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Commentaries on “There Must Have Been a Third Ship!”
(See pages 53-65, July, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain Lawrence Wainwright, usn (ret.).—Mr. Carrothers’ article mentions briefly a matter which should have earnest study by those concerned with safety at sea. It is the plotting of radar observations, which was not done on either the Stockholm or Andrea Doria. If it had been done by these ships, it is virtually certain that the collision would not have occurred. Amazingly, this fact has received no public attention.
Radar plotting is routine for most radar- equipped naval vessels, but commercial vessels are apparently deterred by the cost of the necessary personnel. The usual PPI presentation of a marine radar gives a picture which, like the maneuvering board, involves a number of vectors. If there are several targets, some in motion and some fixed, the number of vectors is large, and only part of them are displayed. The picture changes so slowly that the relative motion vectors are not apparent; only the relative position vectors are seen. Altogether, the presentation is such that, except in extremely simple cases, the ordinary human mind cannot grasp and digest its full implication. To do so, the aid of plotting is essential.
Radar is capricious. Some of the reasons for this are known, others remain to be learned. It is not impossible that the “Third Ship” did not appear on either the Stockholm's or Andrea Doria's radar screen during the critical
minutes just before the collision. Systematic observation of the screen, as necessitated by Plotting, would almost certainly have brought this added target to attention long before the situation became critical. It seems obvious that, until the operation can be successfully mechanized, manual radar plotting should be made mandatory in cases such as this one. At the very least, pertinent regulations should receive thorough consideration by the appropriate authorities.
John F. Campbell, Panama Canal Pilot.
The Andrea Doria-Stockholm collision was not unique. Similar collisions under exactly similar conditions have happened in the past and undoubtedly will occur in the future. I took part in answering an SOS call in April, 1951, when Esso Suez collided with Esso Greensboro, south of Southwest Pass, Louisiana. This disaster, the worst in more than a decade prior to the Andrea Doria-Stockholm collision, happened under strikingly similar conditions.
Every watch officer holding a license issued hy competent authorities of the leading maritime nations knows that radar is an aid and not a method of navigation. All that needs to he accomplished now is to have watch officers put this know-how into actual practice. I am happy to relate that in my duties as a Panama Canal pilot, where I am constantly °n the bridge of many different types of vessels under all flags, I see more and more Slgns posted in the chartrooms and wheel- houses calling to the attention of watch officers: “Safety comes first, schedules second.”
I strongly disagree in part with Mr. Car- fothers when he states “the Andrea Doria should have executed a hard right turn instead of attempting the hard left turn as ordered.” At her speed, the Andrea Doria would advance at least a full ship’s length before even beginning to answer her helm. Thus it becomes obvious that the Doria had no more than begun to answer her helm when she was rammed. Captain Calamai’s only hope and prayer, when the situation was made clear to him, was that by ordering the hard left turn a miracle would carry him safely across the Stockholm’s bow. Whether Captain Calamai should have ordered the helm over hard left or hard right is of little importance because seemingly accurate plots are usually at great variance with actual on-the-spot conditions. He showed good judgment when he made his decision to keep the Doria’s engines turning full ahead and attempted to maneuver out of a most difficult situation.
An interesting point mentioned by Mr. Carrothers was, “The lone officer on the Stockholm’s bridge had many other duties besides radar observation pertaining to his position as officer in charge.” I have not read the testimony concerning this case, but, since the collision occurred at 2309, it would be interesting to know the following:
1. 2300 would be a logical time to check the vessel’s position, since it was steaming in confined waters and about to make a landfall. What time were the R.D.F. stations in the vicinity manned?
2. If Mr. Johannsen, who was alone on the bridge, did check the vessel’s position by R.D.F. bearings, at what time was this done?
3. Were those bearings run back or forward in time?
4. Since soundings are important in the vicinity of Nantucket Light Vessel, where was the fathometer located? In the wheelhouse or chartroom?
