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FURTHER INFORMATION ON DEATH OF A GERMAN BATTLESHIP
The Bismarck is shown as she appeared during her sea trials. A Canadian correspondent has provided some interesting comments and Commander Bidlingmaier has replied, furnishing significant data based on interrogation of Bismarck survivors and examination of source documents.
End of the “Bismarck”
(See pages 77-88, July, 1958 Proceedings)
J. P. Thornton, Victoria, B.C., Canada. —We are fortunate in having in Victoria a man who was a petty officer gunlayer in the Rodney and saw the entire fight through a high-powered telescope. As the action developed, the Bismarck became a helpless hulk and the Rodney closed the range to 3,000 yards. The Dorsetshire then torpedoed the Bismarck, first on one side, then the other. On the second hit, the German ship shuddered, rolled over, broke in two, and sank. This gunlayer’s account can be matched by dozens of other eyewitnesses and it is evident that whether or not the Bismarck's sea cocks had been opened, she had been sunk by torpedo attack.
The idea that the Bismarck was scuttled to prevent her being captured and towed to a British port is ludicrous. Since the ship was within some 400 miles of the French coast and close to German air and submarine power, it simply could not have entered the Admiralty’s mind to tow this ship at about three knots.
It seems to me that the German naval mind is in real danger of acquiring a psychosis on the subject of scuttling, with the sinking of their fleet at Scapa, and later that of the Graf Spee at the Plate, three destroyers at Rombacks Fjord, and finally the claim that the Bismarck was so destroyed.
Commander Bidlingmaier’s Reply
Commander T. Gerhard F. Bidlingmaier German Federal Navy.—The petty officer gunlayer’s observations agree with what Captains Grenfell and Roskill have written in their books about the final action, except for the statement that the Bismarck broke in two. These authors relied chiefly on British sources and the observations described are correct, but not necessarily their conclusions. For my article, I read not only these British books, but I also carefully examined all available German war diaries and dispatches and accounts of Bismarck survivors. I conversed with some of these, particularly with one of the two officers rescued. They all agreed that they received and executed the order to scuttle and abandon the Bismarck. This order was given by Lieutenant Commander von Miillenheim-
Rechberg, who later was saved, the senior surviving officer above the armored deck, after all the ship’s guns had been put out of action by British gunfire. To scuttle this battleship, not only were the sea cocks opened, but demolition charges also were used.
One of the two surviving German officers had his battle station in the middle turbine room, and he told me that after he had prepared a demolition charge to explode at the cooling water main admission, he led his personnel to the upper deck. As they passed the main battery deck they heard the demolition charge explode. When they reached the main deck, they saw only the Dorsetshire. Together with some 400 men and ratings, this officer waited about thirty minutes on the quarterdeck as the ship was settling and then gave the order to abandon ship. This was about forty-five minutes after the original order to scuttle and abandon ship had been given.
If I may be permitted to trust British official history books on World War II, our German ships proved gallant fighters wherever engaged, although most of them were defeated at last owing to odds impossible to overcome.
The Battle of Surigao Strait
(See pages 104-107, April, 1959 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral J. G. Coward, usn(ret.).— Regarding Admiral Oldendorf’s comments on the Battle of Surigao Strait,* I wish to submit the following facts to keep the record accurate.
To the best of my recollection and belief my squadron (Desron 54) was not placed under Admiral Oldendorfs command during the Battle for Leyte Gulf. No orders were issued to my squadron except by me and we were definitely not included in Admiral Oldendorfs battle plan.
