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Editor’s Note: The lead article in the May, 1956 Proceedings, “Special Trust and Confidence,” by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl evoked more comment and interest than any article Proceedings has published within the memory of the present editorial staff. The comment has been overwhelmingly favorable. Significant excerpts from a number of the letters and telegrams are printed herewith.
Lieutenant R. J. Klingenmeier, Jr., usn.—The article was straightforward, nonapologetic and to the point.
My fellow classmates, regular officers of the Army and Navy, here at the Princeton Graduate School are so enthusiastic about it that they would like copies to distribute to their associates in both services.
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Captain Joseph B. Love, usa.—I congratulate Colonel Heinl on a timely, forthright, simple, and commendable presentation about what is wrong with our Officer Corps. It was outstanding.
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Captain A. G. Beckmann, usn (Ret.).— Lieutenant Colonel Heinl gives an unusually clear picture of the present-day “loused-up” officer status in the Armed Forces.
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Vice Admiral Charles Wellborn, Jr., usn, Commander Second Fleet.—I was very much pleased with the lead article entitled “Special Trust and Confidence,” by Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr., usmc, and also by another article, “An Old Weapon for a New Problem,” by Lieutenant Raymond A. Komorowski, usn, and Lieutenant (jg) John W. Weiser, usn. Both of these articles seem to me to have the right approach for getting the Navy out of its current doldrums, and I hope the Naval Institute will continue to feature such articles in the Proceedings.
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Professor of Naval Science.—I consider the Heinl article contrary best interests naval service. In printing article you may have done great damage to NROTC effort to motivate students for Navy career. Copies received for distribution NROTC students being returned by mail.
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Colonel C. S. Thorpe, usaf, (Ret.), Tucson 12, Arizona.—It is a rare thing when I write a letter to the editors of anything, but I feel that I would be derelict indeed if I should fail to comment on Colonel Heinl’s article.
To my mind, an article of this type is well worth ten years’ membership in the U. S. Naval Institute.
I have one suggestion; namely, that every effort be made to have this article brought to the attention of all members of all the Service Academies, all student officers in all branches of the military establishment, and the commanders at all possible levels.
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C. P. Tomlinson, Helena, Montana.— This article is more to the point than any
article I have read in many a moon.
Under ECA I was a Foreign Service Reserve officer Class II in Europe, and from what I observed I can only feel that the trouble is basic in the type of personnel picked out by our various departments. To start with, many of the men were not gentlemen in any sense of the word, and the women were worse!
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Robert L. Tanner.—After a flood of articles advocating increased pay, faster promotions, fringe benefits, choice of duty stations, and so forth, as a panacea to halt the increasing resignations; Lieutenant Colonel Heinl’s article comes as a welcome relief.
Incidents such as the Colonel describes do more than cause senior officers to long for the “old days” when an officer’s word was accepted per se; the gradual lessening of an officer’s “Special Trust” is the most important single factor in driving young men to civilian pursuits! Many senior officers will disagree, stating that the low pay is most often mentioned. True, it is often mentioned but simply because most juniors are disinclined to mention these other factors for obvious reasons.
The blame for these conditions should not fall solely upon senior officers, but also upon the Department of Defense, which in its zeal to unify the services for over-all strategic policy purposes has created a monster of entangling, picayune regulations, strangling the initiative to seek command.
Recently I had to decide for myself whether to remain on active duty or to return to civilian life. As this is the most frequently-discussed subject among junior officers, I had ample opportunity to get many opinions from my contemporaries. The overwhelming reasons for leaving the service were not pay, benefits, and the like, but lack of challenge, lack of respect, and lack of a goal in which they could be proud.
The lowering of standards for a commission with the resulting lowering of standards for promotion does not go unnoticed. Neither does the situation where very senior officers are treated by civilian representatives of the United States with less respect and common courtesy than they would treat a total stranger. Nor does the fact that a Commanding Officer has less authority to use his discretion than ever go unobserved by these same officers who the Navy claims such a desire to retain.
I sincerely hope that Colonel Heinl’s article will be read by men who are in a position to act quickly on the problems he presents.
