Part I
It came as a surprise to me in mid-August 1942, to learn that, as Commander Destroyer Squadron 2,1 had been chosen to assume command of a force to bring troops and supplies to Guadalcanal. The impact of this new responsibility may be appreciated when I say in all candor that neither I nor any of my staff had the slightest knowledge or experience in the Solomon Islands. Of Guadalcanal itself we knew no more than its location on a chart. We had much to learn, in little time, of the plan and scope of the operations to be carried out.
As an escort force commander I had, since the beginning of the war, participated in landing operations in the Philippines and Celebes, at Ambon .and Timor. These experiences had taught me that the seizure of a strategic point is no simple matter. Detailed preliminary study of the target area and close liaison between the landing forces and their escorts are vital factors. And to insure success, the landing operation must either take the enemy by surprise, or it must be preceded by powerful naval and air bombardment to neutralize enemy defenses. Knowing that neither of these possibilities would be available to me, I foresaw grave difficulties in my task and knew that we would suffer heavy losses. I resolved, nevertheless, to do everything in my power to succeed.
Japan’s string of victories in the five months following the attack on Pearl Harbor gave her control over a vast expanse of territory reaching from the homeland through southeast Asia, the Netherlands Indies, Melanesia, and Micronesia. Her first failure to attain an objective in World War II was occasioned by the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, 1942. This was followed a month later by her disastrous defeat in the Battle of Midway.
Among the naval forces which limped shamefully from this historic battle was my Destroyer Squadron 2, whose assignment it had been to escort the transport group of the Midway Invasion Force. Desron 2 consisted of light cruiser Jinlsu, my flagship, and ten Fubuki-class destroyers organized as follows:
Desdiv 15: Kuroshio, Oyashio
Desdiv 16: Yukikaze, Amalsukaze, Tokitsukaze, Hatsukaze
Desdiv 18: Shiranuhi, Kasumi, Arare, Kagero
On our way back to the homeland the transports and their loadings were dropped off: the Airfield Construction Unit at Truk, the Ichiki Army Detachment at Guam, and the two battalions of Special Naval Landing Forces were returned to Yokosuka. The escorting warships went on to an assembly point in the western Inland Sea.
By July my squadron was ordered by Second Fleet to Tokyo Bay. There we joined with forces of the Yokosuka Naval District in antisubmarine operations.
During this time Japan’s naval activities in the Solomon Islands were intensified with the aim of intercepting the line of communication between the United States and Australia. For this purpose the Eighth Fleet was organized on July 14, 1942, to operate in the southeast area. It was commanded by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, who flew his flag in heavy cruiser Chokai, and contained the following forces:
Crudiv 6: Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, Furulaka
Crudiv 18: Tenryu, Talsula
This fleet advanced to Rabaul in late July where it took over command of the area from Fourth Fleet. In addition to these surface forces, the 25th Air Flotilla was sent to Rabaul to conduct air operations under the Eleventh Air Fleet.
In May, 1942, a few Special Naval Landing Forces and Airfield Construction Units had been sent to the southeastern part of New Guinea and the Solomons. They had succeeded in building a seaplane base at Tulagi by the end of July and were making slow progress on an airfield at Guadalcanal. The latter was scheduled to be occupied by land-based planes of the 25th Air Flotilla from Rabaul, but the enemy had already reconnoitered the southern Solomons, and he was aware of our intended advance to these new bases.
Accordingly, United States forces, whose morale had been lifted by the victory at Midway, ventured their first full-scale invasion of the war by sending the 1st Marine Division to Guadalcanal. Carried in some forty transports and escorted by powerful U. S. and Australian naval forces, 11,000 Marines successfully landed (August 7) on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, where they overwhelmed the outnumbered Japanese garrisons and took possession of the seaplane base and the partially completed airfield. Several days of bad flying weather which preceded the American landings had prevented any reconnaissance activities by our Tulagi-based flying boats, and we were taken completely by surprise.
Shocked by news of this enemy success, Admiral Mikawa hastily assembled seven cruisers and a destroyer and sped southward to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy at Guadalcanal in the early morning of August 9. This was the famous First Sea Battle of the Solomons and considerable results were achieved.1
Despite the heavy damage inflicted on the enemy’s warships, his unmolested transports were able to unload all troops and munitions. Thus the enemy landing succeeded, and his foothold in the southern Solomons was established.
While these important events were taking place Desron 2 continued in antisubmarine operations for the Yokosuka Naval District. Arare was sunk2 and Kasumi and Shiranuhi severely damaged in the Aleutians by enemy submarines. Other destroyers were transferred from my squadron, with few if any replacements, so that by early August the once-powerful Desron 2 consisted of only the flagship Jintsu and destroyers Kagero, Umikaze, Kawakaze, and Suzukaze (the latter three of Desdiv 24).
