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Lieutenant Commander P. W. Rairden, Jr., USN.—As a former commanding officer of the Gull (AMS-16) and Gayety (AM-239) and COMINDIV 31, I would like to make a few comments on “Wonsan: The Battle of the Mines,” by Commanders Cagle and Manson.
The mine warfare experience gained by the U. S. Navy in the blockade phase of the Korean War was every bit as valuable as the assault sweep at Wonsan, though not as spectacular. Our planners were immediately faced with the complex problems of command relationships, logistics, sweeping tactics, gunfire, and air support. MINPAC was reactivated and we had to design and build new types of sweeps, such as the MSO and MSB, and develop many helicopter techniques.
This war forced us to think again of the mine as an offensive weapon. Today the Mine Force, now an important part of our total naval establishment, provides young line officers many challenging opportunities early in their careers. This has an important, beneficial impact upon our naval present and future because we now receive a steady flow of command-tested junior officers and an increasing proportion of senior officers who understand and appreciate mine warfare problems.
Our NATO and SEATO allies have been quick to learn lessons from this war. Their forces, largely MDAP-built, use the same ship types, sweep gear, and tactics as we do in minesweeping operations and problems.
I should like to thank Commanders Cagle and Manson for emphasizing the increasing importance of mine warfare. All of us who have been in mine warfare know that our most important task at the moment is to impress upon other surface sailors that the mine is big business. The aviators and submariners seem to appreciate this point more than do many line officers who have become so deeply involved in amphibs or destroyers or service force types that they scarcely think about mine warfare.
Military Planning at the Seat of Government
(See page 713, July, 1957 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jack E. Magee, usn.—The key of Colonel Hittle’s article is the statement, “There should be no change in this concept.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff concept has been war-proven and equal to the task of global war. Why adopt the concept of the vanquished when our own concept has been combat-tested?
Pressures are growing daily to force greater unification of the three military services— Army, Navy, and Air Force—as a means of saving money, eliminating duplication, and providing better working agreements between the services. Senator Symington (D-Mo.) in an NBC television “Meet The Press” interview in February of this year called for “more unification,” but did not spell out any specific proposals. Recently the editors of U. S. News and World Report predicted that greater unification would be forced on the four military services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—in order to save money during 1958. This prediction was substantiated by the editors of Aviation Week (April 1, 1957 issue) in which they affirmed:
“The long overdue major overhaul of the Defense Department is not far off. Nobody concerned with defense problems has been happy over the way inter-service problems have been handled, the tremendous growth of the over head in the Secretary of Defense’s establishment, and the failure to achieve real economy in meeting the nation’s defense requirements.”
It is certain that the reorganization of the Defense Department will be attempted soon. What form this greater unification will take is anyone’s guess.
The advocates of the General Staff System are just as ardent for their concept now as they were when the Defense Department was organized in 1947. The proponents of this system have already started their campaign. Colonel J. M. Pitzer writing in The Army Combat Forces Journal takes the view that the U. S. Military Services should have a single command—Staff system at many or all levels whose members would have no ties with any component service. In April, 1957 issue of the Army, Major George Fielding Eliot recommended that:
(1) The Secretary of Defense be made Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
(2) The Secretary of Defense on major items take the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(3) The Secretary of Defense’s staff be enlarged commensurate with the duties entailed as Deputy Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces.
There is no doubt that the General Staff concept will be offered as a solution for greater unification of the Armed Forces. As Colonel Hittle has commented:
“It offers what so many seek—an easy, simple solution to a very complicated problem.”
It is the Navy’s responsibility to our nation and Congress to champion the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, for it is the best system devised by men to carry out the responsibilities of strategic planning and conduct global war. Congress must be continually reminded of their declaration of policy in the “National Security Act of 1947”:
“It is the intent of Congress to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single
Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff.”
Colonel Hittle’s article is well timed and states excellently the case for the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept. More articles similar to this excellent one should be written about this subject. Congress and our people must be kept continually aware of any changes made to our concepts of military organization. This is a continuing struggle, and we must continue to bear the standard for the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept.
The USS Mercy Belonged to the U. S. Navy
(See page 34, January, 1957 Proceedings)
(Editor’s Note: The following comment comes from the former Commanding Officer of the USS Mercy.)