About 2000 on October 24, 1944, after I had learned that a Japanese Task Force was heading for the southern end of Surigao Strait, I called Admiral Oldendorf personally on the T.B.S. and informed him in effect that unless
* Editor’s Note: Inadvertently and inaccurately, Admiral Oldendorf was referred to as a Vice Admiral in the April, 1959 Proceedings, whereas he has held the rank of Admiral since 1948. The Naval Institute regrets this error.
otherwise directed I would make the initial torpedo attack in two sections from opposite sides of the Strait. Immediately after firing our torpedoes, the Eastern section would retire to the north, close to Dinagat Island, and the Western section close to the shore of Leyte. In that way we would deliver a most effective blow against the enemy and then quickly clear the battle area without any chance of entangling with McManes’ and Smoot’s squadrons, or fouling the line of fire from our heavy ships. In the night battle of Guadalcanal I had witnessed such a fiasco, while in command of the Sterett, and you do not forget such a disaster!
At first Admiral Oldendorf suggested that after I delivered my attack I regroup my five destroyers and head north on one side of the Strait. After I explained my objection to having one of my sections unnecessarily cross the battle area, Admiral Oldendorf approved my original battle plan. I then sent out my battle order, action Desron 54, information Admirals Wilkinson and Oldendorf.
These comments confirm Rear Admiral Morison’s documented history of Leyte, and, I believe, can be verified from the official T.B.S. logs of the battle.
In closing I personally wish to thank Admiral Oldendorf for the “very well done” he extended to the officers and men of my squadron and to Rear Admiral Morison for the excellent and accurate portrayal of our torpedo attack.
Leadership and Responsibility
(See pages 78-83, February, 1959 Proceedings)
Commander Douglas A. Powell, Jr., usn.—Lieutenant Ripley made a very good presentation of the theoretical attitudes and qualifications for today’s naval officer. However, there is a wide gap existing between theory and actuality which always must be kept in mind and which must be considered when dealing with men—the mature, reasoning men who are absolutely necessary for vital, dynamic leadership. A dedicated naval officer is a human being and must be treated as such.
One sentence in the article jumped out of context and jarred! “Interest in self-improvement, mechanical ways to produce a desired
result, or a plan to live within a salary can never reach the spirit of the junior officer by challenge or acceptance of responsibility.”
In the first place, interest in self-improvement is a necessary attribute and personal goal if the junior officer is to mature into a seasoned, thinking, well-rounded, responsible, and reasonable naval officer and leader of men. It includes not only the gaining of practical experience afloat and ashore but the enhancement as well of professional competence through study. With time on the job at a premium, professional study must be accomplished outside of the normal, routine work day in the wardroom, stateroom, or at home when ashore.
I must agree that the “mechanical ways to provide a desired result” is an approach which must be avoided by all officers. Only by conscientious, constructive, and independent thinking can we hope to overcome the problems and difficulties of this cold war period. It cannot be accomplished by merely plugging cliches and pat phrases into formulas for automatic solutions.
The only way the naval service can get away from the junior officers “plan(ning) to live within a salary” is to have the officer corps exist as bachelors within the framework of the service, while simultaneously remaining outside the framework of society as a whole. This is neither practical nor desirable. Emphasis on leadership and “the spirt of the U. S. Navy” is essential but neither “the mechanics of living” nor the reasons therefore can be forgotten or the raison d’etre of the naval service ceases to exist. To suggest removal of the “officer retention” and “dedication” problems from out of the framework of our American society is to beg the questions of “why?” and “how?” and to defeat any solution before such solution has had a chance to be fully developed and tried.
For the officer to be free to devote his time to dedicated service and to the broadening of his professional knowledge by study, it will be necessary to reaffirm the requirements of responsibility and to sell the acceptance of this sense of responsibility back down the normal chain of command through to the petty officers who should form the working, supervisory base of the naval service. This reaffirmation is being accomplished now by means of the re
vitalization of the concepts of leadership. Only when we revert to that condition of chief and first class petty officers adequately and conscientiously supervising work and records within their spheres of activity, will officers in all echelons of command have the time to devote to their professional, moral, and sociological advancement. The officers cannot continue to be snowed under by all the little details of correspondence, records, and work supervision, for which a third or second class petty officer is qualified to assume responsibility, if they are to provide comprehensive, aggressive enforcement of dynamic attitudes and a positive approach to the daily business of operating the fleets and naval shore establishment.