As a result of the enemy’s invasion of Guadalcanal, the Japanese Second (Advance Force) and Third (Carrier Task Force) Fleets were ordered to Truk. At the same time I also received orders to rush to Truk and there await further instructions. We departed Yokosuka on August 11 with only my flagship and destroyer Kagero, Desdiv 24 having been called to Hiroshima Bay to augment the escorts of the Second Fleet. Even before reaching Truk, however, I was informed that my two ships had been incorporated into the Eighth Fleet and that I had been designated by Combined Fleet order as Commander of the Guadalcanal Reinforcement Force.
On the evening of August 15, while my ships were loading supplies at Truk, I received an important and detailed order from the Eighth Fleet Commander at Rabaul. The gist of this order follows:
a. Desdiv 4 (2 DD) plus Desdiv 17 (3 DD) and Patrol Boats No. 1, 2 , 34, 353 will be assigned to the Reinforcement Force.
b. The first landing force will consist of 900 officers and men of the Army’s Ichiki Detachment.
c. In the early morning of August 16 six destroyers carrying the landing force will advance to Guadalcanal where the troops will be unloaded on the night of the 18th in the vicinity of Cape Taivu, to the east of Lunga Roads. Each soldier will carry a light pack of seven days’ supply.
d. Jintsu and Patrol Boats No. 34 and 35 will escort two slow (9-knot) transports carrying the remainder of the landing forces, consisting mainly of service units. These transports will also carry additional supplies and munitions for use by the earlier landing forces.
Patrol Boats No. 1 and 2 will escort fast (13-knot) transport Kinryu Maru, carrying the Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Force, and join with the above group. All will unload in the vicinity of Cape Taivu on the night of the 23rd.
With no regard for my opinion, as commander of the Reinforcement Force, this order called for the most difficult operation in war—landing in the face of the enemy— to be carried out by mixed units which had no opportunity for rehearsal or even preliminary study. It must be clear to anyone with knowledge of military operations that such an undertaking could never succeed. In military strategy expedience sometimes takes precedence over prudence, but this order was utterly unreasonable.
I could see that there must be great confusion in the headquarters of Eighth Fleet. Yet the operation was ordained and underway, and so there was no time to argue about it.
There was not a moment to lose. During the night of August 15 ships had to be supplied, troops loaded on destroyers, operation orders prepared, and all forces ready to sortie early next morning. Every member of my headquarters worked through the night to complete the complicated and endless details which precede a naval sortie. Somehow, at 0500, the designated hour, six destroyers embarking the Ichiki Detachment put bravely to sea under the command of Captain Yasuo Sato. Next out of the anchorage were Army transports Boston Maru and Daifuku Maru, escorted by Patrol Boats No. 34 and 35. In Jintsu I sortied from the south channel and moved eastward to take command of the entire force.
My advance force of six destroyers encountered no enemy submarines as it steamed southward at 22 knots. The other ships followed along on a zigzag course at 8 ½ knots. A radio message from Eighth Fleet on the 17th announced that Crudiv 6 would operate as an indirect escort and that Desdiv 24 would be added to my command. Accordingly, around noon of the following day, three more destroyers caught up with and joined the convoy.
Operating on schedule the six advance destroyers avoided discovery by the enemy and arrived in the vicinity of Cape Taivu at 2000 on August 18. There they unloaded 900 troops of the Ichiki Detachment within four hours. Desdiv 17 then returned directly to Rabaul, while Kagero and two ships of Desdiv 4 (Hagikaze, Yamakaze) remained to guard the landing area.
Early in the morning of the 19th, although there were as yet no enemy planes operating from the field on Guadalcanal, Hagikaze was hit by bombs from a B-17.4 She was damaged enough so that I ordered her withdrawal to Truk in escort of Yamakaze, leaving Kagero alone in the vicinity of the landing.
Since there was no Japanese reconnaissance of the waters south of Guadalcanal, we were totally unaware of what forces might be there. Early on the morning of the 20th Kagero was bombed by carrier-based planes. She was not damaged, but the appearance of these planes was clear evidence of an enemy striking force nearby. This was confirmed when one of our Shortland-based flying boats reported one carrier, two cruisers, and nine destroyers about 250 miles southeast of Guadalcanal.
The crack troops of the Ichiki Detachment, after making their bloodless landing on Guadalcanal, attempted a night assault of the enemy’s defenses at midnight of August 20 to recapture the airfield. This reckless attack by infantrymen without artillery support against an enemy division in fortified positions was like a housefly’s attacking a giant tortoise. The odds were all against it.
