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The Aqua Lung
(See page 392, April, 1957 Proceedings)
(Editor’s Note: The following comment comes from the Secretary of the U. S. Liaison Committee for Oceanographic Research which is affiliated with Captain Jacques-Yves Cousteau’s Calypso Oceanographic Expeditions.)
Mr. James Dugan.—“Stalking the
Takao” says that Leading Seaman J. J. Magennis, V.C., used an “aqua-lung” in 1945. This is incorrect. The Cousteau-Gag- nan Aqua-Lung (a registered name) was not employed in World War II, although invented clandestinely in France in 1942. It is an automatic compressed air diving apparatus, while Magennis used an oxygen rebreathing unit developed by Sir Robert H. Davis.
The Aqua-Lung, now adopted by thirteen navies, entered combat with the French Navy in Indo-China and with the U. S. Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams in Korea. The word “Aqua-Lung” is often mis-applied to quite different free-diving gear, including oxygen sets. Compressed air and oxygen regenerating lungs differ radically. Oxygen leaves no bubbles but is limited to 35 feet of depth. Compressed air exhalations rise to the surface, but it allows the diver to reach more than 200 feet.
Lneasy Lies the Head that Wears a Crown
(See page 69, January, 1957 Proceedings)
Captain Edward B. Ellis, usnr, Master, S. S. lixochorda, American Export Lines.—Mr. John C. Carrothers’ article is the first expression of sympathy for shipmasters from a marine engineer that has ever come to my attention! None has ever even hinted that a master should slow down in a f°g. The general idea always seemed to me to be that everyone else thought that the “old man” was afraid when he slowed in fog, not that the safety of the vessel and everyone on it is the master’s primary duty, and that as the old adage goes “it is better to be safe than sorry.” Thank you, Mr. Carrothers!
I have had more passengers express their gratitude to me for slowing down in bad weather for their safety and comfort (and the safety of materiel and ship’s personnel) than ever criticised me for being late on account of fog or bad weather. My principals ashore have never questioned my actions in either case.
It is suggested that a scheduled vessel be “pushed” in good weather, if she is not already doing her best. Get some miles “up your sleeve” under favorable conditions, if at all possible, so you can reduce speed in fog or bad weather and still arrive on schedule.
If you get ahead of time and are reasonably sure of no fog or bad weather being encountered, slow down. Chief engineers seem reluctant to “push” and consequently burn some extra fuel which may never be recovered during the voyage even if slowed down later. However, fuel oil today is not the most expensive item in the operation of a vessel. TIME is, and that embraces all the other costs including that extra voyage a season gained by a short frenzied period in port each call, mostly at overtime rates for everyone except management. I have often wondered if it pays. It certainly did NOT in the Andrea Doria-Stockholm case.
There is too much advertising of fast crossings and not enough of SAFE crossings. Most passengers would fly if they were in such great hurry to get there. I think the speed element is over-emphasized in the solicitation of passenger traffic and that the pleasures a vessel has to offer in SAFETY is
of much more popular appeal. People should be able to “rest, relax and recuperate” at sea.
The Radio Technical Commission for Marine Services in Washington is making a study of electronic aids to safer navigation including radio communication in conjunction with radar. A short range FM radio, in the wheelhouse directly under the officer of the watch, used with the ship’s radar and whistles in a fog at sea, is a simple example. Of course, this usage would have to be standardized and universal. The reports of this Commission should be of considerable interest to readers of the Proceedings.
Very little is spent in the outfitting of a merchant vessel in navigation and communications equipment compared to an aircraft. No ship should be called modern unless she has every proven aid to her SAFE navigation that a plane has.
A liner equipped with two radars, operative, with officers plotting separately for each, proceeding full speed in poor visibility, taking upon herself the avoidance of all other vessels, certainly is disregarding the Rules of the Road in regard to excessive speed, is making course changes in doubt when not in sight of the other, and not stopping engines when a whistle is heard forward of the beam. She is a menace to every other ship in her path. Would her master ever admit this complete responsibility in any admiralty court?
