Book Reviews

 

 

u. s. NAVY BUREAU OF ORDNANCE IN WORLD WAR II. By Buford Row­land, Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.R., and William B. Boyd, Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. 522 pages, plus appendix. 1954. §3.00.

Reviewed by Captain Walter T.

Jenkins, U. S. Navy

(Captain Jenkins, a graduate of the Class of 1930, is on duty at the U. S. Naval Academy as Head of the De­partment of Ordnance and Gunnery.)

The year 1933 marked the end of our Period of national retrenchment, and from that date until the cessation of hostilities in World War II, advancements in, and the complexity of, weapons of war increased a thousand fold. This historical record, written ^{ln a}n interesting narrative style, vividly de­scribes the problems, failures, and accom­plishments in Naval Ordnance during the Period. It is, in effect, a sequel to an earlier book, published after World War I, which was of great aid and assistance to Ordnance bureau officials during the earlier years lead- ^ln£ up to World War II.

Each of this volume’s twenty-four chap­ters gives a comprehensive coverage of one of the many subjects in the field of Naval Ordnance, each chapter being a complete story in itself. For this reason the book may lack continuity, but it does not lack unity. While it is primarily a guide and reference for those specialists who are responsible for the development of matters pertaining to Naval Ordnance, all who have a basic inter­est in Ordnance and Gunnery should at least read portions of the book. Certain of its chapters will be of general and educational interest to all: be he an “Expert” or plain “Gunner,” he will find his favorite project covered herein.

Chapter I is primarily a study in organiza­tion. It describes how expansion and reor­ganization of the Bureau were anticipated prior to the outbreak of hostilities and the further modifications which were necessary to meet the vastly expanding production re­quirements in the early years of the war. The three succeeding chapters, “Ordnance and Science,” “Armor,” and “Projectiles,” show that the recognized need for proper liaison and coordination between the Bureau, sci­ence, industry, and our Government repre­sentatives before the war benefited us later on.

For those of us who held such a marked re­spect for the Japanese torpedo and little else but criticism for our own, “Torpedoes” presents a vivid account of the defects, their “why,” the manner in which they were dis­covered, and the tremendous problems sur­mounted in overcoming them.

Transfer of knowledge works both ways, but the British, due to their earlier entry into open hostilities, were subjected to the effects of new types of enemy weapons long before the United States. As a result, they were able to provide the United States with much valuable knowledge which greatly aided the Bureau in accomplishing many urgent short­cuts. Although British contributions appear throughout the book, “Degaussing,” “Depth Charges” (ASW), and “Nets and Booms” are interesting and well written chapters which emphasize this fact. Likewise, “Army- Navy Cooperation in Ordnance” describes the teamwork and close cooperation on the home front, how some of the requirements of the two services overlapped, and the manner in which they mutually supported each other in the common cause.

This serves to point up some of the sub­jects covered. Others delve into “Mines,” “Rockets,” “Aviation Ordnance,” “Fire Control Radar,” “Ammunition,” “Inspec­tion Administration,” and the like. They por­tray our growing needs and explain why budg­et limitations and political and industrial ramifications affected our capabilities. The reader will gain a better knowledge of big business, contract procedures, and the effects of the machine tool industry on our produc­tive capacity.

While in preparation Bureau of Ordnance in World War II was carefully and com­pletely reviewed by two of our all-time ord­nance “greats” and former Bureau Chiefs, the late Admiral Blandy and Vice Admiral Hussey. Authorities in many fields assisted in its preparation and in the editing of its contents. The appendix lists the names of Bureau Chiefs, Division Directors, Section Heads, and Commanding Officers of Major Ordnance Establishments from March, 1941, to September, 1945. Those leaders were responsible directly or indirectly for much of what is described in this volume.

Anyone who reads the book will be more conscious of the need for foresight and ad­vance planning for expansion of facilities dur­ing peacetime to meet the requirements of war. Fortunately, in these respects, and in spite of certain mistakes, the Bureau kept pace with and anticipated our increasing consciousness toward preparedness. This should be a continuing process, and as a re­sult of these experiences we were better prepared to meet the Korean crisis. With this book as a guide, there is assurance that re­sponsible personnel in the field of Naval Ordnance can continue to insure our pre­paredness in the future.

