While the events of November, 1956, may go down in history as marking the end of the Suez era, they do not tell the whole story. There are other signs to indicate that the post-Suez era may have been upon us anyway. It may have been brought about by the inexorable advance of technology.
New technological developments have, over the years, increased the power and range of the weapons of war. More powerful weapons, with longer ranges, have progressively increased the vulnerability of narrow waterways.
In World War I the Germans were able to keep traffic moving in the Kiel Canal. The British were able to keep traffic moving in the English Channel. With the exception of a few hours in 1915, Suez remained open throughout that war.
In World War II, however, the Kiel Canal was put out of commission by Allied bombing. Traffic in the English Channel was severely restricted by German mines and anti-shipping aircraft. And far to the southeast, the Suez Canal was blocked a number of times by Axis bombing.
Nuclear weapons, better aircraft, guided missiles, and long-range delivery capabilities today bring Suez within easy range of attack. Traffic in the Suez Canal can now be stopped in a number of different ways, and from a number of different directions, depending upon whose interests would be served best by stopping it.
Those who blocked the Suez Canal a few months ago may have done the Free World a great favor by focussing attention on the Canal’s increasing vulnerability. It may be fortunate indeed if the present difficulty caused by the temporary loss of Suez forces the Free World to think seriously about a substitute for that vital waterway, before we are actually confronted with some major emergency.
While the world struggles to extricate itself from the immediate distress caused by the loss of Suez, long-term readjustments will begin. New focal points will develop in the pattern of world commerce. World strategy will be affected, as it always has, by shifts in the economic centers of gravity. The importance of Suez to the economic and strategic order of things will gradually diminish—slowly and painfully at first—but it will diminish. Men have become quite skillful over the centuries at adjusting themselves to new conditions.
The passing of Suez marks the end of an era, but perhaps it also marks the beginning of another. Some will interpret it to support their contention that sea power should be relegated to the past. Others will take a broader view, mindful of the fact that shortterm adversity oftentimes means long-term progress for those with wisdom and foresight. To them, the passing of Suez will turn out to be a stimulus to history-making progress— progress which will propel sea power into new dimensions of effectiveness.
The effects of the post-Suez readjustment will be reflected in many ways, in many parts of the world. Substitutes for Suez will, of course, be found—strategic substitutes, as well as economic substitutes. Only a few of the many possible effects are discernible today. Let us examine some of them in more detail.
The Southward Shift
Now that the ease with which the Suez gateway can be closed has been brought forcibly to world attention, the focal points of world shipping will begin to shift southward. The maritime economic pattern of the world will gradually readjust to the more secure sea routes around the south of Africa and perhaps to the south of the American continents. The Suez cut-off will naturally be used during those periods when it is mutually agreeable to all concerned to allow it to remain open. But as of November, 1956, no major power can afford to count on its use in time of war.
To the totalitarian powers of the Eurasian continent, the loss of Suez in time of war has long been taken for granted. This is perhaps one of the factors that has spurred development of the Northern Sea Route which is, for all practical purposes today, a Soviet-dominated route. The Northern Sea Route, however, has many limitations. The heavy ice of the Arctic Seas and the bad weather which prevails combine to make navigation of this route hazardous and expensive in comparison to other shipping lanes. The Bering Strait at the western end of the Northern Route could be easily blocked in time of war. These factors combine to make the northern passage a poor substitute for the Suez Canal route.
The passage around the south of Africa is a different matter. Here the only disadvantage is an increase in distance, a factor which will gradually be compensated for in a number of different ways as time goes on.
What is lost as a result of increased distance over this southern route is more than regained by its greater security over the Mediterranean-Suez route. The southward shift of world sea lanes increases the difficulty of interdiction by the land power of Central Asia in event of war.
The closing of Suez will stimulate the economic growth of the Southern Hemisphere. The search for new markets and new sources of raw materials close to the developing shipping lanes south of the Equator will be stimulated. Industries and maritime facilities will expand to meet the needs of increased world shipping in the Southern Hemisphere.