Girvin B. Wait, Master, SS Korean Bear.— This analysis of the Andrea Doria-Stockholm disaster, in which a third ship is injected, is a supposition. It is hard for me to believe that a third ship could have been involved, as at no time did any witness mention that there was more than one target on the radar screen prior to the accident.
Here is my theory. At 2305 the Stockholm saw the lights of the Doria and altered course 22.5 degrees to the right. Doria’s captain saw in the radar that the other vessel was getting quite close. Still feeling that it was on his starboard bow and not caring to turn the ship toward the shoreline, he altered course somewhat to the left. Possible confusion and excitement began to reign and the helmsman continued swinging the vessel to the left. The change in Doria’s course could not be observed by officers on the bridge, since they were looking for the other vessel visually. When they did see the Stockholm at 2309, she was on their starboard bow and collision was imminent.
This is a gospel I preach. When approach-
ing another vessel in a fog, make a major change in course in sufficient time for your action to show on the other vessel’s radar screen. If you do not permit the other ship to come within two miles of your vessel, you will have no collision.
Captain E. B. Perry, usn (ret.).—The proposed solution of the Stockholm-Doria collision, which requires a third ship, is barely possible but extremely improbable. There is a much simpler solution, well within Stockholm and Doria versions, which I believe will appeal to seamen.
My solution is as follows. When the two ships were some ten miles distant from each other, the Stockholm was on an easterly course, steaming at approximately 18 knots. The Doria was on a westerly course, reduced speed. The Stockholm then changed course 10 degrees to starboard, the Doria 10 degrees to port. Both vessels then proceeded on their new courses and then sighted one another as the Doria started to emerge from a fog bank. The distance between these vessels at that time was about two miles and the Stockholm’s visibility, in contrast to the Doria’s, was good. The Italian liner, having had the Stockholm on her starboard bow by radar, considered a star- board-to-starboard passing and altered course further to port.
From her position of poor visibility the Doria had sighted the Stockholm on her starboard bow and contemplated a port-to-port passing. When the Stockholm first visually saw the Doria, the busy Third Officer of the Stockholm believed he saw the Doria’s range lights open, indicating that the Stockholm was on the port bow of the Doria, and also thought he saw the red port light of the Doria. The Doria still was partly fog-shrouded and a quick, accurate identification of lights would be difficult, particularly if the Third Officer’s eyes had been subjected to a strong light in the wheelhouse. It is possible that a vessel, such as the Doria, which had been steaming at high speed in a dense fog, had not been too careful to blanket non-navigational lights about the deck. I have known of a red port curtain, flapping through the port of a lighted stateroom, to be mistaken for a red side light. In the low visibility area in which the Doria then was, the green side light would have been difficult and perhaps impossible to distinguish. Therefore the Third Officer of the Stockholm, seeing some lights which he believed indicated that he was on the port bow of the Doria, changed course to starboard. Within a minute after the simultaneous visual sightings, the Doria had altered course to port and the Stockholm to starboard and the latter’s Third Officer had identified the green starboard side light of the Doria. Three minutes later the inevitable happened.
Captain R. P. Maurice, usnr, Master of USNS Piscataqua.—My tanker, operating on a rigorous schedule, principally between Japanese and Korean ports, because of the time spent in coastal waters among considerable shipping, probably uses surface search radar more than most ships.
Frequently the PPI shows too many echoes for us to attempt plotting all. In many cases it is necessary to concentrate on the closest, or those which have greater implications of possible danger. Undoubtedly at times the watch officer has, after discounting a “third ship” which, to his mind offered no threat, completely forgotton that ship. In my own experience I have on a few occasions entered the wheelhouse at night, and, after a look at the scope, found that the watch officer was so concentrating on one or two pips that he appeared to be unaware of others. In each case, when questioned, he claimed to have checked the pips in question, and, after determining that they offered no immediate hazard, paid attention only to those of concern.
It is considered highly possible that the Stockholm’s watch officer had concentrated on the suggested “third ship” to such an extent that he had neglected what earlier might have appeared as a lesser danger.
