The Middle East has been in recorded history longer than any other region of this earth. During the last few hundred years, the Middle East has been a region of passage upon which extra-regional forces converged. Intrinsically, ever since the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate in the eighteenth century, the Middle East has been object rather than subject of international politics. This condition still obtains today. Grave as are the problems raised by the rise of Arab nationalism, they can be neither studied profitably nor dealt with effectively in isolation. Virtually every major problem of the Middle East is a derivative of developments that have originated elsewhere; not a single problem can be solved without the intervention of extra- regional forces of one kind or another—political, economic, and military.
To blame all the troubles of the Middle East upon the communists would be indeed a gross oversimplification of the many and complex causes underlying the contemporary crisis. The rise of Arab nationalism antedates the Bolshevik Revolution by many years. As a matter of fact, it was the West (and, among Western powers, chiefly Britain) who triggered, during World War I, the “Arab Awakening.” It was only during the inter-war period that the forces of Arab nationalism hardened in opposition to Great Britain and France who, upon the demise of the Ottoman Empire, had established their respective zones of influence in the Middle East. During the 1920’s, the links between Arab nationalism and Bolshevik Russia were, to say the least, tenuous. Communist Russia seemed to have abandoned the policies which Czarist Russia had pursued so single-mindedly for generations: for all practical purposes, Russia had ceased to be a factor in Mideastern politics. The antagonisms evoked by the presence of Great Britain and France in the Middle East conformed to a familiar historical phenomenon: the Middle Eastern peoples were too weak and too divided to rule themselves; they fretted under the domination of foreign power. The Arabs, in particular, transferred their resentment at Turkish domination to those Western powers—Britain and France—who had defeated Turkey, freed the Arabs of the Turkish yoke—and now themselves filled the vacuum created by the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the withdrawal of Russia from the affairs of the Middle East. During World War II, the defection of the Mufti of Jerusalem to Berlin and the abortive revolt in Iraq in 1943 were straws in the wind. After World War II, the military collapse of France and the gradual decline of British power created in the Middle East a vacuum which, to this day, has not been filled. The relative impotence of the Middle Eastern peoples made it inevitable that the Middle East would become again a pawn in the international power struggle. Although the creation of the state of Israel supplied a rallying point for Arab nationalism, the Arab peoples have been unable to transform themselves into an autonomous unit of political and military power. It is these two factors, namely the withdrawal of Western (and, chiefly, British) power from the Middle East and the intrinsic military and economic weakness of the Arab states, which opened the gates of the Middle East to communist intervention.
In this country, prevailing opinion on Middle Eastern affairs can be divided roughly into two schools of thought: the first insists that the root of the Middle Eastern crisis is communist intervention and that hence to cope with Middle Eastern problems is tantamount to coping with the communist menace; the second school of thought insists, to the contrary, that the Middle East’s troubles stem from internal political, social, and economic issues, that we should not look for a communist under every Arab bed, and that broad-gauged Western policies of economic assistance and support of socially progressive forces can restore peace and stability to the Middle East. Both schools of thought are right—and both are wrong. They are right because each has identified one aspect of the problem correctly; both are wrong because they mistake the part for the whole.
To begin with, the social and economic transformation of the Middle East is a mere episode in that vast revolutionary process that, ever since the beginning of the industrial revolution, has been unmaking the international political system. It is quite true that the problems of the Middle East cannot be solved by policies that do not look beyond the communist menace. Even if there were no communist Russia, the Arab peoples would still strive for unity; the Arab-Israeli conflict would still defy an easy solution; the just distribution of revenues from Arab oil between the Western interests and the Arab states would still be a matter of controversy; and the entire region’s need for a better use of available water resources still would have to be met by costly development schemes. But it is communist conflict strategy which has succeeded in either sharpening or aggravating each of these problems or in sabotaging settlements that could have opened the way for the constructive collaboration between the Western and the Arab peoples. The communists who have no direct responsibilities in the Middle East have exploited every acute or latent conflict within the region in order to thwart every responsible attempt at concluding viable political settlements and advancing the economic welfare of the region as a whole. The communists have given aid and comfort to each and every extremist and conspiratorial movement directed against the West.
The major problems of the Middle East— the Arab-Israeli conflict, the intra-Arab conflicts, the clash between pan-Arabism and the major Western powers, and the Turkish-Arab as well as Turkish-Greek antagonism—are at once home-grown issues of the Middle East and global issues of the cold war. It follows that, strictly speaking, there is no major Middle Eastern problem which can be solved locally and that a rational approach to an effective Western policy for the Middle East must integrate the issues of the Middle East into the over-all problems of globally contending power blocs and global social and economic transformation.
