Lenin, speaking to the Third All-Russian Congress of Water Transportation Workers in March 1920, was said to be dreaming of the day when the newly formed Soviet Republic would send its merchant ships to all corners of the globe—the day when the Soviet merchant marine “would take its proper place in international trade.” By the end of 1958, Soviet merchant ships had visited over fifty countries, making calls at no less than 380 seaports.
The strides of progress made by Soviet maritime transportation in the past four decades have been significant beyond the mere recital of statistical materials and, in its own way, the development of the merchant marine is as important to Soviet long-range strategic and economic planning as is the now well-established submarine development program in the U.S.S.R.
At the same time one finds no stated direct connection between the merchant marine and the Red Navy. It is presumed, however, that many Soviet merchant mariners hold the equivalent of naval reserve commissions, from the fact that frequent mention is found of departures of personnel for military or naval service. Too, returning ex-merchant marine personnel are greeted with much fanfare and appear to receive more favorable consideration for schooling than those seamen who have not yet done their patriotic duty. The quasi-military aspect of the Soviet merchant marine evolves in part from the political control exercised over the crews and also from the fact that the merchant marine is state-owned and operated.
In general, Soviet merchant ships operate as do all merchant ships—on tight schedules, fighting demurrage and overtime work in ports, seeking faster turnarounds, concerned with damage and pilferage and, most recently, very much concerned with turning a profit, particularly in foreign exchange. It is well, at this point, to note that the vast fishing fleets which roam the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are not considered to be a part of the merchant marine since they do not come under the control of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet (Minister V. G. Bakayev). This Ministry, divided into twelve major steamship companies, each operating as a separate entity, yet tightly controlled from the top, enjoys all-union status and is responsible for the operation of cargo carriers, tankers, and combination cargo-passenger and passenger ships.
To understand the progress which has been made by the Soviet merchant marine one must go back to 24 January 1918, when V. I. Lenin signed the decree which nationalized the remains of the fleets which had belonged to certain large, privately owned shipping concerns. The decree, which had been carefully edited by Lenin himself, confiscated in the name of the new government something over 1,000 small and large merchant ships, said to total 865,000 gross registered tons (GRT). This tonnage was land-locked within the Caspian Sea basin and scattered over the water areas from the western basins in the Baltic and Black seas to the Pacific littoral.
It will be recalled that the period from 1920 to 1932 was the period of greatest need for water transportation, for only this type of communication could make delivery of export cargoes to obtain the means of production needed to perpetuate the new state. Late in 1921 Lenin wrote that:
“ . . . this year, the first year in the business of trade with abroad we have taken a long step forward. This has been connected partly with the question of transportation, our main, or, I dare say, one of the main, bases of our entire economy. Our progress has been connected with foreign trade.”
Thus, the primary role of the merchant marine was established and basically has never been altered. The fostering of this foreign trade was accomplished initially by some shipbuilding taking place within the Soviet Union (to the detriment, at the time, of naval building), the purchases of ships abroad during a period of depression plagued markets, by the establishment of trade agreements with various nations and the use, on a charter basis, of foreign flag ships. Soviet charters were, in fact, of sufficient importance in the 1930s to have economic overtones in Great Britain where, when certain of the charters were canceled as a result of British embargoes on trade with the Soviet Union, additional shipyard workers were laid off. Development of trade ties and basic merchant marine activity in this period resulted in lucrative charters for many nations, for at the time Soviet ships were capable of carrying but ten per cent of Soviet sea-borne foreign trade.
