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Lieutenant General E. A. Craig, usmc (ret).—After reading the very interesting discussion on the overland transport of German ships in World War II which was written by Rear Admiral Walter Ansel, usn, (Ret.), I happened to remember an important article written by Captain Roland E. Krause, usn (Ret), “Cooperation Between the German Army and Navy,” page 987, July, 1939 Proceedings.
Admiral Ansel writes of the Germans belatedly hitting on the solution of a ramp bow as an integral part of the hull. Apparently the Germans had the solution in 1917 but did not apply it correctly until World War II. The 1933 article describes a landing barge used by the Germans in the conquest of the Baltic Islands during World War I. In this amphibious operation the Germans employed a battalion of “Embarkation Pioneers” equipped with some so-called “Horse Boats.” Each boat could carry seventy fully-equipped soldiers, °r ten horses, or two field guns. The boats were equipped with ramp stern which appears to be an integral part of the hull.
Even in those early days the Germans Used many of the amphibious techniques which many believe to have originated with the Americans and British. In this particular operation the Germans used: coordination of anding force and navy staff work; air Reconnaissance of the objective; minesweep- of transport area; preliminary bom-
ardment of gun installations and troop areas by BB’s and DD’s; preliminary land- *ng operations to cut off approach of rein- orcements to landing area; landing of “Pioneers” and control groups; colored beach markers; formation of transport groups, each group lifting a regiment of 3500 infantry, a squadron of cavalry, two batteries of artillery, and a battalion of “Pioneers” (reinforced regiment); combat loading. Some 25,000 men were landed, and the operation was a complete success.
The Re-enlistment Treadmill
Lieutenant Commander F. H. Lemly, Jr., usn.—The current personnel situation in the fleet has created several severe repercussions within the naval establishment. The most apparent and, patently, the most important has been the reduction in proper maintenance and correct utilization of equipment and supplies. Operating with less than the pseudo peacetime allowance, coupled with the fact that a considerable portion of this reduced on-board count consists of raw recruits, has blinded us to a potentially dangerous ramification of the low reenlistment situation—we are all (in the forces afloat, at least) on a treadmill committed to a one hundred percent reenlistment rate, with an incipient disregard for the quality of the reenlistees.
Should we jump aboard? Unfortunately, bandwagons have a way of leaving the nonriders far behind, and one jumps aboard out of sheer self-preservation. The temptation is great, indeed. One hundred percenters in the reenlistment league receive the monthly kudos from on high.
Do we want every possible reenlistee? There are, undoubtedly, many who barely qualify for reenlistment in accordance with the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, Article C-7821 (14). Article C-1402 (7) further eliminates personnel whose financial obligations have not been properly met. There are others who qualify with ease but who have failed to advance beyond pay grade E-3 during their first, and, sometimes, second enlistment. Must we worship false idols and reenlist every potential “second cruise” seaman?
It might be far wiser to qualify reenlistment efforts with a weighting factor designed so as to bring out the quality of the results. We are cheating ourselves in this marathon. The misfits we reenlist today will in all probability be the misfits of next year. Shall we, perhaps, take the opportunity to select, instead of to beg, men to reenlist? The results will bear fine fruit, I will wager. The young man of today’s Navy does not want to associate with a group of wastrels.
A World with Bulk Cargo Aircraft
(See page 497, May, 1956 Proceedings)
Brigadier General Dale 0. Smith, usaf.—I have read with avid interest the outstanding article by Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, in your May issue. He has performed one of the neatest jobs of prediction that it has been my pleasure to review.
Tracing the effect of new modes of transportation in every significant civilization of history, Admiral Hayes has identified patterns of evolution which relate to commercial development as well as to political and power components of nations. Extrapolating these principles to air progress, he foresees an era when aviation will dominate all other modes of transportation. This condition will upset many power balances that have been traditionally established and may even lead to an ascendency of Russia in the economic and power struggle.
This surprising conclusion was based upon an analysis of the principle causes for Russia’s technical backwardness. Transportation difficulties in Russia have been caused by a number of geographical disadvantages, such as a river system that did not lend itself to commerce or canals, lack of natural rock for roads, lack of a coal and steel industry for railroads, and a thousand mile plus land separation of coal and iron ore deposits to militate against a steel industry. Forced labor and uneconomic practices of a planned economy are permitting Russia to overcome some of these natural drawbacks to technical progress. Cheap transportation by bulk cargo aircraft, however, would put her on a par with countries that have been blessed with surface transportation assets.
