Conditional Surrender Or Unlimited Destruction*

I

“Biggest political mistake of the war”

—Hanson W. Baldwin

It is almost impossible at this late date to stir up any kind of argument over the policy of “Unconditional Surrender” that was accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca. Though there were many reasons at the time for the acceptance of their policy, practically everyone today agrees that it was, as Chester Wilmot put it, both “unnecessary and unwise.” Certainly the attempt to annihilate an otherwise defeated nation created a power vacuum that facilitated the expansion of Russia into Central Europe. A more limited political aim might have preserved some worthwhile contribution to the European balance required to create a buffer against the spread of Communism. But all this, of course, is hindsight; today, the burning question is what should be the political policy of the Western nations in event of war with Soviet Russia.

Both Napoleon and Hitler tried a policy of unlimited war against Russia and failed. Of course, they did not have a General Grant or a President Roosevelt to label their aims “Unconditional Surrender,” but their objective of establishing French or German sovereignty over a large economic and social bloc of Russian people was not different from the Allied policy of World War II of establishing complete domination over a conquered nation and dictating the terms of peace.

It is interesting to note, however, that in the hundred-odd years between these two magnificent failures, two other wars were fought against Russia for limited objectives. In each case, the outcome was successful and Russia was defeated. First, there was the alliance of powers that came to the aid of Turkey in the Crimean War of 1854. The objective was simply one of defending against aggression; there was no attempt to spread the conflict for more ambitious aims. Later, in 1904-05, Japan defeated Russia with the simple political objective of halting the expansion of Russia in the Far East.

It would be extremely hazardous to conclude from these four examples of history that an unlimited war against the heart of Russia would be doomed to failure or that a limited war against the Soviets and her Satellites would be crowned with success. In the first place, nuclear weapons of almost unlimited destructive capacity have changed the whole character of warfare. It is now possible to carry out more destruction in a matter of hours than was wrought in all the wars of history. Under such conditions, unlimited war against the Soviets might well be successful, and limited war might well be inapplicable.

II

“The ultimate object in war is the restoration of peace on satisfactory terms."

—Major General Sir Frederic Maurice

Long before writers began to quote Clausewitz, it had been recognized as axiomatic that the political aim of war should be within the military means. That is not to say that the political aim is always within the military means. It never is as far as the defeated nation is concerned. The political objectives of Japan in World War II proved in the end to be beyond her military means. But the political objectives of the United States were well within her military means, and peace was restored with Japan on reasonably satisfactory terms. On the victorious side, there is always the strong temptation to expand the limited political aims to conform with the full extent of the military capacity. This is dangerous; for example, when the United Nations changed their political objective of merely repelling the North Korean invasion to the complete military defeat of that country, it brought on a quite unexpected war with Communist China. On the other hand, there is the equally great danger that political objectives will be so limited or so ill-defined that they no longer form a useful basis for military operations. In the same Korean war, General Van Fleet submitted three different plans to achieve a favorable military decision, only to have them all turned down by his political superiors.

From the standpoint of the winning side, if peace is restored on anything but satisfactory terms, it is usually due to a poor selection of political objectives. Satisfactory terms are those which safeguard the national interests. But in an alliance, national governments are likely to have widely divergent views on this matter and, consequently, on what properly constitutes legitimate political war aims. In 1914, agreement was reached between the War Offices of France and Great Britain that the British Expeditionary Forces would be deployed in support of the French Army. This agreement was reached without any prior agreement between the two countries as to the political aims; the British were therefore committed to the employment of their land forces without having considered the political aim which these forces were to serve. Today, the countries of NATO have allocated their armed forces to the control of an international military command without first having determined agreed political aims beyond that of collective defense against the unidentified aggression laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty itself.

Should the Soviets start a war against the NATO Alliance, it is easy to arrive at the principal objective of the NATO Alliance: to restore the peace on satisfactory terms. But what are these satisfactory terms? Are the terms satisfactory if Russia is destroyed? Are the terms satisfactory if peace is reestablished with Communism still in control of Russia and the Satellite States? Regardless of what terms the Western nations would demand, one thing is clear: if definitive terms or political aims are not established in peacetime, then they will be dictated under the emotional stress of the confusion and uncertainty of the first few days of war. This would be too late.

III

“We have at last arrived at the point when war—in the sense of total war as we have known it in our generation—has abolished itself as a practical instrument of policy.”

—Marshal of the R.A.F., Sir John Slessor

There is no question that peace has been preserved during the last ten years by the great nuclear deterrent in the hands of the United States. Sir Winston Churchill and many lesser lights have repeatedly emphasized this fact over and over again. This atomic and nuclear potential has been and will continue to be the foundation of the security of the West. Even admitting that Lord Russell may be right in estimating that five well-placed hydrogen bombs could knock out England completely and even granting that it would be a perfectly feasible operation to eliminate Western Europe as well as England by nuclear bombardment, there still remains the American capability of launching devastating reprisal on Russia that prevents the Soviet leaders from deliberately striking the first blow.