Controllable Pitch Propellers
(See pages 110-111, January, 1959 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander A. E. Hammar- lund, usn.—To my knowledge, there have been no standard commands promulgated for ships with variable pitch propellers and as a result there are various types of commands devised which could lead to trouble. Lieutenant Commander McCartan gives as an illustration, “Port back two feet, six inches.” It is my belief that the standard command should be, “Port shaft back two and one-half foot pitch.” All commands for the variable pitch propeller should be in the same unit: namely feet of pitch. Using feet and inches could lead to confusion and trouble. For example, in a mooring situation the conning officer may desire to ease forward when he would command, “Port shaft ahead six inches.” A slight garble in communicating the command, or, a misunderstanding on the part of the engine console operator, and the pitch will be set at six feet, resulting in the shaft delivering ten times the thrust desired. By using one foot as the unit of pitch there would be no doubt, as the command would be “Port shaft ahead one-half foot pitch.” In this case there is no doubt as to the amount of pitch required and, more important, there is a lesser chance for error or misunderstanding.
The pitch indicators are graduated in feet and quarter-feet which would dictate the adoption of the “foot of pitch” terminology.
The placing of the word “pitch” at the end of each command is for clarity. The pitch can be controlled from the engine room; in which case the engine order telegraph is utilized in the pilot house, with the present standard commands being given the conning officer.
I personally adopted the foot as the unit of pitch after an incident in mooring, similar to my example. When I attempted to ease forward, the console operator advanced the pitch to six feet after six inches was ordered. Fortunately the error was detected before the ship moved far enough forward to collide with the presidential yacht of Mexico.
Lieutenant Commander Timothy J. Keen, usn.—Lieutenant Commander McCartan wrote a fine article, “Notes on Handling Ships with Controllable Pitch Propellers.” This subject is dear to all MSO ship handlers, and I agree completely with the author on all points but one. In the fourth paragraph he implies that the terminology, “feet of pitch,” infers horizontal (or longitudinal) motion of the servo piston which rotates the blades on their individual axes. Actually this piston moves only a few inches to crank the blades from full ahead to full astern. “Feet of pitch” is really descriptive of the propeller as a water screw. “Pitch” is the distance in feet that a propeller will advance through a medium, in one revolution, in the direction of the axis of rotation, with no slippage. All fixed blade propellers have fixed pitch. The controllable pitch propeller can be varied, theoretically, from zero pitch to infinite pitch (zero to ninety degrees rotation of blades about their individual axes). Six feet of pitch, design maximum for MSO propellers, is achieved with a relatively small angular displacement of the blades about their axes.
The author’s enthusiasm is understandable. MSO ship handlers know what happens when they order changes in pitch, and the maneuverability afforded by the system is most gratifying, regardless of term definitions. The controllable pitch system does, however, suffer a disadvantage which might be stated to round out the discussion. The bad feature is the continuous propeller rotation at all times when the main engines are available. The ship handler groans with anxiety when he has, for practical purposes, “stopped” his engines and he sees a stern mooring line dropped in the water. The “stopped” propeller can wind it in at great speed with better than 200 shaft RPM. With maximum power available—the usual case when maneuvering in confined waters—the shaft cannot be stopped in time to avert an imminent threat to the propellers. The propellers are also subject to minor calibration errors which cause some residual pitch when indicators show zero feet. This introduces an undesired and sometimes unexpected thrust, ahead or astern, for which the conning officer must always be alert.
Lieutenant Jacques de Seynes, French Navy.—I agree completely with Lieutenant Commander McCartan’s conclusion, “Maneuverability imported by this control is astounding.” I have noticed that when a ship is steered only on rudder, zero pitch, it is rather difficult to handle, because of the effect of the propellers, which are still rotating. This influence breaks the flow of water which normally is directed against the rudders.
