Some of the most noteworthy Navy news stories these days concern U.S.S. Nautilus and U.S.S. Sea Wolf, our future nuclear-powered submarines. Regarding their operational abilities, one popular expression has it: “They’ll be able to operate submerged for such long periods that they’ll surface only long enough for the crews to reenlist.”
I like this statement, even though it is not true, for it implies that sailors reenlist in the Navy somewhat as a matter of course. It lends a bright note to an otherwise cheerless situation.
The real situation is evidenced by the statements heard every day in ships and at shore stations. All too often we hear a division officer say, “I’m losing my best man to the outside.” Or we hear a leading petty officer say, “The gang’s only third class and two of the top strikers are getting out next month.” The most generally heard expression in this respect is, “The first-cruise men just aren’t reenlisting.”
What is the Navy’s reenlistment rate? The over-all rate seems to be from 40 to 50 per cent. That is, a little under one half of all men in all pay grades and with from about four to sixteen years of service to their credit are shipping over at the end of their enlistments.
At first glance, an over-all reenlistment rate of from 40 to 50 per cent may not look so bad. An examination of these figures, however, immediately highlights the need for some serious thought on this subject. The fact is that this percentage represents all periods of service. When broken down into time-in-service groups the picture undergoes a great change.
The reenlistment rate of those finishing their second enlistment is about 80%; of those finishing their third enlistment—or completing 12 years of service—is about 90%. And somewhere in the neighborhood of 95% of those ending their third enlistment— or completing 16 years of service—sign up for another cruise. However, the reenlistment rate for those finishing their first enlistment is only from 10 to 20 per cent. (Enlistments discussed here will be dealt with as the usual four-year contracts. The few six year contracts and the extensions and minority contracts are included in these figures instead of being treated separately.)
Extend the figures of this continuing program on for a few years. All the percentages for the second, third, and fourth cruise reenlistments are based on that one man in five who stays on after his first enlistment. It is also an unfortunate fact that in practically all cases it is a matter of his electing to stay on rather than of his being selected to stay on. Going back to percentages, the 20% rate would actually represent from 20 to 25 per cent of those desiring to remain in the Navy. Electing to stay on is also a major factor in the second, third, and fourth period reenlistments.
We have no proof whatsoever, that the one man in five who initially reenlists is the best of the five for the Navy. There are indications that he is not the least qualified of the five—for he must have an average mark no lower than 2.5 in proficiency in rate and no lower than 2.75 in conduct. If a third class petty officer or below, he will be permitted to ship over if there are no valid complaints against him for nonpayment of debts or alimony or nonsupport of wife—and if “the person is considered desirable material for retention in the Navy.” And too, his service record must not say “Not Recommended for Reenlistment.” (In actual practice when the “Rec. for Reen.” notation is missing, yeomen and personnel men merely check to see that the marks are high enough. If so, they proceed as though the favorable notation were there.)
All indications point to this: only a small degree of selectivity is exercised in the matter of reenlistment. This condition applies not only to the first cruise group—that all important group of young men from which all careerists must come—but to successive groups as well.
An ideal situation for the purposes of selection would be one in which four out of five or even nine out of ten men completing their first enlistments would desire to reenlist. These last words are emphasized. A heavy increase in the number of initial reenlistments would lower personnel turn-over, put less stress on the recruit and service school training programs, and retain skills in the Navy. But much more important is an increase in the percentage of those who want to reenlist, for a surplus of applicants would make selectivity possible. And with selectivity comes the numerous advantages to the Navy of a competitive personnel selection program. The fact remains, however, that about four out of five men ending their first cruise currently do not desire to reenlist. It is important therefore for us to find the reasons for their attitude.
As I see it, the reasons fall into five general categories. First are those inherent aspects of naval and military life that traditionally make such a life less attractive than civilian life. Second are those based on what might be listed as “rights and benefits of the veteran”—benefits which for all purposes serve as inducements to a prospective reenlistee to get out and stay out of the Navy. The third category centers on the effects of the fine technical training given in the Navy. The fourth, and probably the newest, category is an indirect result of the Selective Service Act. The fifth category is one to which the others contribute and is stated simply by the saying, “It’s just not the fashion to ship over.”