Population migrations will follow, as they always have, the new pattern of world shipping. The Englands and New Englands of the future may very well arise in the temperate climates of South Africa, South America, and Australasia. This would mean that the maritime and industrial power centers of the world might one day shift from the Northern, or “Land,” Hemisphere to the Southern, or “Water,” Hemisphere. This shift may come sooner than is generally realized, if the more highly-industrialized population centers of the Northern Hemisphere elect one day to cancel one another out in a nuclear exchange.
The Mediterranean Salient
The focal point of world strategy today is the Mediterranean Sea. The country which holds the Mediterranean in time of war, holds the key to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
To keep Europe, the Middle East, and Africa free of the yoke of totalitarianism in event of war will require a continual flow of shipping across the Atlantic and into the ports along the shores of the Mediterranean. If this shipping is lost before it can be unloaded at its destination, our friends of the Mediterranean area will also be lost. For the Free World to remain in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, the Sea Powers must remain in the Mediterranean Sea in force.
Whoever controls the Eastern Mediterranean is in the best position in the age-old struggle for influence in the Middle East. The main access between the Communist powers and the Suez area is by way of the Eastern Mediterranean. Free World influence in the Middle East depends on the sea communications of the Eastern Mediterranean.
To the Communist powers, the Mediterranean Sea is a blue water salient penetrating deep into the hard shell of the Communist land perimeter. This land perimeter consists largely of satellites, difficult mountain terrain, and ice-bound Arctic seas. The Dardanelles represent one of the few natural breaches in the inner fortress of the Asiatic heartland. Turkey and the Black Sea lie between the heartland inner fortress and the sea power of the Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean assumes new importance for the strategic deployment of deterrent forces, as the powerful, long-range weapons of the nuclear age are adapted to shipboard use. The inner fortress of the Asiatic heartland can now be reached quickly and effectively, in event of war, by naval forces deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. As long as the Eastern Mediterranean salient is held in sufficient strength by Free World sea power, the Communists dare not move against Western Europe. As long as the Eastern Mediterranean is held by the sea powers, they have it within their power to assist the independent nations of the Middle East to resist totalitarian infiltration from the north.
With the loss of Suez, however, the influence of the Mediterranean Sea on the strategic situation in South Asia and East Africa will henceforth diminish. It still remains the vital southern flank of the European continent. It still remains the blue-water salient that stabs 1,500 miles deep into the Eurasian heartland. It must still be held and used in time of war if Europe, Africa, and the Middle East are to be held. However, with the growing vulnerability of Suez to political and military action, the Mediterranean can no longer be relied on as the gateway to the East.
The Other Salient
However vital the Mediterranean may be as the strategic focal point between Europe and Africa, its usefulness as a direct passage to South Asia and the Indian Ocean has been greatly reduced. Fortunately, however, another sea approach to this critical area is available from the south, through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.
The Indian Ocean basin lies almost directly on the other side of the world from the United States. It is also about as far removed from the threat of interdiction by the submarines of the Asiatic heartland as it is possible to be. From its apex in the Arabian Sea—less than 800 miles from Soviet borders—the Indian Ocean expands into the Southern Hemisphere, forming a huge triangle of ocean space. Between Australia and South Africa lie five thousand miles of open ocean. Another five thousand miles of open ocean stretch between the Persian Gulf and the Antarctic continent far to the South.
The Indian Ocean assumes new importance in the post-Suez era. Shipping, which once skirted the southern fringes of Asia en- route to the Suez Canal, must now cross the Indian Ocean if the Suez Canal is blocked.
From the vast stretches of this southern ocean the sea powers may one day be able to exert their strongest influence in the Middle East. The great nuclear-missile fleets of the future will be able to deploy in this trackless ocean area with maximum security. These fleets will be equipped with the most powerful, long-range weapons of the time. Great aircraft carriers, long-range missile ships, great tankers, cargo ships, and Marine-laden amphibious assault ships will one day ply these southern waters—moving into the more restricted waters to the north for specific purposes and disappearing again toward bases deep in the Southern Hemisphere. They will be able to exercise a strong deterring influence on any aggressive inclinations which might develop in the Asiatic heartland to the north.