The case of the Iraqi coup d’état in July, 1958, is a fair sample of the dual nature of Middle Eastern crisis, part internal and in part generated from abroad. After the event and in absence of American intervention, it has been argued that it was “spontaneous” social pressures which urged a small group of Iraqi military leaders onto the road of rebellion against a regime to whom they had sworn loyalty. Yet the Iraqi kingdom had launched upon schemes of economic development and land reform far more progressive than those now in operation in Egypt and Syria and, for that matter, in any other Arab land. The Iraqi people, like all the peoples of the Middle East, are in the midst of the transition from a predominantly rural and static order to urbanization and industrialization. Despite the rise of Arab nationalism and Arab xenophobia the Arab peoples are undergoing, willy nilly, the process of Westernization. This process creates social and cultural frictions and complicated problems of readjustment. In this respect the situation in Iraq was no different from that, let us say, in India and Indonesia. On balance, the Iraqi government had managed to carry out such necessary reforms as redistribution of land and raising the living standards of rural workers more effectively than most of its neighbors. Social inequalities in the United Arab Republic were surely no less glaring than they were in Iraq under the monarchy. In brief, the officers’ revolt had been prepared in close consultation if not with the Soviets then with local communist factions and most certainly with the help of Nasser acting as the intermediary and proxy of the Soviets. More likely than not, the social and economic transformation of Iraq would have taken place peaceably; in another five or ten years, the work of the Iraqi Development Board would have borne fruit; and a new generation of political leaders would have come to the fore without bloodshed—had it not been for a ruthless campaign of political-psychological warfare and indirect aggression launched by Nasser and backed by Moscow. If any Arab country had the fair prospect of economic progress and social improvement it was Iraq. Yet it was precisely the purpose of the Arab extremists and their communist allies to keep the pot of political unrest boiling and to deprive the Iraqi regime of the breathing spell necessary for the implementation of a fairly intelligent and not ungenerous program of reforms.
Soviet policy for the Middle East proposes that there shall be no breathing spell for the gradual transformation of the region into a modern, prosperous, and harmonious community. The communist blueprint for the Middle East is malevolent and destructive. The prescription is violent revolution and the ejection of the last shred of Western influence. Soviet objectives are plain. The primary objective in the Middle East of the Soviet Union is to break up the Northern Tier Alliance. Contingent upon the attainment of this objective is the accomplishment of several other related tasks: ring Turkey with hostile neighbors and pry loose the North Atlantic Alliance from its foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean; sharpen the cleavage between Pan- Arabism and the West; wrest the oil resources of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq from the strategic control of the United States and Great Britain and thus place the economy of Europe and, in the future, of all Western countries at the mercy of a hostile Arab Federation; eject the remnants of British influence from the margins of Arabia; open a direct bridge for communist penetration into Africa; and gain formal recognition of the Soviet Union as a Middle Eastern power together with an incalculable increase of Soviet prestige throughout the entire world. The primary objective, namely the destruction of the Northern Tier Alliance, has come within sight as the result of the revolt in Iraq. The Soviets can now look forward confidently toward attaining the other objectives, for time is now on their side. Another phase in the strategy of protracted conflict—total conquest by a series of piecemeal conquests—nears completion.
So rich has been the harvest and so bright the prospects that the Soviets can be expected to forego the immediate collection of all their winnings—except the ones that are already in their pocket. The Turks have had to watch first, at their southern border, the absorption of Syria into Nasser’s empire and then, at the eastern border, the virtual defection of their ally, Iraq. With communist Bulgaria and an angry Greece to the west, the geographical isolation of Turkey is complete except for the hazardous approaches across the Aegean Sea and of Iran, a sparsely settled and none too stable country which is now flanked by the Soviets to the north and the hostile Arab republics to the south.
The fortunes of the revolutionary Arab leaders are now ineluctably tied to the chariot of Soviet policy, for they owe their very existence to direct and indirect Soviet support. Although the Soviets might not be able to count on Arab gratitude, they can rely on the momentum of a Pan-Arabism which is now indistinguishable from Nasserism and set on a track diametrically opposed to Western interests. In the fullness of time, Pan-Arabism may shed its pathological phobias and haunting sense of inferiority and settle for a shade less than the total fulfillment of its aspirations. But if the history of other “pan movements,” such as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and Mussolini’s dream of an Italian Mediterranean, supplies a guidance for the future, Pan- Arabism (in its present incarnation: Nasserism) will not abandon its grandiose objectives until it has met an immovable object. So far, United States policy has not seen fit to block its triumphant path and has, on previous occasions, helped to smooth it.
