Collapsing into a chair in the Saratoga's Flag Plot in the moments following the Stewart Island action, Admiral Fletcher said: "Boys, I'm going to get two dispatches tonight, one from Admiral Nimitz telling me what a wonderful job we did, and one from King saying 'Why in hell didn't you use your destroyers and make torpedo attacks?' and by God, they'll both be right." This rather interesting anecdote is apt illustration of the fact that there are no absolutes in the field of "Command Decisions." Students of naval warfare have considered the subject of naval command decisions a particularly fascinating one. This article was written to present my observations during some intensely interesting command decisions at sea in the Pacific War. The observations developed are based primarily on personal experience rather than research, and it is well appreciated that they fall short of completeness.
The subject of command decisions has received some rather censorious treatment in the past by various experts of varying degrees of expertness. Were a composite recorded of all criticism thrust upon military commanders throughout history, one might, on the basis of such compilation, deduce that no military man in the history of warfare—land, naval, or air—ever made a truly sound decision. This, of course, simply wouldn't be true. As a matter of fact, the naval war in the Pacific, the arena of our experience, affords many historic examples of brilliant and spectacular military decisions. The primary objective of the author is not to pass judgment on these decisions, but rather to analyze them to determine what each can contribute to a more comprehensive knowledge of the basic ingredients of sound decisions at sea.
Readers of the PROCEEDINGS in particular recognize that the basis of professional existence of military officers is primarily that of preparation for command and the exercise of such in an effective manner. Military officers St-rive principally to train themselves to make sound command decisions and appreciate that their ultimate success or failure will rest Primarily on their ability to do so competently, provided they are fortunate enough to have the opportunity.
One element that the "experts" often fail to consider in their critiques is the "atmosphere" in which decisions at sea, or military decisions for that matter, are made. The Whizzing sound of bullets and multifarious and perplexing factors compound the difficulties inherent in arriving at sound decisions. These agitators are ebullient gremlins assiduously creating the well-known "fog of war," and they detract appreciably from a peace of mind approach to making tactical decisions. They are of particular importance if one is to recapture the atmosphere in which decisions were made. Further, it is my conviction that no major Task Force or Fleet Commander ever had sufficient intelligence (in the military sense of that word!) to insure that his decisions could be made with absolute certainty. For these reasons, it seems imperative that a realistic background atmosphere be related to any analysis of the following interesting decisions.
This article includes several of the operations in the Pacific which the author witnessed and in which he had the good fortune to participate. The Pacific War decisions were not selected on the basis of their momentous effect on the ultimate outcome of the war, but because each brings out some interesting points on Pacific War decisions. For example, the Marcus Island raid had no effect in changing the over-all complexion of the war; yet it is consistent with our selected criteria by virtue of its fascinating nature.
Marcus Island Raid
The raid commenced with a dispatch— most operations did. Subsequent to the second raid on Wake Island, Admiral Halsey received a dispatch from Admiral Nimitz stating his desire that a raid be conducted against Marcus Island. If memory serves, an escape clause was included within the dispatch directive, such as "if feasible" or "if practicable." But the intention of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was quite apparent; he wanted the raid carried out. Several members of the Staff were with Admiral Halsey in the Enterprise's Flag Plot when this dispatch was received. After observing the location of Marcus some 960 miles southwest of Tokyo, wrestling with the destroyer logistic problem involved, and contemplating the number of aircraft in the Enterprise Air Group, Admiral Halsey was somehow able to restrain his enthusiasm for the operation. It was obvious that he, the Master of the Raid, must employ an entirely new type of striking operation. Here was a genuine challenge!
To analyze the problem area of the decision, two questions appear salient: Can this raid be conducted, and if so, how? Now, we recall that contemporaneous to the Marcus Raid the Fleet was "shadow boxing" with a profusion of Japanese "ghosts." There was a great deal of concern with the submarine infested waters of the Pacific, and we had almost an unduly great respect for the unknown in our approach to the Japanese submarine potential. Marcus, less than a thousand miles from Tokyo, still gave one a feeling of "messing around" in the enemy's backyard. The actual conduct of the raid is particularly noteworthy in point of courage and imagination which Admiral Halsey demonstrated in executing Admiral Nimitz's directive, even though his initial reaction to the projected operation lacked enthusiasm. This operation may have been the impetus for the "Swim With Halsey Club" which was organized about that time aboard the carrier Enterprise.