As pointed out in the article, Doria’s watch officer could easily have noted and then forgotten the suggested third ship; but it is not reasonable to suggest the same for Stockholm, unless, due to the greater distance off when he first observed a possible third ship, he had erred by concentrating on the closer danger.
I do not see mentioned the range or ranges at which Stockholm’s radar was set; the first contact was reported as 12 miles, hence it is assumed that at least a 20-mile range was in use; but if the radar range was 20 miles when
Stockholm sighted an actual third ship at 12 roiles, Doria, at 23 miles, would not have appeared on the scope at all! Perhaps, later, Stockholm1 s radar was reduced to 8 miles, or even four or less, which would have left Doria °ff the scope until a very short time before the collision.
While this is surmise, the possibilities mentioned do exist; as radar is still new to many, 11 is thought that bringing these possibilities to the attention of all mariners may serve to assist them in evaluating future situations.
C. E. Watson, Boothbay Harbor, Maine.
The lack of response by a percentage of the vessels in the area to the automatic alarm signals and the comments regarding the alarm deserve attention. I have sailed in peacetime as radio operator in cargo vessels and in Passenger ships. I have never trusted an autoalarm. At times when I was the only operator during foul North Atlantic or Pacific weather i have stood watches beyond the required eight hours per day with no thought of overtime in order to be at the receiver should someone require help.
These alarms are relatively ineffective under noisy atmospheric conditions and are becoming more and more complicated in their construction. The more complicated an alarm becomes, the more difficult its repair. Many times repairs at sea on electronics machines are impossible. I recommend instead of the continued use of the autoalarm the assignment of three radio operators to each American flag vessel. The bridge watch requires a minimum of three mates, so why not extend this to include the radio room?
John C. Carrothers, Summit, New Jersey.—I have read with deep interest the letters received by the Naval Institute relative to the third ship theory. From the tone of many of these letters it is obvious that the writers do not go along with this theory.
The third ship theory is based primarily on the Stockholm's testimony. Their entire navigational watch claims to have sighted visually the lights of the Andrea Doria over the Stockholm’s port bow. They said the Andrea Doria was showing her red port side light with masthead navigational range lights open. This indicated to them that the two ships were on parallel courses headed in opposite directions. A positive radar fix was then made on the Andrea Doria by Mr. Carstens-Johannsen, the Stockholm’s third officer. The fix placed the Andrea Doria bearing 20 degrees over the Stockholm’s port bow at a distance of 1.85 miles. The Stockholm then made a 22\ degree right turn away from the Andrea Doria. Now, the Stockholm declared, at the same moment the Andrea Doria made a sharp left turn in violation of the Rules of the Road and ran across the Stockholm’s bow in such a manner as to cause the Stockholm to enter the Andrea Doria’s starboard side practically at a right angle.
The point in case here is that learned men claim that it would have been utterly impossible for the Andrea Doria to have executed such a turn in the time and space available. A veteran ship master who is now working as a pilot serving one of our greatest harbors wrote, “I have been going over it (third ship analysis) with a great deal of interest. The one thing is sure—if the Third Mate of the Stockholm saw the lights on his port bow as claimed they surely were not the Andrea Doria for she could never have gotten across his bow into the position she was in when rammed.” For professional reasons this captain-pilot has requested to remain anonymous. Captain after captain, to whom this turning maneuver has been presented, agreed unequivocally to the impossibility of such a turn.
The composite position plot, plot $3 in the analysis, which was produced from the testimony of bothships, indicates that it would have been impossible for the Stockholm to have ever seen the Andrea Doria’s red port side light at any time before the collision. This is the crux of the entire enigma which can be cleared up beyond the shadow of any doubt in the matter of moments and at no cost.
The only part of the Andrea Doria’s navigational records saved was the graph from her course recorder covering the final twenty-four hour period. This graph, as well as the Stockholm's graph, was submitted in evidence at the inquiry.