It is no doubt too late to save many officers now on active duty, but for those yet to come, make that one stripe hard to get, something to strive for, and worth the winning. See to it that rules which degrade the status of officers are promptly repealed and acts that do so are swiftly punished. See to it that selectivity is the primary watchword for promotion. Above all, return that “Special Trust.” Then all the cajoling in the form of pay, fast promotion, and benefits may be considered secondary. Then men in any quantities required will be eager to follow a career in the Navy. Then and only then will this problem be solved.
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Robert M. Trent.—Lieutenant Colonel Heinl’s concern over the reluctance of the service to accord commissioned officers the responsibility and privileges to match the “special trust and confidence” mentioned in their commissions is understandable—but his proposed solutions are not all entirely practicable.
Colonel Heinl bewails the fact that the large size of our Armed Forces precludes the establishment of a small, mutually-acquainted “band of brothers” whose integrity would be unquestioned. The only solution to this would be a reductioh in the size of the Armed Forces—surely Colonel Heinl would not advocate a reduction in force which provided a small, elite officer corps but also resulted in a military establishment too small to meet our world commitments of today.
Another corrective measure advocated by Colonel Heinl is the thorough indoctrination of officer students in the proper conduct and behavior expected of officers. However, a.s Colonel Heinl himself points out, the fundamental attitudes of honesty and integrity are acquired very early in life—probably 1° childhood. Therefore, the indoctrination given officer students is too late. Even the full-time four-year service academies don’t get the officer candidates until they are about eighteen years old with habits and traits already well formed by family and early environment. The ROTC trained officers are actually under military supervision for only a very small portion of their four college years. Add to these the thousands of wartime officers commissioned en masse from various officer candidate schools and other sources and the integrity indoctrination problem becomes staggering. Therefore, except for certain superficial indoctrination courses, the services are not given any real opportunity to mold the character of officer students. In other words, the services are forced to accept the integrity standards already established by our American democracy in the homes and local communities throughout our land. That this standard is not high is unfortunately true. Until the integrity and behavior instilled in American youths by family and school are improved, the services have no choice but to protect themselves by the restrictive measures deplored by Colonel Heinl.
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Lieutenant Commander P. H. Sullivan, usn.—Colonel Heinl’s treatment of an irritating problem has made obsolete countless thousands of words previously published on officer morale. He has identified and discussed the problem; he has proposed the solution. As I read the article I could feel my temperature rise and my blood pressure increase as each case reminded me of a direct parallel in my own experience. I should like to contribute an experience of mine that the Colonel may add to his already impressive collection.
At the completion of my last tour overseas, when I received my orders I received the usual check-off list; because I was living in quarters under the control of the Army I received another and far more formidable Army check sheet. I began the weary procedure of getting the initials of countless enlisted men (or the initials of their foreign civilian assistants). I did this with resignation and with as much grace as I could muster, but my equanimity failed me on the last hurdle. This last initial was to insure that my quarters were shipshape upon my departure and was to be obtained from a representative of the local Army medical activity. In order that I might pass this test with a 4.0, we held an all-hands field day in true naval fashion. In addition to my wife, myself, and our regular maid, we hired two extra maids for the day. We scrubbed, swabbed, waxed, polished, and burnished those quarters until I feared for that last coat of varnish. Some twelve hours later the sun rose on our last day overseas. We were ready to go.
The last-minute details were still very much in the fore. Did I have in good order and correct form the following: the health and immunization certificates, passports, cabin assignments, boarding passes, customs declarations, my own orders, dependents’ orders, declaration of non-pregnancy, so many but no more American dollars, an approved fountain pen (because the MSTS disbursing officer had ruled out ball-point pens on travelers checks), etc., etc. I still had a few problems: the keys must be returned to Sgt. So-and-So; the pick-up truck which was to carry our ten pieces of luggage was lost somewhere; the boys had to be convinced that bamboo fishing poles would not be stowable in the staterooms; (there would be no fishing over the fan tail), and other little problems which could be enumerated.