The other vessel’s only safe action is to stop dead in the water, close watertight doors, and wait until this hazard of the sea has cleared her. It was never the intent of the Rules to give passenger liners any privileges.
The further north one sails the more his familiarity with fog increases and so does his contempt for it to a certain extent. Some of the nationals who have such a good reputation as seamen have sometimes shown little prudence. It is the careful shipmaster who knows and respects fog for the enemy it is, and who oftimes keeps out of trouble by carefully observing the Rules.
The “language barrier” mentioned by Mr. Carrothers is a subject that is either avoided or evaded. In some quarters it is considered under the category of discrimination. Conditions exist as stated by Mr. Carrothers.
It is my opinion that all seamen on deck, all petty officers in all departments, all personnel having any key passenger ship station should pass an examination in English including nautical phraseology. It is not enough to speak or understand pidgin English on an American vessel, particularly on one carrying passengers.
Steamship lines have safety programs most of which concentrate on accidents to personnel. Why not more action on the general safety of the ship, her cargo, and the good records of all concerned?
Mr. Carrothers has presented a clear and fearless statement of facts which every operator and ship commander, naval or merchant, should read.
The Direct Approach
Lieutenant (jg) John D. Musa, usn.— The startling and rapid changes in today’s Navy make it more and more evident that men are needed who can not only operate, using present equipment and methods, but also create the equipment and methods of the future. Most of this creation is now done either by civilians or by top-level naval personnel. The Navy is losing a large reservoir of intelligence, talent, and experience in the lower levels by not encouraging direct communication between these people and the top brass who have the power to consider their ideas and put them into action if valuable.
Beneficial suggestion programs in industry have proven their value time and time again. I understand that the Chief of Naval Personnel was very pleasantly surprised at the quantity and quality of ideas produced by a recent forum of enlisted men. The Bureau of Ships has a profitable suggestion program of long standing.
The most desirable program would be one that provided some sort of reward, preferably but not necessarily financial, for the effort often required to fully develop and mature an idea. The reward could be in the form of a letter of commendation or an enhancement of promotion opportunities.
More essential than reward, however, is the clearing of a path from the bottom to the top. The chain of command is vital in ordinary routine operations, but it is tremendously discouraging to an idea. I am sure
that a positive and vigorous plan to encourage direct submission and consideration of ideas from any Navy personnel would turn up hundreds and repay the Navy many times over. Such a plan, applied on a small scale in the forum of enlisted men mentioned previously, produced results that speak for themselves.
Old Ironsides?
John Lyman.—“The interior of Constitution’s hull while frigate . . . was being reconstructed ... in 1857.” So the photograph below was described in the caption to Figure 257 of Theodore Roscoe’s and Fred Freeman’s recent Picture History of the U. S. Navy.
Something rang not quite true about this illustration when I first saw it in the book, and a second look provided the answer. Ihis is a beautiful example of the art of wooden shipbuilding, and so is the Constitution; but I remembered having crawled all over Old
Ironsides when she visited Oakland in April 1933, and she was not wall-sided and flat- bottomed as in the photograph, but instead bad considerable deadrise in the floors and tumble-home in the topsides.
Still, the picture credits in Roscoe and Freeman told me that the source of the photo was the Library of Congress (well known to roe as a reputable organization), and there seemed a remote possibility that Constitution had actually looked like this after her rebuilding in 1857, and that the rebuilding of the late 1920’s had changed her to her present shape.
A visit to the Print and Photograph Sec-
tion of the Library was soon arranged, and in a very few minutes the original of the above antique photograph was turned up. It was labelled “steamer John G. Crisloplier,” and the accession number showed that it was copyrighted shortly after 1900. Wall sides and flat floors are quite normal for steamers, and there is no reason to suspect the authenticity of this caption. But the question still remained: how did Messrs. Roscoe and Freeman come to call this the Constitution?