Most of our men met violent death assaulting the enemy lines. The only survivors were some twenty men of the signal unit who had remained near the landing point. They made a radio report of the defeat, then managed to cross the island through almost impenetrable jungle and join with some of our Army forces which landed later. Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki himself committed suicide after burning the regimental colors. Thus our first landing operation ended in tragic failure.
I knew Colonel Ichiki from the Midway operation and was well aware of his magnificent leadership and indomitable fighting spirit. But this episode made it abundantly clear that infantrymen armed with rifles and bayonets have no chance against an enemy equipped with modern heavy arms. This tragedy should have taught us the hopelessness of “bamboo-spear” tactics.
Upon receipt of the report that there was an enemy task force southeast of Guadalcanal, Vice Admiral Nishizo Tsukahara, Commander Southeast Area, ordered my slow convoy to turn about immediately and come north. This order was followed shortly by one from Commander Eighth Fleet directing that my ships turn to course 250°, that is, twenty degrees south of west! Thus I had orders from the area commander and from my own immediate superior, but they were contradictory! Considering the situation, I decided to change to course 320°. Unfortunately, radio conditions went bad about that time and created an additional problem in that I could not communicate with either headquarters ashore. That afternoon, August 20, I sent Kawakaze ahead to relieve Kagero at Guadalcanal.
Around 1420 I got news that twenty enemy carrier planes had landed on the field at Guadalcanal. This meant that they had succeeded in capturing and completing the airfield in less than two weeks, and it was now operational. This would make our landing operation all the more difficult.
It was welcome news, however, on the night of the 21st to learn from Eighth Fleet headquarters that Second Fleet (the advance force) and Third Fleet (the carrier force) would move to the waters east of the Solomons on the 23rd to support our operations and destroy the enemy task force. This message designated the position to be taken by our convoy at 1600 on the 23rd, and our landing on Guadalcanal was postponed to the next night.
Highly encouraged by the prospect that we would finally be given support by Combined Fleet’s main body, we again steamed southward while I sent the four patrol boats to fuel at the Shortland Island anchorage. The enemy task force was sighted on the 21st by another of our reconnaissance planes. It was still in about the same position where it had been sighted the day before. Another scout plane reported two enemy transports and a light cruiser about 160 miles south of Guadalcanal. I sent Kawakaze and Yunagi south to get this latter group, but the destroyers found nothing. Kawakaze returned to the waters off Lunga on the 22nd, where early in the morning she torpedoed and sank an enemy destroyer.5 She then came under attack by carrier planes whose strafing injured some of her crew but did no damage to the ship.
My slow convoy advanced southward to within 200 miles of Guadalcanal on the 23rd. As expected there were one or two U. S. “Consolidated” flying boats shadowing us continually in spite of a steady rain. We continued toward our designated point, anticipating that there would be fierce raids by carrier planes the next day.
An urgent dispatch came from Commander Eighth Fleet at about 0830 directing the convoy to turn northward and keep out of danger for the time being. We complied hastily, but knew that this would delay our landing until the 25th. Hence, we were startled at 1430 to receive the following order from Commander Eleventh Air Fleet, “The convoy will carry out the landing on the 24th.” I replied that this would be impossible because some of our ships were so slow. Our uneasiness at the impending battle situation, the difficulties of our assignment, and this second set of conflicting orders was heightened by atmospheric disturbances which again disrupted our radio communications and greatly delayed the receipt and sending of vital messages.
On the 24th, too, enemy flying boats shadowed us from dawn to dusk. At 0800 we had a radio warning that 36 planes had taken off from the field at Guadalcanal. We continued to operate according to plan, expecting a mass attack which never came.
At 1230 we spotted a heavy cruiser speeding southward on the eastern horizon, closely followed by an aircraft carrier. These were Tone and Ryujo who, with two destroyers, were serving as indirect escort to my reinforcement group. Also, Ryujo’s planes were to attack the airfield at Guadalcanal, and 21 of them were launched about this time. Two hours later we saw signs of an air attack on these warships to the southeast, diving enemy planes, smoke screens being laid, and most fatefully a gigantic pillar of smoke and flame which proved to be the funeral pyre of Ryujo. She was fatally hit with bombs and torpedoes from enemy carrier-based planes and sank in the early evening.
Ryujo’s planes, returning from the Guadalcanal strike and finding no carrier to land on, patrolled briefly over my ships and then flew off to the northwest to land at Buka, on the northern tip of Bougainville. They reported success in having bombed the Guadalcanal airfield and shot down more than ten enemy planes.6
News of Ryujo’s sinking was not received in the various headquarters until the 25th. It seemed to us, in fact, that every time a battle situation became critical our radio communications would hit a snag, causing delay in important dispatches. This instance was typical, but it seemed to hold no lesson for us since communications failures continued to plague us throughout the war.