Captain Thomas A. Esling, usnr (ret.). —In his article “Seaweed and Ivy” Dr. George M. Gregory makes a serious error when he gives the USS Mercy to the Army!
For the record: the Mercy was placed in
commission at San Pedro, California, on August 7, 1944, with a full Navy crew of twenty-three officers and three hundred men. In accordance with a directive from the Chief of Naval Operations the 214th Army Hospital Ship Complement was received on board. Two other Navy ships, the USSCow- fort and USS /lope, were similarly staffed.
The USS Mercy sailed on August 31, 1944, for Pearl Harbor where alterations were made to better fit her for the duty she was to perform, viz. as hospital ship for the landing forces in the Pacific, operating under Commander 7th Fleet. The ship did not return to the United States until November 14, 1945. In the meantime she took the first wounded from the landings in Leyte Gulf
and from the naval battle of Leyte. She made several trips between Okinawa and Guam during the Okinawa Campaign, visited fifty Ports or island bases and served as a base hospital for the Korea Occupation Forces until a permanent base was set up ashore. She was twice attacked, deliberately or through mistaken identity, while sailing with full lights on as required by the Geneva Convention, but escaped damage. You will recall that her sister ship, the Comfort, was badly damaged and had many killed by a kamikaze.
The error in the article is excusable only because it was unusual for a Navy hospital ship to carry an Army medical unit. The experiment was highly successful, however, and the two branches lived and worked together admirably. The attached photograph ls offered as further proof and with the hope that you will correct the error in a future issue of the Proceedings and give the USS Mercy back to the U. S. Navy.
(Editor’s Note: The above comment was sent to Dr. Gregory, author of the original article, for his comment which follows.)
The Empire State III (ex-Mercy) still carries the legend, in letters a foot or more high: U. S. ARMY TRANSPORT MERCY. These are welded on, and there is an order *n the works at the present time to have them burned off. In a hasty readying of the vessel for New York State Maritime College’s 1956 summer cruise, the letters were painted over, but from close range they are still visible through the paint.
Frankly, I did not know that the Empire State III had at one time been a U. S. Navy ship, and I am happy to have the assistance
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of Captain Esling in keeping this fine vessel’s record straight.
(Editor’s Note: The Mercy was decommissioned on May 17, 1946 at San Francisco and turned over to the Army for continuing use as a hospital ship.)
Design of Soviet Submarines
(See pages 734-741, July, 1957 Proceedings)
Allison W. Saville, Bothell, Washington.—What a pleasure it is to read Lieutenant Huan’s article which serves as an excellent contrast, in view of its scholarly approach, to the sensational journalism we sometimes read on Russian submarines in newspapers.
Lieutenant Huan stated that the 620-ton Shcha-class boats were designed by German engineers. The designs were worked out in The Hague at the office of Ingenieurskanloor voor Scheepsbouw in 1933-34. This office at the time was a joint stock company owned by Krupp’s Germaniawerft of Kiel, Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, A. G. of Bremen, and the German Navy. Four German engineers from this firm, Hugo Seligmann of the Ship Design section, Hermann Grieger of Engine Design, and Ebschner and Mauritz worked up these designs under the watchful eye of several Soviet designers at The Hague office. The latter gentlemen no doubt were there to help with Soviet specifications. In 1934, Seligmann went to Leningrad to check weight calculations on a Russian submarine. Whether his work was in conjunction with the Shcha designs or not is not known. The whole project, however, indicates the Russians were not satisfied with their own creations at this point and turned to a German submarine design firm for useful aid.
AS FAR AS PEIPING
Contributed by LIEUTENANT SI AO CHAO-PIN, Chinese National Navy
A small craft was practising gunnery exercise off the west coast of Taiwan one afternoon while the sea was moderate, visibility poor, and sunlight unfavorable; the gunnery officer was a new hand.
The craft and the tug with its sled were steaming southward parallel to the China coast. After the gun roared out, the splash was spotted 3,000 yards over the target—even the scheduled firing range was shorter than that.
“Don’t you think it’s too far, Mr. Chang?” asked the skipper. “No, sir, I want it go as far as Peiping,” answered the gunnery officer.
(The Proceedings will pay $5.00 for each anecdote submitted to, and printed in, the Proceedings.)