Italian Naval Policy Under Fascism
By Admiral Romeo Bernotti, Italian Navy (Retired)
Italian naval policy between World War I and World War II was determined by the political ambitions and idiosyncrasies of Benito Mussolini. On the surface it is true that the “Fascist government of Italy, seeking to revive the might and glory of the Roman Empire, made every effort to build a powerful navy.” This statement by the American historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, in his Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio (Volume IX, in his u. s. naval operations in world war ii) reflects what Mussolini announced rather than what he accomplished. The story of Italian naval development between wars is extremely complicated, being largely decided by the over-riding position of the newly created Italian Air Force and the optimistic claims of that youthful organization.
Lack of coordination among the Army, Navy, and Air Force resulted in the lack of an overall war plan. To understand why the Italian Navy was inadequately prepared for World War II and why Italy did not have a realistic naval policy requires a careful study of the politico-military background for a fair evaluation of historical truth.
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In October, 1922, Fascism seized power during the social crisis brought to Italy by the imminent threat of Bolshevism and by discontent for the unsatisfactory nature of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Fascism stressed the World War I victory. Supporting national prestige, it advocated respect for veterans and for the efficiency of the armed forces, and raising them from the poor condition into which they had fallen as a consequence of precipitous demobilization. The welding of the new regime with the armed forces was symbolized by appointing Marshal Armando Diaz as Minister of War, and Admiral of the Fleet Paolo Thaon di Revel as Minister of the Navy. This professional guidance was more apparent than real, for Mussolini, with his journalistic and revolutionary inclinations, intended to retain absolute control of military affairs, even when his ideas were contrary to those of his experienced military leaders. His desire to exploit national prestige became manifest in August, 1923, in the form of a demonstration of power on the occasion of the Greek- Italian Affair, which caused the Italian Navy to occupy Corfu, thus placing Italy in opposition to Great Britain and to the League of Nations. In these circumstances the Duce was disappointed for the first time by the Navy, for he wished to disregard Italy’s military inferiority in comparison to the forces and war potential of the British Empire. The Duce thought he could challenge Britain’s sea power, his concept of naval warfare being that created in the popular mind by superficial study of World War I, according to which battleships had been superseded by submarines and motor torpedo boats. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary General for Foreign Affairs met with remarkable difficulties in showing Mussolini that to insist on rejecting the British request of evacuating the Ionian island would imply serious risks. Mussolini’s misjudgment of the British strength compelled the Italian naval authorities to submit to him these unpalatable facts, which in contrast to his optimistic estimate, aroused the Duce’s ire.
At the time of the Corfu incident, the Italian Air Force was in its infancy, but Mussolini believed that it offered the most promising possibilities for development. General Douhet boasted in his theory of air supremacy (in which evident truths were confused among fantastic, one-sided conceptions): “Here is a weapon that will enable poorly armed nations to oppose the greatest industrial powers, that will quickly end conflicts, bringing destruction and terror to internal fronts, thus rendering useless land armies and naval forces!” These extreme ideas were strongly supported by the Italian Air Force authorities and by the Fascists. In line with the concept that an Air Force was capable of operating efficiently against land and sea targets, with the same type of aircraft, the same weapons, and the same courses of action, in 1923 Mussolini decided upon the unification of all air forces into a single organization, with the creation of a Commissariato dell’Aeronautica (Board of Aeronautics). The separate Army and Navy Air Forces which had developed to a certain degree during World War I were abolished.
The Italian Navy was fully aware of the great possibilities that its air wing afforded for reconnaissance over sea and for anti-ship warfare and had achieved remarkable results in tests with torpedo aircraft; hence the Duce’s decision to eliminate the naval air force was strongly opposed by the Navy Minister, Admiral Revel. This difference of opinion was the main reason for the latter’s resignation in 1925. The Duce thereupon took upon himself the Office of Minister of the Navy; concurrently the Board of Aeronautics was transformed into a Ministry, and the Air Force was set up as the third service, completely independent in organization and personnel.
Since the Duce’s dictatorial will was law, Douhet’s ideas inevitably prevailed. Mussolini felt that this air policy followed the right path to place Italy in the lead in the art of warfare at a crucial moment. Furthermore, he wished to preclude any evidence of error which might have been possiible with new types of carrier-borne craft.
A drastic law therefore placed all existing aircraft under a single chain of command— that of the Air Force.