It is at this point that the issue becomes confused. The nuclear deterrent is only a deterrent if it is backed up by the will to use it. There is a wide difference between the calculated decision to use the hydrogen bomb in war to further the aims of politics and the final desperate decision to hurl it at the enemy in the face of the threat of extinction. In the final analysis, there is no question that the will to use the H-bomb is there. The United States Strategic Air Command and the great carriers of the U. S. Navy stand ready to deliver it. The only question is: under what circumstances will they be called upon to do so?

General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has repeatedly stated that, in the event that Russia by mistake, miscalculation, or pure deliberation launches a war against the Atlantic Alliance, NATO must and will use atomic weapons. The defense of Western Europe is not possible otherwise. The NATO Council has recognized this fact and has approved for planning purposes the incorporation of “modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defense system.” But it was that, and no more. The political decision to use these nuclear weapons is too closely enmeshed in the political decision of war aims themselves to be delegated to the military commander.

There are those who say that this should be clarified. They say that it is entirely a military decision, the decision of selecting the proper weapon to achieve the military objective. A military commander should be given all the tools to carry out his mission. He should not be restricted in advance by a decision, or lack of decision, that in effect ties one hand behind his back.

In a sense, this is a very valid point. Where the issue is clear cut, such an argument would normally be decisive. But here the issue is not clear cut. This confusion stems from two facts: first, there is the lack of agreed political objectives among the Western Powers; second, there is the lack of appreciation as to what political objectives can be obtained in a war that employs nuclear weapons. An understanding of the second should facilitate agreement on the first. To understand the second factor, nuclear warfare must be examined within the context of maximum and minimum political objectives —“unconditional surrender” or the restoration of the status quo.

Broadly speaking, there are two military strategies: the conventional or classical strategy of defeating the enemy’s armed forces in the field, and the strategic bombing strategy of striking into the heart of the nation itself to destroy his centers of industry and thus to destroy his power to wage war. There is of course no sharp line of demarcation between the two. Under both strategies, air power plays a powerful role and nuclear weapons have a dominant effect. It is, however, important to note that the strategy of strategic bombing must encompass at least a successful holding action in the field. As General Gruenther has stated, he is not only charged with winning the war, but he is also charged with preventing the Soviets from over-running Western Europe.

When one considers the effect of a strategic bombing war on the social and political structure of modern states, one is forced to the conclusion that “to destroy a nation’s power to make war, destroys her ability to keep her citizens alive.” This reluctant and paradoxical conclusion is forced by the consideration of the effect of nuclear weapons upon cities.

When one attempts to visualize the targets and target system that must be destroyed to wreck the ability of a nation to wage war, there appears a formidable list of industrial plants, aircraft and armament factories and depots, rail transportation nets, ports, oil refineries, and tank farms, not to mention assembly areas, airfields, and naval bases which directly support the forces in the field. In most cases these targets have one thing in common: they are located near the centers of population—cities. Cities are the points of concentration for the power and culture of a community. Cities are the vital centers of production, the homes of workers, the points of concentration of military and industrial transportation, the nerve centers of political administration. Despite the vast territory of the Soviet Union, forty per cent of her 212,000,000 citizens live in cities and industrial settlements with an urban density of population about twice that of the cities of the United States. An atomic bomb large enough to guarantee the destruction of an aircraft factory will also kill thousands in the area of the factory. Also there is the nuclear “fall out.” Admiral Strauss pointed out after the Bikini test that “about 7,000 square miles of territory downwind from the point of burst was so contaminated that survival might have depended upon prompt evacuation of the area or upon taking shelter or other protective measures.” This area would be roughly the size of the state of New Jersey. Even if every effort is made to avoid mass destruction of populations by careful target and weapon selectivity, millions would still be annihilated as a by-product to the strategic bombing campaign. It would be quite impossible under these circumstances to destroy the industrial capacity of Russia by nuclear bombs without destroying the cities and thus the nation itself.¹

The very nature of strategic bombing with nuclear weapons rules out the minimum political aim of restoring the status quo. A civilization that has been destroyed cannot be restored. The tremendous vacuum created may eventually be refilled, but the situation will never be the same. It is even doubtful whether the intermediate political aim proposed by that great proponent of strategic bombing, Sir John Slessor—“to drive militant communism back behind its own frontiers and keep it there”—could be supported by this type of war. Strategic bombing counts on a successful holding action in the field, but there is no assurance that Russia can be prevented from over-running Western Europe. Paradoxical as it may sound, the very destructive effect of nuclear strategic bombing has deprived it of its ability to be integrated with the surface strategy of defending Western Europe. Strategic bombing, while it can “kill” the Russian nation, cannot defend the German frontier without annihilating our allies in the process.