Into this far-from-tranquil scene strode the Army medical representative, the last man on the check off list. Spic and span in his little white coat, which concealed his corporal’s stripes, he began his inspection with many busy notations on his clip board. In the last-minute bustle some dust had settled, as dust will, and a few bits of debris had come adrift. This “deplorable” situation our maid was trying to correct, each stroke of her broom interspersed by an apprehensive glance at the figure of authority in the white coat. In a few minutes without so much as a “by your leave” he airily announced, “I got half a mind not to okay this place and withhold your release.”
That did it. My reply, a little more vigorous than grammatical, was “Half a mind is precisely what you got young man if you think that you or anybody else in the
United States Army can keep me from carrying out my orders. I have read very carefully these orders signed by the Chief of Naval Personnel, and nowhere does he state that they be modified by an Army pill roller. Tell me your boss’s name, rank, and telephone number so I can relieve you of the onus of carrying that complicated thought to him.” He did; I did; we left. Need I add that we boarded our ship on schedule.
This little anecdote illustrates one point brought out by Colonel Heinl. You can do something about it if you will.
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Commander H. W. Osterhaus, Jr., usnr.—I would like to express my congratulations to you for publishing this timely and excellent article. For a number of years I have watched the prestige of our officer corps go down and have realized that we ourselves are the ones doing the least to maintain that prestige. We have cried to the Congress and asked for pay raises, but we still have not done anything to build ourselves up from within.
I personally can give places and incidents which will bear out the statements of Lieutenant Colonel Heinl regarding the absurd and degrading station orders printed or published by some Commands.
It is true that attempts have been made to bring some of that much-maligned “Old Navy” back into this present oversized establishment, but by and large they have not had the aggressive support necessary.
We should get back to our Navy of yore where the struggle for promotion did not overshadow that most necessary of all duties—that of leading and teaching the younger officer and building from within a corps that is in fact one in which we place “Special Trust and Confidence.”
Well done, Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl, USMC!
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Captain B. H. Shupper, usn, Commander Destroyer Division 601.—Both Lieutenant Colonel Heinl and the Naval Institute are deserving of the highest credit for his article. I know that many officers share his views but have lacked either the literary ability, the gumption, or the inspiration to set them forth in writing. I believe you have performed a great service in publishing his essay.
I have decided that it is time for me to stop counting on access to a shipmate’s or the wardroom copy. Enclosed is my check and an application for membership.
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Commodore John F. Rees, usn (Ret.).— I think it is the finest appreciation of the current problem that I have read or heard discussed anywhere.
I have two minor criticisms: (a) The “Old Tuscarora” had seven decks and no bottom —in my day. (b) Colonel Heinl omitted the famous old Marine Corps Saying “Regulations were made for Second Lieutenants and damn fools.”
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William C. Patterson, (former Lieutenant Commander, usn).—Lieutenant Colonel Heinl’s article was a bombshell, a refreshingly true estimate of the situation, long overdue for telling! I admire your courage in printing the article since it probably will be the most controversial piece that has appeared in a long time.
Two years ago I resigned my commission with regret. Although I left the service primarily because of family reasons, I cannot deny that the picture of service life in Colonel Heinl’s article was a contributing factor. As a matter of fact, I tried to write a similar article but could not find the right words. I felt like one of the blind men examining the elephant. The service is so large, and what good could one man do? But Colonel Heinl has written a truly remarkable article, considering its implications, and I wish both him and the Proceedings good luck in having the fortitude to write and print an honest criticism of the service.
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Captain Archibald McLeod (mpo), usa. —Colonel Heinl lists a half dozen causes for this poor attitude. I believe he left out the most important one—to wit—the general relaxation in all services of not just “military courtesy,” but plain everyday “common courtesy,” the kind taught to the most of us by our mothers and fathers.
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Chief Journalist J. D. Harrington, usn.—Colonel Heinl documented his case effectively. No professional can disagree with him in any great degree. Enlisted men, however, can add a question: Why stop there? Even the most casual survey, conducted anywhere in today’s Navy, will elicit from enlisted men enough evidence that, not only do they feel they are not held in respect as required, many of them feel that they do not even receive justice.