Admiral Hayes accurately foresees the period when aircraft will carry bulk cargo. The only stumbling block to such use is the matter of power and its expense. In terms of nuclear power, the technological breakthrough has essentially been accomplished. Further development and refinement of aircraft nuclear propulsion will eventually provide the economical power necessary for aircraft to compete on the open market with all other forms of cargo transportation.
It is refreshing to run across an article such as “The World with Bulk Cargo Aircraft.” The thesis is meticulously developed with wholly verifiable evidence, and well documented throughout. Moreover, the writing is clear, the logic unassailable and the subject matter interestingly presented. This is by all odds the best article it has been my pleasure to read in the Proceedings.
Royal Navy Monitors of the World War I Era
(See page 667, June, and page 1155, October,
1955 Proceedings)
Lieutenant (JG) Richard S. Pattee, usn.—I have read with interest the recent articles and the various comments on HMS Furious and her 18-inch guns. Herewith are two pictures of the monitors HMS General Wolfe and HMS Lord Clive, each with one of the ex-Ficrious 18-inch guns mounted aft. HMS Prince Eugene carried the third (spare) 18-inch gun from HMS Furious.
Since the 18-inch mounting was very much an afterthought, there was no magazine space available, so the cordite charges were stored in an unarmored, enclosed space aft, on the main deck immediately below the 18-inch gun. The shells were carried topsides; the shell containers can be seen in the photograph of HMS General Wolfe. I have no specific information, but I imagine the smoking lamp was rarely lit.
I do not have any information on the final disposition of the three Furious guns after the monitors were scrapped in 1919-20. However, I have heard that they were eventually used as part of the defenses of Singapore. This last I cannot confirm, but would be
glad to have any amplifying data.
Below is a list of the Royal Navy’s World War I monitors, which I believe is complete as far as the major ships are concerned. The third photograph enclosed is of HMS Raglan, one of the 14-inch gun monitors.
Name | Built | Main A r moment | Remarks |
T error Erebus | 1915-16 | 2X15742 | Served in WWI and WWII; Terror sunk off Tobruk, 1941; Erebus scrapped 1945-46. Guns for Terror from Marshal Ney. |
Marshal Soult Marshal Ney | 1915 | 2X15742 | Guns from BB under construction; those for M. Ney ordered for HMS Barham; M. Ney could not maintain steerage way at maximum speed of 6 knots; disarmed, used as a hulk, 1916. |
Roberts Abercrombie Raglan Havelock | 1915 | 2X147- | Armed with 14" guns and turrets originally from Bethlehem Steel Co. (U.S.) for the Greek battlecruiser Salamis building in Germany. Raglan sunk off Dardanelles by SMS Goeben (Turkish Yavuz) in 1918. Were to have been named Stonewall Jackson, Admiral Farragut, Robert E. Lee, and General Grant respectively. |
General Crawford Sir Thomas Piet on Rir John Moore Prince Rupert Earl of Peterborough Lord Clive General Wolfe Prince Eugene | 1915 | 2X12735 | Armed with guns and turrets removed from Majestic class BB of 1894-95. Last three ships refitted 1918 and each armed with one 18" gun from HMS Furious. General Wolfe had forward gun; Lord Clive had after gun; Prince Eugene had spare gun. |
Glatton Gorgon | 1914 | 2X9.4"4X6" | Building for Norway in England, taken over, 1914. Ex-Bjorgvin and Nidaros, respectively. Glatton was sunk in Dover Harbor by internal explosion, 1918. |
M21-M28 (?) | 1914-15 | 1X9.2730 | Armed with guns removed from old cruisers of the Edgar (1893) class; several sunk, 1914— 18. |
M29-M33 (?) | 1914-15 | 2X6740 | Armed with miscellaneous old cruiser or battleship secondary guns; several sunk, 1914-18. |
Humber Mersey Severn | 1914 | 2X67-2X4.7/ howitzers | Building for Brazil and taken over by Royal Navy, August, 1914. Ex-Brazilian Vavary, M deira, and Solimoes. Last two sank the German cruiser Konigsberg in the Rufiji River, German East Africa, 1915. |