The Navy Life
Some of the very finest aspects of life in the Navy are those we list as intangibles. It is unfortunate that many of these are nebulous and indefinable for they are so often the factors that offset the less pleasant but more concrete aspects of service life. Comradeship and shipmate spirit—these offset the close quarters of shipboard life and the stand-in-line aspects of shore stations. Manhood and leadership qualities in some of their most splendid forms—to offset the often hazardous life and hard training. The feeling of being a member of a smoothrunning team that would fight to the end— to counter the many long watches, the distant cruises, and most important of all, the many outward manifestations of military discipline.
Talking up—or knocking down—a subject can strongly influence a young man’s viewpoint. One of the best ways for those in authority to influence a man finishing his first cruise is that tried and proved one of the “shipping-over talk.” Those who do this best seem to acknowledge both the good and bad points of Navy life. They never fail, though, to bring in those idealistic factors which place the naval and military life on a different plane from the civilian life.
The most influential shipping-over talks, of course, are those given by a man’s own compartment mates, his good friends in the division.1 Unfortunately, however these men are not currently given to talking up the subject. It would seem, in any case, that a certain obligation exists for the division CPO and leading POs, the division officer, and on smaller ships even for the executive officer or commanding officer, to talk up reenlistment.
One typical small-ship scene sees the executive officer checking his expiration-of- enlistment cards and learning that he has, say, four sailors coming up for discharge the following month. He has the word passed for them; they report to him. He inquires of them the number intending to reenlist. It ends about there.
In contrast is the scene in which he sends for those he feels should stay in the Navy and then discusses the matter with them. Sailors usually know of those who are getting out about the same time they are. Those asked to reenlist feel somewhat honored and wanted. Those not asked are—to be blunt—not wanted anyway. This officer, then, is performing a selectivity function of his own. He is choosing the best man for that second- cruise group on which further career groups will be based.
Some men seem definitely anti-career while a few seem procareer. In between are those who waver. A man in this undecided group is not determinedly set either way about shipping over while still on his first cruise. His feelings will run warm and cool, even as the end draws near—as dictated by the degree of his contentment or discontentment. A few “wrongs” by his division petty officers or the ship’s officers, a few too many mid-watches, a turned-down leave chit and, perhaps, a decision by Congress to set aside the pay raise—these make him run cool. A bit of warm praise, a good leave, a more favorable shipboard billet—these warm him up. This mood which helps determine his choice is one that changes monthly or even weekly.
Many senior petty officers whom I know keep the better men among their potential reenlistees in good humor during the final weeks. Not much is said about it. Perhaps it is done instinctively. It is a good point to remember, though. The difference between a good man’s staying in the Navy or getting out of the Navy can be decided here. POs and CPOs can let it be known by deed as well as by word that they would like their better men to stay with the division. Or if not with the division, then to stay with the Navy.
Perhaps the Navy Department had this “warm and cool mood” in mind when it issued the booklet, Pass the Word, a few years ago. This booklet discussed certain aspects of making the Navy a career. It dealt with such matters as advancement opportunities, sea/shore rotation, in-service personal benefits, married life in the Navy, retirement benefits, and naval housing. It was a well-intentioned booklet, but it made little splash when it came out and few copies are seen today even though it went to all ships and stations. Perhaps the booklet did not come up to expectations. It was a step in the right direction, however, for it faced the issue that there are certain aspects of Navy life that come out second best when compared to those of civilian life. At the same time, the booklet pointed out that the Navy life has certain advantages over civilian life, too.
Even though this booklet has been out of print for three years, the general tenor of its thoughts is common knowledge to any junior officer or senior petty officer who keeps up with developments. Such an approach should be made to many of those nearing the end of their first enlistment. Lay it all on the line. Give the selected first- cruise men a straightforward shipping-over talk as their period of service draws to a close.
Effects of “Vet’s Rights”
A significant concept met during this post World War II period is that based on the numerous rights and benefits of the war veteran. Congress doubtlessly had no such intention in mind when in June, 1944, it passed the first G.I. Bill or when it passed subsequent allied legislation; but the important fact now exists that many of these federal rights and benefits are at cross purposes with the reenlistment programs of the military services. These benefits are so well known that many young men first entering the service have a mental check-off list of them. It is natural that they do, since these benefits are well explained to prospective recruits by recruiters. In fact, they are often brought forth as inducements for signing up.
For a young man not to avail himself of certain of the veteran’s benefits as soon as possible after his release from active service would be to deny the “opportunity knocks” idea so prevalent in our way of life. The fact of the matter is that the material benefits available both immediately after—and for a few years after—a relatively short period of service outweigh the material benefits connected with reenlistment. When some of these federal rights and benefits are considered, the wonder is that the reenlistment rate is up to even its present level.