A course recorder accurately scribes on a graph a ship’s gyrocompass heading, minute by minute. Any deviation from this heading is instantly scribed on the graph. The actual collision would be recognizable on the graphs from both ships. From these graphs the
Stockholm's angle of entry into the Andrea Doria's starboard side can be determined right to the degree. Then, from this position, and by using the graphs, the courses of both ships can be plotted back, minute by minute, right to the points of original claimed radar sights.
A known factor is that the Andrea Doria was advancing .364 knots per minute and the Stockholm was advancing .308 knots per minute. With the speeds and gyrocompass headings known, the exact relative positions of the two ships can be determined accurately for any given moment.
These computations would certainly indicate whether the Stockholm ever saw the Andrea Doria's red port side light as she testified. If it is proved that the Stockholm did not see the Andrea Doria's red port side light, then the only possible conclusion is the presence of a third ship.
After the disaster Congressman Bonner, Chairman of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, ordered an investigation into the disaster. For a deeper investigation into this matter, it is my hope that Congressman Bonner will request that both course recorder graphs be made available to the United States Coast Guard[1], the Navy, or any other qualified agency, for study. An unbiased analysis of what these graphs recorded, on the night of the fatal collision, would not only verify the cause of this horrible disaster but would be a monumental contribution toward the prevention of similar disasters.
Historical Co-operation between France and Germany
(See pages 100-101, March, 1958 Proceedings and 103-107, April, 1958 Proceedings)
Professor Claude P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy.—In contrast to the unauthorized Russian translation and inaccurate review of United States Submarine Operations in
World War II, a U. S. Naval Institute publication, it was refreshing, during my recent tour of Germany, to find strong evidence of German and French historians co-operating in the interests of historical objectivity and accuracy. All textbooks used in German schools are checked by French historians of a joint Franco-German academic commission, while German historians perform a similar service for the French writers of textbooks. The military historians I met stressed their desire to obtain viewpoints of colleagues in the foreign area where international events are under study.
Two Plus Two Equals Five
(See page 709 July, 1956 Proceedings)
Dr. Alvin D. Coox, Tokyo, Japan.— Lieutenant de Gyarmathy’s anecdote concerning the restricted life in Tokyo during World War II was interesting from the “foreigner’s” point of view. As for the Japanese themselves, not a few vocal skeptics incurred the vengeful wrath of the authorities because of so-called “thought crimes” and violations of stringent naval censorship in the jittery, doomed Japan of 1944-45. Such was the case of Dr. Tetsuzo Watanabe, a prominent economist involved in the shocking Issaro affair. Dr. Watanabe now directs the far-flung activities of the strongly anti-Communist Jiyu Ajiya (Free Asia) Publishing House.
One night in February, 1944, Dr. Watanabe dined with a dozen professional associates at the Issaro Restaurant in Osaka, after having attended a financial convention in that city. Upon his return to Tokyo, he promptly forgot the matter. Five full weeks later, however, he was arrested at dawn in his Tokyo residence by agents of the dread Kempei-tai (military police) and whisked away to Osaka. There he underwent two months of intensive interrogation and imprisonment in a “pigsty.”
At the eventual hearings, the prosecutor demanded three years’ imprisonment at hard labor. The charge was “vicious crimes”; i.e., the utterance of irresponsible statements objectionable to public security. The indictment asserted that the Accused voiced his opposition to the Axis alliance of Japan with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, believed in
Anglo-American superiority, and opposed the war against the United States and Great Britain. More specifically, it was alleged, he had stated to fellow-diners at the Issaro Restaurant that the Japanese Government must have erred in its bulletin of December 8, 1943, which claimed that 29 American capital ships had been sunk or crippled. According to Dr. Watanabe, this would have meant the utter annihilation of the United States capital-ship fleet, since the number of such vessels totalled only 23 in autumn, 1943. He dared to suggest that the asserted annihilation tv as contradicted by the power of the American naval attack launched against Truk in February, 1944, as announced by Imperial General Headquarters itself.