By 1957 a radical change had taken place. For the first time in its history, the Soviet merchant marine claimed more than half the share in goods carried to and from abroad; a substantial 53.9 per cent of all Soviet export-import sea-borne trade moved under the Soviet flag. In that same year the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet reported that profits from such trade exceeded chartering expenditures. According to Nikita Khrushchev, “the volume of foreign trade of the Soviet Union was equal to thirty-three billion rubles in 1957 and as of October 1958 the Soviet Union is in sixth place in the world in size of foreign trade, trading with over seventy nations.” At the same time, the Soviet merchant marine has become an active participant in the world charter market and makes its ships available to foreign charterers at prices which are attractive indeed, when it is clearly to their advantage, either economically or politically to do so. Known to the writer are charters of U. S.-flag ships to carry sugar cargoes to Morocco at better than $10 per ton while at least one Soviet ship did the same job at under $6 per ton. The difference in price may well have resulted in a net loss to the Soviet ship for the voyage, but the propaganda value of the sugar delivery by a Soviet-flag ship to an under-developed country may well have outweighed the actual monetary loss. This is all the more probable when it is considered that the ship discharged the cargo during the run of the annual Casablanca Trade Fair, in which the Soviet Union was a major exhibitor.
Thus, we come to the secondary, or propaganda role played by the merchant marine. Propaganda is secondary, however, only if one chooses to place more importance on economics. The first step in the development of economic ties has for many years been the pushing of the oft-repeated Soviet claim that vast markets exist within the U.S.S.R. and the captive nations, including Red China. There follow the usual meetings of trade delegations, the signing of agreements amid the usual press proceedings and, finally, the beginnings of the trade. Nowhere does there appear, however, the propaganda value of ship “sales” to Indonesia at a time of crisis between that nation and the Netherlands, of oil deliveries in Soviet tankers to Iceland during critical political periods, or the arms shipments to the Middle East which arrive in Soviet ships at such times as suit Soviet needs. It has long been all too apparent that foreign trade is an important instrument of general Soviet policy because the benefits, political and economic, to be derived from foreign trade have not been lost on Soviet leaders. Once the trade deal is signed and delivered, the Soviet merchant ship becomes the active agent of that policy.
Today the Soviet Union has established cargo lines operating between the Black Sea and India, Albania, and the Middle East; between Soviet Baltic ports and ports in England and East Germany; between ports in the Soviet Far East and Japan, as well as a run between Japan and the Black Sea; passenger lines between Odessa and Alexandria, Odessa and Durres, Leningrad and London, Leningrad and Le Havre, Odessa and Marseilles. All this is in addition to trade agreement arrangements, such as the petroleum contract with Argentina, or such politically necessary arrangements as have been worked out between the Soviet Union and Red China. In every case goods and people concerned move by sea, directly involving the merchant marine.
Soviet propaganda would have us believe that a theory based on the concept that Soviet foreign trade serves the aims of world Communism is “unintelligent.” It is pointed out (1) that thirty years ago, even in the absence of diplomatic relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., trade developed successfully and (2) that the barriers erected after World War II have harmed only the United States because the curtailment of trade between the two nations has had no effect on the ability of the Soviet Union to recoup the damage inflicted during the war. Of course, the argument is specious, casting the Soviet Union, as always, in the role of the put-upon “good neighbor” anxious to aid the “ailing” trade of what is termed as “the other of the two most powerful nations on this planet.” This line of attack is fostered by Soviet reprints of U. S. press editorials and statements which criticize Department of Commerce disapprovals of export licenses, or reports which suggest that resumption of trade is a logical step along the road to “improving relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.” What is not stated by Soviet propagandists is the type of goods involved and what also remains unsaid is that there are only certain types of trade the Soviet Union is willing to accept and only certain commodities the Soviet Union is willing to export. Finally, we read the veiled threat in the Russian grammatical form used with children that “ ... if you get underway late and do not set the correct course to the East, while you may ultimately make port, you will find your place at the dock taken by a ship of another flag.”