As it developed, the Marcus Island raid was conducted by the Enterprise and two cruisers, the Salt Lake City and the Northampton. In view of the short-leggedness of the destroyers, the decision was made to leave the destroyer screen behind with the tanker. Unquestionably, this raid was the inception of the operational requirement for the nuclear destroyer. Consider how much less perplexing this tactical decision for the strike would have been for Admiral Halsey were his screen composed of nuclear "cans," so that it was feasible to take his destroyers with him!
There is a sidelight in connection with the Marcus Raid which is rather interesting. We listened continuously to the Japanese radio station on Marcus Island. The weather had been unfavorable at the launching point after our approach, and quite understandably there was some anxious conjecture concerning the weather which would be encountered over the target during the conduct of the strike. As a matter of fact, the first launch of the Enterprise Air Group was delayed in the hope that most positive information of weather at the target would be available before ordering the carrier aircraft to take off. Fortunately the Japanese were extremely co-operative. Their broadcast station "joined the air" promptly at five o'clock and commenced the day with a forecast of the local weather, indicating the Oriental weather prophet felt suitable atmospheric conditions would be provided for the bombing of the Islands. Upon receipt of this information, the strike was immediately launched. In most instances the enemy was not so generous in sharing the work of their weatherman as were the Japanese in this operation.
The Marcus Island raid is unique in that it involves no command relationship problems. There were no contact report problems similar to those which recur constantly in later operations. The raid was conducted without further incident. One aircraft was lost, but considerable damage was inflicted on the air installations, which impeded the Japanese shuttle of aircraft to the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. But perhaps most importantly, the success of the raid quite conceivably provided a germ for Japanese thinking toward more defensive air employments. It may well have been the starting point for the enemy's husbanding resources for the defense of their Empire. Quite probably Admiral Nimitz's purpose in conducting this raid was to "obtain a sounding" on the effectiveness of the Japanese defense of their homeland in preparation for ensuing operation. In any case, the conduct of this Task Force operation emphasizes determination, as characterized by Admiral Halsey, as an important component of the sound decision. Determination, here as always, is apparent as an essential element of effective leadership in action.
The Doolittle Raid
The Doolittle raid provides some interesting food for thought on the subject of the problems faced by the man in command at sea, at the point of contact. As planned and agreed upon, the Doolittle Strike was expected to be a rather uncomplicated affair. There were no illusions of grandeur regarding the raid. Admiral Halsey was to move in Task Force Sixteen to some six hundred miles off Japan's coast, launch Doolittle, and get out. There were but two carriers and a minimum of heavy support ships and destroyers for the screen. With B-25's spotted on deck and U. S. Army Air Corps pilots and crews aboard, the Hornet, with Doolittle embarked, sailed from a United States port, while aboard the Enterprise Admiral Halsey sortied his Task Group out of Pearl Harbor in preparation for a rendezvous north of Midway with the Hornet Task Group. Almost immediately upon joining up, Halsey received a dispatch from Doolittle. Perhaps the dispatch warrants close scrutiny; it is an extremely interesting message in point of tactics. Now it must be remembered that the launching point agreed upon by Halsey and Doolittle, at a secret conference in San Francisco prior to undertaking the mission, was to be six hundred miles due east of Tokyo, the center of the Mikado' might. In his dispatch to Halsey, Doolittle pointed out that from a position six hundred miles off the coast he felt that he had every little chance of effectively conducting his strike and also enabling his pilots to return safely to the prearranged air bases in China during daylight. "From five hundred miles my chances would be much improved," he stated. However, he felt that in order to ensure an effective strike and the safe return of his pilots, he would prefer a launch point four hundred miles off the coast of Japan. This he felt was the safe range, and the best range from his point of view. Doolittle was, of course, seeking the optimum in effective range for his raid. Whether these facts are commonly known is not certain. One must admire Doolittle immensely for the imagination, the courage, and the capability he demonstrated in designing the operation, then selling and executing it himself. It was Doolittle's dream. He was prepared to see it through, regardless of the odds.