To carry out Colonel Heinl’s worthy and needed objectives, and extend them far enough so that all hands, officer and enlisted, will know that they command respect when they start demanding it, I propose this. From the top to the bottom, authorities might initiate a “gathering of observations.” Let commanding officers inform all hands that they will welcome, in writing and unsigned, the directing of attention by all hands to any station incident, regulation or policy that reflects poorly on the honesty, integrity, or position of petty officers or officers. Though these would be of a “suggestion box” nature, and undoubtedly would attract a great number of worthless contributions from the chronic gripers, I feel sure that each commanding officer would learn of many things not ordinarily brought to his attention, matters which could and should be remedied by a simple “Change it!” from his lips.
By allowing such a contribution of “observations” for, say, a two-week period, and repeating the process six months later, a commanding officer would be able to stamp out the minor matters which, unless checked, snowball into a deleterious rotting of morale. An officer who has to show his identification card four times while making four separate purchases in uniform at a Navy Exchange store suffers no less a loss of pride in self and service than does a petty officer who is told by a seaman sentry to “Hold it up there, Mac! Let’s see your card!”
These matters do not ordinarily come to the attention of the man empowered to rid his command of them because not one in one hundred enlisted men will feel strongly enough about them, nor have the moral courage, nor the all-important feeling of freedom from reprisal to carry them to request mast. Only a welcoming of “observations” by the top man will trim dignitylowering policies, regulations and conditions from the daily life at a command.
As to all arguments, there is a counterargument to the proposal outlined above. The chain-of-command is bypassed, one might say, or a “Gestapo atmosphere” is created. To this I can only paraphrase the statement of a Navy captain who said in private conversation recently that “if a man feels a certain way about something, and that feeling can prove harmful to the unit or the Navy as a whole, I want to know about it. Whether he’s right or wrong does not matter. If he’s wrong I’ll show him where he’s wrong. If he’s right, I want to take action, fast!”
America’s Iron Ore Needs
(See page 385, April, 1956, Proceedings)
Mr. Hugh Harley.—With proper respect for the sincerity and accuracy of the writer I must take issue with the viewpoint presented in this article.
This is typical of a very widespread and dangerous fallacy that we must depend on importation of iron ore and some other critical minerals by ocean transport in time of future war. It is inherent in the policy of the metallic industries of this country of using nothing but cream and ignoring almost inexhaustible supplies of good whole milk immediately at hand. Just as studies have been made of extraction of oil from shales in case of necessity so Federally financed studies should be made of optimum extraction from the lower grade ores upon which our metallic industries were founded in generations past.
1. Europe’s steel industry generally depends on lower grade ores and would find limitless wealth and hope in our ignored reserves in the United States of comparable ores.
2. Somewhere in my files I have some figures on the percentages of metal in various ores which Hitler’s State used during
World War II, and I believe he finally got down to ores with an FE-content of 12 or 13% before the end. Yet our steel men continue to drool over 69% ores from Brazil or Venezuela or Chile or Africa (Republic Steel) or Laborador or where have you.
3. I don’t know how far down the Japanese got when they were scraping the barrel, but I remember seeing some war-made ingots that found their way here, and I think they included carbonized grasshoppers.
4. When an executive of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company back in the ’30’s, I had a hand in getting rid of a huge acreage of iron ore reserves in the central Pennsylvania counties as a means of cutting our tax bills. We sold to the State of Pennsylvania for forest preserves, etc., reserving mineral rights for fifty years, if I remember correctly. Those reserves had been greedily collected by the corporate pirates of the Nineteenth Century who preceded us. We got $3 or $3.50 an acre from the State and of course were relieved of the tax bill. The rich ore of Messaba had changed the picture.
5. We have made some feeble moves in fostering steel mills at a number of points abroad but fuel and ore and the auxiliary materials go together and I wonder at the defective economic base of some of these enterprises, particularly in wartime. Reversing the picture would we be justified in continuing to ship Chilean ore and maintaining protection for the transit over the long sea routes under wartime conditions where our Navy and airforce were desperately needed in other theatres?