I have mentioned that the Library of Congress is a reputable organization. Its staff members, likewise, are resourceful. The John G. Christopher photo has been copied in the Library, and its negative has been assigned the number USZ62-7663. Several photos of the USS Constitution have been copied also, one of which is the above illustration. It seems clear that the caption information on this photo, whose copy negative carries the number USZ62-7662, somehow became associated with a print from USZ62- 7663.
The steamer John G. Christopher was built in Wilmington, Delaware, in 1891-92 by the Jackson & Sharp Co. (now the American Car and Foundry Co.) for the Merchants Steamship Company of Jacksonville, Florida. She was taken over as a new vessel by the Clyde Steamship Company, running under the name Winyah until about 1913, when her engines were taken out and her stout hull was made into a barge. As the North East, owned by the Brooks-Scanlon Corporation of Jacksonville, she was scrapped about 1926.
The original caption on the above photograph reads thus “U. S. Frigate Constitu-
lion (Old Ironsides) ready for launching after repairs on Dry Dock Railway, U. S. Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., May 27, 1858.” A similar view, taken from a point a little farther forward on the port beam, appears opposite page 58 of Ira N. Hollis’ book The Frigate Constitution, published in 1900, with the caption simply “The Constitution ready for launching,” but it is obviously the same occasion.
U. S. Navy’s Attitude on Convoys
(See page 1047, October, 1956 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Bern Anderson, usn (ret).—Captain Roskill’s thesis that strategically the convoy system is an offensive measure certainly is deserving of attention and acceptance, but to substitute an alphabetical gobbledygook for a traditional, respected and accepted term is neither necessary nor desirable. While I agree with him generally, there is one statement in his article that should not be permitted to stand unchallenged. That is that “the U. S. naval authorities were not convinced of the value of convoys and preferred to hunt.” Just the reverse is true.
He cites Samuel E. Morison’s The Battle of the Atlantic in support of his conclusion, but I question that the book can properly be used to support it. Morison does not identify the American naval officer who stated that the Navy did not like convoys as they were a purely defensive form of warfare, other than as a “routing officer,” surely a dubious source for drawing conclusions about the attitude of responsible naval leaders. Incidentally, the paragraph in which this quotation occurs has been eliminated in the 1954 revision of The Battle of the Atlantic. The book does show quite clearly that nearly a year before Pearl Harbor the Navy was prepared to escort convoys in the North Atlantic. In February, 1941, Chief of Naval Operations Stark ordered the formation of a “Support Force” in the Atlantic, with the mission of escorting convoys. The U. S. Navy did fail, however, as did the Royal Navy, to provide adequate escort vessels which were necessary to make the convoy system feasible and workable.
A strong case can be made for the conclusion that U. S. naval authorities not only favored convoys but also that they were
enthusiastic supporters of that system. Captain Roskill himself quotes Admiral Sims’ report to the Secretary of the Navy in June, 1917, stating that convoys were the only solution to the submarine threat and that they were offensive in nature. It is well to recall in connection with that statement that when he arrived in England in April of that year, he found an internal struggle in progress with a minority in the Admiralty favoring convoys but with a majority, including the First Sea Lord, opposed. Admiral Sims had noticed that the Grand Fleet, screened by destroyers, seemed to be immune to submarine attack, and he could see no reason why the same result could not be obtained for the vital shipping that was being destroyed at so high a rate that England was literally faced with starvation. He sided vigorously with the convoy advocates and was at least partly responsible for the intervention of the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, who ordered the system tried. Started only in May, 1917, the results were spectacularly successful from the start. With that record, it is surprising to read that between the wars British official thought reverted to the idea of fighting submarines chiefly by hunting them out and patrolling shipping lanes, which had been the unsuccessful means used before the convoy sytem was adopted.