Obviously the crux of Admiral Halsey's decision was the determination of the optimum launch point. There was a problem of time and distance involved in the task of getting Doolittle in, then getting the Striking Force out. The Doolittle dispatch, in effect, changed the complexion of the entire operation for Admiral Halsey. For all practical purposes he had to "start all over again"—the objective, the risk, the threat, the tactics—all required a new, but quick look. As Task Force Commander, he was obliged to make a decision based upon a further evaluation of the tactical situation, requiring that he re-analyze such prime factors as the relative security of his small force compared with possible losses of Doolittle's aircraft. CINCPAC had thoroughly briefed Admiral Halsey, prior to his departure from Pearl, on the probable reception he would receive were his forces to draw too near to the coast of Japan. The warmth of the Shinto reaction to be expected was stressed in this briefing. Yamato Damashi, as the true samurai spirit, quite probably would be encountered in the initial direct action against the Empire. Every aircraft capable of carrying a bomb or torpedo would be loosed against his forces and ordered to "attack and destroy the enemy." Admiral Halsey's superb ability as a great leader and fighter is widely recognized. He was, of course, extremely anxious to do all he could to meet Doolittle's request in this operation. They arrived at a compromise acceptable to Doolittle which appears to have been very sound. Admiral Halsey agreed to exert all efforts to take Doolittle in to four hundred miles from the coast of Japan to ensure the success of his over-all operation even though the previously agreed position had been six hundred miles. But recognizing the existing military threats and particularly that of shore based air, he felt that if the Force were sighted and reported at any time he would be obliged to direct an immediate launch of the Doolittle strikes.
We all know what happened. When the Task Force had penetrated to but eight hundred miles off the coast, it encountered several small patrol craft of the Japanese Fifth Fleet. These "Spit kits" were a part of a mobile defense line that guarded the final approaches to Japan. The ships of this group were assigned primary duties of reporting the enemy and their collateral task was fishing. The Nashville opened fire on the first of these units but was unable to sink it expediently. Whether or not our force had been reported was of course the immediate question. We had picked up some rather frantic and garbled Japanese conversation which understandably evidenced extreme anxiety. Captain Buraker, the Operations Officer, called to ask if the Japanese had reported our presence, and we told him we were reasonably certain that they had. Thereupon Admiral Halsey directed that Doolittle be launched. Very shortly thereafter the Civil Air Defense circuits in the Empire teemed with forewarning messages, confirming our assumption. We had been sighted and reported, and the Empire was alerted for our attack! We believed that 70,000,000 Japanese, heretofore thoroughly impressed with their invincibility by constant reports of their successes and impressive results of their offensive actions from Pearl Harbor to Singapore, now awaited somewhat stunned their first glimpse of the realities of war. The Japanese forces prepared to fend off their first air attack from the sea, but the Japanese public was kept in the dark.
The results of the raid bear out most convincingly the soundness of Admiral Halsey's decision. Doolittle accomplished his mission; the security of Halsey's forces, rather weak at best, remained intact, and the Japanese warlords were shown beyond question that their homeland was vulnerable. As a result, the Japanese subsequently retained a greater number of forces in their homeland for defense. It is generally well accepted that the Doolittle raid had a marked psychological impact on both home fronts. The small striking force of American aircraft scared the daylights out of the Japanese military after 2,600 years of immunity, and these daring offensive Air Corps pilots, led by Jimmy Doolittle and sponsored by "Bull" Halsey, gave our people a much needed offensive shot in the arm. There was, however, a regrettable loss of aircraft and .pilots to the Doolittle force. This must be analyzed relative to the probable losses to the Task Force which represented a good portion of the carrier strength in our Navy at that time. A valid evaluation of the soundness of the decision must correlate the point of view of Doolittle, the Air Commander, and that of Halsey, the over-all Task Force Commander. There has been little argument on this operation and it is rather doubtful that much will ensue. It is felt that one can state unequivocally that the decision made was sound. Halsey had struck again! The Japanese were to feel the sting of his deception and decisive blows again and again until the last minutes of the war in the Pacific.
The Battle of Midway—June 4, 1942
Midway is generally accepted as the turning point of the war in the Pacific, and most students of naval warfare agree it was the most significant action of the entire war. Admiral Spruance's Force was justifiably proud when it steamed into Pearl Harbor with swabs flying high at the Enterprise fore truck, a symbol of victory after the historic naval battle. But at the time, even amid the elation, the full import of the victory was not completely recognized by most of its participants.