At about 1400 hours on the 24th, a radio message from Combined Fleet headquarters announced that the group of enemy ships located east of Malaita was steaming southeastward. This was a powerful force consisting of three aircraft carriers, a battleship, seven cruisers, and a number of destroyers.7 Bomber squadrons from our carrier group (Sltokaku, Zuikaku) attacked this force some twenty to thirty miles south of Stewart Island.8 There they found the enemy split into two units, each centered on an aircraft carrier, and took them under attack, setting two ships on fire.9 Our night fighter forces pursued, but the eastbound enemy had too much of a start in his withdrawal. The chase was abandoned as all Japanese ships reversed course and headed northward. Thus ended the second naval battle of the Solomon Islands, or Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
My reinforcement convoy, meanwhile, had been ordered to withdraw temporarily to the northeast, but, on hearing that two enemy carriers were on fire, we turned again toward Guadalcanal. Considering the battle situation and the movement of the enemy, I had grave doubts about this slow convoy’s chances of reaching its goal, but it was my duty to make the attempt at any cost. I had a feeling that the next day would be fateful for my ships.
By 0600 on the 25th we were within 150 miles of the Guadalcanal airfield. Five of our destroyers which had shelled enemy positions there during the night had afterward raced north as planned to join my warships in direct escort of the transports. These additions were aged Mutsuki and Yayoi of Desdiv 30, plus Kagero, Kawakaze, and Isokaze. Upon their joinder, my signal order was issued concerning our movements, formations, and alert disposition for entering the anchorage that night. And just as my order was being sent, six carrier bombers broke out from the clouds and came at my flagship.
We were caught napping, and there was no chance to ready our guns for return fire. The dive bombing was followed by strafing attacks. Bombs hit the forward sections of the flagship with terrific explosions while near misses raised huge columns of water. The last bomb struck the forecastle between guns No. 1 and 2 with a frightful blast which scattered fire and splinters and spread havoc throughout the bridge. I was knocked unconscious, but came to happy to find myself uninjured. The smoke was so thick that it was impossible to keep one’s eyes open. Severely shaken, I stumbled clear of the smoke and saw that the forecastle was badly damaged and afire. There were many dead and injured about. Strangely, however, Jintsu did not list, and she seemed in no danger of sinking. Such emergency measures as flooding the forward magazine, fighting the fire, and caring for the injured were carried out in good order. Luckily the magazines did not explode, watertight bulkheads held, and the engines remained in running condition. The cruiser was still seaworthy, but bow damage precluded her running at high speed, and so she was no longer fit to serve as flagship.
Meanwhile the attacking enemy had not ignored the transports. Kinryu Marti, the largest and carrying about 1,000 troops of the Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force, was set afire by a bomb hit. Induced explosions of stored ammunition rendered her unable to navigate and near sinking. Seeing this, I ordered Desdiv 30 and two patrol boats to go alongside and take off her troops and crew. At the same time I sent the other ships northwestward at full speed to avoid further attacks.
Transferring my headquarters and flag to destroyer Kagero, I order Jinlsu to return to Truk by herself10 for repairs. She was still able to make 12 knots. Now enemy B-17s appeared and bombed Mutsuki as she engaged in rescue work alongside Kinryu Marti. With no headway on, the destroyer took direct bomb hits and sank instantly. Consort Yayoi rescued her crew while the two patrol boats continued to rescue men from Kinryu Marti just before she sank. I ordered all rescue ships to proceed at once to Rabaul.
My worst fears for this operation had come to be realized. Without the main combat unit, the Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force, it was clear that the remaining auxiliary unit of about 300 men would be of no use even if it did reach Guadalcanal without further mishap. To complete the dismal picture, flagship Jinlsu had to be withdrawn because of heavy damage, Kinryu Maru and Mutsuki were sunk, and three of my other escort ships had to withdraw with rescuees. It would be folly to land the remainder of this battered force on Guadalcanal. I reported my opinion to headquarters and began a northward withdrawal toward the Short- lands. My decision was affirmed by messages from Combined Fleet and Eighth Fleet, and the operation was suspended, ending in complete failure the effort of this convoy to reinforce our Guadalcanal garrisons.
Even as we headed for the Shortland Islands, however, I received an Eleventh Air Fleet order directing that the remaining 300-odd troops be transported to Guadalcanal on the night of the 27th in fast warships. I could not help but feel that this was a hasty decision not based on careful planning. Nevertheless, I prepared the following operational order:
Umikaze, Yamakaze, and Isokaze will take the 390 troops now loaded in the transport, together with four rapid-fire guns and provisions for 1,300 troops and leave Shortland for Guadalcanal at 0500 hours under Commander Desron 24. At 2100 they will arrive at Cape Taivu to land troops and supplies. During the night they will return from Guadalcanal.
