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Captain C. H. Amme, Jr., USN.—Mr. Eugene Wilson’s article “Operation World Peace” has left me completely confused. In one paragraph he states that, “weapons are so destructive and impossible to control that they can only be used in total war. Unless we can find a way to return to limited or controlled pressures as a means of settling disputes we may as well resign ourselves to the fact that the current conflict is so basic it can only be resolved by resort to war. This reduces the problem to questions of how, when and where.” The author then proposes as an alternative to this horrible state of affairs, “a return to first principles in the hope of discovering some other way out” and then recommends as a practical step, that the United States should convene an international peace conference “to rule out lethal bacteria, poison gas, nuclear fission or fusion, and other weapons which unnecessarily hazard non-combatants.”
This is precisely what the Russians have been advocating since the end of World War II. As recent as June 22, 1955, Mr. Molotov, addressing the United Nations on its Tenth Anniversary, preached that “it is up to the United States ... to renounce the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons” and “that the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to assume this obligation if the countries possessing atomic weapons do so too.” On the other hand, the United States and her allies have consistently maintained that control or abolition of atomic weapons cannot be treated separately, but must be part and parcel of a general disarmament program encompassing conventional weapons.
But then Mr. Wilson goes himself one better. He suggests that, “to facilitate action on such a proposal we might make it clear that the alternative to the adoption of some such proposal is the resolution of the fundamental philosophical conflict between East and West by resort to arms.”
Great balls of fire! Mr. Wilson first wants to propose to the Russians the same proposition the Russians have been offering us for ten years and then to “make it clear” to them if they don’t agree to their own proposition then we will go to war to solve the “fundamental philosophical conflict” (Since when has war solved the conflict of ideas?).
Lest someone misunderstand what the author is recommending, he clarifies it in the next paragraph: “it is important to note that the suggestion does not contemplate a disarmament conference. What it does contemplate is a revision of International Law. . .
If Mr. Wilson thinks that a revision of International Law such as he suggests might lead to the resolution of the basic conflict between East and West, then I am afraid that he, himself has (to use his own words) “turned away from the only proven guarantee of peace, overwhelmingly superior force in the hands of men of good will.”
(Editor’s Note: Captain Amme’s comment was sent to the author of “Operation World Peace” for his comment. Mr. Wilson’s reply follows.)
There need be no confusion between the principle of limitation of armaments presently proposed by Soviet Russia and that proposed in “Operation World Peace.”
The Soviet plan proposes to outlaw specific weapons and to limit the relative sizes of armed forces. It is a political stratagem having for its object a reduction of the pressures of competition.
The article suggests a return to the principle of limitation upon the uses of armed force. It has for its object the preservation of civilization by protecting civilian institutions from unwarranted destruction by military forces. It is an application of humanitarian principles which gave the name Western Christian Civilization to our social order.
Historically, the principle underlying the Soviet plan failed when it was tried following the Armistice of 1918. Treaty limitations proved unworkable, and disarmament paved the way for the Second World War.
Historically, the plan suggested in “Operation World Peace” succeeded during the interval 1815-1914 in giving the world an interlude of relative peace, and limited wars, called Pax Britannica. During that century which followed the devastating Napoleonic wars, and extended into the lives of a generation of men still living, the Western Powers joined in the formulation of a body of international law based on the principle of limiting the uses of armed force to legitimate military objectives. This principle, which was supported by world opinion and enforced by overwhelmingly superior force in the hands of men bent on keeping the peace, automatically ruled out scorched earth tactics which in the history of mankind had always proved to be bankrupting, militarily, economically, politically, technologically and ideologically. They had always left the “victor” saddled with the job of restoring the edifices he himself had battered down.
Following the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the principle broke down when the Germans resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare. In the Second World War the Marx-Engels dogma of total war was applied under the Douhet thesis of conquest through terror with its tactic of unrestricted “strategic” bombardment of urban populations. With the advent of explosive forces as yet beyond human control, the abandonment of the principle of limitation as to use left the world facing the threat of destruction of Western Christian civilization—if not mankind itself. A return to the principle would automatically rule out the use of uncontrollable forces and reduce tensions to the point where reduction of armaments would follow naturally. Hence “Operation World Peace.”