Captain Roskill’s own The War at Sea, Vol. I, describes how, in September, 1941, the United States Navy began escorting transatlantic convoys and turning them over to British escorts south of Iceland, a development that could hardly be stretched into supporting a conclusion that we did not favor the convoy system. His real example, however, was the failure to anticipate that German submarines might attack our coastal shipping along the Atlantic seaboard, which they did do with heavy losses to us beginning in January, 1942.
There is no point in evading the fact that the U. S. Navy did fail to anticipate this and to take precautionary measures to cope with it. The result was some improvised and hasty stop-gap measures as described by Morison in The Battle of the Atlantic. They were totally inadequate, but it is not fair to interpret them as evidence of preference for the hunting and patrol method. The Com-
mander of the Eastern Sea Frontier did try this because the destroyers available were too few to even consider establishing convoys at that time. The convoy system was organized and established in May, 1942, and the menace from submarines was removed. Under the circumstances, this accomplishment was very creditable.
Practically all of the available and suitable escort vessels were already engaged in escorting transatlantic convoys, which were considered vital, and these escorts were not and could not be withdrawn. That meant that completely unsuitable craft, aside from a very few destroyers, yachts, and anything that could be scraped together, had to be thrown into a situation that demanded some action. Admiral King had become Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, less than a month before this submarine offensive began, and the country was still reeling under the effects of Pearl Harbor. Before the convoy system could be adopted I believe that there were some legal questions to be settled as coastal shipping operates under different United States laws than ocean shipping. The fact that the Army Air Force also got into the anti-submarine field at this time requires special attention; but first let us see how Admiral King himself felt about the convoy system.
In a memorandum to General Marshall in June, 1942, he said that “escort is not just one way of handling the submarine menace; it is the only way that gives any promise of success. The so-called patrol and hunting operations have time and again proved futile.” (Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor quoted this passage in his recently published memoirs, The Central Blue, with obvious satisfaction as his Coastal Command was later to make a substantial contribution to the defeat of the U-boat, especially in attacking boats leaving and returning to Bay of Biscay bases. But Admiral King’s memorandum was dealing with a special and urgent problem.) That President Roosevelt was like-minded with his naval commander is shown by a memorandum to Admiral King in July, 1942, in which he said “I am in entire accord with your views as to the advantages of escorted convoys. . . . My goal—and I believe yours also—is to get every ship under escort.” That goal was never reached, but by 1944 approximately 85% of all ships exposed to possible submarine attack in the North Atlantic were in convoy, a performance that greatly exceeded the record in World War I.
At that time Admiral King was in the early phase of a long controversy with Generals Marshall and Arnold over the employment of aircraft in anti-submarine work. At the risk of oversimplification, Admiral King’s position was that main reliance should be placed on the convoy system, supplemented by aerial cover and by over-water antisubmarine patrols. General Arnold wanted to set up an Air Force Anti-Submarine Command, patterned after the RAF’s Coastal Command, which would hunt down and destroy submarines independently of convoys. General Marshall, deeply concerned by our shipping losses, backed his air chief. This controversy is described at length in Admiral King’s memoirs, and' a shorter account may be found in Morison’s The Atlantic Battle Won. It is sufficient to note here that when finally settled by the President in 1943 Admiral King’s ideas prevailed.
It also may be noted that British writers who have studied this controversy from their own point of view do not seem to appreciate the depth and vigor of the jealousies, rivalries, and differences in conviction that existed between the U. S. Navy and the Army Air Force up to and into World War II. It had its roots in the frequent, violent, and often ridiculous attacks on the Navy by General Mitchell in the early 1920’s. Mitchell is now hailed as something of a prophet by air enthusiasts, but those of us who remember his numerous press interviews, magazine articles, and book also remember that as a prophet his batting average was rather low. World War II and its aftermath did much to eliminate the bitterness of that rivalry, but it still has not entirely disappeared.
We should not be very surprised if British writers miss some of these things, for it is very difficult for an American student to understand the logic behind the Royal Navy withholding its Home Fleet for its traditional task of preventing the invasion of England in June, 1944, rather than using it in support of the greatest invasion of the Continent ever launched.