As soon as we had entered Shortland anchorage on the night of the 26th, I summoned the Army commander and advised him of my plans. The entire night was then spent in transferring troops and munitions to the destroyers.
Early next morning the three destroyers were on their way. They had been gone but a few hours when I received an Eighth Fleet dispatch saying that the landing operation at Guadalcanal should take place on the 28th! To my immediate reply that the destroyers had already departed, Eighth Fleet responded, “Recall destroyers at once. Am sending Desdiv 20 to Shortland where it will be under Comdesron 2.”
It was inconceivable that no liaison existed between the headquarters of Eleventh Air Fleet and Eighth Fleet, since both were located at Rabaul, and yet such seemed to be the case. I had again received contradictory and conflicting orders from the area commander and my immediate superior and was at a loss as to what to do. If such circumstances continue, I thought, how can we possibly win a battle? It occurred to me again that this operation gave no evidence of careful, deliberate study; everything seemed to be completely haphazard. As commander of the Reinforcement Force, this put me in a very difficult position.
I was compelled to recall the destroyers immediately, and they returned that evening. While they refueled and took on supplies I summoned the commanding officers and made arrangements for the operation to be conducted on the 28th.
Aoba and Furulaka of Crudiv 6 arrived at Shortland around 1600, and I visited Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto in the flagship Aoba to brief him on the area situation. He had preceded me as Comdesron 2 and as we were good friends there was a frank exchange of views. We agreed to cooperate closely together. Little did we know that this meeting would be our last. My friend, Admiral Goto, met a hero’s death in the battle of Cape Esperance in October.
From successive dispatches I finally learned why four Desdiv 20 destroyers had been temporarily assigned to my command. It had been planned that they would load an advance force of the Kawaguchi Detachment from Borneo and bring it to Guadalcanal to be landed in the vicinity of Cape Taivu on the night of the 28th with the remaining troops of the Ichiki Detachment as second-wave reinforcements. When this became clear, I ordered Captain Yonosuke Murakami, Comdesdiv 24, to take his own destroyers together with Isokaze and four ships of Desdiv 20 to make that landing on the night of the 28th.
A hitch in this plan developed, however, when I received word from Desdiv 20 that, because of fuel shortage, it could not stop at Shortland but would go on south and, staying east of the Solomons, operate independently of Isokaze and Desdiv 24. This further served to increase my pessimism about the success of the landing operation.
A subsequent urgent dispatch from Desdiv 20 confirmed my fears with a report that it had been bombed for two hours in the afternoon of the 28th by enemy planes at a point about 80 miles north of the Guadalcanal airfield. The division commander, Captain Yuzo Arita, was killed, Asagiri sunk, Shirakumo damaged badly, and Yugiri moderately. As a consequence, their advance on Guadalcanal had to be abandoned and the surviving ships returned to Shortland. Another operational plan had come to nought.
This made it more obvious than ever what sheer recklessness it was to attempt a landing operation against strong resistance without preliminary neutralization of enemy air power. If the present operation plan for Guadalcanal was not altered, we were certain to suffer further humiliating and fruitless casualties.
We were in the midst of a midnight conference called to discuss the unfavorable situation when Desdiv 24 reported that it was also returning to Shortland. In this decision the commander acted independently, without orders, on grounds that the battle situation had taken an unfavorable turn. Such conduct was inexcusable. Yet, if I now ordered these destroyers to turn about and head for Guadalcanal, they could not make it before dawn and would then fall easy prey to enemy planes. Repressing my fury and disappointment, I had no choice but to concur with the decision of Comdesdiv 24, but he got a severe reprimand when he returned next morning. And I, in turn, received strong messages from Combined Fleet and Eighth Fleet expressing their regret at our setback.
On the morning of August 28, Kinugasa of Crudiv 6 entered port, signalling that she came under Eighth Fleet orders to serve as flagship of the Reinforcement Force. Admiral Mikawa had made this move, realizing that the communication facilities of a destroyer are not adequate for a force flagship. I transferred at once from Kagero and expressed my appreciation to Mikawa for his timely thoughtfulness.
Early on the 29th Eighth Fleet ordered, “Use destroyers to transport Army troops.” Thereupon I directed Desdiv 24 and Isokaze, then at Shortland, to load troops and supplies and depart at 1000 hours so that landings could be carried out during the night. At the same time I ordered Patrol Boats No. 1 and 34 to embark the remaining 120 troops of the Ichiki Detachment for Guadalcanal, where they would be unloaded on the night of the 30th.