For the more immediate future it is quite clear that any operations which might be necessary on the northern shores of the Arabian Sea can be supported more effectively by sea from the south than they can by land from the north. The deserts and mountains of the Middle East area pose a formidable logistic problem for land operations. Operations supported from the sea, even over the longer distance, are an easier matter.
The double salient of the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea provide the means of keeping the Middle East free of totalitarian domination, provided the sea powers are willing to maintain the mobile naval forces in these areas required by the circumstances. This, more than any other factor, will be a decisive influence in the orientation of the strategic, oil-rich areas of the Middle East.
New Impetus to Technology
The loss of Suez will stimulate the search for ways to reduce the time and cost of longer shipping hauls, such as those involved in shipments around the south of Africa.
The greater distances of these southern trade routes are already under attack from a number of different directions. The great tankers of today, ships which displace in the neighborhood of one hundred thousand tons, are already beginning to compete successfully over the greater distances of the southern route with smaller ships, which bring oil from the Middle East via the Suez Canal- Mediterranean route. These larger ships of today represent only a milestone in the continuous upward trend in the size of ships. The economic necessity for larger ships to keep transportation costs down on long hauls, makes continuation of this trend inevitable.
The loss of Suez means that the Middle East oil supply, which has become so important to the world economy, particularly the economy of Western Europe, can no longer be counted on as it once was. As a result, the search for substitutes for this oil will be accelerated. Adequate substitutes will eventually be found. Nuclear power and nuclear propulsion of ships is one such substitute. Events in the Middle East may have already accelerated the development of nuclear power to the point where it may compete successfully with oil much sooner than had previously been anticipated.
The practical use of nuclear propulsion in ships will, of course, be spurred by any new developments in other aspects of nuclear power. For example, considerable effort is being expended by the military services to develop nuclear power plants for aircraft. What is learned in this program will be very useful in advancing the design of nuclear propulsion plants for ships.
Nuclear propulsion plants will unquestionably become smaller, more economical, and more powerful as engineering experience is gained. The day will certainly come when nuclear power plants of tremendous power— and of incredible endurance without refueling—will be available in relatively small packages. This means that the question of fuel economy on relatively long shipping hauls will gradually become less important. It also means that the relative importance of Middle East oil to world economy will gradually decline.
The time factor which today looms large in long shipping hauls will also come under attack, as nuclear propulsion plants of great power and endurance become available. The effort now being devoted to nuclear propulsion may eventually give us propulsion plants with more power than we will be able to use effectively in the hulls now under development.
Increased power of unlimited endurance means that ships of radically higher sustained speeds will eventually be practical. To absorb great increases in power, ships will require radically new underwater hull designs. Unprecedented streamlining of above-water hulls will also be required to sustain higher speeds for long periods through heavy seas. It is a fortunate coincidence that the radical streamlining of above-water hull structures would also be a means of providing better protection for ships against the effects of nuclear blast, heat, and radiation, in event of nuclear war.
These trends will be stimulated by the search for economy and efficiency in the tough competition for the ever-increasing volume of world shipping trade. It may well be that the overriding requirements for economy and efficiency over long shipping routes may provide a greater stimulus for advance than the naval requirement, which today seems to be getting only a moderate amount of attention.
Economic as well as military necessity, coupled with the swiftly unfolding developments in nuclear propulsion, may lead to increases in the sustained speed of large ships, far beyond anything being planned today. This seems to be a logical development in view of the fact that the world speedboat record of forty years ago was considerably less than speeds being sustained today by some of the larger ocean liners on their regular transatlantic runs. In 1916, for example, the world speedboat record was 36.8 miles per hour—about 32 knots. Today, some larger ocean liners maintain higher speeds than this on their regular runs. Recently a speedboat set a new world record of 250 miles per hour. Judging from past experience, speeds such as this will not be confined to experimental speedboats for very long.