The prosecution further charged that Dr. Watanabe expressed doubts concerning the truth of IGHQ’s announcements of enemy aircraft losses. For example, it had been claimed officially that the ratio of air losses stood at 13:1 in Japan’s favor during the aerial fighting at Rabaul. In the case of one particular air engagement, during which 102 of 200 enemy aircraft were allegedly shot down at no cost, Dr. Watanabe reportedly performed a number of arithmetical computations. He had assumed that each plane mounted six to ten machine guns; the total enemy force must then have possessed some 1,500. Since each individual weapon was capable of firing at the rate of more than 500 rounds per minute, the total fire power poured forth during just a few seconds of combat would have totalled far more than 10,000 rounds. “The conclusion was reached by the Accused that it was humanly impossible for the Japanese Air Force to have emerged without the loss of a single aircraft.”
After accusing Dr. Watanabe of referring to the alleged authenticity of British and German official announcements of naval and air losses—in comparison with the veil of Japanese secrecy—the indictment concluded that his pessimism and irresponsible views bewildered the people. There was a danger that they would begin to doubt the very wisdom of the nation’s welfare and the certainty of ultimate Japanese victory.
Under the circumstances, logic and documentation could avail Dr. Watanabe naught. The verdict was inevitable: Guilty as charged.
“In connection with offenses committed by the Accused against the Naval Criminal Law; and against the Law for Temporary Control over Speech, Publication, and Assembly; he is sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for a year, with a stay of execution for three years from this date.” The Supreme Court refused to re-examine the case or the verdict. Not until October, 1945, was Dr. Watanabe amnestied by Allied Occupation directive.
It had been Dr. Watanabe’s constant conviction that the inflated Japanese naval and air communiques provided no stimulus for the country’s morale, but inevitably misled the politicians and military leaders, to say nothing of the general public, in appraising the critical war situation. He had said as much as Kempei Headquarters, where he had been asked to transcribe his unreserved views. “A delightful intellectual experience to be allowed freedom of expression,” he had incongruously thought at the time.
Now that the ordeal was over and Japan had capitulated, his basic contentions had been proved tragically true. Off Tokyo Bay lay the powerful Allied fleets, covered by warplanes darkening the skies. Could the Prosecutor and the Chief Judge, who had judged him “Guilty” in the divine name of the Emperor, now confront him without shame or remorse? The question was by now academic, but Dr. Watanabe felt—and still feels—that it was not his own good name but that of the prostituted wartime judiciary which was slurred by the infamous Issaro affair.
First Wartime Submarine Submerged Passage of Gibraltar Straits
(See page 38, June, 1958 Proceedings)
John King, Brighton, Mass.—The Ve- niero was not the first submarine to make a submerged wartime passage of the Straits. Actually, German U-boats in World War I achieved this honor. SMS U-21 passed into the Mediterranean submerged in 1915 and out again in 1917. Near the end of the war, fourteen German submarines that had been based in the Adriatic successfully emerged from the Mediterranean after passing through the Straits submerged. Thirteen of these arrived home in Germany in November, 1918, and only the U-34 was lost.
Six P6M SeaMasters are now being flight tested at Martin’s Baltimore seadrome. The 600-miles-per-hour seaplanes can deliver a 30,000-pound payload of conventional or nuclear weapons.
Is U. S. Aid to the Orient Working?
(See pages 1149-1157, November, 1957 Proceedings)
Colonel H. B. Benge, usmc.—The November issue of the Proceedings reached us here in Taiwan late in December. Twenty- one officers concerned with the United States Aid Program as it pertains to the Chinese Marine Corps read Mr. Reday’s article.
In general, we agree with many of his points, particularly regarding the number of U. S. Personnel engaged in the administration of foreign aid. With one exception, we agree that our country should not issue equipment or supplies without having sufficient personnel on hand to advise or supervise its utilization. All of us agree that nobody should be assigned to MAAG without his family. Each adviser and his family should have one year of instruction in the United States, learning to speak and read the language, and studying the history, government, and customs of the country to which they will be assigned. The purpose of the MAP effort also should be studied. This background year should be followed by two years on station.