Lieutenant Commander Bruce B. Dunning, usn.—Lieutenant Commander McCartan amply described the advantages inherent in the controllable pitch propeller and the ease of ship maneuverability which such a system provides. But, while he alluded briefly to the fact that mechanical difficulties can exist in the system, he slighted a subject that will provide ex-commanding officers of minesweepers with a supply of sea stories for many years to come.
Some twenty months in minesweeper command convinced me that while the skilled engineers who designed the controllable, or as I prefer to call it, variable pitch screw, provided a very high degree of ship maneuverability, they were assisted in their efforts by possibly the most proficient gremlin who has yet cast his influence over the machines of modern warfare.
It was in the field of sudden casualties that the variable pitch gremlin showed true virtuosity. On one occasion, one of the ships in the division to which my ship was attached was standing in to a berth in San Antonio Channel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Noting that the current was setting him on rather rapidly, the captain called for port ahead standard, intending to give the ship a momentary kick. But then, as the ship headed rapidly for the next ahead, the captain found he couldn’t get his ahead bell off. Next he called for all engines back full, without effect, and then all engines back emergency full, with remarkable and apparently permanent effect. As the ship charged full astern across the narrow channel, the skipper, with commendable presence of mind, shut down the fuel supply to the engines and dropped an anchor. The ship fetched up with five yards to spare, and just missed hitting a small French freighter moored across the channel, but not before the crew of the freighter abandoned ship.
Lieutenant Commander McCartan was correct in his description of the advantages of the variable pitch propeller system. In fact the maneuverability was truly astounding at times when the ship took over by itself. But then it takes time to work the bugs out of all new developments and as improvements were made and as the engine room crews became more familiar with the system, troubles occurred less and less frequently. But I can’t think of a single skipper in the Mine Force during the period of my tour who didn’t develop at least a few grey hairs as the result of a pitch system that was truly variable.
Propellers and Harems
(See pages 38-48, January, 1959 Proceedings)
Commander Ralph S. Stevens, Jr., usn— Reading the story of William McLintock’s intrepid conduct brings to mind the account of a similar experience by a Yankee seaman, Rans- ford Bucknam.
A steamer commanded by Bucknam lost her propeller while en route from Tampico to New York, in 1889. Disdaining offers of help or rescue from shipping, Bucknam shifted his cargo forward, fabricated and fitted a jury-rig propeller, and brought his ship into port unaided.
Bucknam had enough romance and adventure to interest the most insatiable historical novelist. After his marriage, and while living at Castine, Maine, he commanded the first “whale back” employed in the coastwise trade. Later he was hired by Cramp’s Shipyards to deliver four revenue cutters then under construction for the Turkish government.
The Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was so impressed by Bucknam that he offered him command of the Turkish Revenue Service. Bucknam accepted, and discharged his duties with distinction. On several occasions, while accompanying the Sultan, he saved his life from assassins. With his duties Bucknam acquired the title of Admiral and the usual) perquisites. But the perquisites proved his downfall. Mrs. Bucknam proceeded to Constantinople forthwith after hearing rumors of Bucknam Pasha’s acceptance of a harem. It is doubtful that she had a reservoir of patience when she finally gained admittance to the Admiralty chambers and confronted her mate. While the details of this confrontation are unknown, it is certain that Bucknam soon rejoined Mrs. Bucknam on Penobscot Bay.
Ransford Bucknam was offered a commission as Admiral in the Turkish Navy in the first World War, but refused.
He died shortly thereafter.
Rules of the Road
(See pages 1065-1068, October, 1957 Proceedings and pages 104-105, September, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain Gilbert T. Rude, usc&gs (ret.). —Discussion and criticism, such as provided by Lieutenant Commander Maguire on “North Atlantic Lane Routes,” are welcomed as serving to bring out weaknesses in the proposals advanced in the subject article.