6. I feel the Bureau of Mines has not only stultified itself but has challenged Providence with its ingrate moanings about “exhaustions” of our mineral resources. We have doubtless all noted the reinterated despair over elimination of our oil resources. I have also in mind a manganese field in northern Arkansas out of which the local citizenry has been making very comfortable living over four or five generations. Report after report has claimed exhaustion and lo, next year the corpse revives and continues to send the stuff to market.
Strategically let’s take a long look at the “good the gods provide us.” I believe any intelligent group will quickly find the facts and inspire a re-study of the problem of economic wartime supply.
William Schuman, Radio Officer, SS Arlington.—I was very interested in your April, 1956 Proceedings, particularly the articles “America’s iron ore needs” by John Bunker and “The American Merchant Marine and WW III” by Commander John Collins, USNR. I was glad to see attention being focused by a magazine of your standing on the tragic state of our U. S. Merchant Marine. The Proceedings are received aboard my vessel with much interest by most all hands.
Mr. Bunker presents a very interesting and competent study, but there seems to be one important point that evokes no serious comment from the author. In the final analysis, this point could be the key to whether these foreign ore deposits will ultimately reach our steel mills in the event of war or national emergency. And that is: the absolute dependence by American steel producers, with the sole exception of Bethlehem steel, on foreign bottoms to transport this ore to the United States (Great Lakes excluded).
It would appear reasonable to assume that as a result of our shipping experiences in both World Wars I and II we learned conclusively that we were unable to depend on the Merchant navies of our allies to carry our supplies. This conclusion is still valid in spite of agreements such as the NATO emergency shipping pool (classified), and it would be a prudent defense measure for the United States, as the major steel producer of the world, to maintain a fast, efficient, and modern ore carrier fleet to insure the transport of vital foreign iron ore in peace and war. Mr. Clarence G. Morse, Maritime Administrator, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, in testimony before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the 84th Congress on February 3, 1956, pointed out the fact that the U. S. Merchant Marine is particularly deficient in ore-carrying vessels.
Mr. Bunker states on page 388 “the New England Collier Fleet (now numbering eighteen modern vessels) has been partly engaged in carrying coal overseas and returning with ore from sources as far distant as Vitoria, Brazil, and Narvik, Norway. These colliers have a total lift of about 180,000 tons.” This statement merits analysis closer than Mr. Bunker has given to it.
It is difficult to understand on what basis Mr. Bunker rates these vessels as “modern.” The Collier fleet, with the exception of two vessels, the SS Pocahontas Fuel and the SS Oakey L. Alexander are all vessels of the EC-2 Collier class or converted liberty ships. They were built Circa 1945 with 2500 hp steam reciprocating engines with an average speed of ten to eleven knots. Rear Admiral R. E. Wilson, Deputy Commander, MSTS, Dept, of Defense, in testimony before the special subcommittee on marine subsidies of the senate committee on interstate and foreign commerce in June, 1953, described our liberty fleet as too slow for modern needs and noted other qualitative deficiencies in our merchant vessels of today.
The present day Collier fleet is composed of the following vessels:
A—Mystic SS Division, Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates (all EC2 Colliers)
1— SS Arlington 5—SS Malden
2— SS Boston 6—SS Kewton
3— SS Concord 7—SS Reading
4— SS Lexington 8—SS Winchester B—Pocahontas SS Co.
1— SS Pocahontas Fuel VCE Collier
2— SS Oakey L. Alexander VCE Collier C—Sprague SS Co. (all EC2 Colliers)
1— SS Plymouth 3—SS P. W. Sprague
2— SS Penobscott 4—SS Seaconnet D—Staples Coal Co.
1—SS Berwindvale EC2 Collier
E—M. & J. Tracy Co.