Midway was a fascinating battle—militarily it has everything! The more one studies and contemplates the action of this battle, the more fascinating it becomes. It is one of the great sagas of the sea and naval warfare; it is a battle replete with heroism, devotion to duty, death and destruction, suspense and surprise. All of the problem areas of naval warfare seem inextricably woven into the story of this great naval air battle. At the battle 0.f Midway all of the principles of war were either exploited or mishandled by the commanders on one side or the other. Problems of command, the contact, the weather, the objective, surprise, and security unfold to the student of naval tactics. We who were of forded the opportunity to live through this exciting battle will probably concede, that this was the greatest of the entire war.
Aboard the Enterprise during the action at Midway, three particular aspects of the battle appeared to be decisive factors in its outcome. First: by exploitation of superb intelligence, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was able to effect remarkable strategic concentration of far-flung forces; his tactical commanders were able to achieve surprise and defeat a markedly superior naval force. The pre-battle intelligence available to U. S. commanders at Midway was probably the best ever enjoyed in the history of naval warfare.
Second: the key tactical decision at Midway wasn't made by either Admiral Spruance or Admiral Fletcher. Commander Wade McClusky, the Air Group Commander of the Enterprise, made the most momentous decision in the entire engagement. Were it not for his decision to search for the Japanese Fleet when he failed to establish contact at their reported position, quite probably, in spite of the excellent intelligence, the battle would not have been won. The position reported from the initial PBY contact on the Japanese striking force was a point in latitude and longitude to the northwest of Midway Island. The contact also provided amplifying information that the Japanese Fleet was steaming on a southeasterly course at twenty-five knots to close Midway for initial attacks. There were diverse manners in which this initial contact was treated by the U. S. aircraft which were in the air at the time. Some ignored the course factor; McClusky did not. The Enterprise air group proceeded to the point where the Japanese were expected to be. But the enemy fleet was not there. Additional information from the PBY search planes was not forthcoming. Had the Japanese exceeded their twenty-five knot - estimated speed? Had they turned around? Or had they commenced a retirement to the westward? These are the questions with which McClusky was obliged to wrestle in order to determine his course of action. A glimpse at his fuel gauge was not reassuring; he was being extended beyond a comfortable range. As a matter of fact he had been thrust into a situation that was in all respects anything but comfortable. There were some who emphasized the importance of low fuel, jettisoned bombs, and retreated to Midway. McClusky could have done so with justification, but he was determined to find the Japanese and attack. He decided that the Japanese had turned around, and he must seek them to the northwest. Thank God for Wade McClusky. Many of us would not be alive today were it not for the soundness of his decision. His judgment, determination, and courage in the development of the initial contact and subsequent attack on the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu saved the day.
A third point flows logically from the McClusky action in the air incident: the Battle of Midway emphasized the importance of timing in tactical situations.
Perhaps it is not too widely known that prior to the time the Enterprise Air Group Commander was able to find and attack the enemy, a plain language contact report from one of the aircraft from the heavy cruiser Tone was heard on the big "E." This plane was reporting our position and the composition of our force. Fortunately the Commander of the Japanese striking fleet requested a verification of this report which must have seemed inconceivable to him as no U. S. carriers were to be available to oppose the occupation of Midway. Had not naval intelligence at Imperial Headquarters accounted for the Saratoga on the West Coast, the Yorktown heavily damaged in the Coral Sea, the Lexington sunk in the same battle? Was not Halsey sighted off Efate en route to the Coral Sea with the Enterprise and Hornet? This must be a mistake! Machigai Naku (no fooling)! Fortunately these Japanese cruiser scouting planes were rather vulnerable and this search aircraft was shot down just as the pilot began to repeat his contact. This episode must have caused some consternation in the minds of the Japanese.