It is unfortunate that the article has been interpreted as recommending the “scrapping” of the provisions of the Rules of the Road in connection with speed on the high seas under conditions of poor visibility. The article actually was not meant to recommend a relaxation of the limitations upon speed on the high seas; that relaxation, induced by tight schedules, has already come about. Neither is a rejection of the present rule intended, only a modification in established zones, of a rule that is being violated on the high seas more often than observed, and a possible plan offered to lessen the attendant dangers resulting from breach of the rule.
Commander Maguire makes the observation: “No one argues that commercial factors outweigh safety factors in the determination
of proper speed in fog”; on the other hand can anyone argue that commercial factors, under present conditions, are not already outweighing safety factors? The lane-route proposal was made with a view toward lessening the danger of head on collision illustrated by the Andrea Doria-Stockholm tragedy, conditions which do exist whether we like them or not.
It is quite obvious that Commander Maguire’s “overpasses and clover leaves” cannot become a reality at sea, and his use of the word “universal” appears not well taken in this connection. The use of the term “high seas” in the subject article meant just that, not immediate harbor approaches. Harbor approaches were, of course, not meant to be included in the proposed route zoning; it was assumed that exception to such areas would be taken for granted, since the presently established North Atlantic Lane Routes in the case of New York, for example, have their beginnings east of the seventieth meridian, well seaward of the harbor approach. In the comparatively short distances involved in areas adjacent to principal harbors, however, little loss of time would be occasioned, even to the superliner, in following moderate speed as prescribed by the rule as it was intended to be interpreted and which should be so interpreted in such areas by the careful navigator under whatever plan for solution of the situation may possibly be developed in the future.
The author of the subject article did not seek “to derive advantage from the fact that only angled collisions will occur.” Under the proposed plan it appeared obvious that lane routes would in some areas necessarily have to make crossings of other lanes, and the primary point of that paragraph in the subject article was that the situation in a case of two ships crossing, obviously would allow more time for a thoroughly intelligent interpretation of radar observations as against that of two ships meeting head on. The matter of fixing responsibility in the case of collision was a secondary consideration, as indicated by even a cursory reading of the paragraph; it was mentioned only because of the difficulty in this respect in the Andrea Doria-Stockholm case.
It can be accepted that thoroughly correct interpretation of radar observations will tend toward reducing the risk of collision during periods of low visibility. Then why should not the matter of radar equipment maintenance, radar operation, and its operating personnel be explored, even though possibly unnecessarily, with the view of determining whether the radar operator is the equal in experience in his department to the officer on the bridge in his. He may be, and if so there need be no quarrel with the suggestion; in view of the increasing importance of radar in safe navigation the suggestion was made toward insuring thoroughly intelligent interpretation of radar observations under all conditions.
The “digressions” on the use of bottom contours for purposes of navigation may have no direct bearing on the question of speed in fog, yet their use does have a bearing on position determination in keeping within lane routes during fog, especially in the case of low-powered ships.
We do know that two ships, Andrea Doria and Stockholm, did meet head-on during a period of low visibility; the proposed additional lane route GHK very probably might have served to prevent this tragedy. There possibly may be other lane routes, if established, that would serve a similar beneficial effect on safety at sea.
May we express the hope that the subject article, together with any additional discussions and criticisms, may serve toward leading to some constructive and acceptable suggestions from the ranks of experienced professional seamen for a solution of a situation that does exist, whether we like it or not.
“Savannah’s” First Mate
(See pages 105-107, September, 1958 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander David P. Marvin, uscg (ret.)—In later years, the first mate of of the Savannah resided in New London, Connecticut, and was extremely proud of having served in the first steamer to have crossed the Atlantic.
After his death, a fine representation of the ship was graven on his marble tombstone. I saw it in 1932, in the large cemetery about a mile on the Hartford Road from the Coast Guard Academy. The Savannah is shown with courses brailled up, paddlewheels in place, and with a plume of marble smoke.