Money is not necessarily the root of all evil—the evil in question being the loss of Junior Officers. Having just completed a three-year tour in the Office of Naval Officer Procurement of one of our larger recruiting districts, I have come to the conclusion that most of the current theories on the loss of personnel are based on the erroneous assumption that the young men leaving know “why’ and “what for.” My purpose in writing will be to develop the theory that the greatest contributing factor to the loss of Junior Officers is their own lack of experience in the civilian world they are so eager to re-enter and to offer a practical, working solution to the problem as I see it.
To understand why our Junior Officers are leaving, we must look not only at their background but at their motivation for entering the Navy in the first place. With the exception of prior service men and sons of service men, I have yet to interview more than a handful of prospective officer applicants interested in more than the best way of satisfying their Selective Service obligation or a scholarship. I have interviewed more than three thousand men in a three-year period, including some 500 prospective NROTC students, fifty to seventy Naval Academy aspirants, the majority of the rest being for OCS, AOC, and NAVCAD Programs. Motivation has been judged on the basis of why they preferred the Navy to any other branch of service, rather than any real motivation to naval service. Many are becoming officers in the Navy as a lesser evil than being drafted in the Army and have given no serious thought to the idea that Selective Service obligation and a career could be considered any other way than as two separate and distinct problems. This is a discouraging fact but, in view of the background of the individuals entering service, should not be surprising,
Who is the average Junior Officer? Like the rest of American youth today he is preoccupied with “security”—security represented by physical rather than spiritual values. It is seen early in his monogamous, adolescent “going steady,” and selective social groups that cushion his contact with the rest of society. It is conditioned by a life that has set boundaries of home and college, these two often closely allied geographically. Security becomes not so much the spirit of either but the locale—unchanging, the people—constant, and the future—predictable.
Our average Junior Officer has completed two to four years of college and (this is the crucial point) has come into the service directly' from the class room with little or no intervening work experience. This can be attributed partially to Selective Service but primarily to the post-depression era in our land of plenty in which “Daddy” not only could pay but was eager to. I do not mean to imply that he hasn’t worked during the summer months, because the majority have; however, this is a far cry from being self- supporting. Not only school but social life has been substantially subsidized by the family.
Most of our young men first become self- supporting in the service. It is a rude awakening and certainly spoils a nice college dream. Had the opportunity presented itself for an average officer to become self-sufficient as a civilian, the dream would have been just as spoiled. Unfortunately, he does not realize this as he marks time in service, waiting to get out and conquer the world—a world that is only theoretically rosy and is, in reality, highly competitive. Long years of experience go into the climb toward executive heights, and the attrition is much higher than that in the Navy. Pay potential in the nebulous future may be greater for the few—but for the average, in the all important present that includes three meals a day, service pay and privileges run circles around the civilian counterpart. For example, a young officer will attain the rank of lieutenant commander within fourteen years, with pay and allowances amounting to about $8,850.00 annually. That income places him in the top eight per cent of salaried people in the United States. Since forced attrition through this rank will not exceed 25 per cent, it would be the height of conceit to consider lieutenant commanders as a whole within the top eight per cent of our nation in ability. The young JG who remains in the service past his initial obligation has about a 75 per cent chance of reaching this pinnacle within fourteen years. As a civilian, his chances are somewhat less than 25 per cent of ever reaching this salary.
It would appear, therefore, that the average Junior Officer is a man adjusted neither to military nor civilian life. The Navy’s problem is to combat a lack of experience on the one hand and a proclivity for a type of life it can’t offer, on the other. There is no single solution to halt the mass exodus of our Junior Officers; however, the following, at least partial solutions, should pay dividends considerably greater than the effort involved in their execution. The solutions that I offer are based on education and a revision in the augmentation program.
First, the Navy must educate its men to the many concrete advantages it can offer and enable them to compare these advantages point for point with those offered in civilian life. There has been such a great clamor concerning the pay raise that the services have given themselves a black eye. The raise was more than necessary to maintain our present standard of living in the face of rising costs. It will further serve to off-set by financial security the lack of “locational” security that naval service creates. Unless we go out of our way to inform them of the other advantages we now enjoy, this raise in itself will mean little in stopping the mass migration.
Education presupposes teachers, and every organization should have a Rights and Benefits Officer or, better still, every officer should be a Rights and Benefits Officer. This is a good theoretical solution; however, with the many collateral duties that officers already have, an educational program on this basis would probably fail. As a more practical solution I recommend that the present automatic eighteen months promotion to the grade of ltjg be supplanted by a correspondence course requirement based on rights and benefits. A text for such a course is presently available in The Officers Fact Book (NavPers 15898). Through taking this course, anyone should come to understand promotion, pay, allowances, educational opportunities, “medicare,” retirement, and survivor benefits, should something happen to him. To imply that even a Junior Officer doesn’t know about his pay benefits may seem foolish, but give yourself this test without reference to publications. List to the nearest dollar the (1) retirement pay for lieutenant commander on twenty years’ service, (2) commander on twenty, (3) captain on thirty, and (4) Navy’s contribution to your family should you die in service, (5) Social Security to your family should you die in service. If you miss any of these questions, which should be of primary concern to you, then it should not come as a surprise that our Junior Officers don’t appreciate or even know what they have.
The second phase of my solution involves education through experience. The old saw that you can always tell an ensign but you cannot tell him much will be true as long as there are ensigns. He is inexperienced and prefers to learn the hard way. Admitting that teaching alone will not convince everyone, we must provide a program whereby the unconvinced may gain wisdom trying their wings in the civilian world. Not everyone will wish to return to active duty, but many would if it could be done simply and with prestige.
I propose a program that would give highly qualified officers on separation every reasonable assurance of a Regular Navy Commission provided he applies within one year of release from active duty. To give such assurance necessarily entails a high degree of selectivity. The machinery to accomplish this is presently in existence, however, and the program would require only implementation.
The program would work in this manner. Commanding Officers would recommend those highly qualified young officers scheduled for RAD to the Augmentation Board six months prior to release. The Augmentation Board at its regular quarterly sittings, or more often if required, would review the records of those recommended and select a number of the best qualified based on the anticipated needs of the service.
The results of this selection should be made known to each officer selected prior to separation and suitable entries made in his Service Record and DD 214 (Notice of Separation) to the effect that he has been “Selected for Augmentation.” This notation would mean that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the young officer could give his “Civilian Dreams” a full year’s workout, with the assurance that any time during that period he would receive a USN Commission immediately upon application.
This program not only leaves the door open for the man to return, it welcomes him. There are also many desirable side effects: (1) it will materially cut down the time required after application in augmentation processing, which now averages in excess of six months. This is important, since the individual who has decided to return wants to return to active duty yesterday. (2) Since the program is selective it boosts the ego and leaves the individual with a good feeling toward the service on departing; (3) Last, but probably the most important, it gives the outwardly self-assured young officer the inner security of knowing that his service in the Navy to date has been good and his naval future is bright.
The loss of personnel is not only an old song but a sad one. The ideas and solutions I have presented are not panaceas; however, they are workable and will have some measure of return. I have written a new verse with a different beat, accenting Navy’s advantages rather than faults, and increased the tempo to provide for positive action. The time has come to stop thinking negatively and come together as Navy men proud of our heritage and willing to work constructively for the future.