What sort of weapon has the Soviet Union forged to aid and abet the dual role which it has assigned to its merchant marine? While no precise figures as to the size of the Soviet merchant marine are available, those published are adequate for present needs, suggesting as they do a fleet of some 800 ships of three million GRT. What is more significant than the actual numbers is the fact that with each succeeding year the percentage of world tonnage assigned to the Hammer and Sickle flag increases. This constant increase is the result of new building and has permitted doubling the tonnage assigned by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet to foreign trade between 1946 and 1957. The fleet has shown a three-fold increase in ton-miles of operations in the same period. Soviet performance statistics are grouped under three headings: (1) tons carried, (2) ton-miles steamed, and (3) foreign exchange earned. All merchant ships, including coasters, use the first two, while the latter is now in use for those ships engaged in foreign trade or on charter. Passenger vessels substitute the word “passenger” for “tons.” Those ships, passenger and cargo, assigned to the foreign trade runs are the propaganda and moneymakers. By the beginning of 1959 the dead-weight capacity of the merchant marine was three times that of Tsarist days. Preliminary Soviet estimates of growth for the period of the current 7-year plan (which expires 31 December 1965) call for a doubling in the size of the merchant marine, with a corresponding increase in the value of tonnage carried under the Soviet flag. The types of ships to be built and the areas in which they will be built will be taken up later. Right now the mere thought of a Soviet-flag merchant marine of the planned size calls for some exploration.
Is there employment for such a fleet? Today the answer appears that there is, for we have noted that Soviet ships carry only about half of their sea-borne foreign trade. At the same time, suppose the Soviet fleet were double in size and able today to carry all her own goods. What would happen to already depressed markets in shipping? What numbers of ships would be forced to lay up for lack of work caused by their replacement by Soviet ships? What repercussions would a Soviet merchant marine of this size have on the relations between the Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union? What would occur in the shipbuilding industries of Western nations as Soviet needs became surfeited by the production of her own and captive nation yards? These are just a few of the questions which suggest themselves. From the Soviet Union we learn of stepped-up efforts to expand trade ties now in existence, as well as of efforts to expand trade by finding new outlets in areas of the world not now considered by Soviet policymakers as sufficiently penetrated. In the latter category, for example, is the agreement, signed in September 1959, between India and the Soviet Union, whereby India is to receive a loan of some 1½ billion rubles. Shortly before the loan announcement appeared, the Soviet press announced that an Indian steamship line had decided to open a new cargo run between Indian and Soviet ports in November, assigning two new, fast cargo ships. This run is, evidently, in addition to that which was inaugurated in 1956 and which, in its first 27 months of operations, registered 71 sailings for Soviet ships and 31 sailings on the Indian side by Scindia Stream Navigation Company ships. England and the Soviet Union have recently agreed to a joint type of operation between Leningrad and British ports, with one or more ships from each side performing the service. The pattern, meager as it is, suggests that unless there is a reciprocal agreement of this type, Soviet cargoes will move only in Soviet ships.
Today, however, pressure of this type cannot be applied across the board. A case in point is the tanker problem. Late in 1951 a Soviet-built tanker named Kazbek appeared on the scene, the first of over fifty 12,500-ton deadweight petroleum carriers now wearing the Soviet flag. All have been built in Soviet shipyards in Leningrad, Kherson, and Nikolayev. A few have been turned over to East Germany and one or more have been assigned to the Red Navy. At its peak, in the period from 1954 through 1957, the program called for what amounted to one tanker delivery per month. The program has now tapered off to about five units per year and may be scheduled for termination. Despite the rapid growth of the tanker fleet, the Soviet Union found itself unable to keep up with the need for lift capability. It is claimed that in 1958 the Soviet Union had to charter 2½ million tons of tankers in order to meet the export requirements in petroleum. Sixty-two per cent of the chartered tonnage flew Scandinavian flags, twelve per cent flew Panamanian or Liberian flags. One Italian tanker is known to have been chartered to furnish the export quota for Morocco. Since 1958 exports of petroleum were about 7½ million tons, up from six million tons in 1957, it follows that exports will continue to increase, as will the need for tankers. This need may be filled by the one-half million deadweight tons of tankers to be added to the fleet by the end of 1965. At some point supply and demand should balance, eliminating charter tankers from the Soviet picture.