Actually, the more one examines the question, the more it becomes obvious that such unlimited destruction would in fact be the military execution of the maximum political aim. It would cause not only the destruction of the Communist regime but the devastation of the Russian people; it would carry with it the unlimited right to dictate the terms of peace, and the inescapable responsibility of reconstructing a devastated nation. It may not be called “unconditional surrender,” but that is what it would be in fact.

What about the other strategy—the strategy of defeating the enemy’s armed forces in the field? Today, there is talk of the “tactical” atomic bomb, which means to say the atomic bomb employed tactically— which further means to say the atomic bomb used against the enemy’s armed forces as opposed to that used against the nation itself. With these so-called “tactical” atomic bombs it is now possible, according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to put the military forces out of action without having to bomb the civilian population engaged in war production. These bombs form an integral part of NATO plans for the defense of Western Europe. By the use of “tactical” atomic bombs, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) hopes to make up for the deficiencies in manpower and “conventional” weapons allocated to the defense of Western Europe.

This strategy of defeating the enemy in the field by using tactical atomic bombs could conceivably be used to support the minimum political aim of restoring the status quo. Such a course was recommended in Indochina, and this “tactical” atomic strategy might possibly have succeeded in maintaining a certain semblance of status quo in North Viet Nam, albeit bloodied and shattered. But, on the other hand, such direct intervention by the United States might have brought Communist China into the fight. The war would have become more bloody, and in the end the United States would probably have been forced to commit ground troops to stem the tide. In any event, a limited objective of sorts would have been possible. It was not likely that Russia, to spread the war, would have braved the nuclear deterrent at that lime.

In dealing with limited wars of this kind, one significant factor emerges. Both Korea and Indochina are outside the sphere of the Atlantic Alliance. Both wars were fought against Communism, but not against Russia. Under these circumstances tactical atomic bombs might possibly be employed in limited wars with limited political objectives as long as Russia herself is not involved. It is quite impossible, however, to conceive a set of circumstances in which open conflict with Russia could be limited to tactical atomic operations. Even if initially this strategy were consciously adopted by both Russia and the West, it would rapidly degenerate into an all-out contest of devastation, with each side throwing bigger and more destructive weapons at the other as the other side gained an advantage.

Thus, it is clear that, either in the context of the strategy of strategic bombing or in the context of the classical strategy of defeating the enemy in the field, the use of the atomic or nuclear weapon against Russia inevitably calls for the maximum political aim in war. Recognition of this fact, tragic as it is, will at least clear up the confusion as to whether the Western political leaders will or will not authorize the use of atomic and nuclear weapons in case of war with Russia. There is no longer any choice. By their own actions, the Western Nations have denied themselves adequate conventional means of responding to a direct military challenge of the Soviet Union. In meeting this challenge, there can no longer be a limited aim of restoring the status quo, of “pushing militant Communism behind its borders and keeping it there.” It is a case of all or nothing.

The United States and her Allies are obviously quite reluctant consciously to recognize this fact. In the first place, NATO’s political aims are developed on the assumption that peace can be kept. It would be exceedingly difficult to project these aims into a situation of nuclear war. This reluctance to recognize the unlimited political character of a nuclear war is underscored by the reluctance of the public to accept the concept of nuclear war itself. There are still far too many people who feel that it is still possible that atomic and nuclear weapons might not after all be used in a war with Russia. It is sober comfort that this belief has not been subscribed to by the responsible political and military leaders of the West.

The other factor influencing the reluctance to accept an unlimited political objective is the certain knowledge that nuclear devastation can work both ways. Any war won by the Western Nations on this basis can have but one outcome—the total destruction of Russia and almost total destruction of the Western Nations. It is this realization above all others that will force the acceptance of the unlimited political objective. It will not be a choice consciously made; it will be relentlessly imposed by the material existence of the nuclear bomb itself.

IV

“Undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another.”

—President Eisenhower

An obvious, yet dangerous, conclusion may be drawn from all this: if the nuclear deterrent succeeds, then there will be no all- out war with Russia; if there will be no all- out war with Russia, then there will be no need to formulate political war objectives.

The trouble with this conclusion is that it overlooks the wide area between the cold war and the very hot all-out war. If the Western nations can sit back and resignedly accept the inevitable unlimited political war objective in Europe, they cannot accept for long the lack of agreement on political war aims in other areas of the world, such as Southeast Asia, where militant Communism has taken to arms. Here there are times and places where Communist military aggression must be opposed by the military force of free nations. And this military force must be guided and controlled. Clearly, agreed political war objectives must be selected if the restoration of the peace is to be on terms satisfactory to the free world. The terms of Geneva and Panmunjom are the results of the failure of the Western nations to agree upon their political aims in time to translate them into effective military action.