1— SS Michael Tracy EC2 Collier
2— SS Thomas Tracy EC2 Collier
The only two vessels of our Collier fleet which can be classed as modern would be the ships of the Pocahontas SS Co. Both these vessels are VC2 (Victory) Collier type of 6000 hp with gear turbine propulsion machinery with an average speed of seventeen knots. However, the SS Oakey L. Alexander is a coal burner and can be used only in limited coastwise trade because of bunker limitations. At the present moment only sixteen of these vessels would be available for overseas trade. With the present industrial boom and demand for coal and its byproducts all these vessels have been actively engaged in the coastwise trade for the last year and present indications are that they will continue here for at least the remainder of this year. The amount of foreign ore imports carried by our Collier fleet during 1955 and the first three months of 1956 is so insignificant as to be virtually non-existent.
An examination of the statistics showing dry-cargo traffic between the U. S. and Norway for the two years 1953-54 point out the serious situation regarding U. S. dependence on foreign bottoms for our iron ore imports.
Dry-Cargo Traffic Between U. S. and Norway 2 Years, 1953-54 tons of 2,240 pounds
| Total All | U. S. | Flag | Norwegian Flag | Other Flags | ||
| Flags | tons | per cent | tons | per cent | tons | per cent |
Liner in (to U. S.) | 466,685 | 145,872 | 31.3 | 305,298 | 65.4 | 15,515 | 3.3 |
Tramp in (to U. S.) | 2,845,180 | 123,959 | 4.4 | 358,455 | 12.6 | 2,362,766 | 83.0 |
98.5% of the tramp in (to the United States) and a small portion of the liner in (to the United States) were Swedish ore shipped through the Norwegian Port of Narvik. A grand total of 2,928,000 tons of Narvik ore were shipped in both classes of service. Our position in the increasingly important Venezuelan ore trade is hardly any better. Of all the new “super” ore carriers
recently built and being built not one will be registered under the American flag although they are virtually all substantially owned by American Capital and will all be engaged in U. S. import trade.
At this point it would do us no harm to note once again the preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936: “It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a Merchant Marine;
A—sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne and a substantial portion of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times,
B—capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war and national emergency,
C—owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable and
D—composed of the best equipped, safest and most suitable type of vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.”
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, usn (ret.)— Captain Blackburn is right in calling attention to the seriousness of omitting the good old Eagle from the list of “Hydro ships” mentioned and pictured in Captain Cochran’s article, for the Eagle, in her day, was the most well-known of all the survey ships engaged in the Caribbean area. During the course of her career, she also became involved in most of the revolutions which from time to time occurred in that once turbulent section of the world.
After the 1906-07 period mentioned by Captain Blackburn, the Eagle continued in similar work for another ten years. It was my good fortune, as a lieutenant, to relieve the late Lieutenant Commander A. K. Shoup, usn as her captain, in July, 1916. Not only was she my first command but one of the most independent I ever had.
After a summer overhaul at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., I took her on a slow and stormy passage to Guantanamo, and then resumed survey work in the Port de Paix, Mole St. Nicolas, Gonaives area of northwest Haiti. The ship was once more in Samana Bay, making a reconnaissance to determine the possibilities of a naval station there, when the United States established a military government to pacify the strife-torn Dominican Republic.
Returning from Haiti to Guantanamo for fuel and provisions in February 1917, after what proved to be the old ship’s final bit of survey work, we were ordered by CNO to report to the CinC Atlantic Fleet for duty, and, by him, as the result of a serious revolutionary outbreak in Cuba, to proceed to the north coast of that island “to protect American life and property.” The execution of these orders found us, for a time, preserving law and order in the city of Nuevitas, which had been abandoned by all law enforcement agencies, and, later, protecting American sugar mills at Manatf, and at Preston and Banes in the Nipe Bay area.
The entry of the United States into the war, in April, 1917, found the Eagle at Manatf, where her white and spar-colored painting was promptly changed to “war color” with some slate-gray paint borrowed from the sugar mill. She was soon assigned to the “Caribbean Patrol Detachment,” and, as one of her duties, co-operated with the Military Governor of Santo Domingo in patrolling the Dominican coast. Later, we became occupied with the training of the Cuban Navy and in arranging for its cooperation in the Carribbean patrol.