Tankers are, however, but a part of the merchant marine story, despite the fact that tankers make up 20 per cent of the total GRT of the fleet. Most of this tanker tonnage is, obviously, “young.” Overall, however, the average age of the merchant marine, as of 31 December 1956, was, according to a U. S. Department of Commerce study, 25 years. This has fallen somewhat so that today, the average age is closer to twenty years. Age, hence condition of the ships, continues to plague Soviet planners and operators.
The merchant marine is made up of ships which burn coal, black oil, and diesel; which use reciprocating engines, turbines, diesel-electric installations, and various types of diesel engines of Soviet and foreign design and construction. The diversity as to types has not been lost on Soviet designers and planners, so that today plans call for what are known as “serial” ships, ships built according to a standard design in quantity, as for example, the Kazbek-class tankers. Modifications are made as the program moves along and as actual operations suggest such modifications. Among the old ships, and it may be noted that 29 per cent of all steam-propelled ships are coal-fired, not over half are classed in the Register of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet counterpart of Western classification societies. It is safe to state that at least ten per cent of the total number of merchant ships is always undergoing scheduled repairs; another ten per cent is limited in use under the Rules of the Register because of poor technical condition; and a third ten per cent are not available at any given time for reasons of voyage repairs, unscheduled yard periods resulting from damage, or routine maintenance. Steps are afoot to modernize the fleet, to convert coal burners to oil so that by 1965 less than two per cent will be burning coal. Major overhaul periods, which can stretch out as long as five years and more, are assigned to older ships, during which time they are virtually rebuilt. For example, Otto Shmidt, built in 1915, recently left a Leningrad yard after a stay of many years, during which time frames and hull plating were replaced, as was the main engine and auxiliaries.
Coupled with problems of technical condition are those connected with operations which depend very much on weather conditions in areas where ice closes ports for months on end and very much on finding qualified personnel to man the ships. In the first half of 1956, to cite one group of figures at random, the Ministry recorded 26 cases of groundings, 26 collisions of varying degrees of severity, seventeen cases of anchor loss, and 39 accidents and breakdowns of main engines and boilers. When the list was analyzed it was found that 70 per cent of the casualties resulted from personnel violating Sailing Rules, failure to observe sound engineering principles, or from sheer incompetence. Late in 1959 the Black Sea, Northern, and Murmansk steamship companies were taken to task because of serious damage which ships of the companies had incurred. It was pointed out that while the numbers of damage cases in 1959 were somewhat reduced from previous years, the losses incurred from the damages had doubled.
Much of the problem may be attributed to the fact that, despite a rather widely held belief that Russians love the sea, the contrary is closer to the truth. Conditions on the older ships did nothing to foster a love of the sea, and, in general, those seamen who chose the sea were in a sense escapists, preferring life on board ship to life ashore. Even at sea, however, escape is impossible. Work is organized under “agitators” who constantly harass the men to improve their work, to step up production norms, to save fuel and lubes. Off-duty hours must be spent in listening to boring lectures in the “Red Corner,” the space on each ship set aside for “cultural” activities. Contrary to what may be generally supposed, the Soviet seaman is not a shining example of sobriety and hard work. The Communist Party leaders, the Young Communist group, and the Labor Union all are distressed by alcoholism and religious resurgence among the seamen, from command on down. Brawling ashore and acts of “hooliganism” are deplored and in certain cases have been excused by Soviet claims that the misdeeds were the result of foreign “provocation.”
A publication with the curious title, Agitator’s Notebook, is provided to propaganda personnel and contains helpful hints for lectures and meetings. It also provides some surprising information on the state of things as they actually are. Here is a sample, taken from a 1956 issue:
“Lost work time in maritime transportation due to absenteeism is still very high, although somewhat lower than that of last year. In the first six months of 1956, for cargo ships alone, some 700 cases of absenteeism were reported, involving a loss of 3,000 man-days. Since the daily operation of a large cargo ship requires about 100 man-days, this figure is the equivalent of removing 30 large ships from service for one whole day, or may be taken as having one cargo ship of 6,000-8,000 tons deadweight idle for a whole month.”