It is time the Western nations saw the Communist threat in its world context. The Communist’s avowed goal of world domination has been documented with unvarnished honesty and pursued with demonstrated sincerity. The Soviets’ “tactic of the smile” and their efforts to penetrate the uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa by promises of some S500 million in economic credits and grants-in-aid have not changed their ultimate purpose one iota. The men in the Kremlin fully accept that their goal is a long term undertaking, and they have a* Machiavellian appreciation that the best way to eat an artichoke is to eat it leaf by leaf. It is time the Western nations realized that each leaf gobbled by the Communist monster hastens the day when the heart of the artichoke will be exposed.

There is a tendency among Westerners to concentrate upon the threat of Russian military aggression in Europe and to regard the defeat in Indochina as a French failure, the revolt in Malaya as a British responsibility, the threat to Formosa as an American project. Actually, these are the problems of Western civilization, and it is in this area of Southeast Asia that the Western nations have their greatest opportunity for political accomplishment.

The challenge is here, and the problem is great, greater because of the threat of nuclear “genosuicide” which hangs over all mankind. Today, the task is to respond firmly to the challenge of Communism in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Africa, or wherever it appears; to meet ideas with ideas and, if necessary, to meet force with force. But let it be guided force, force with agreed political objectives— objectives fully backed by the public opinion of free countries, objectives that permit some flexibility of. action other than “unconditional destruction.”

The responsibility here is twofold. For the politicians, it is to select political objectives which will form the basis of peace on satisfactory terms. For the military, it is to provide the proper forces and strategy to carry out these limited political objectives without starting a chain reaction that might bring about nuclear World War III.

The unlimited political war aim of the Atlantic Alliance has been inexorably dictated by the fact that defense is only possible by the use of the nuclear deterrent. And defense is possible only in this way because there are not sufficient so-called' conventional ground, sea, and air forces at NATO’s disposal to stand up to the tremendous military might of Russia.

At the present time these considerations do not hold in the Far East. Fortunately, there is still scope to employ conventional or atomic forces in a limited strategy, a strategy of defeating the armed might of the enemy in the field. In this quarter, there are the very considerable ground forces of South Korea and Nationalist China, the first class tactical air arm of the United States Air Force, and, above all, the United States Navy with its mobile, hard-hitting land, air, and sea elements. The only thing lacking is a clearly agreed set of limited political objectives to be used in the event force is required to counter Communist aggression in this area.

Political agreement on these objectives will be difficult to get. It is necessary not only to have the agreement of the Western powers but also the support of the free countries of Asia. To obtain the latter the Western powers must eventually reject colonialism and align themselves with the revolutionary transformation which attempts to establish national free states based on the concept of the dignity of individuals with the same set of cultural values.

The impulse to side with this revolution comes naturally to the people of the United States, who themselves are the epitome of a living revolution firmly founded on a common way of life. But this impulse should be tempered by the realization that the western way of life is not necessarily good as an eastern way of life. What the Western nations should seek is a workable union with the Eastern countries based on tolerance and respect for each other’s institutions, and freedom to choose their own way of life. The key word of this union should be “workable.” It should not be a union based on high- sounding catchwords such as “democracy,” “economic well-being,”—phrases which have entirely different meanings to societies of different cultures. Nor should it be only a formal regional pact based solely on a military “posture of defiance.” It should be a realistic union, aimed at meeting the challenge of Communism, aimed at countering the appeal that Communism has for the underfed and spiritually disillusioned masses of Southeast Asia. As Burma’s U Nu said: “War won’t suppress Communism. From the

First World War came Communism from Russia. From the Second World War has come Communist control of half of Europe and of China. The more wars you fight, the more Communism you will get. If the British had not given us our independence, we would have been Communist too.”

Obviously such a union cannot be a sporadic affair. It should be a union based on the model of the NATO Permanent Council —a union where ambassadors of widely different economic, cultural, and political societies meet continuously in an atmosphere of mutual respect. For only in working together day by day will it be possible to resolve the various conflicting views to arrive at a policy to combat the spread of Communism that will earn the support of the East as well as the West.

Once this political agreement has been reached, then the military issue becomes clear. The right strategy can be mapped out and the proper forces readied.

The war against Communism is a war of ideas. Military power cannot be effective as long as the free people continue to be divided in the theory and ideas behind the expression of their political aims. But given agreement on this score, the legal and moral position, reinforced by a power reserve, will enable the free nations to seek a resolution to the tremendous conflicts of the world by other means than an “all or nothing” policy.

This political agreement will be difficult to obtain, and risky to carry out. The results may not be spectacular. But if it does no more than preserve the status quo, it will have saved much of the free world from Communism and will have arrested the slide towards a nuclear World War III.