With the survival of mankind at stake, the use of armed force to curb an outlaw, who refuses to conform to the just and equal laws of a civilized society, would be justified by moral principle. That principle, applicable in even the smallest community, is equally so in world society. “Pax Britannica” was a cooperative world order based upon freedom and justice. It failed, not because the principle was faulty but because men failed to apply the principle. A concept which kept the peace for a century is manifestly superior to one which promoted total war in two decades.
EARLY CANADIAN SUBMARINES
(See page 725, June, 1955, Proceedings)
D. R. Overall-Hatswell, Encino, Calif.—On page 725, the Christian Science Monitor is quoted: “The Canadian Navy acquired its first submarine recently.”
When I was in Halifax, N.S., in 1917, I met a Lieutenant G. H. S. Edwardes, R.N.C.V.R. (for some obscure reason they put the ‘C’ in the wrong place in those days), who was Senior Officer, Submarines. “Submarines” comprised two ex-Chilean boats, and I was on board each of them. Whether he told me this himself, or whether it was the current yarn, I have forgotten, but when the two boats first went to sea in company, in answer to Lieutenant Edwardes’s signal to dive, the other boat replied REGRET UNABLE NO PERISCOPE. Anyway, Jane's Fighting Ships, 1918, bears me out in part as, on page 88, under “Dominion of Canada” will be found the following:
“1 Holland type: CC2 (Seattle Con. & D.D. Co., 1914). Displacements: 310 tons on surface, 373 tons submerged. Dimensions: 157 ft. 6§ in.X14 ft. 11J in.XOO feet. Torpedo tubes: 3—18 inch. H.P. 600 on surface =13 kts.; 260 submerged = 10j kts.
“1 Holland type: CC1 (Seattle Con. & D.D. Co., 1914). Displacements: 313 tons on surface, 373 tons submerged. Dimensions: 144 ft. 3^ in.X14 ft.X11 ft. 6 in. Torpedo tubes: 5-18 inch. H.P. 6C0 on surface= 13 kts.; 260 submerged = 10j kts.
“Note.—Above two boats were begun for Chilean Navy as Antofagasta and Iquique.
They were purchased by Canada just before outbreak of war.”
So H.M.C.S. Astute is not the Canadian Navy’s first submarine, and their first submarine happened to be American-built, not British-built!
Inter-Ocean Tunnel-Canal
(See page 263, March, 1955 Proceedings)
Jorge Cortinez Delfino, Santiago, Chile.—It is generally known that the Panama Canal is no longer able to handle the intensive traffic which is constantly increasing as a result of the industrial and commercial growth not only in the Americas, but in the world as a whole. This is a problem whose solution cannot be put off, since it is becoming more serious each day.
Every day at either extremity of the present canal one can see large numbers of vessels awaiting their turn to enter the locks. In addition, the locks, besides constituting a slow method of crossing, have a limited width of 110 feet (33.53 meters), which excludes large modern vessels, both commercial and military, from the use of the canal.
With a view to solving this problem, the U. S. Navy has spent more than five million dollars on various studies concerning the Central American isthmus, trying to find a suitable location for another crossing, always basing their calculations, for lack of other means, on the construction of another canal similar to the one in Panama. The following proposals have been made:
Nicaraguan Canal.—Even before the initial work on the Panama Canal by the United States early this century, some thought had been given to a route via Nicaragua. However, studies indicated that it was more convenient to build one in Panama, since Gatun Lake is 26 meters above sea level, while Lake Nicaragua is 35 meters. At that time, even, it had been proposed that a canal be built without locks, and that it be located at sea level1—neither of which was feasible in Nicaragua. Hence, for this and other reasons, the Nicaragua plan was abandoned in favor of construction in Panama.