Attempts are being made to raise educational standards, particularly among the crewmembers who are to be assigned to the new, faster, and more complicated ships coming off the ways. The training received by young specialists graduated from the maritime schools does not fit them to cope with the flood of paperwork encountered in maritime operations, Soviet or otherwise. Schools are being told they must teach their future seamen the intricacies of paperwork, that they must take up the business of how ships are chartered and that they must teach methods for making practical estimates of costs so that savings in money and materials can be effected. It is urged that, since customs of ports in various parts of the world differ, a study of these customs must be made so that the student can become familiar with them before he gets afloat. Finally, criticism is leveled against the language programs, which, like all language programs, do not always provide the student with the practical applications he needs.
Once the man is afloat he finds educational facilities available to him which include classes conducted by senior personnel, on-the-job training so that he may learn a second profession, and correspondence courses of all types. The correspondence course program is widespread, and the sponsoring institutions have established consultation points in key ports within the Soviet Union. It is theoretically possible to obtain the doctorate degree through this system without appearing on “campus.” Finally, there is a selective process which channels likely students into the fulltime shore-side programs.
The selective process starts at the preschool level and entrance examination results determine the lucky candidates. For the school year now in progress, only 150 of 543 applicants were accepted by the Odessa Maritime School; 700 applicants were examined for 300 vacancies in the Leningrad Institute for Water Transportation for its regular, evening, and correspondence classes. This pattern was duplicated in the four institutions of higher learning and the fourteen so-called middle schools operated by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. Plans announced in September 1959 call for better training over a broader base in order to provide more highly qualified personnel for the future. These plans call for the training of 230,000 men during the seven-year plan period.
These are the men who will be needed for the merchant marine which is to double its tonnage in the same period. The breakdown of the planned increase runs higher in dry cargo carriers than in tankers, 2.2 to 1.8 to total three million tons. This follows the plan for an increase of 2.5 times in the volume of oil which will be moved in 1965 as opposed to that tonnage moved in 1958, all of which is to move in Soviet tankers. Dry cargo tonnage is scheduled for a 3.2 times increase over 1958.
Tankers will come from Soviet shipyards, as well as from abroad. Building within the Soviet Union will include the remains of the Kazbek-class program, the continuation of the program of Pekin-class (27,000 tons deadweight) which already numbers three under construction, a class of 17,000 tons deadweight in the planning stages. Bulgaria has already started on a shallow-draft tanker program for the Soviet Union and Finland, in accordance with the terms of the current trade agreement between the two nations, will continue to provide the Soviet Union with tankers of the Pevek-class.
Poland and East Germany are prime builders of dry cargo carriers, passenger ships, refrigerator and fish carrier ships, tugs, and other craft. Rumania has built tugs, Czechoslovakia dredgers. On the ways are rail ferries, cotton-timber carriers, coal-ore carriers, various classes of combination ships, salvage tugs, and passenger ships.
Here then, in broad brush fashion, is the Soviet merchant marine of today—and tomorrow, a merchant marine which will “permit the State to make a more correct decision in connection with the problem of taking care of the foreign trade carriage of the U.S.S.R. and of the participation of the Soviet merchant marine in world trade. . . . The anticipated development of maritime transportation will free the national economy from its dependence on capitalist countries for oceangoing transportation.”
Enlisting in the Navy in 1931, Commander Kassell was commissioned in 1942 and served in Idaho, Yorktown, Morris, and Snowden during World War II. He was Electronics Officer at Fleet Training Center in Norfolk and subsequently studied the Russian language and history at Cornell. He served as Repair Officer in Bryce Canyon (AD-36) and Sierra (AD-18). After attending General Line School at Monterey, he was CO, MSTSO, Casablanca, Morocco. Commander Kassell is now attached to Op-09D in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.