Meanwhile, transport Sado Maru arrived at Shortland carrying the main force of an Army detachment under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi which had been selected to reinforce Guadalcanal. I invited General Kawaguchi and several of his senior officers to come on board Kinugasa so that we could make plans and arrangements. The Kawaguchi Detachment had earlier achieved notable success in landing operations on the southwest coast of Borneo, after a passage of 500 miles in large landing barges. It was disturbing to me, however, when General Kawaguchi now insisted that his force should continue southward in transport Sado Maru as far as Gizo Harbor, which was just beyond the range of the enemy’s land- based planes at that time. From there they would proceed to Guadalcanal using all available landing barges. The General was supported by all the other Army officers in rejecting my proposal to transport their troops by naval vessels.
This presented a serious handicap to the whole operation, and I was lost for a solution since I had no knowledge of what orders the Kawaguchi Force had been given about transportation. I reported the situation to my superiors at Rabaul and advised General Kawaguchi to inform Commander Seventeenth Army of what had come up and see if his intentions would be approved. The conference closed with our agreement to hold further meetings concerning the reinforcement operations.
With the present unfavorable war situation, it was the Navy’s hope that all reinforcements could be transported without a moment’s delay, and we were willing to exert every effort for this purpose. Any delay was regrettable, and this one was even worse since it was caused by a conflict of opinion between our own Army and Navy forces at the front. I was in an extremely difficult position.
On the night of August 29 Captain Murakami’s four destroyers landed troops in the vicinity of Cape Taivu, as did three ships of Desdiv 11. A radio message from Guadalcanal during that day indicated that there was an enemy force of two transports, one cruiser, and two destroyers near Lunga Point. Accordingly, Commander Eighth Fleet Mikawa sent an order direct to Comdesron 24 for Murakami to attack that enemy force as soon as the landing of troops had been completed. To my great astonishment Murakami ignored this order and, as soon as the troops had been landed, set course for Shortland. This was a flagrant violation of a direct order, and on his return I summoned Captain Murakami to demand an explanation of his action. He had not made the attack because the night was clear and lighted by a full moon, and many enemy planes had been seen overhead. So dumbfounding was this statement that I could not even think of words to reprove him. Blame attached to me, of course, for having such a man in my command, and I was conscience stricken. He was transferred shortly to the homeland.
In the morning of August 30 Amagiri and Kagero entered the anchorage at Shortland carrying the advance force of the Kawaguchi Detachment and towing the badly damaged Shirakumo. I ordered undamaged Amagiri, Kagero, and Yudachi (Isokaze’s replacement) to load the main force of the Kawaguchi Detachment and rush to Guadalcanal. The warships hastily completed all preparations for departure, but General Kawaguchi and his officers were still strongly opposed to warship transportation since they had received no orders from Seventeenth Army and they were not disposed to comply with our naval order. At 1000 hours I was compelled to have the remaining troops of the Ichiki Detachment depart in Yudachi for Guadalcanal. I thereupon reported to Eighth Fleet, requesting that Seventeenth Army headquarters be consulted at once and asked to issue necessary instructions to General Kawaguchi. That night Mikawa’s chief of staff sent a dispatch criticizing me bitterly because Amagiri and Kagero had not also departed for Guadalcanal. It was lamentable, to be sure, but could hardly be attributed to anything but the narrowness of General Kawaguchi and his officers.
Patrol Boats No. 1 and 34, which had departed the previous day, were twice attacked by enemy planes but sustained no damage. They radioed asking instructions for their run-in to Guadalcanal, and I directed them to follow close on the heels of Yudachi when she dashed in to land reinforcements. I was greatly relieved and gratified when the report came in that all three had successfully landed their Army troops before midnight of August 30.
I treated with General Kawaguchi again on the 30th about the transportation of his troops, but he stubbornly refused my proposal on the ground that he had still received no instructions from his superiors. As commander of the Reinforcement Force I could brook no further delay. Thereupon, I ordered eight destroyers—Kagaro and Amagiri, and Desdivs 11 and 24 each supplying three—to make preparations for departure early the next morning. Around 2000 hours a message came from Eighth Fleet saying, “Under our agreement with Commander Seventeenth Army, the bulk of the Kawaguchi Detachment will be transported to Guadalcanal by destroyers, the remainder by large landing barges.” I lost no time in resuming discussions with the General and his officers, but they were not easily convinced. Contending that the order was not directed to them, they held out until Kawaguchi himself finally gave way; the commander of the regiment never did agree. The ponderous task of getting the troops on board the destroyers was begun at once.
It was noon of the 31st when eight destroyers sortied for Guadalcanal carrying General Kawaguchi and some 1,000 of his officers and men. All troops were landed successfully at midnight, and the ships returned without meeting any opposition. This was the third time that a complete Army unit had been landed successfully from destroyers.
On August 30 I had received the following message from Eighth Fleet: “Comdesron 3 will depart Rabaul for Shortland early in the morning of the 30th. Upon the arrival of Comdesron 3, Comdesron 2 will relinquish his command and proceed to Truk on board Yugiri.”