Mexican Canal.—A canal in the Tehuantepec region would run to some 200 kilometers minimum. This, plus the “exaggerated spirit of nationalism of the Mexican people,” was the chief reason for rejection of the Mexican canal idea, according to the committee of experts studying the plan at that time.
Sea Level Canal in Panama.—In addition to the alternatives mentioned, there has been of recent years a proposal to convert the present Panama high level, lock canal to a sea level route—an operation which would require about three billion dollars, and the excavation of 820 million cubic meters of material to bring the average elevation down 20 meters, since, as we have said, the maximum elevation above the oceans is 38 feet at Gatun Lake. It would be necessary to build a lock at each end of the canal in order to control the tidal currents and to protect the route from high and low tides.
In addition to the required excavations, such a sea-level canal in Panama would necessitate the construction of 60 kilometers of dikes and sluices to carry off the water of the swift Chagres River, now emptying into Gatun Lake. Such a canal would be as exposed as the present one to air attack. For these reasons, the proposed sea level canal at Panama is open to as many objections as the present higher level, lock canal.
Open Canals and Their Defense.—-In fine, no matter what other open canal is constructed, it would be as vulnerable as the present one—or more so—since, with the appearance of the atomic bomb, one could not count on defending the canal.
A New Method of Solving the Problem.— Fortunately for the security of the hemisphere and the well-being of the American peoples, there is another solution to this delicate problem. This plan is not only modern in design but it also eliminates the dangers to which any open canal is exposed. The new route would be subterranean, at sea level, in a direct line, and free of the handicaps of climate—and, most of all, free from air attack.
Paradoxically, tiny Costa Rica—the most mountainous country of Central America— which had never been mentioned in earlier plans, is the one that can render the greatest benefit to maritime transportation if it is willing to contribute a strip of its territory for the realization of a plan which, with my Chilean compatriot, Roberto Gomez Alvarez, I have proposed. This plan has been approved by engineers and topographers of recognized^ standing, and after thorough study by the Geographical Institute and Minister of Public Works of Costa Rica, this combination is seeking to obtain from the Costa Rican government the concession of a strip of territory five miles wide and 100 kilometers long, from ocean to ocean for the ultimate purpose of constructing such a canal in Costa Rica. The press of that country has lent its support, and the plan has been studied by Army and Navy engineers of the United States, and is known to Senators and Representatives of that country, which probably alone can finance such a tremendous construction.
The concession requested by the Costa Rican combination has favorable chances of being approved, after certain requirements are fulfilled, once it is submitted to the National Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica.
It would bring a vast permanent income to Costa Rica, both from the transit fees and a fixed annual rental for the strip of territory conceded.
At this time, an American Senatorial Committee is again studying the entire question of the Panama Canal. And since all the old plans for its solution have serious objections, it is suggested that the U. S. Senatorial Committee might beneficially make a thorough study of the plan proposed by myself and Senor Alvarez, since in the opinion of many engineers it is the most practicable one for the final solution of the whole canal problem.
With the joint cooperation of the United States and Costa Rica, a happy solution to the problem might be found by adopting our plan for the construction of a tunnel-canal in Costa Rica—or rather two canals—one for transit in each direction.
The German Side of the Channel Dash
(See page 637, June, 1955 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. M. Hochner, USNR-R.—I should like to take this opportunity to compliment the Institute for publishing papers by foreign naval officers which tell their side of the story. Officers on active duty may, perhaps, have access to publications detailing such information, but your publication is the main source for reserve officers on inactive duty.
In particular, I should like to comment on and question the article by Captain H. J. Reinicke, former German Navy, on the Channel Dash.
In describing the transfer of the Admiral and his staff from the Scharnhorst to a destroyer, and, later, from this destroyer to a second destroyer, Captain Reinicke speaks of a “jump” transfer in the first case, and the use of a “small ten-oared cutter” in the second.