The statement that Orientals are simply not going to stand up and be counted for or against us in a cold war is absurd. South Korea and Taiwan right now are actively engaged in a cold war against Communism. The Chinese Nationalist troops daily exchange artillery fire with the Communists and their ships frequently have engagements.
There may be military leaders in the U. S. forces who know little about the history of the Orient, but I haven’t found any. Any military man worth his pay is interested in military history. Some of the most famous military writers were products of the Orient.
To speed the military training of the Oriental nations there must be an increase in the number of combined U. S.-foreign exercises. Since our aim is to help the Orientals become self-sufficient, combined exercises offer a fine teaching opportunity.
The preceding paragraphs contain our comments concerning MAP and indicate that we strongly believe in this program and effort. Our sphere here in Taiwan is small in the over-all picture, but we believe it is representative. •
Mr. Reday Replies
Mr. Joseph Z. Reday, Tokyo, Japan.—It ls wonderful to receive a letter as thoughtful an<J as full of good sense as that of Colonel Benge and his group. I agree with much of what he says and feel that we diverge in our opinions mostly because I generalized all over the Orient whereas he and his group localized from the viewpoint of Taiwan.
The Little Americas overseas which result from families being there look too much like an occupation to the natives in whose countries they live. My experience in talking to Orientals on this subject leads me to doubt their admiration for these Little Americas as examples of the democratic way of life. The military is not a democratic organization in any way, shape, or form. These Little Americas also contain too much PX goods and too many tax free imported automobiles.
I disagree with Colonel Benge’s statement that Orientals will stand up and be counted °n our side. I believe that Korea, Taiwan, and Viet Nam do, but their few millions are dwarfed by the half-billion other Orientals. India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Laos, and Cambodia, for example, are unwilling to count themselves as firmly against Red China and the Soviets.
Regarding American knowledge of the Orient, I did not mean to single out military personnel particularly when I suggested that our leaders do not know much of the Orient’s history and culture. Only a few of our military people know much about Emperor Hide- yoshi or about the principles of Taoism and Confucianism. Other American groups know less than the military personnel about these subjects.
Japan is my major interest in the Orient and I agree that the proper way to keep Japan friendly and co-operative is to help her get on her feet and stand as a partner. I cannot believe that keeping U. S. military forces or large numbers of bureaucrats in Japan contributes either to friendship or co-operation. This is not the fault of either group, but is simply a consequence of the fact that people do not like a foreign military force or foreign bureaucrats in their country.
It would be difficult not to concur with Colonel Benge’s recommendations for longer tours of duty for MAAG personnel, thorough indoctrination in matters of the host country, language instruction, and more joint U. S.- Foreign exercises. These are common sense steps which obviously can add to the effectiveness of MAAG. I would go even further, and cut numbers of MAAG even at the expense of efficiency for the sake of less visible mixing in the political administration of the host country and I would do the same with economic assistance programs. This was the real theme of my article.
“Australia” not Oldest Registered Merchant Vessel in America
(See pages 92-93, April, 1958 Proceedings)
John Lyman, Washington, D.C.—The Australia was originally the Ella Alida, built by J. P. Smith at Patchogue, Long Island, in 1862. Her first documentation as a new vessel was taken out on August 8, 1862. On March 2, 1863, she was registered at Nassau as the British schooner Alma, and under this name was captured off Doboy Sound, Georgia, by the USS Seneca on October 22, 1863. Sent to Washington, D.G., for adjudication, she was condemned by decree of the District of Columbia Admiralty Court and was sold at auction on December 10, 1863, for $4,232. Two days later she was registered at Georgetown, D.C., as the American schooner Australia.
The Australia does enjoy the distinction of having the lowest official number of any merchant vessel now documented, but this is largely a coincidence. When official numbers first were adopted in 1866, the block of numbers from 1 to 1,999 was set aside for vessels whose names began with the letter “A.” In turn, customs houses were assigned subblocks in alphabetical order, beginning with Alexandria, Virginia. Since the Australia was owned in Annapolis, she drew the low number 25, which she has retained ever since.