The consolidation of Nasser’s empire places upon every one of the remaining independent Arab states heavy psychological pressures. Nothing succeeds like success, and perhaps no other ethnic group is as susceptible to the band wagon effect of victory as are the Arab peoples. Mohammed started from a smaller base than Nasser. His charismatic leadership transformed a handful of faithful into an army of fanatical conquerors. Nasser has stirred the Arab soul to its depth. No other Arab ruler’s head now rests easily. The shadow of the United Arab Republic now falls over the Sudan, and the repercussions of the events in Iraq were felt all the way to the Maghreb. It is indeed no longer safe to oppose Nasser’s wishes. Assassination is one of the favorite subjects of Egyptian propaganda. To the south of the Sahara, Arab cultural influence has always been strong. The peculiar revival under Nasser’s aegis of Arab power is bound to exert its fascination upon African lands, especially those that, having recently won their independence, now seek to find their bearings amidst the crosscurrents of world politics.
Although the “Arab Awakening” dates back to World War I, Pan-Arabism under the leadership of President Nasser deviates in many respects from the earlier pattern of Arab nationalism. First and foremost, Nasser’s Pan-Arabism has aligned itself with Soviet communism which itself is a “pan movement.” Secondly, Nasser’s Pan-Arabism surpasses in intensity and scope those Arab nationalist movements which emerged as a result of World War I. The aspirations of the new Pan-Arabism are indeed unlimited. The vision is not so much the ejection of residual Western influence from the Middle East and North Africa as the creation of an Arab Empire reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic and into the heart of Africa. Thirdly, in Israel, the new Pan-Arabism has found a common antagonism, a unifying issue, and a whipping boy. Pan-Arabism has now its martyrs, namely the Palestinian refugees; and Pan-Arabism has its martial legend, namely the defense of the Suez Canal against the Israeli, British, and French hosts.
Can the West come to terms with Nasser’s Pan-Arabism? It is about as likely that the West can come to terms with Pan-Arabism as it was, twenty years ago, that the West could do business with Hitler. There never existed an Arab nation, and the territorial limits of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism are even less well defined than those of Pan-Slavism and Hitler’s Pan-Germanism. To come to terms with Pan-Arabism, if this is what we must do, will mean the acceptance of indeterminate claims. In most of Africa, for example, the line between ethnic origin and Islam is so vague that Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islam are either the same thing or the one can readily be substituted for the other. Nasser’s own Pan-Arabism is not the authentic expression of Arab nationalism and, still less, of Arab cultural solidarity. Nasserism, to give Egypt- based Pan-Arabism its proper name, is a communist front. It owes its remarkable diplomatic maneuverability to the Soviet Union. It has been armed by the Soviets. At every major turn of the road it has leaned heavily on the Soviet diplomacy of nuclear blackmail. In sum, Pan-Arabism as it confronts us today is the creation of Soviet diplomacy. To come to terms with Pan-Arabism in its present incarnation is to come to terms with Soviet nuclear blackmail as the arbiter, today, of the Middle East and, tomorrow, of Africa and Europe. Nasser’s Pan-Arabism is anti-national. Syria, the Lebanon, and Iraq were established as independent nations. Syria has fallen to Egypt. There is no doubt that Nasser proposes to incorporate the Lebanon into the United Arab Republic, and his designs on Iraq and the states of the Arabian peninsula are plain. It was the unlimited and revolutionary aspirations of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism which provoked the greatest democratic leader of the Arab world, President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, into expressing publicly his gratification at the American landings at Beirut. His speech of July 26, 1958, was implicitly a declaration of war against Egyptian imperialism and terrorism. It sounded a warning which no Arab mindful of his liberties and no Western statesman concerned with the collective security of the West can ignore.
An approximation to an effective policy of the United States for the Middle East must start out—as must any American policy for coping with the problems of the cold war— with an assessment of the underlying strategic issue. The challenge-and-response of Middle Eastern politics is Soviet nuclear blackmail versus Western determination to stand up to it. In the Middle East, communist policy does not deviate from the classic principles of protracted conflict laid down by communist doctrine. The communist objective is still to whittle down the West’s position by ambiguous challenges—challenges so massive that they cannot be met by the West’s locally available resources, yet not so massive as to leave the West no other alternative than to fight for its survival with every weapon at its disposal. This is the dialectic of Soviet nuclear diplomacy. The conflict is, therefore, a psychological one, and military weapons are employed—on a stand-by basis so to speak— as means for reinforcing psychological-political pressures.