The federal benefits are fine for those who receive them and are, in effect, a form of payment for services rendered. And the same legislative bodies that create these benefits also create the benefits that accrue to those who reenlist. In this latter respect it cannot be said that the stress placed on the reenlistee’s benefits comes anywhere near to approaching the stress placed on the ex- G.I.’s benefits.
Consider a Seaman (pay grade E-3) whose four-year cruise is to expire in the latter part of this year. During his period of service he earned credits for well over the maximum of 36 months of schooling allowed under the G.I. Bill for Korean veterans. Broken up into 9-month school years, these 36 months mean four years of college or high school and college combinations. Single, he would receive $110 monthly during this schooling; married, $135 monthly. Other educational and training benefits which a Korean War Vet can take up are on-the-job training ($75 to $105 monthly) and institutional on- the-farm training ($95 to $135 monthly). Payments in the on-job and on-farm training are in addition to whatever he may earn as his on-the-job wages.
If the Seaman chooses to reenlist, his monthly pay rate will be $115 if single and $166 if married.
Although the slight difference in cash-on- the-barrelhead dollars favors the man who ships over, this paramount fact must be remembered. One payment is a form of wage for a job being performed—an often demanding job that helps, in a small way, to keep the world’s best navy in operation. The other payments are more on the form of a gratuity to assist a man to better himself in the world.
Should the Seaman choose to reenlist, he will have four types of payment accruing to him: mileage, lump sum for unused leave, mustering-out pay, and reenlistment allowance. However, he is entitled to the first three payments whether he reenlists or not. And to receive his mustering out pay he must break continuity with the Navy through receipt of a “Report of Separation from the Armed Forces of the U.S.”
Other payments that await the man who leaves the Navy after a relatively short period of service are home loan benefits, disability compensation, hospitalization, certain types of medical and dental treatment, and life insurance continuance rights. He also finds that the government has made Social Security payments for him during his period of service. While most of these technically accrue to the man who stays with the Navy, certain of them have no value for they only duplicate available benefits. Moreover, the man who stays in for a second cruise knows that he risks the expiration of other G.I. benefits—especially the educational and training types.
The veteran’s benefits form an impressive muster and have a strong influence on the young man faced with the choice of staying in the Navy or returning to civilian life. In fact, they serve as an inducement to leave the service. Since a purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons for the one-in-five rate of those desiring to reenlist and to discuss ways to increase that rate, we should consider ways to meet this influence.
No doubt these influences have been brought to the attention of the two Armed Services Committees of Congress by Department of Defense officials. Perhaps a higher degree of compensatory benefits for those staying with the service or extensions of the shorter-term veteran’s benefits have been suggested. Beyond the committee witness level these matters are out of the hands of the Navy. Perhaps all we can do at this particular point is hope that Congress will take full recognition of the fact that the “rights and benefits of the veteran” are often at cross purposes with the reenlistment programs of the Armed Forces.
It’s a rare ocean passage that has no sunny skies and smooth seas, however, and even the present topic under discussion can be focused to give a brighter picture. For example, certain of the veteran’s benefits are long term; therefore it might do well to place a strong emphasis on them instead of tabulating them with the various short term benefits as is the usual case. With these awaiting the man after the end of eight, twelve, or more years of service, those who discuss reenlistment with men nearing the end of their first cruise have something of a talking point and also a rebuttal for the short term benefits. The long term benefits lose some of their significance when considered in connection with Fleet Reserve and retirement benefits—but then, not every man who ships over once is going on to complete 20 years’ service. Among the long term benefits that accrue to the reenlistee are: hospitalization, certain Civil Service point preferences, disability compensation, and interment in a national cemetery.
Unfortunately, also, the news coverage given the veteran’s benefits greatly exceeds that given the reenlistee’s benefits. “Vet’s rights” is a key subject with the Armed Forces Press Service. As a result, it receives a big play in the ship and station papers. The subject is well covered in the All Hands and Our Navy magazines and the Navy Times weekly paper, too. Lastly, metropolitan newspapers carry syndicated columns on vet’s rights and benefits.