WILHELM VON TEGETTHOFF, EIN

GROSSER OSTERREICHER. By Peter

Handel-Mazzetti and Hans Hugo Sokol.

Oberosterreichischer Landesverlag; Linz.

1952. 374 pages. Austrian Schillings 88.00.

Reviewed by Professor A. E. Sokol

(Dr. Sokol is Professor of Asiatic and Slavic Studies and a Research Associate of the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California.)

This first biography of the great Austrian admiral, written by two former officers of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, might well be the epitaph of that navy itself. Deprived of its coast by World War I as well as of its status as a world power, Austria itself seems almost to have forgotten that, not so long ago, the country ranked among the foremost naval powers.

A biography of Admiral Tegetthoff will be of interest to an American reader chiefly for one reason: the fact that he was the vic­torious leader of the first battle between fleets of ironclads. Attacking a greatly superi­or Italian fleet near the island of Lissa in 1866, the Austrain admiral, his ships de­ployed in a wedge-shaped formation, broke through the enemy’s line and in a series of fierce fights rammed and sank the Italian flagship—from which the Italian admiral had departed a short time before—and caused a second Italian vessel to blow up. Only a man of indomitable spirit could have achieved such a victory in the face of a strong foe and of innumerable obstacles placed in his way by land-lubber bureaucracy and false economy. Only a genius could inspire his crews, composed of ten different national­ities, with his own confidence and valor, despite the inadequate means at his disposal: ships armored with chains or rails, anti­quated guns, and asthmatic little gun boats.

But while he gained international fame as the victor of Lissa—he visited the United States in 1867 and was treated here “like a prince”—Tegetthoff never received at home the recognition that his energy and far­sighted wisdom should have merited. Ex­cept for the unpleasant mission of bringing home from Mexico the body of his former commander, Maximilian of Hapsburg, he was given no important task for his restless spirit to cope with. Disappointed and retir­ing, the admiral died in 1871, at the age of only 44 years.

His death did not, however, spell the end of his influence on naval tactics and warship construction. Even today there exist battle­ships with rams, witnesses to the mistaken belief that it was that mechanical device rather than the genius of the leader which won the first modern fleet battle.

The book brings out strikingly Tegett- hoff’s tragic personal fate as well as his place in the history of naval warfare. It should make worthwhile reading for those who can handle German, whether they are profes­sionals or members of the general reading public.

THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIP­PINES. By Robert Ross Smith. Washing­ton: Office of the Chief of Military His­tory, Department of the Army, 1953. 623 pages. $5.50.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Frank 0. Hougii, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

(■Author of several historical hooks and monographs, Lieutenant Colonel Hough is at present Head of the Writing Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.)

It is a pleasure to report that this new vol­ume in the Army’s Pacific series fully meas­ures up to the high quality of its predeces­sors. Covering operations in General Mac- Arthur’s Southwest Pacific Area from early 1944 through the seizure of the Palaus in the ^fall of that year, The Approach to the Philip­pines paints a large picture with clarity and ^ln spots with a vividness unusual in a work of this type. Robert Ross Smith, an Army Reserve officer, served on Mac Arthur’s staff and possesses the staff officer’s grasp of the larger strategic aspects. A combat vet­^eran, he has a well developed “feel” for ter- ^ram, and his action narrative moves with pace and assurance. This is not to imply that one has to experience war in order to be a successful military historian. The saying goes, “You don’t have to be crazy to be a fighter pilot—but it helps.”