The real significance of the American landing in the Lebanon lies in the fact that the bluff of Soviet nuclear blackmail was called. The Soviets spoke their piece—and it is the same piece that they have been speaking with increasing vehemence ever since the Suez Canal crisis—and did not launch their atomic missiles against Washington and London. The United States did not choose to press the point beyond the frontiers of the Lebanon. Had the United States cared to venture upon a straightforward showdown with Nasser, the strawman of Pan-Arabism would have been knocked down. For Pan-Arabism, deprived of the backing of Soviet nuclear blackmail, is no more substantial than the hot winds that blow down the Nile valley. Cairo’s and Moscow’s anger at the American landings in the Lebanon did not spring from moral indignation at the American intervention into the domestic affairs of that small country: Cairo and Moscow were enraged and confounded because the United States had defied unexpectedly the nuclear blackmail tactics of Soviet diplomacy. American military capabilities for turning the Great Deterrent to good account in “limited” situations and American determination to stand up to Soviet nuclear blackmail constitute the cornerstone of an effective American policy for the Middle East.
Only thus “local” problems become manageable. The most crucial of these is oil, for Arab oil turns the wheels of European commerce and, to a large measure, of NATO’s war machine. Western analysts frequently speak of Arab oil as a “vital necessity” for the Free World. This places a heavy club in the hands of the Arabs. If the Arabs can be made aware of the possibilities inherent in new processes for tapping commercially the West’s virtually unlimited resources of shale oil and the West’s determination to expand, if need be, oil production within its own territorial confines, the West’s bargaining power with the Arab world will rise considerably. There is no need of threatening the Arabs with a boycott, for this might aggravate their hostility—and quite justifiably so. But a vigorous demonstration of the West’s ability to open up alternative oil resources would go far in restoring the balance between the Arabs’ exaggerated expectations and the economic facts-of-life. The West is the principal market of Arab oil. If the flow of oil were cut off, Western economies might feel a temporary, albeit annoying, pinch. But new resources could be tapped, and loss of access to Middle Eastern oil would not be fatal to Western prosperity and power. In the long run, Arab economic development is more dependent upon the sale of oil than is the West upon its purchase.
Britain’s balance .of trade leans heavily upon the revenues from oil produced in the British controlled sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf. The stability of the pound sterling, it is said, will be threatened were Kuwait detached from the “sterling area.” How to lessen the vulnerability of the pound sterling, this is essentially a domestic problem of Great Britain. Its solution calls for ingenuity and, in all likelihood, for an increase in British industrial productivity as well as far-reaching reforms of Britain’s habits of work and consumption; it does not call for abject surrender to Soviet-Egyptian blackmail pressures.
The judicious employment of American military power and the reduction of the West’s dependence upon Middle Eastern oil will, by themselves, not create a stable Middle East. It is, however, difficult to see how any problem of the Middle East can be dealt with rationally as long as the United States and its Western allies (and especially the British Commonwealth) have not agreed upon a joint strategy for, first, coping with Soviet thermo-nuclear blackmail and, secondly, meeting Nasser’s threat to the oil supply to Europe either locally or by the development of additional fuel resources within the strategic orbit of the West.
Fundamentally, the current Middle Eastern crisis stems from the inability of the Western powers to close ranks and to slough off that defensive mentality which has enabled the communists to carry the cold war into the territory of the Free World while they enjoy all but complete immunity within their own orbit. Thus far, the conflict has been waged on uneven terms. The communists have been free to shift the initiative from one sector along the periphery of their empire to the other: Korea and Indochina yesterday, the Middle East today and, perhaps tomorrow, Berlin, or Africa, or Southeast Asia, or Japan. It constitutes a major victory for the communists to have succeeded in pinning the West down in the Middle East—and to have performed this feat with a minimum of expenditure and with the assistance of local proxies who must bear the major risk and can be disavowed whenever the communists deem caution the better part of valor.
The West has not grasped the nature of communist conflict strategy nor developed policies and organizations that could beat the communists at their own game. The Western democracies still indulge in their favorite pastime: self-deception and business-and-play-as- usual. If the Middle Eastern crisis has jolted the Western democracies out of their complacency, its tragic consequences—Western strategic positions lost and loyal friends murdered—may still prove a boon to the Western peoples. The tragedy of the Middle East, so reminiscent of that which befell Eastern Europe as the result of Hitler’s unchecked offensive of blackmail and subversion, may awaken the Western peoples to the true community of their interests and to the need for solidarity in purpose and sacrifice.