Of course, if the rights are there let those who are entitled to them know about it. But what about the immediate material benefits of the reenlistee? As it happens, just about the only news coverage on the whole reenlistment picture concerns an occasional military career-consideration action of Congress or a departmental directive making some change in reenlistment policies, procedures, or payments.
One reason for the difference in news coverage, so I have been told, is as follows. The public information staffs of the Veterans Administration, in keeping with their function, frequently issue well-written press releases and fact sheets on the various vet’s rights and benefits. On the other hand, little on the reenlistment picture comes out of the Navy Department.
It seems that no one authority is wholly concerned with the reenlistment program. BuSandA, of course, takes care of the payments while BuPers deals with other aspects. In BuPers, reenlistment comes under different activities. One reviews the requests of those failing to meet the proficiency marks and conduct marks of those otherwise qualified for reenlistment. Another activity implements the policy makers’ decisions and issues the basic directives. And then the nation-wide recruiting offices ship over the broken-service reenlistees. Ergo, the Navy Department public information official who seeks to provide information or news copy on this subject to military or commercial news outlets must contend with necessarily decentralized activities.
Probably more influential than this spread- out, however, is that a seldom-changing picture which takes form in directives and which affects a somewhat limited number of persons does not make for top rate news copy. Even so, it would seem that more could be printed on the subject, especially in the Navy-sponsored news outlets—at least to the extent that “Rights of the Vet” do not completely overshadow “Rights of the Reenlistee.”
In summary of the above, there seem to be two factors here that adversely influence the reenlistment rate. First, the veteran’s material benefits outweigh the reenlistee’s benefits, both of the Navy type and of the long-range “vet’s rights” type. Second, not enough is written or said about the benefits that do accrue to the reenlistee. Other than making recommendations to legislative groups, there is little the Navy can do about the first factor. But it is within the power of the Navy Department, of officers in lower echelons, to rectify to some extent the second factor.
Selectivity and Controlled Quotas
One manner in which the present reenlistment rate manifests- itself is a situation currently seen aboard many ships—perhaps more so in the amphibious and auxiliary types than in the others. We see, for example, quartermaster gangs of one chief, one 1st class, one 3rd class, and fifteen strikers; and radio gangs of one chief, one 2nd class, and eleven strikers. This is not a matter of slow rates; it is a shortage of one and two hash- mark sailors.
It can be maintained, of course, that the ship is numerically up to strength. But with fifteen strikers and a 3rd class averaging out with one 1st class and a chief, the level of skill is far below par. The ship’s organization is seriously off balance.
As I understand it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Services Committees deal with total enlisted strength figures, while the three departments—the Navy Department especially so—place a strong emphasis on levels of skill of the men—a fact which makes both a high reenlistment rate and a high degree of selectivity necessary for the Navy’s welfare.
Personnel selection programs imply controlled quotas. It is good that they do, for with a really high reenlistment rate (say of 90%) we would have a “navy of old men”— in which the incoming rate would largely be governed by the rate of those going into the Fleet Reserve. The enlisted structure should pyramid somewhat in the way the officer structure does: a larger number of young men for a smaller number of somewhat older men, in other words, a pyramid of time-inservice groups.
In an enlisted navy of maximum personnel efficiency perhaps the ideal rate over a number of years would be something like 40% reenlisted at the end of their first cruise; 60% of this group at the end of their second cruise; 75% of these after their third, and 85% of these after their fourth period of four-year service. Through such control the present rate would be more than doubled for the first end-of-enlistment group; would be decreased to a slight extent for the more advanced intermediate-service groups and would be decreased to a greater extent for the longer-service groups. That initial 40% rate, of course, is based on an assumed partial fulfillment of that which is a major topic of this paper: adding to that one man out of five first-cruise men who wants to stay in the Navy.
Reducing the quotas for the longer -service groups may seem inconsiderate or, to some, even heartless. By the same token, however, so is the senior officer selection board system. To soften the threat of “being passed over” a procedure similar to one used by the Veterans Administration might be followed. The VA has a system of compensation payments based on disability rates of from 10 to 100 per cent. Thus, a man leaving the Navy after eight years of- service could draw, say for example, $40 or $50 monthly; a man with 12 or 16 years’ service, $70 and $90 respectively. The traditional 20-year period would still be signalized by a greater jump to the present $125.35 monthly retainer pay.
