33 | 50.1 | 26.9 | 2.0 | 249 | 49.5 | 25.8 | 1.1 | 221 | 47.5 | 22.5 | 2.9 |
1 Jan 59 | 107 | 51.8 | 29.3 | 2.1 | 33 | 49.1 | 25.8 | 2.1 | 246 | 50.1 | 26.5 | 2.5 | 205 | 47.6 | 23.1 | 2.9 |
1 Jan 60 | 107 | 51.5 | 29.1 | 2.0 | 36 | 48.5 | 25.2 | 1.8 | 236 | 50.8 | 26.1 | 2.8 | 198 | 47.5 | 23.2 | 2.9 |
All Flag or General Officers
1 Jul 41 | 70 | 59.2 | 37.4 | 4.3 | 19 | 59.0 | 36.0 | 2.5 | 251 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 44 | 179 | 54.8 | 32.9 | 2.7 | 60 | 52.0 | 29.0 | 2.4 | 884 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 47 | 188 | 53.5 | 31.7 | 4.2 | 47 | 53.0 | 29.0 | 4.4 | 373 | 52.2 | 28.7 | 4.2 | — | — | — | — |
1 Jul 51 | 195 | 53.6 | 31.7 | 5.1 | 48 | 54.0 | 30.5 | 5.0 | 389 | 54.9 | 31.3 | 5.7 | 286 | 48.7 | 24.9 | 4.9 |
1 Aug 55 | 213 | 54.1 | 32.1 | 5.2 | 60 | 53.0 | 30.6 | 4.3 | 482 | 52.6 | 29.7 | 4.2 | 390 | 47.9 | 23.8 | 4.6 |
1 Jan 57 | 213 | 54.2 | 32.1 | 5.6 | 61 | 52.3 | 29.4 | 3.5 | 497 | 51.4 | 28.2 | 4.1 | 425 | 48.6 | 24.6 | 5.4 |
1 Jan 58 | 216 | 54.1 | 32.0 | 5.4 | 60 | 52.1 | 29.0 | 3.6 | 492 | 51.5 | 28.2 | 4.1 | 408 | 48.6 | 24.3 | 55.2 |
1 Jan 59 | 216 | 54.2 | 32.0 | 5.2 | 60 | 51.6 | 28.5 | 3.9 | 476 | 52.0 | 28.8 | 4.9 | 405 | 48.9 | 24.7 | 5.7 |
1 Jan 60 | 216 | 54.1 | 31.9 | 4.9 | 59 | 50.5 | 27.0 | 3.2 | 467 | 52.5 | 29.1 | 5.1 | 394 | 48.8 | 24.7 | 5.8 |
Note: The first column (1) gives numbers of unrestricted flag and general officers. The second column (2) gives their average age. The third (3) gives their average years of commissioned service. The fourth (4) gives their average years of service as flag or general officers.