Operations westward along New Guinea’s northern coast lacked some of the dramatic features of the parallel drive across the Cen­tral Pacific; hence are perhaps less familiar to the general public, despite the com­mander’s well known flair for publicity. Cam­paigning on a huge sub-continent, Mac- Arthur could lay his plans with consummate skill to strike where the enemy was unpre­pared to oppose the landing, then either by­pass him entirely or take him in flank or rear. The prodigious hop from the Huon Peninsula to Hollandia and Aitape bypassed at one stroke the entire Japanese Eighteenth Army. Ironically, the bitter large-scale fighting that resulted from General Adachi’s futile effort to break out of this entrapment passed almost unnoticed at the time; by then (July-August, 1944) the war had moved far on to westward, and nobody was much interested in something taking place some hundreds of miles behind what had been pro­claimed as the front.

“I will return,” Douglas MacArthur had declared upon leaving the Philippines, and he did precisely that. But behind the dra­matic denouement lay a long series of trials and tribulations. For two years he groped and stumbled, handicapped by a lack of nearly everything. The opening of this book finds him ready to hit a real stride at last. The great Japanese base at Rabaul had been securely neutralized. The U. S. held virtually undisputed control of sea and air. Plenty of troops, equipment, and shipping had become available. Mr. Smith leaves him six months later poised to make good his promise: all of New Guinea conquered save for futile bunches of enemy left to wither on the vine; the flanks of his approach secured by seizure of Morotai and the Palaus.

The strides by which all this was accom­plished look impressive on a map—and the book contains many excellent ones—as the pattern of the campaign unfolds. But Mr. Smith also takes the reader behind grand strategy to the grim reality experienced by the begrimed jungle-sloggers who imple­mented it. It is all there: the rain and mud and stench of tropical jungle from Finsch- hafen to the tip of Vogelkop Peninsula; the bloody coral caves of Biak and Anguar; the terrible beach at Peleliu. There was little of glamor in the Southwest Pacific, beyond MacArthur’s much-photographed cap. It is to the author’s credit that he has made es­sentially drab material readable and inter­esting in detail, and comprehensive and comprehensible over-all.

A CENTURY OF CONFLICT. By Stefan T. Possony, Professor of International Politics, Georgetown University. Henry Regnery Co., Chicago. 1953. 422 pages. $7.50.

Reviewed by Colonel George C.

Reinhardt, U. S. Army

(<Co-author of Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, Colonel Reinhardt is a frequent contributor to the Pro­ceedings.)

Dr. Possony’s paradox: “The war for com­munism must use peace as one of its most powerful weapons” may explain why Soviet aggression has not yet . . . and may never . . . deliberately provoke World War III. Communists employ war as an instrument of policy only to hasten a foregone favorable conclusion. Wars between “imperialist states” will on the contrary be fostered by every conceivable means. The artificially “fixed war,” the concept of “sanctuary,” are practised as in Greece, Indo-China and Korea. Here communist strategy cleverly exempts its real sources of strength from the scene of conflict, drains opposing forces out of all proportion to the communist effort ex­pended. The lessons for a free world are as obvious as they remain vital.

Communism, warns Possony, has never wavered from its basic aim in a century of struggle: world conquest, following the moral destruction and physical defeat of the bourgeosie. His authoritatively documented argument painstakingly erects a condemna­tion judicially severe, devoid of polemics. Facts speak for themselves, evidence is briefed impartially for reader judgment.

When data is inadequate to prove that Russia fomented the Chino-Japanese strug­gle; precipitated Japan into the Pearl Harbor attack; the weak points are reviewed, en­thusiastic contemporary indorsements by emminent communists are quoted. Equally calmly the clearcut case of Bolshevik-Im­perial German collaboration in World War I is established.

A major danger of communism, according to the author, is the adaptability of its strat­egy which learned from Clausewitz as read­ily as from Marx or Engels. Clausewitz’s statement that an aggressor boasts his love of peace because he prefers to win without conflict was espoused by Lenin. His succes­sors concur.

Communists leaders no longer subscribe to the Marxist line that capitalism must fall of its own weight. Nevertheless they are avid students of modern warfare which punishes the improvisor. Their strategy no less than their ideology follows long term (though flexible) schedules. Probing attacks they may risk. Repetition of the Mongolian border “in­cidents” that were in fact brief, full scale wars may be attempted .... Whether these are vigorously prosecuted, or blandly dis­avowed, will depend on their initial success, the degree of strength or demoralization they uncover in the enemy of the moment.

