How can the U. S. Navy maintain a cadre of trained personnel with a reasonable experience level? This is a question which has been facing Navy planners since the conclusion of World War II. The answer to the question lies somewhere in the area of the basic causes for high attrition resulting from reduced re-enlistment rates and the diminishing number of junior officers who choose to make the Navy a career.
Many theories have been advanced as to the causative factors behind the dwindling numbers of career personnel. The savants have delved deeply into the psychological, political, economic, and other scientific media for the answers. They have arrived at many “answers” but no real solution.
Since World War II, the professional intellectuals have attributed the underlying problems to socio-economic causes, such as too much sea duty, too little pay, a caste system in grade structure, and a lack of democracy in the service. Changes have been made purporting to rectify these ills. Duty rotation plans have been established to permit more shore duty and less sea duty. A form of legalized bribery, known as the reenlistment bonus, has achieved some advance in re-enlistments. Pay increases have been granted. The military caste system by grade is being replaced by an economic caste system based on specialty. Democracy is being injected into the Navy by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the removal of “special privilege” of officers as so capably stated by Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., in his article, “Special Trust and Confidence” published in the May, 1956 Proceedings.
Having taken these corrective measures, why then the complaints, except for isolated instances, in wardrooms from Yokosuka to Naples? Why do commanding officers look to the tenders for ships force repairs and the Shore Industrial Establishment for tender support? Having adjusted the socio-economic inequities, why is the problem still extant? The answer can be found in the above cited exceptions. It can be summed up best by a combination of very unintellectual and old-fashioned phrases such as “a taut ship,” “a busy ship is a happy ship,” “heel and toe,” “RHIP and RHIR,”1 and many others. These expressions are commonly applicable to all of the exceptions. Most of the commanding officers with high re-enlistment records are singularly “old fashioned” in matters of discipline, privilege, and responsibility.
The sociologists may raise their hands in horror at the prospect of a proposed return to an “undemocratic Navy.” But—was the Navy, during and prior to World War II, actually undemocratic? The very bedrock of democracy is the recognition of the essential dignity of the individual. Does the neosocialist approach of equal privilege for all recognize the essential dignity of the individual? Does a bribe, however legalized, contribute to an individual’s self-respect or dignity? Does a job on the beach outside of the individual’s training, experience, and interest add to his dignity? Is a caste system based on specialty less onerous than one based on attainment? Does it lend dignity to either the specialist or the non-specialist? Is the individual dignity of the accused enhanced by escape from punishment through legalism? Have these changes democratized the Navy? If not, where do the answers to these questions lie?
The resolution of a single fundamental problem will go a long way toward providing most of the answers. This problem, reduced to its essence, is that of the deterioration in the recognition of individual dignity. Individual dignity is the personal dignity of a name, a background, a personality, an intellect of distinct character, potential and attainment rather than a pattern of holes in an electric accounting machine or a number on the paymaster’s rolls. Individual dignity is that which is yours and is mine. It belongs to Joe Cherok, seaman, son of a coal miner, not to the port lookout. It belongs to Ned Smith, fuzzy-cheeked and fresh out of OCS, not to the Communications Watch Officer. It belongs to Mike Slater, Machinists Mate First, who dreams of a sheep ranch back in Montana, not to the throttleman. It belongs to Francis Xavier Kilpatrick, father of two colleens, not the Supply Officer.
This individual dignity has many aspects. It embodies a man’s aspirations, his hopes, his capabilities, and his accomplishments. It encompasses his basic urge to be needed, to be an important member of the team, to have personally contributed to the group effort, to have achieved results from his own efforts, to be a man among men.
The foregoing philosophy is not new or revolutionary. It has been generally accepted as basically sound in a democratic society since the inception of the latter concept of social organization. If it is generally accepted, then why does the problem exist?
It is because the officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, are failing to practice what they preach. What they privately deprecate in their seniors they practice on their juniors. The junior officer who grouses to his roommate about the Chief Engineer “breathing down his neck on the 8 to 12” stands peering over the Chief’s shoulder as the latter “bends on” to a still- son wrench, while a fireman leans against a stanchion. If there be any doubt as to the essential validity of this statement, it can be readily verified by observation on nearly any ship in the U. S. Navy today.
The Chief Engineer’s explanation for his actions is that these OCS kids just don’t have it. He is working himself into an early grave because he has to check personally everything himself or it won’t be done. The JO volunteers that if he doesn’t watch, the Chief will twist the stud off. Then the Chief Engineer will be really on his back. The Chief bemoans his having to take up on the stud himself but explains that he hasn’t a fireman who knows which end of a stillson to hold. The fireman leans against a stanchion to stay out of the way, wondering meanwhile what he is doing in the Navy.
The individual dignity of none of these is preserved. The fault lies with all. The juniors did not assert themselves by a concerted demonstration of capability. The seniors did not permit performance by the juniors, much less require it. The corrective action must come from the seniors. The chain can be broken at any level of the seniors. It is patent that the higher the echelon the easier it is for corrective action to be accomplished. Effective and far-reaching results can be obtained, however, at the department head and individual command levels.
As a child cannot learn to walk, if always held up to prevent falling, a junior cannot learn to assume responsibility and to function in his own right, if denied the opportunity by being perpetually supported. Growth and self assurance, both important factors of individual dignity, are functions of experience which includes elements of error and failure as well as success. The child in learning to walk learns as much from his tumbles as he does from his successful strides. The perpetually supported child has little recourse but to accept the frustrating attack on his dignity from such support. However, since the Navy is an organization of adults, individual dignity can and will assert itself. If denied the environment in the Navy in which to develop, the individual will move, at the first opportunity, to another environment where he believes his individual dignity will be preserved. Every adult American resents being treated as a child although his actions may influence his seniors to consider him as such. He will continue to refuse a naval career until he can be convinced that he is important to the Navy. Then—and only then—will the Navy become important to him.
This then is the challenge to present Navy careerists. The answer to the initial question of this article is largely in their hands. The answer is a fundamental one which must be supplied voluntarily by All Hands as individuals. It cannot be legislated or directed. It can be encouraged and fostered by all levels within the naval establishment. A sixth cruise Boatswain’s Mate First Class, who had difficulty signing his pay chit, stated the answer succinctly many years ago. He advised the author, when the latter made Third Class, to be the kind of Petty Officer that he wanted to work for when he was a seaman. The advice was sound. This advice adapted to every level of officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, is the essential answer to the Navy’s problem of maintaining a cadre of trained personnel, with a reasonable experience level. While equitable remuneration is an important factor—pay increases, fringe benefits, legalized bribes—none of these can replace the coin of individual dignity. Until the Navy again pays off in the latter coin, new careerists will be largely mercenaries rather than the more desirable man-of-warsmen who value highly their individual dignity.
1. An Old Navy expression meaning “Rank has its privileges and rank has its responsibilities.”