My first reaction to this unexpected transfer order was a feeling of indignation because I had spared no effort to fill this assignment successfully. On second thought, however, I realized that much had happened during my few short weeks in this command. I had lost many ships and men in difficult battle situations, one of my subordinate commanders had proven inadequate to his assignment, and there had been delay in one reinforcement operation because of my conflict with the stubborn Army commander. I was not free of responsibility in these matters, but there were other considerations. I had had to change flagship three times in as many weeks and, with the exception of Kagero which had been with me since the start of the war, every unit of my command had been added by improvization with no chance to train or practice together. All these factors contributed toward my difficulties of achieving a unified command. To make matters worse, I was so exhausted—mentally and physically—that I could hardly keep going. Under these circumstances it was only proper that I be given relief from the strain of this command. I was especially gratified to learn that my close friend of Naval Academy days, Rear Admiral Shin- taro Hashimoto, would be taking my place.
Early in the morning of August 31, Admiral Hashimoto’s Desron 3, consisting of flagship Sendai and Desdiv 18, arrived at Shortland. My command was turned over to him in a brief ceremony. I then transferred from Kinugasa to the damaged destroyer Yugiri and departed for Truk with heavy heart, accompanied by members of my staff and headquarters.
We reached Truk the next day and again became a part of Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo’s Second Fleet. Back once more to my basic assignment as Comdesron 2, my energies could be concentrated on the reorganization and build-up of my squadron.
South Pacific Naval Actions
Rear Admiral S. E. Morison, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, and other American naval writers have acknowledged the excellent performance of Japan’s Fubuki-class destroyers and powerful long-range torpedoes. The success of these ships and weapons was not the product of a moment nor of chance. It was the result of careful planning and training. The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars indicated that torpedo-attack warfare seemed to agree with the character of Japanese sailors. A great deal of study was devoted to torpedo tactics. Especially after the Russo-Japanese war, tremendous expenditures and effort were put into the production and improvement of torpedoes and craft to use them. Special emphasis was also placed on the training of skilled crews for handling torpedoes on board the ships.
At the Washington Conference in 1921 the 3-5-5 ratio that was decided upon for fleet strengths of Japan-United States- Britain placed Japan in a position of numerical inferiority. To offset this the Japanese Navy formulated a policy aimed at improving its night-combat strength, based largely on torpedo fire-power. Warship construction consisted of Furutaka-class (7,700 tons) and Nachi-class (10,000 tons) cruisers and Fubuki-class (2,300 tons) destroyers. These ships were equipped with four to nine torpedo tubes to handle our new 23-inch oxygen torpedoes (warhead charge of 770 pounds) whose effective range was 16,000 yards at 45 knots. With this kind of armament a single destroyer was capable of sinking a battleship. This torpedo power could be used to advantage in day as well as night actions since these same weapons had an effective range of 32,500 yards with a speed of thirty knots. Thus great reliance was placed on the offensive power of such torpedoes.
An ideal torpedoman is full of aggressive spirit and has a strong sense of responsibility and pride in his work. If a commander, he must be skilled in shiphandling, capable of absolute control over his men, and possess the determination and mental acuity so necessary in night combat. Such qualities are developed only after intensive and continuous training. Torpedo officers start their careers in small vessels and spend most of their time at sea acquiring the experience that must accompany the torpedoman spirit. There were many veterans of this field during the war, including such men as Admirals Kantaro Suzuki and Keisuke Okada (each later served as premier of Japan), and Admirals Chuichi Nagumo and Jisaburo Ozawa.
Most of Japan’s torpedo craft at the outbreak of war were commanded by qualified experts. I believe it may be said with justifiable pride that at the beginning of the war our torpedo forces were the best night combat forces in the world. But once the United States, equipped with effective radar, began in late 1942 to conduct bombardments and torpedoings without having to use searchlights, then the advantage of Japan’s fleet in night combat was drastically reduced.
My Desron 2 had been the Navy’s crack night combat force since before the war. My division commanders and skippers were brilliant torpedo experts, and from top to bottom the training and discipline of the crews was flawless. Operational orders could be conveyed by the simplest of signals, and they were never misunderstood. I knew that with such men under my command I could accomplish any mission, no matter how difficult it might be.
Since my assignment to bring reinforcements to Guadalcanal, however, most of my combat-tested ships, officers, and men had been diverted to other commands. Such replacements as I received had no chance for the training and drilling so essential to the success of closely coordinated operations. I say this not in self-justification but merely to tell of events as they occurred and facts as they existed.
On my arrival at Truk I was pleased to find that additional destroyers had been made available to Squadron 2. There were three each from Desdivs 9 and 15, and four from Desdiv 2, bringing the squadron to its original strength of ten units. I chose Hayashio as my flagship.