Dr. Possony traces the long, too little understood struggle, with keen analyses of many overlooked factors. A factor which helped the communists to power was the un­willingness of the majority of Russians in 1917 to take the threat seriously ... as in other nations since. Although reasons varied from nationalist aspirations within greater Russia (they expected a Bolshevik regime to so weaken Russia they could gain their inde­pendence) to democrats’ fear that applica­tion of force against the Bolsheviks might restore the reactionary regime; no one acted. Democracy can abdicate no less than “divine right.” Yet Communism does not change its spots however often non-communists repeat their mistaken identifications.

World War I taught the communists an ineradicable lesson from the sidelines. Rus­sian defeats were directly traced to abomi­nably bad logistics. Contemporary press ac­counts of soldiers without rifles were forgot­ten by other nations on an “it cannot happen here” basis. Only the communists remem­bered. Two decades later England heard “too little and too late” from its magnificent war­time premier. U. S. soldiers in 1941 maneu­vered with wooden mockups of tanks and artillery.

World War II’s “strange alliance” saw the Russians concentrating on logistic sup­port from the western Allies . . . and insist­ing upon using the supplies in complete secrecy according to their own strategy. Al­lied strategy in that war, marking Germany as the primary foe to be defeated before Japan was seriously attacked, fortuitously played into the hands of Communist long range programs. As early as 1918 Stalin had exclaimed “don’t forget the east” .... In the teeming millions of the Far East, the smouldering anti-colonialism of south east Asia “lies the key to world communism’s struggle against capitalist imperialism,” he warned.

While “peace” continues to be the “party line,” Communism’s key men regard a war against the United States an essential pre­liminary to world control; aerial weapons the best military means of fighting the United States; and atomic air power the best weapon. Staging such an assault, they believe, must await Allied dissension, weakness and unrest in the United States, either political or eco­nomic crises.

Thus neither war nor defeat without war are inevitable, according to Dr. Possony. He prescribed an “extended strategy” which makes “all-out war an extreme risk for the Soviets” . . . while we work for “gradual modification, contraction, and replacement of Soviet rule.”

JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1953-54.

Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman. New

York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

462 pages. $23.00.

Reviewed by Commander Ellery H.

Clark, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve

(Commander Clark is an associate professor, Depart­ment of English, History and Government, U. S. Naval Academy, and a member of the naval history staff

This fifty-fifth edition emphasizes the three major post-war naval developments of ^ship specialization, guided missiles, and ^atomic propulsion. “They are the logical but expensive outcome of the application to oaval affairs of scientific and technological development in many different fields of in­vention and research,” concludes Mr. Black­man.

The demise of the general purpose warship is very clearly indicated. At present, Britain has four different types of frigate; two for antisubmarine warfare, one for antiaircraft, and one for aircraft direction duties. The United States similarly has made changes, now classifying carriers either as attack, hunter-killer, support, or escort and desig­nating submarines as attack, hunter-killer, radar picket, or guided missile.

The United States missile and rocket launching vessels now range from the experi­mental battleship Mississippi to submarines. The attack carrier Princeton and the large fleet submarine Tunny both carry and fire the supersonic guided missile “Regulus.” For some years two other submarines, Carbonero and Cusk, have tested “loon” missiles, while the veteran experimental ten­der Norton Sound's “Aerobee” rockets have reached altitudes of 78 miles and speeds of 2,000 miles an hour. Engineering progress is apparent in the destroyer Timmerman which is testing installed lightweight machinery and in the atomic propulsion being designed and constructed for the new submarines Nautilus and Sea Wolf.

Three firsts have been achieved by the United States Navy: Antietam as an angled deck carrier, the experimental submarine Flying Fish, credited with 5,000 dives, and the Norfolk, new destroyer leader. A sub­marine hull novelty is the large watertight storage chamber on the after deck of the transport Perch which provides considerable space for amphibious landing equipment. In new carrier construction the Forreslal and Saratoga will have strength flight decks, a hull development initiated some years ago by the British.