Out-of-service payments to a man less than 30 years of age and for service of only eight years may seem too strong a recommendation, a somewhat far-fetched concept.2 But we must fight fire with fire by bringing in new concepts to offset other new concepts that are already at work. (Remember, too, these men could still be held in the Reserve and kept in training. Here their skill and experience would make them key members. They would be similar to Reservists in a drill pay status, but would receive the additional monthly retainer).
Two Recent Factors
In talking over the subject of reenlistment with other sailors and with officers, three points have repeatedly arisen. The first is the effect of the previously discussed “vet’s rights.” The other two are the effect of the fine technical training given in the Navy and the indirect effect of Selective Service.
Training. Our ships and aircraft will go nowhere but forward in complexity of equipment—-highly technical equipment which must be both operated and maintained. Witness the three new general service ratings created only this year: guided missileman, aviation fire control technician, and aviation guided missileman. Before World War II the terms “Class A school” (for the few we had) and “twelve weeks” were practically synonymous. Today our many Class A schools go up to 36, 42 and 44 weeks in length for their courses. This is training which follows almost immediately the 12- week recruit training. Many of the better qualified Class A graduates go on to advanced studies at Class B or Class C schools. A large part of their naval service, then, is schooling. The ships and planes, of course, demand this school-taught skill. But in the more advanced cases almost half of the service time of these first-cruise men is school duty. High school graduates for the most part, they have the idea of schooling strongly imbedded in their mind. Their actual naval service is all too often but an interlude between past and future (G.I. Bill) schooling. All this is on the one side.
On the other side is the beckoning of industry for those Navy-taught skills. Lieutenant George P. Steele, II, U. S. Navy, of the New London Submarine School’s Staff, discussing the electronics technician situation of 1950-51 (in the August, 1952, Bu- Ships Journal) said: “The training received at advanced schools, and even at basic schools, was too often more valuable to the individual than his naval career, particularly since the rapidly expanding civilian electronics industry offered attractive jobs.”
It will take strong inducements to encourage such men to stay in the Navy. But it is the Navy’s duty to try to keep the best of them.
Selective Service. The Selective Service Act has a definite influence on the reenlistment picture. Indirectly it has brought, and will continue to bring, large numbers of fine young men into the Navy whose prime purpose in joining this branch is to avoid service in what to them were less attractive branches of the Armed Forces. Put another way, it brings in young men who place a strong emphasis on merely putting in their time and getting out.
The above motivation to an initial enlistment is in contrast to such traditional ones as adventure, travel, steady pay, opportunities for learning a trade and for promotion. Regardless of their reasons for joining, these young men are as valuable and as select as any other group. Though they may enter with a negative outlook there is no reason why they could not be brought around to a positive outlook on making a career of the Navy.
Three Inducements with Immediacy
Heard and read about are various proposed inducements to reenlistment. Among them: a higher ratio of shore duty to sea duty for all rates; faster advancements; easier operating schedules for fleet units; increased prestige for petty officers; an across- the-board pay raise; reinstatement of lost Navy Exchange privileges; a greater spread between the E-l and E-7 pay scales, and a higher initial reenlistment bonus.
The chief purpose served by having more shore duty billets, faster advancements, and easier schedules would be to make for an easier-going—and perhaps less efficient— Navy. Some of the latter, though, seem to have merit and from time to time are given consideration by Navy and Defense Department officials. Aside from the higher bonus, however, none of the above are inducements to reenlistment in the sense that the application of them would be a leading consideration at, or just before, the time for shipping over. Instead, their effect would spread out through the period of service.
In contrast are those inducements whose value lies in their immediacy to the man thinking about shipping over. Among these are three which seem especially pertinent in their four-square solidness. Two had been leading factors in the past but have fallen off greatly in their effectiveness. These two are reenlistment leave and a factor popularly known as choice of duty station. The third involves the process itself. It will be discussed first.
In most cases the process of reenlistment is anything but a pleasant one. All too often it is one of those stand-in-line, hurry-up-&- wait affairs. This is especially true for men of the larger shore activities and for men of small ships and of small shore installations nearby who are sent to the larger activities to ship over. (The best places in this respect seem to be those ships with attached medical officers and which are administratively able to handle the process. They take care of their own—no more). Typical statements heard at the shore activities: “You come over Tuesday and we get you out Thursday. . . . Enlistment expires Monday? We backdate your papers. . . . The papers haven’t come down from ‘Disbursing’ yet . . . any hour now.” A man likes a little rank around when he agrees to devote four more years to his Navy. But the officer who certifies the Shipping Articles, swears the man in and offers the handshake is usually the activity’s separation officer or personnel officer, usually a lieutenant or below. What’s more, physical examinations include an oppressive amount of checking out in company with groups of ‘“separatees” being examined for discharge.