But the fortunes of war or so-called breaks, good and bad, in the conduct of war, never are entirely one-sided. The periods of decision are filled with tension for both adversaries. Perhaps herein lies the foundation of the drama of our Admiral's decisions in their environmental setting of their wartime formations at sea. The Battle of Midway provides illustration of this truism. Like the Japanese, we had our troubles in dealing with the unknown: uncertainty as to how much of the enemy force was poised to strike, what degree of the information in the Tone plane report had been received by the Japs, and which of us would get there "fustest with the mostest." Understandably, whether Spruance, Slonim, or seaman, we all had that sinking feeling in the pits of our stomachs prompted by fear that the Japanese with their superior forces, in fact in the driver's seat, were about to provide us with the treatment we had hoped to administer to them. The feeling was one of relief and exhaustion when we learned that the Enterprise and Yorktown Air Groups were conducting their first attacks. The margin regarding time and force had been anything but conducive to equanimity. The maiden of good fortune had smiled most co-operatively at Admiral Spruance that morning.
We were relative neophytes in the sport of naval air warfare. Mistakes were made and lessons learned the hard way. What was Admiral Spruance's principal decision at Midway? He was forced to decide whether to turn west to rout the enemy fleet after their carriers had been sunk, or to steam eastward to avoid being forced into a night surface engagement. There has been much controversy around this decision to steam eastward rather than to the west where the enemy was located. In this matter, clarification has been gained by consideration of the threat posed by a night encounter of our cruisers with Yamamoto's battleships. This was a factor which properly weighed heavily on Admiral Spruance's mind, since such an encounter could well have proved disastrous. The facts available subsequent to this battle have confirmed the soundness of this decision.
We found that Point Option, now called PIM, also proved troublesome. A carrier force of limited strength, operating aircraft continuously, cannot maintain any direction other than into the wind, but this fact was somehow not apparent prior to the battle. This was an important principle learned.
Seniority has had a habit of frequently rearing its ugly head to impact upon command in the decisive actions, battles, and operations of war. Personalities have forced their way into areas of command in military operations throughout history.
Fate paved the way for Admiral Spruance to command the operation in a rather strange and not entirely acceptable manner. The Yorktown was put out of action very early in the game and consequently Admiral Fletcher shifted to the Astoria with the Yorktown survivors, relinquishing command to Admiral Spruance. With respect to this command relationship problem, it is a curious point of speculation whether or not we would have lost the Yorktown and whether the ultimate outcome of the battle would have altered if the three carriers had operated as one formation under one commander.
Midway paved the way for victory in the Pacific. But, it also was the inception of the greatness of Admiral Raymond Spruance. Fortune smiled upon him again many times as our war progressed westward, but he always beckoned her with sound judgment and his uncanny ability to be one thought ahead of his adversary. Rear Admiral Burton B. Biggs, USN, termed him the luckiest white man alive. This was true, but Midway gave evidence that he was to become the greatest tactician in the history of our Navy. The soundness of Spruance's decisions will stand up to the scrutiny of posterity. His leadership and stature will provide nourishment to future greats through his example of objectivity and sensitivity and brilliant courage in action. Here was a leader who never made a mistake. He liked to think things through; and this he did.
The Turkey Shoot—June 20, 1944
Not too dissimilar to the Battle of Midway is the first Philippine Sea action, the so-called "Turkey Shoot." It is an extremely interesting operation in several respects. The most significant decision is, of course, Admiral Spruance's decision not to turn to the westward the night before the actual engagement occurred. This has been the subject of much discussion and controversy over a considerable period.
There is an interesting prelude to this operation. Admiral King had reviewed the overall plans for the Saipan Operation and was somewhat concerned over the fact that the voluminous amphibious plan weighed about seven pounds, whereas the fleet action annex to the Fifth Fleet Operation Plan was alarmingly light. He sent a dispatch to Admiral Nimitz asking him whether he felt that sufficient consideration had been given to the possibility of the enemy's coming out with his fleet to oppose the landings at Saipan. Admiral Nimitz assured him that both he and Admiral Spruance had discussed this at considerable length, with the hope that the Japanese fleet would come out. They were fully prepared to engage them should they sortie in defense of Saipan. In retrospect, it seems that neither felt, however, that it was highly probable.
Admiral King's visit to Saipan after the position had been secured, perhaps with a bit of fire, in his eye, appears to have been significant. The purpose of his trip, quite reasonably, was to evaluate this decision. He probably wanted to obtain the facts that were available on the spot, to the people who were on the spot! The apparent approval by COMINCH of the conduct of the over-all amphibious operation and fleet action and the basic decisions was reassuring; it tended to confirm the soundness of the "Turkey Shoot" thinking.