The Air Force was made a separate service on the assumption that the greatest efficiency of air power and the greatest economy would result. Air warfare was not considered as a coordinated action with land and naval operations, but as a “parallel war,” in respect to the others—although in theory, war was defined, in its integral meaning, as an overall effort. On the other hand, the concepts of air warfare were rudimentary; the previous cooperating air forces were not much developed, and so, to avoid wasted effort, the concentration of all air activity in a single service might have appeared logical to whoever was not aware that air activity in over-land and over-sea operations requires different equipment and training, and that maritime warfare demands immediate readiness, thus proving a naval air wing as a vital condition for a sound efficiency.
A characteristic of the guidance in Mussolini’s military policy consisted in the praise of appearances, namely, a boast of strength rather than of actual military readiness.
The Navy and the Army would, to the public eye, still be a navy and an army even without their air forces, and so the Duce considered it a negligible factor to lower the standards of these services by abolishing their separate air forces. He was instead fascinated by the promising aspects of the newly-born weapon and by the enthusiasm with which General Italo Balbo of the Air Force loudly pointed out its most striking developments.
The Navy did not suffer without protest the nasty blow which deprived her of her naval-air possibilities. There was among several senior officers a strong reaction that appeared in generous polemic articles of the military press. Especially after a world war, an open conflict of opinions on professional problems becomes an indispensable condition of progress; it is a proof of vitality which should not be suppressed, but encouraged.
In January, 1922, the Italian Institute of Maritime Warfare began to conduct studies similar in nature to those of the American Naval War College. The new Institute, with the participation of Army and Air Force officers, endeavored to find a new orientation in war doctrine by studying realistic problems and resorting to free discussions in which also the controversy between the surface and air forces was subject to a thorough and fair examination.
From its beginning the Italian Institute of Maritime Warfare acknowledged the necessity of aircraft carriers. But the opinion did not spread universally in the Navy, for, at the time, it was felt by some that owing to the high speed and long range of aircraft, an intervention by shore-based aircraft would always be possible in naval operations in a restricted area such as the Mediterranean.
Mussolini, now that he had taken office as Minister of the Navy, wished to deal with the naval problems personally. In December, 1925, he therefore acted as chairman at a meeting of the Board of Senior Admirals, where the problem concerning directives on naval policy was examined. No discussion was allowed on the question of a naval air force, and the conference agreed that Italy should not build aircraft carriers—a decision that was peculiarly arrived at. This fundamental question was asked: ‘‘If the naval budget were to be increased to a certain extent, and additional millions of lire appropriated for the purpose, how could the funds be best exploited?” In answering, each officer was concerned with his own category, and there was, of course, no representative of naval aviation. The question in these terms was not suitable for an open-minded discussion. The various opinions were limited to practical details, and Mussolini’s preconceptions were thus confirmed.
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The Duce imposed specific limitations on the naval policy. Primarily, he refused to plan a primary build-up of naval forces, as he wished naval progress to be decided by programs of a contingent character; furthermore, he denied the advisability of any initiative which might cause a rearmament race. He opposed scrapping vessels after a certain period of age, as he intended that conditions of fitness and substitutions be decided case by case. In short, he wished to keep control of the Italian Navy in his own pocket.
Italian naval material was in critically poor condition. The five dreadnoughts (which became four after scrapping the Dante Alighieri) were in the same conditions as during World War I, and in the meantime their relative value had become poorer, as compared to the battleships of the other major navies, which had undergone thorough refits. In 1925 Italy had begun the construction of two large, light Treaty-class cruisers, Trieste and Trento; no other constructions of major vessels were to begin or to be scheduled for the next two years.
The projects for light cruisers of the Condottieri class had been approved. There was much boasting about these ships in whose 5,000 tons of displacement the aim was to achieve a speed of 37 knots and an armament of eight 152-mm. guns. In other navies these goals would generally require 7,000 or 8,000 tons with a lower speed. To follow sound practice, it would instead have been necessary to estimate the cost of modernizing the Navy and all additional requirements, making an accurate comparison between the existing vessels and those proposed.
At the beginning of the autumn of 1927 a memorandum was submitted to the Duce establishing the basis of a naval policy and containing the following essentials:
(1) The need for defining a theoretical program as a basis for actual plans, with the aim of reaching certain standards in the development of the fleet.
(2) The determination of naval policy according to the requirements of a possible war between “great powers,” assuming that a conflict would not be limited locally, owing to the connections and common interests of peoples in the present conditions of life, thus eliminating any mirage of a short period of hostilities.
(3) The realization of the strategic value of the Mediterranean and the vital importance of a naval strength for Italy; importance which was not lessened but only changed under certain aspects by the advent of the Air Force.
(4) The need for a coordinated employment of naval and air forces. Acknowledging the promising aspects of the air arm, the requirements of overseas air warfare were pointed out, stressing the need of aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. These vessels would act in coordination with naval operations and would provide timely intervention for defensive or offensive purposes.