There are several vessels older than the Australia but with higher official numbers still on the active list of documented merchant vessels. Generally credited with being the oldest documented merchant vessel is the Saltesea of Key West, Florida, which was built at Poughkeepsie, New York, in 1822. Her original name was James Morgan and her official number is 13,937.
Command Specialist Insignia Recommended
Lieutenant Chester C. Edwards, usn.— Almost all naval officers with experience are specialists. Of all the corps in the Navy, it is the General Line that alone contains those who have specialized in the command of air, surface, and sub-surface vessels. A command specialist is the unrestricted line officer who has distinguished himself by devotion to and qualification in the exercise of command. Only a portion of the command specialists of the unrestricted line are now identifiable; most familiar are those qualified in aircraft and submarines.
The OOD of a ship underway is the officer qualified and designated by the commanding officer, under Navy Regulations, to act for the commanding officer in the direction of the ship. He must meet with decision the many shiphandling and other problems of modern naval operations. Once he is a qualified OOD underway, the general line officer has made the first of several important steps up the career ladder of the unrestricted line officer eligible for command at sea. It would seem appropriate that command insignia for all command specialists should be authorized.
If and when this forward step is taken by the Navy, appropriate devices must be selected. I recommend a gold breast pin and the traditional star as the basic insignia. Further identification could include a significant all- encompassing design for surface vessels or could be selective by major types, with a pair of appropriate ship profiles flanking the star. Officers qualified for command could add a third distinguishing device, such as a wreath embellishing the star. Eligibility to wear the insignia should be based on unrestricted eligibility for command at sea and qualification standards already established.
The benefits of such insignia would be multiple. Foremost would be identification of the unrestricted line officers eligible for command in a manner which recognizes qualification as command specialists at sea. The wearer also would have a visible expression of competency and accomplishment which is now only represented by letters of qualification filed in officers’ service jackets. Situations would arise where an individual would be qualified and eligible to wear a choice of devices. If no precedence were set, the individual would be able to select and wear the device which represents in his own mind his most significant accomplishment.
Paperwork Problems
(See pages 129-130, May, 1958 Proceedings and pages 1185-1197, October, 1947 Proceedings)
Captain P. R. Osborn, usn.—The Navy has long suffered from a “pathological shotgun procedure” for issuing directives. A “guilt complex” descends upon the staff officer with an idle pen until the final recipient is utterly overwhelmed by the plethora of directives, instructions, and correspondence received. As Lieutenant Willet states, “the days of quick decisions based on experience and knowledge are gone.” One never can feel sure he has acted in accordance with all the literature on a given subject.
I always remember as an even then unattainable ideal, the pronouncement of my Head of Department in the USS Colorado many years ago, emphatically stated when confronted with the rather modest paperwork demands of that day, that a ship should be able to be run by:
(1) The Navy Regulations
(2) The Bureau Manuals
(3) Ship and Fleet Regulations
(4) Watch Quarter and Station Bill.
He believed that everything else should be thrown over the side! This is an oversimplica- tion perhaps, but imagine trying to operate today on the above premise! The Navy Regulations, which used to be all embracing, are a rather innocuous compilation today and the manuals have in effect been superseded by the Directive System.
An excellent approach to this problem was published in the October, 1947 Proceedings in an article entitled “A Real Solution for the Paperwork Quandary,” by Commander C. S. Arthur, in which he advocated that staff work be utilized to collate and send to the individual unit only that paperwork they needed on a “need to know” basis instead of adding to the general flow. As he stated, until officers are freed from slavery of paperwork they simply haven’t got time to give effective leadership to their men, and the service suffers.
[1] Contrary to popular belief, the United States Coast Guard played no part in the investigation following this disaster. This accident involved a collision between two foreign ships in international waters. Therefore the Coast Guard had no jurisdiction. The inquiry was held under the jurisdiction of the United States Federal Court with a special master presiding, appointed by Federal Judge Lawrence E. Walsh.