Let us reconsider for a moment the basic decision involved: whether to turn westward to chase the enemy fleet after the coast watchers reported the Japanese fleet was steaming through San Bernadino Strait. It would perhaps appear that the key to the operation was based on Japanese plans for a free ride on the "merry-go-round." By means of utilizing the air fields on Guam for refueling, the range for Japanese based planes could be increased while remaining outside of effective striking range of our carriers. This they attempted to do.
Based on the relative composition and strength of the opposing forces, it did not seem probable that the Japanese were prepared to meet our Fleet in a frontal attack to contest our occupation of Saipan, even though the seizure of Saipan did pose a serious threat to the Empire. This assumption could be wrong, however, inasmuch as the Japanese fleet actually did come out in the Leyte operation for what practically amounted to a suicide "Banzai" attack on our fleet in order to deny the Philippines. However, it seems that the Japanese were more concerned about the Leyte operation, as there was a realization in the high command that the loss of the Philippines was the last stage in the strangulation of Japanese sea power and their ability to feed and sustain their nation. For the loss of the Philippines to the Japanese meant that their last line of sea communications would be ruptured and irreparable. Therefore, quite understandably, while the anticipated loss of Saipan was assessed as great, there is little question that the Japanese people did not become as frantic as they did later in the Leyte Gulf operation. This appears to be an extremely important factor. If the fleet were not moving in for a normal fleet action, a move to countermarch our forces would have resulted in no engagement whatsoever. We might have lost the opportunity to sink the important carriers Shokaku and Taiho and inflict other damage during the operation.
Based on the coast watchers, initial report of the Japanese fleet transiting San Bernadino Strait, Admiral Mitscher recommended to Admiral Spruance during the night that we head westward and attempt to engage the Japanese fleet at daylight. At approximately this same time the Indianapolis picked up a message from the Zuikaku which had been originated by the Commanding Officer of the Shokaku. We knew that in Japanese procedure the call sign of a commander in parenthesis meant the commander had originated the message and was at the station sending.
The Shokaku skipper's message was very brief. You could sense that it was being handled as a pretty hot potato and had the highest priority use in Japanese naval traffic. We were unable to read the message. However, we realized that it carried extreme urgency and that it was unusual in the sense that one carrier commander was sending it from another carrier. We considered the message as being of more tactical significance than the report of a conference aboard the sister ship. We evaluated it as a possible result of the sinking of the Shokaku, although we had no report to confirm this. As it had happened Captain Kossler in the Cavalla actually had put several torpedoes into and actually had sunk the Shokaku at the time reported in the message, but because he was being "held down" by ASW forces of the screen he was unable to report the results of the attack, and more importantly, he could not report the position of the Japanese fleet. At the time Admiral Mitscher's recommendation came in, we on the Staff were attempting to sell the idea of turning around; when Admiral Spruance completed his analysis of the situation, we realized we were wrong. Consequently, it would seem logical that there was no error in the Admiral's reasoning, concluding to remain in a position where he could provide adequate protection to the amphibious force at Saipan. This was the basic objective of the operation. As a matter of interest, many a verbal battle has been fought on this point through the years. By turning to the westward, Admiral Spruance anticipated an "end run" by the Japanese and wanted to be in a position to counter any thrust made at our amphibious forces. To have not remained in the vicinity of Saipan, he felt, would lay Turner's forces open to destruction, and he would be unable to prevent this. A salient point is that at this time our forces were being shadowed; we had constant and continual intercepts and radar confirmation of enemy aircraft which were in contact with our forces. There was no doubt that our every move was being reported almost instantaneously. On the other hand, we had no definite information revealing the exact location of the Japanese fleet, beyond that of the coast watchers—generally the least reliable source, professionally speaking. There was a misfortune in that one of our seaplanes operating out of Saipan "on a shoe-string" had contacted the enemy, but as a result of a communication failure this message was not received until about nine hours later. Had we known specifically the precise and continuous location of the enemy fleet, a turn to the west might well have been advisable. But because the Japanese were continuously aware of our location and because their plans probably had been developed on the basis of utilizing Guam to safely attack our forces with their carrier based aircraft, it seems that should we have turned to the westward that night, the Japanese would have countermarched in a similar direction. Once out of range for effectively using Guam's airfields for planned shuttle bombing, in all probability they would have retired. In this event we would never have been afforded an opportunity to destroy the forces which we were able to reach and attack during the operation.