Russia’s fleet is believed to include 370 submarines either in commission or reserve with another 100, all with snorts, now being built. Information both textual and pictorial on the Russian Navy is, as usual, limited, and many of the photographs are quite old.

Britain’s Royal Navy remains the second largest and is devoting more attention to conversion and modernization than to new construction. Several years will be spent on the fleet carrier Victorious in an effort to in­corporate contemporary developments. This is the greatest single reconstruction project in British history. Believing conventional types of warship are no longer practical, they have placed no orders for carriers, battleships, cruisers, or destroyers since 1945.

There are about 2,500 illustrations of which one-quarter are new. Of the recent photographs those of Russia’s new cruiser Svsrdlov and three United States submarines, hunter-killer K3, radar picket Burrfish, and guided missile Cusk, are unusually interesting and striking.

This issue of Fighting Ships is the most significant of the present century in the his­tory of maritime technology’s rapid advance, and deserves the considered attention of professional students in such related fields as strategy, design, construction, weapons, propulsion, and tactics.

OUR SECRET ALLIES: THE PEOPLES

OF RUSSIA. By Eugene Lyons. Duell

Sloan & Pearce, N. Y., 1953. 376 pages.

$4.50.

Reviewed by Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, U. S. Navy (Retired)

(Admiral Stevens is the author of Russian Assignment which records his first hand observations of the Communist stale while U. S. Naval Attache in Moscow, 1947—49.)

Mr. Lyons’ book is an important one, for it is written for the puprose of influencing American policy vis-d-vis Soviet Russian through its impact upon American thought in an area of Soviet internal relationships that has been little understood and strangely neglected. Its basic thesis is that ever since the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 there has been a permanent state of civil war in Russia between the people and the regime, and that the often baffling events inside the Soviet Union are normally due to measures of self-protection taken by the regime against actual or potential resistance.

Although those who are best informed on Soviet life and politics have long accepted this thesis, this is the first time that its un­derlying justification has been clearly, fully and systematically set forth. Mr. Lyons, the brilliant author of Assignment in Utopia, has done this eloquently and convincingly. His journalistic technique is amply backed by solid facts. Soviet propaganda and the Iron Curtain have resulted in the distortion and even the virtual elimination of much significant information. Mr. Lyons has much to say, and the fact that he has seen much of it with his own eyes accounts for the passion with which it is sometimes ex­pressed.

His approach is organized roughly along historical lines, with frequent digressions to destroy the many myths that mark past and present Western thought, but always with an eye to the evidence of the existence of the permanent civil war. The actions of the Malenkov regime, explained in terms of self-protection, serve as an introduc­tion. After a statement of the main theme, there follows a contrast between the compar­ative liberalism of Tsarist times and the tyranny of the Soviets, particularly in political thought and the processes of justice. Soviet chronology is then followed from the Revolution to the aftermath of World War II, but with the assumption that the reader is familiar with the main events.

The Revolution is employed to demolish the myth that the Bolshevik coup d’etat was accomplished with popular support. The succeeding chaos is used to refute the even more prevalent belief that the Red Terror was forced on the regime by the White Guards and by foreign intervention. The Kronstadt Revolt is put in its true per­spective, and an excellent account is given of the armed suppression of strikes, with many vivid examples. The peasant rebel­lions, including Tambov, are described. Re­cent materials are used generously, as in Orlov’s account of Kirov’s assassination, and the book is particularly rich in its employ­ment of emigree accounts and interpretations of the events of the last twenty years.

World War II is discussed primarily from the viewpoint of the scale of the vast Soviet political surrenders. The Vlassov movement is well handled, and the Allied forced repatri­ation of nonreturners is properly excoriated. Mr. Lyons is at his best in attacking the common belief that Soviet aggression is merely the old Russian imperialism in an­other form, and in his refutation of the theory that the West should exacerbate racial and national antagonisms in the Soviet Union.