My question is whether the condition of the sea, speed of the vessels, lack of skill or training on the part of personnel, or ignorance of the “high-line” method of personnel transfer on the part of the German navy necessitated these two seemingly obsolete methods of transfer. Having served aboard destroyers, and having participated in underway logistics operations in all kinds of weather this point puzzles me. An answer would be appreciated.
Another question raised itself near the end of the article. According to Captain Reinicke, the Scharnhorst had one flash lamp on the bridge, and destruction of this had delayed transmission of a vital message to the Admiral. Even our destroyers commonly carried four 12-inch signal searchlights. It seems peculiar that a capital ship should be so underequipped. Or do we just “talk too much”?
A final comment. In the article, as in many written by foreign naval personnel, the terms “stoker” and “sailor” frequently appear, implying a strong division between the two. It would appear to me that one of the strengths of our Navy, not commented on in many articles concerning same, is the minimizing of such a distinction. True we have our family jests about “deck apes” and “snipes,” but duties, especially aboard destroyers, where the engineering officer’s gang man at least one quarter of the gun stations at general quarters, there is a heavy intermingling without loss of technical efficiency or pride in a man’s particular service. I have never heard of it happening in foreign navies, but many Chief Engineers, in the United States Navy, are—and are required to be—qualified OOD’s, Warrant Machinists stand deck watches, engineering rates stand deck watches in port, etc.
I hope it is the intent of the Proceedings to publish, if available, more information on such items as the naval actions in the Baltic in World War II between the German and Russian navies.
(Editor’s Note: Mr. Hochner’s inquiries were forwarded to Captain Reinicke for comment. His reply follows.)
Question No. 1: About the transfer of Admiral Ciliax and his staff:
The German Navy had not developed any other means of transfer from one ship to another but (a) going alongside, if even only bow to stern for a short time and often interrupted by maneuvering to keep ships in position, or (b) using one of the ship’s boats depending on the weather and sea. Method (a) was mostly used in moderate weather and in an emergency, and though the sea was rather rough in this case, the urgency was there to get at the head of the line again being one of the reasons, the other was that we were under constant attack from the air, and there would not have been time enough to lower boats.
I have been in destoyers myself as No. 1 and as captain for more than seven years, and I must say that with the newer ships, having a rather thin skin, the going alongside was not much favored, always causing trouble with bumps and dents even in a moderate sea; we preferred to lower the cutter. On the second occasion when we had to change from one destroyer to another, the sea in the Hoofden off the Dutch coast had become very steep and rough (the tidal current running against the increasing westerly wind), and therefore the cutter was used, fearing that the two 2500-ton destroyers would be damaged when going alongside, and because we were in the firing between Prim Eugen and the British Harwich Force.
Question No. 2: About the flash lamp on the Scharnhorst’s signal bridge:
As a matter of fact, the ships had fixed flash lamps on both sides of the signal bridge. Besides they had signal searchlights, smaller ones and 60-cm ones. But all these were fed by ship’s current. As a reserve there were one or two hand flash lamps on every side of the bridge, these were mostly used on destroyers, as being visible only at a short distance when darkened (blue glass). In this case, by the heavy concussion of the mine explosion, all ship’s circuits were “out,” because the safety switches on turbines driving dynamos and on diesel engines driving emergency dynamos fell off and stopped these engines automatically. Naturally it took some time before there was “juice” again, and in the meantime the hand lamp should have been used. But—that was broken by the concussion, and therefore the delay.
Question No. 3: About “stokers” and “sailors”:
There was no strong division between deck personnel and engine personnel, though we had special branches for both. The contact and comradeship between both was indeed very close, and they were performing duties in both respects, at least when on General Quarters, engine personnel being ammunition numbers down below or between hoists and guns, and deck hands being stationed among the demolition and firefighting parties. But there were no deck watches by engineers in the German Navy, the engineers being fully concerned with their responsibility for propulsion, electricity, damage control, and all auxiliary technical equipment. But nevertheless there was one spirit in all of us, whether deck or engine, whether “stoker” or “sailor.”
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