Basically it seems that no mistakes were made in the major decisions of the "Turkey. Shoot." However, there may have been one area in which we could have acted more effectively subsequent to our initial attacks. Our air attacks were of course made at extreme ranges and on their return many of our planes were forced to land in the water after running out of gasoline. There was considerable chaos in the Fleet that night. In one instance two planes landed aboard a carrier simultaneously; others in large groups reported they probably would not be able to get aboard since gas was running low. After recovering what aircraft we were able to land, the OTC slowed from twenty-three to sixteen knots. The radical and vociferous element of the Staff argued for several hours that our best action at the time would be to maintain maximum sustained speed westward in order to exploit our force advantage in the morning by launching a dawn attack. We had less than ten hours till daylight; and at that time it was argued that actually the difference in distance would be only a matter of approximately fifty or sixty miles. We sensed that this range differential might be significant in dealing with "healthy ships" capable of retirement at high speeds. We urged that, as a search and rescue Task Group, we detach one CVL and all destroyers that were running low on fuel (and as usual after an air engagement there were many). But we argued (a frequent ingredient of tactical decisions) and urged that our main force must maintain maximum speed throughout the night. We discussed this approach with Vice Admiral J. S. McCain, later to become famous as Commander Task Force 38, who was riding aboard the Indianapolis as an observer during this operation. He agreed with our suggestions. The necessity for maintaining our speed was confirmed the next day when the first search plane to contact the enemy, a Hancock plane, reported his position and we plotted it as three hundred miles from our fleet center. An attack group was ordered to prepare for attacks immediately. Since the loss of aircraft had been very heavy the night before, the group was given specific orders to attack the force reported by this Hancock plane, but within a limitation of three hundred miles, considered to be the extreme range. As luck would have it, the THF pilot launched from the Hancock checked his navigation and discovered he had been mistaken in reporting the distance. It was not three hundred miles, but three hundred fifty, and consequently no attacks were launched on the second day.
The "Turkey Shoot" highlights the importance in naval warfare of evaluating the importance in naval warfare of evaluating principal objective. In addition, the battle again illustrates the importance of contact reports; problems involving erroneous or incomplete contact reports plagued our admirals at sea in making tactical decisions throughout almost the entire war.
Conclusions
This narrative of observations of naval command decisions raises the question as to what these observations can contribute to a more complete understanding of the common denominators of an effective exercise of command. In summary, the Marcus Raid highlights the importance of determination, courage, and the willingness to accept risks. The Doolittle Strike emphasizes the necessity of compromise followed by decisive action, and the need for flexibility in adjusting decisions to changing circumstances. In the Battle of Midway the elements of surprise, timing, and exploitation of good intelligence become salient factors. The first Philippine Sea Action, known as the "Turkey Shoot," stresses the need for proper evaluation of the principal objective, and the need for accurate planning.
Each operation discussed presents different segments of naval command decisions, which join to form a composite picture. As a result, it seems safe to conclude that the sound decision is composed of the following factors:
(1) good planning,
(2) good intelligence, and in addition a feel of the enemy, or sixth sense, to compensate for lack of intelligence which is always existent to a greater or lesser degree,
(3) good communications,
(4) good staff work,
(5) effective command relationships,
(6) a receptiveness to ideas and a willingness to compromise,
(7) imagination and an abundant supply of courage.
These are the elements of the sound decision, but to be sure, much more is involved. A sound decision is a product of the integrated action of a man in command of a situation, a situation which he has properly grasped through the intelligence provided by others, and to which he has applied his own reason and intuition. Inherent in this situation, to which he has reacted, and reacted properly, is a tremendous burden of responsibility and a demand for great courage. This is a fact which must not be minimized.
Basically, these points add up to the concluding thought that our ability to exploit sea power in an attainment of national objectives will continue to rest primarily on the soundness of the decisions made by naval commanders at the point of contact with the enemy
CAPTAIN SLONIM, a graduate of the Naval Academy, Class of 1936, is now with the Office of Assistant CNO (General Planning). His extensive and varied earlier service experience has included assignment to the Strategic Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operations, Staffs of Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Third and Fifth Fleets, and three destroyer commands. This is his first article to appear in the PROCEEDINGS