Some will criticize Our Secret Allies be­cause it gives no concrete answers for Ameri­can policy. Such criticism is beside the point, for this is a moving, documented plea for a reorientation of viewpoint in the belief that such reorientation, which includes an awak­ening of the Western conscience, will elimi­nate the trap of a naive faith in coexistence, and will in itself produce the necessary specific answers for tactical purposes. It is packed with information which every Ameri­can who is interested in Soviet-American relations should know.

SO NOBLE A CAPTAIN. By Charles Mc-

Kew Parr, Thomas Y. Crowell Company,

New York, N. Y., 1953, 423 pages, $6.00.

Reviewed by Commander James C.

Shaw, U. S. Navy

('Commander Shaw, a Naval Academy graduate in the Class of 1936, is at present Director of the Current History Division of the Navy’s Office of Information.)

In 1525 one of Ferdinand Magellan’s former shipmates, complaining against in­justices to that navigator’s memory, pleaded that “the fame of so noble a Captain will not be effaced in our time.” More than four cen­turies later Mr. Charles McKew Parr took these words as a mandate to set the record straight in Magellan’s favor. Mr. Parr traveled from the Philippines to Portugal and Spain, corresponded with scholars every­where, and searched the ancient archives. From his findings he has written a compre­hensive and fascinating history, not only of Magellan’s life, but of the Renaissance strug­gle for maritime and commercial supremacy which led to Magellan’s world circumnaviga­tion.

After an introduction going back to the 12th century, Mr. Parr relates that at the time of Magellan’s birth in 1480, the Portu­guese, seeking wealth and influence and urged on by such men as Prince Henry the Navigator, had located a secret route to the African Gold Coast. Riches pouring into Lis­bon stimulated voyagers to find a sea route to the Indies and thereby destroy the monop­oly of Venice and the Moslems on the spice trade.

During Magellan’s youth, spent as a court Page and maritime clerk, Columbus dis­covered America and Bartholomew Dias of Portugal rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Stirred by these events Magellan sought fame and fortune by sailing to the Indies. For eight years he cruised the Indian Ocean fighting innumerable battles, exploring dis­tant lands, suffering wounds, shipwreck, and loss of fortune. He returned to Portugal practically penniless and out of political favor but possessing a solid apprenticeship in nagivation and sea warfare. Most impor­tant, Mr. Parr presents evidence that Ma­gellan had actually reached the Philippines and had dreamed of a westward approach across the Pacific.

Four years of political ostracism in Portu­gal ended in Magellan’s flight to Spain where he put his sword and wits at the disposal of King Charles. A combination of his own de­termination and powerful friends including the admiring young monarch finally earned Magellan command of a west-bound task group. In 1519 his five ships sailed on the globe-circling voyage. Magellan’s ob­stacles included sabotage, mutiny, desertion, storms, shipwreck, and starvation. Only his unslakeable conviction, not foreknowledge, enabled him to persist in finding the Straits of Magellan. After reaching his Philippine goal, the devout Magellan was killed, not questing gold, but in a religious crusade. His zeal, to this day, bears fruit in the Philip­pines—the only Christian land in Asia. Ma­gellan emerges from Mr. Parr’s account as a resolute, God-fearing seaman.

So Noble A Captain also contains biogra­phies of several remarkable Renaissance notables. Philippa of Lancaster, shrewd Anglo-Flemish Queen of Portugal; Jacob Fugger, a 16th-century Rothschild; Christo- bal de Haro, “master grocer” in world trade; Spain’s youthful King Charles who longingly dreamed of adventure; Juan Rodriguez de Foneseca, rascally bishop-politician. At first, Mr. Parr’s work may seem slightly over-rich. The reader must concentrate as the author attaches the threads of remote events in far off spots to the life of Magellan. But this intriguing wealth of detail and background gives the book unassailable authenticity and scholarship. Students of war will find in it innumerable arguments for the value of seapower and skilled seaman fighters.