The general attack aimed at recapturing the Guadalcanal airfield was to be launched on September 12. The 3,000 or so men of the Kawaguchi Detachment who had been landed on Guadalcanal from destroyers and landing barges were to effect the recapture. To cooperate with this undertaking the Second Fleet (Crudivs 4, 5, 8, with Desron 2 as direct escort) and Third Fleet (carrier task force) headed southward from Truk on September 9 with the object of destroying the enemy fleet. Everyone in this large fleet was optimistic as the ships sped on their way.
On Guadalcanal the Army’s scheduled attack took place on the night of the 12th, but it ended in failure because of inadequate liaison and cooperation between our various units. The main force of our fleet searched from a point 350 miles north of Tulagi southward as far as Ndeni during the 13th but failed to sight an enemy ship. Sailing northward the next day our ships were about 350 miles northeast of Tulagi when we were attacked by ten B-17s, none of whose bombs hit. While refueling near the equator, September 15, we learned that an enemy task force was operating about 200 miles south of Guadalcanal and that Japanese submarine I-19 had sunk the carrier Wasp.11Fueling completed on the 17th, our ships headed southward in search of the enemy but failed to find him. We circled back to the sea east of the Solomons where, on the 20th, we received orders to return to Truk. We reached port uneventfully on the 23rd after thirteen days of what proved to be nothing more than a fuel-consuming operation.
Meanwhile, operations for reinforcing Guadalcanal were being pushed by Desrons 3 and 4 and minelayers Nisshin and Tsugaru, and enemy planes were damaging our destroyers with painful regularity. Failure of the Kawaguchi Detachment to recapture the airfield convinced the high command that a larger force was needed for that task. Accordingly, studies were made of a plan for carrying out full-scale amphibious operations, and it was decided to transfer Lieutenant General Masai Maruyama’s 2nd Division from Java to Shortland. Thence the main body of the division was to be carried to Guadalcanal in six high-speed transports escorted by the Reinforcement Force. The troops were to be disembarked at Guadalcanal on the night of October 14, and a general attack would take place on the 22nd.
In support of this reinforcement operation, the Second and Third Fleets sortied from Truk on October 11. A few days before, light cruiser Isuzu had been joined as flagship of Desron 2, and the newly organized Desdiv31 (Takanami, Makinami, Naganami) had also been incorporated into the squadron, which was again at full strength, and everyone was in the best of spirits.
While Crudiv 6 (Aoba, Kinugasa, Furulaka) and two destroyers were moving south on the night of October 11 to bombard the Guadalcanal airfield, they encountered an American surface force of four cruisers and five destroyers to the north of Savo Island. In this Battle of Cape Esperance, as it has become known, an enemy cruiser and a destroyer were sunk and one cruiser was damaged.12 Japanese losses were cruiser Furulaka and destroyer Shirakumo sunk, flagship Aoba damaged, and the force commander, Vice Admiral Aritomo Goto, was killed. Destroyer Murakumo was bombed next day and heavily damaged while withdrawing. Destroyer Natsugumo of Desdiv 9 went to her rescue and was bombed and sunk. It was a crushing defeat for the Japanese Navy. Enemy counteroffensives were becoming increasingly ferocious, his airpower was growing stronger, and no one could doubt that the next amphibious operation would be beset with formidable difficulties.
1. Also known as the Battle of Savo Island. U. S. Cruisers Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria, and Australian cruiser Canberra were sunk; heavy cruiser Chicago and destroyers Ralph Talbot and Patterson were damaged. Damage to Japanese ships was negligible.
2. By submarine Growler on July 5.
3. Former destroyers Shimakaze, Nadakaze, Suzuki, and Tsuta, converted similarly to U.S. Navy’s APDs.
4. These planes were based at Espiritu Santo.
5. Destroyer Blue (DD-387) was actually damaged by torpedo attack on August 22 but was scuttled by U. S. forces the next day, lat. 09°17' S., long. 160°02' E.
6. There was slight bomb damage to the field, but no U. S. planes were shot down.
7. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s Task Force 61 which was made up of carriers Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp; battleship North Carolina; seven cruisers and eighteen destroyers.
8. But by this time Task Group 18 (carrier Wasp, three cruisers, and seven destroyers) had been sent south to refuel and was not part of the Japanese targets.
9. Enterprise was the only U. S. ship damaged by aerial attack this date.
10. Actually under escort of Suzukaze.
11. Severely damaged by I-19's torpedo in position lat. 12°25' S., long. 164°08' E., Wasp (CV-7) was sunk by U. S. forces the same day.
12. Actual U. S. losses were Salt Lake City (CA-25), Boise (CL-47), Duncan (DD-485), and Farenholt (DD-491) damaged on the 11th; Duncan (DD-485) sunk on the 12th.