(5) A balance in the build-up of forces keeping in mind the essential aims to be achieved in the naval air field of operations, especially the problems connected with the sea lines of communications, in order to ensure freedom of movements to national shipping, and interdicting the sea routes to an enemy.
(6) A schedule for the production of warships, after having taken into consideration all possibilities and requirements of naval operations, and abandonment of the piecemeal procedure of resorting to expedients. The goal would be to ensure compactness, intrinsic power, good protection, and seaworthy qualities to compete with similar ships of the major naval powers.
(7) The discontinuance of the policy of rebuilding the old dreadnoughts, since the time and resources spent in refitting these obsolete vessels could be more valuably employed on new construction.
(8) Realization of the importance of “lag-time,” for the new naval construction cannot be improvised. Therefore, the period of preliminary planning should increase in direct proportion to the limitations in the industrial output. The Italian industrial organization was not able to work miracles, and it would have been best to establish priorities for urgent items and the time required for the construction of the various classes of vessels including drafting of plans, procurement of material, building, and training of personnel. On this assumption, it was pointed out that Italy should exploit the rights sanctioned in the Washington Five Power Treaty regarding carriers and battleships. From 1927 to 1929 Italy and France respectively were allowed to undertake the construction of 70, 000 tons in major vessels.
(9) The need for harmonizing the requirements for a coordinated action. The American concept of a “well balanced fleet” was mentioned, stressing the fact that a fleet should consist of all classes of vessels, including ASW units, amphibious craft, and aircraft carriers. Although the latter were still in their testing stage in the major navies at that time, the urgent need for a prototype light carrier was pointed out, in order to gain the earliest valuable experience in the field and to exploit the authority provided by the Washington Treaty, which permitted a total of 60,000 tons in aircraft carriers.
Further, in regard to the coordinated employment of the various types of weapons, the importance of torpedo planes, submarines, and mines was pointed out. Aircraft equipped with torpedoes, a decisive naval weapon, should be entrusted to naval personnel, and carriers would be required to afford the highest possibilities of timely interventions.
The characteristics of submarines were to be in line with the ASW weapons, and mines were to be built to counteract minesweeping devices. These standards were intended for a comprehensive plan to meet naval demands, affording possibilities for opposing an enemy with a variety of forces appropriate to each occasion.
The conclusion of the study contained an outline for future naval plans, according to which a summary of requirements was to be submitted periodically, providing the Minister with the necessary data for future programs. The document was only of a preliminary nature and was intended to reach an agreement on fundamental issues. The Duce expressed a favorable opinion in writing and recognized that, in general, the ideas were acceptable; however, he confirmed his exceptions as to the advisability of a carrier.
After this first step, in 1928 the Chief of Naval Operations submitted positive proposals, based on a vast five-year plan which was meant to build the main nucleus of a balanced fleet. The importance of developing ASW vessels was considered in the same light as submarines, as it was felt vital to provide an adequate defense to the bulk of Italian shipping, which would be subject to the submarine threat. The construction of ASW vessels would have also implied improvements in the equipment required to locate and destroy submarines.
The naval program authorized in 1928 was drawn from this plan, and thus the first stage of reconstruction had its beginning. Mussolini, however, imposed the condition that the major vessels of the approved schedule were to be cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons (Washington Treaty-class) in order to compete with France in this type of ships. This meant a return to the old system of basing our naval policy on a balance of forces as compared to those of our other Latin sister. In the past a conflict against France was believed to require an effort to the limit of our capabilities due to the natural geographical situation, while the idea of waging war against Great Britain was rejected on the grounds of our traditional policy. However, the concept of balancing our naval construction with that of France was no more logical, since it was an acknowledged fact that a future conflict could not be restricted to Italy and France alone.
In the 1928 program the only progress achieved was the construction of the new 10,000-ton cruisers—slightly slower than the previous types—with adequate protection from shells equal in size to their major caliber guns. Four cruisers of the Zara-class were built. Among other proposals, the Duce also gave his written authority for a project on a carrier. This authorization was given on the basis of the up-to-date data submitted to him as a justification of the demand for a vessel of this type. The decision revived the hope that the Premier might also change his mind and be persuaded in favor of a naval air arm; it was evident that a carrier would have implied the necessity for having a fleet air wing available. The fact was also clear to the Under Secretary of Aeronautics, Italo Balbo, who had made the following statement to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the summer of 1929: “We will not let you build your carrier.” The antipathy between the independent Air Force and the Navy still persisted, for Balbo considered the relations between the two national services in the light of a perennial rivalry which he stubbornly favored. All attempts to convince him of the value of proficient teamwork when considering such problems were in vain.