When the first steamboat, Clermont, ventured out on the Hudson River in 1807, it was dubbed “Fulton’s Folly” by practical men of the day. Ship design and ship propulsion have advanced a long way since that day, but men still persist in doubting that the advance will continue. Nevertheless, it will continue at an ever-accelerating rate under the stimulus of recent technological and political developments.
New United States Naval Requirements
Political and technological developments are gradually focusing more public attention on distant oceans. The sea-consciousness of the American people is again on the rise. As a result, a greater public appreciation of United States naval requirements in this troubled world can be anticipated.
A new requirement for the deployment of United States naval power has arisen out of the Middle East crisis. The area in question is the Indian Ocean. The United States can keep the peace in the critical Middle East area if we are willing to maintain sufficient naval power in the Northern Indian Ocean, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean.
From the long-term point of view, the Indian Ocean offers the ideal base in all the world for the tremendous striking power of the nuclear-missile fleet of the future. Great carrier air and missile striking forces can operate with relative security in the vast Indian Ocean area. They will be in a position to launch powerful attacks against centers of power in the Asiatic heartland in event of aggression. Their powerful capabilities would draw off counter-attacks which might otherwise be launched against populated areas in the Western Hemisphere.
New Requirements for Naval Bases
Turning now to future requirements for United States naval bases, we see that the same factors which are forcing the southward shift in the focal points of shipping are having their effect on naval base requirements. The necessity for maintaining naval forces in the Indian Ocean without Suez creates a new requirement for naval base facilities in the Southern Hemisphere. In addition, the increasing power and range of new weapons have increased the vulnerability of certain fixed bases in the Northern Hemisphere to such an extent that new locations farther removed from totalitarian threat must be found.
During World War II, the naval bases of the United Kingdom were only of limited use because of their vulnerability to attack. The bases on the east and west coast of the United States, on the other hand, were reasonably secure. This will not be the case in event of another major war. All United States bases on the east and west coasts will be vulnerable to attack. This means that the bases of Free World sea power must gradually be moved southward beyond the reach of the weapons of the Asiatic heartland.
The Caribbean-Gulf of Mexico-Panama area will continue to be useful as a secure naval base area for some years to come. However, for the more distant future, the secure bases of sea power must probably be located deep in the Southern Hemisphere—in South Africa, South America, Australasia, islands of the Southern Oceans, and Antarctica.
Much could be done now in the way of preliminary arrangements for naval bases in the Southern Hemisphere. Negotiations for future anchorages could be undertaken with friendly governments. The mobility of naval bases and naval command facilities could be gradually increased. With anchorages arranged in advance and with mobile base and command facilities available, deployment to the south would be a relatively easy matter in event of necessity.
The cost of increasing the mobility of naval base and command facilities would be considerable. For this reason it is difficult in time of peace to initiate programs designed to increase the mobility of naval supporting activities. It is also difficult for the average layman, who is unfamiliar with the sea, to understand the military and economic advantages of mobility at sea. Nevertheless, the fact remains that mobility of base and mobility of command headquarters are essential to naval readiness for war in the nuclear-missile age.
Of growing importance in any system of secure United States naval bases is the Central American canal system. Central America is far enough removed from the Asiatic heartland to be defensible with a reasonable amount of effort for some years to come. However, the Panama Canal today is not large enough to handle the bigger naval and commercial ships. Still larger ships will surely be built. As time goes on, the need for a modernized canal system in Central America, to include perhaps an alternate route, will become more urgent.
The problems of the Middle East have been a long time in the making. Finding solutions to these problems is also very likely to take a long time. Much will depend on who controls the sea areas to the south and westward of this unhappy land, and how these sea areas are used. The United States and the U. S. Navy will be deeply involved in this part of the world for a long time to come.
Developments in the post-Suez era are forcing the world to look anew toward the oceans for solutions to their economic and security problems. Fortunate indeed are the people and governments who recognize the new dimensions of sea power which lie ahead and who have the wisdom to make the best of the opportunities which await them at sea. They will find in the oceans, as seafaring men of all ages have found, a new measure of security, which looks beyond the dead-end of a nuclear exchange toward a new era of freedom and prosperity.