In the late Fall of 1917, at Galveston Texas, the Eagle, with a complement of regulars, exchanged crews with the betterarmed yacht Dorothea, newly arrived from the Great Lakes, manned by Naval Militia and Reserves. The active career of the famous Eagle, or Aguila as the Cubans called her, ended not long thereafter.
The Ship and the Shore
(See page 1, January, 1956 Proceedings)
Captain Philip R. Osborn, usn.—Chief Quartermaster Stanley’s article prompts me to offer some additional suggestions regarding enhancing the Dignity and Prestige of the Service.
Much has been written in recent years on Post War problems of morale and leadership and changing attitudes, as affecting the Armed Forces. In a letter on this subject made public by the Chief of Information, Admiral Robert B. Carney, then Chief of Naval Operations, mentioned some of the small things that have been done in the direction of preserving the dignity and satisfaction of a service career; such as the restoration of the officer’s dress uniform and sword, and other items for future consideration.
In line with this policy, it is felt that it would be beneficial to restore certain omissions and changes in distinctions introduced in the 1948 Navy Regulations and otherwise since the war. In my opinion, these changes, though minor, constitute an erosion of our vast body of tradition, and by removing certain outward manifestations of the dignity of the service, do an intangible harm. Their restoration, likewise would have a significant effect and keep alive the customs and traditions upon which our morale is formed and must be stayed.
First among these items is the omission of any provision for the senior officer’s pennant, formerly provided for in the old regulations. The display of the SOP pennant would not only afford significant recognition of his identity but permit rapid identification by incoming ships, which is now lacking.
Second, is the change that did away with the salute to the quarterdeck, per se.
Third, is the removal of buglers as an official rate, and the consequent lack of this colorful and stirring accompaniment to our daily lives which gave a sense of order and significance to the established routine.
With the risk of being labelled a “reactionary,” I believe that “Alan does not live by bread alone,” and that the armed services should embody in themselves, even in this new and complex age, the outward and visible manifestations of the power and majesty of the Nation we serve.
The Ewing Mutiny
(See page 62, January, 1956 Proceedings)
Commander John Lyman, USNR.— Alessrs. Emmons and Votaw have provided a most scholarly and at the same time readable description of this mournful incident. Since this version will undoubtedly become the standard account of the affair, it seems desirable to amplify the reference on Commodore Jones’ memorandum to the only previous sentence of death by a court martial for a crime short of murder.
The authors in a footnote suggest that he had the Somers case in mind. However, the Somers case involved not a court martial but summary action by a commanding officer (who as a result stood trial by a court martial himself), so that it is necessary to look elsewhere for the capital crime referred to by Commodore Jones.
The case in question appears to be the execution of Samuel Jackson, a seaman of the U. S. sloop St. Marys, at Anton Lizardo, near Vera Cruz, Alexico, on 17 September 1846. Jackson had left some article of his clothing about the decks of the St. Marys; an officer threw it over the side; and Jackson knocked the lieutenant down. He was convicted on the three counts of striking his superior officer, while in the execution of his office; treating with contempt his superior, being in the execution of his office; and uttering seditious and mutinous words.
There is a full account of the execution by the Reverend Fitch W. Taylor, chaplain of the squadron, in his book The Broad Pennant published in 1848.
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Arthur Godfrey at 10:00 a.m., May 23, 1956, over WCBS (New York) and CBS Network:
“Oh, say, I would like to call the attention of my old shipmates—the officers and enlisted men of all the branches of the service, any of whom are listening, any of whose women folks are listening; see if you can get hold of a copy of the May issue, 1956 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. There’s a very beautiful painting of the Forrestal, the carrier Forrestal, on the cover.
“The very first article—the very first article is by Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Heinl—H-E-I-N-L— Heinl, Jr., of the U. S. Marine Corps. The article is entitled ‘Special Trust and Confidence.’ I wish that everybody in the Service and out of the Service would get that and read it. It is right down the line. It is just pure fact and truth and a marvelous thing for everybody to know, to read, and understand.