During the dictatorial regime, continuity of guidance was precarious. Indeed, after a rotation in leadership subsequent to the 1928 naval program, the overall plan was abandoned, and Mussolini’s decision on a naval air force was irrevocable, undisputable, and finally became dogma.
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From 1933, Italy tried to attain in Africa colonial objectives which aroused the antagonism of the British Empire. Consequently it would have been logical for the Italian Navy to have given the highest construction priority to the most powerful battleships, but instead, interest in the project of renovating our obsolete battleships prevailed.
From 1929 onward, Germany, in accordance with the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, had started building three so-called “pocket battleships” of the Deutschland class—displacement 10,000 tons, speed 26 knots, armament six 280-mm. guns. In retaliation, France in 1932 began construction of the battle-cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, with a displacement of 26,500 tons, a speed of 31 knots, and armed with eight 330-mm. guns. In 1933, as a counter to the Dunkerque class, the Duce answered by refitting two 23,000-ton battleships, the Cavour and the Giulio Cesare. The improvement of these vessels, which were put in commission in 1938, appeared to be an excellent feat of engineering and a thorough repair job. Practically the only original construction which remained was the hull, although even that had been lengthened. Their speed was now 27 knots, and their armament, once consisting of thirteen 305-mm. guns, now included ten 320-mm. guns.
The armament and protection of these vessels, however, were still inadequate to cope with the old British battleships armed with 381-mm. guns. The Italian ships had been originally built in 1911 to compete with similar Austrian and French vessels; this concept thus limited protection and armament. The original flaws could only be partially eliminated, and the ships could never equal the British battleships which were more than 5,000 tons larger in displacement. The Italian battleships Doria and Duilio were subsequently subject to complete refitting jobs, and they were recommissioned during the second half of the year 1940.
While the first two Cavour class vessels were undergoing repairs, the 1932 International Disarmament Conference at Geneva failed hopelessly, so the Italian government in October, 1934, laid down two 35,000-ton battleships, the Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, armed with nine 381-mm. guns. In 1938, the Roma and Impero were placed on the ways. The results were two separate classes—the Cavour and the Littorio—having different characteristics of mobility, armament, and protection which prevented effective joint operations.
By preferring to renovate obsolete ships instead of building carriers, Italy forfeited her greatest possibilities (“feceil gran rifiuto”), thus eliminating an essential element required for the formation of task forces. Great Britain, still the greatest naval power in the Mediterranean, was thus allowed to preserve her qualitative supremacy, and Italy could not even rely with certainty on her Air Force being able to challenge this supremacy. Enemy forces in the Mediterranean should have been met with the combined actions of different types of ships with aircraft carriers as the hub rather than with a large fleet of big battleships. The Italian fleet would have been completed by 1943, as planned, if peace had lasted until that time.
In brief, during the years in which Italy’s foreign policy was comparatively peaceful, the build-up of her naval forces was limited to light vessels and submarines. When the international horizon became clouded, the “spine” of the Navy was tackled and the greatest financial sacrifices were made. This proves that Mussolini’s concept (contrary to a timely preparation for war) consisted in postponing a severe financial effort for rearmament in the hope that a total war would not develop in the near future.
This postponement in developing the armed forces primarily affected the already poorly prepared Army. As stated by General Roatta, “Italy’s poverty cannot be mentioned as the main cause of military unpreparedness, because under the Fascist Regime very large sums were appropriated for other purposes, many of which were neither urgent nor necessary.”
Referring to the conditions of our armed forces in April, 1939, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshal Badoglio, wrote, “The Italian armed forces, as the Duce knew well, were altogether unprepared, except for the Navy, which had a sound preparation.”
This judgment refers only to a comparison between national forces. It would not have been applied to the Navy when being compared to unknown developments in technical efficiency of the other major navies. The Italian Navy worked seriously and was animated by a high sense of duty, but the windowdressing which required the display of apparent efficiency caused many hidden deficiencies, such as an inadequate preparation for mine warfare, ASW operations, night surface operations, and faulty deployment of submarines. Satisfactory results had been achieved in daytime firing exercises; otherwise, no activity or exercise was up to standard.
In 1935, studies for radar apparatus were undertaken at the Electronic Institute of the Leghorn Naval Academy, but our poor industrial conditions precluded the completion of these important devices which, at the moment of their actual production, were still largely in the experimental stage.
The auxiliary aircraft that the Air Force assigned to the Navy for reconnaissance purposes consisted only of a few old planes manned by Air Force pilots. The total lack of naval aviation compelled Italian naval forces to carry out a training schedule based on obsolete methods, blindly assuming that an enemy would likewise have no naval air force. No thought was given to the possibility of radar.
In order to limit our fuel consumption during the period of economic sanctions, the training activities of naval forces were sharply reduced.
The choice of naval bases and their organization was still according to principles in force during World War I. Anti-aircraft defense and the logistical set-up were poor, owing to shortages of financial support.
In 1921 it had been proposed to set up an advanced base in southwest Sardinia for fleet operations in the Western Mediterranean. The base should have been located in the chain of the San Pietro-Sant Antioco islands. The project was rejected, however, as it was considered too risky and costly. Instead, the Navy relied upon the deployment of the major bulk of the fleet from the Naples naval base.
Modern war is total war. In the naval air field, the Italian Navy, without aviation of its own, was only a part. The Air Force was a myth based on a complete autonomy and strange standards in the preparation of what the responsible authorities used to call “our own war.” This situation caused noticeable differences and an absolute lack of coordination between the General Staffs of the three services. Up to 1940’ the office of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs was only theoretically in existence. The Supreme Command was established just before the outbreak of hostilities and was organized with great simplicity, as it was felt that its task should be limited to issuing broad directives to each service on strategical conduct. The concept of a combined war was only slightly understood.
The result of the above conditions was a lack of overall operational plans and an out-of-phase situation between foreign policy and military preparation. For all these reasons, the Italian Navy had a lower standard than would appear “on paper.” It was unbalanced and technically out-dated. It was, finally, affected by Italy’s unreadiness, for in modern times all factors pertaining to wartime efficiency are inextricably linked to each other.
Admiral Bernotti entered the Italian Navy in 1889, rose to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1926 and of Admiral in 1938. During the early 1920’s he founded and headed Italy’s Maritime War Institute. From December, 1927, to October, 1929, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for the Navy; from February, 1932 to October, 1934, he was Commander of the Italian Naval Academy at Leghorn; and from January, 1936, to February, 1938, he was Commander in Chief of the Second Italian Fleet. At the time of his retirement in 1940 he was President of the Admirals’ Committee in the Italian Navy.
Admiral Bernotti is the author of many books dealing with war, international relations, and naval history, the most prominent of which is his three-volume Maritime War in World War II.
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JOE FYFFE ON THE JAMES RIVER
Contributed by REAR ADMIRAL S. C. RING, U. S. Navy
During the 1860’s and the War Between the States, Joe Fyffe was in command of a Northern vessel engaged in the blockade of the James River and the port of Richmond. In the course of his assigned duties he sent to the Secretary of the Navy a telegraphic report as follows:
“Wish to report that I have been approached by the Rebels and offered a substantial payment. Urgently request instructions.”
Even a second telegram failed to elicit a reply from busy Washington, so after the passage of several weeks Joe composed and sent to the Secretary of the Navy, the following:
“Reference is made to two previous reports on same matter. Rebels continue to offer bribe for relaxation of blockade and entry to Richmond. Must have instructions as Rebels are reaching my price.”
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PERMISSION GRANTED
Contributed by LIEUTENANT (J.G.) ROBERT B. GRANT, U. S. Coast Guard
The commanding officer of a newly-commissioned Coast Guard destroyer escort in 1952, about to commence ocean station patrol duties, had given the vessel’s officers permission to grow beards during the approaching first patrol, with the stipulation that the growths be shaven by the time the vessel tied-up, four weeks later.
One of the officers took advantage of the privilege, and, on the evening before returning, sported a curly, reddish-brown affair over most of his face. Knowing that he would be shaving his cherished beard very shortly, but still wishing to test the amiable skipper, the officer asked, “Captain, may I have permission to keep the beard, since it turned out so well?”
The skipper quickly replied, “Sure, and I’ll even give you a box to put it in.”
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JUST MESSING AROUND
Contributed by COMMANDER PETER SHUMWAY, U. S. Navy
In a Franco-American Air Station somewhere in French Morocco in 1944, the American Naval Air forces present were busily engaged in turning the facilities over to the French, which included joint French and American operation of the Base messhall. At noon meal inspection, the CO was delayed by an American messcook who was paying no attention to his job of dishing up spuds, but much attention to the adjacent French messcook (Wave). The CO harumphed several times to draw the lad’s attention and found a most embarrassed boy when he saw whom he was delaying.
The CO asked, “Are you messcooking here, Son?” to which he received a stammered reply of, “Yes, Sir.”
“Well,” said the CO, “Stop messing and start cooking.”
(The Proceedings will pay $5.00 for each anecdote submitted to, and printed in, the Proceedings.)