Those who have been through the mechanics of this process under such conditions do not look forward to a repetition. Also, they bring back word of their experiences, often with color added. The prospects of having some of the same can easily be that one last straw for a man otherwise inclined toward reenlistment.
The “cure” here is largely a matter of administrative consideration and of tightening up on the mechanics of the process. And, too, much benefit can result from a little attention to the personal factors. At some commands, especially the sea-going ones, a brief but impressive ceremony marks the final stage. With the men’s division officers present, the commanding officer swears in the reenlistees and offers congratulations.
Traditionally reenlistment time is leave time. This concept has been altered somewhat by the Armed Forces Leave Act of 1946, upon which all types of leave are now based. At present, reenlistment leave differs from other forms of leave only in small degree. The chances of getting a favorable leave request-chit endorsement for it are better than for, say, an annual leave chit for the difference ends about there. The man who takes reenlistment leave must use leave time accumulated during the previous enlistment; or if he has made a cash settlement for his past leave, he must borrow from future 2½-day-per-month accumulations. By doing the first he starts his service with a zero leave credit; by doing the second, with a minus leave credit.
The fact is that many men do not even take leave upon reenlistment or for several months thereafter. There always is present that desire to accumulate ten or fifteen days for those occasions which do not qualify for emergency leave but which are quite important to a man, personally: a younger brother also going home on leave, a sister getting married, a baptism in the family.
In contrast, the pre-World War II pattern was one in which a man was almost always given a thirty-day shipping over leave—at no “cost” to himself. The leave was prescribed by directives in addition to the regular thirty days of annual leave. Certainly a much stronger inducement to shipping over lay in the earlier form of reenlistment leave than in the present watered-down form.
Another leading inducement of the past was that in which men reenlisting on board— especially those considered by the captain to be somewhat above average in their value to the Navy—were given preference in the matter of new duty stations. These reenlistees were given first choice on the “quotas for transfer to other ships or shore stations” as well as on new construction assignments.
An even more positive form of duty station choice was in operation from mid-1947 to late-1949. Men who shipped over under the provisions of a directive entitled “Greater Opportunities for Selecting New Duty Station Upon Reenlistment in the Regular Navy” were given just that. Generally it amounted to their being allowed to reenlist at any ship or station. In certain cases they stayed at their new duty station for at least four or six months, vacancies permitting. (No shipboard vacancy, they would be sent to another ship of the same type.) In other cases, especially for those with from one to three months between discharge and reenlistment, they were transferred shortly after shipping over. In any event, their positive demonstration of duty preference was a strong factor when their next duty assignment was made.
Opportunities for “choice of duty station” are now much less than those of the past. It is true that the man who ships over within thirty days at an activity from which he is made available for general assignment (i.e., a recruiting station) may indicate his ship- type and fleet preference. But it cannot be maintained that this form of showing choice of duty is as effective as that of five years ago or that the opportunities for actually selecting specific new duty stations are as great as those of pre-war days. In brief, the “choice of duty station” and the “bona fide, no-cost reenlistment leave” inducements of a few years ago have no adequate present-day counterparts.
Career Concept
One of the most important factors in the reenlistment picture is a broad one for which the term “career concept” seems the most appropriate.
What is the career concept? It is the general idea of a man’s devoting several years of his life to the Navy. Of his choosing one of the military skills as his profession. Of his calling himself, for a score or half-score of years, a professional Navyman. This concept, incidentally, is not that which is embodied in this statement uttered now and then by hash-marked senior petty officers: “I’m just in to do my twenty and get out.”
The career concept is important because it sets a fashion. It forms a tide of general thought. The man who considers shipping over when the service-wide career concept is strong finds himself riding the tide. But the man who considers it when the tide is weak breasts the tide. Currently the career concept is not a strong one. And there are no signs that it is growing stronger.
An even less strong career concept was at work during the period from September, 1945, to September, 1947. At that time— when “everybody was getting out”—the Navy’s enlisted count plunged from 3,066,000 to 425,000. (The writer was at a large base in the South in late ’45. He had his service points, his enlistment had expired, and he could have been processed out of the Navy in a matter of hours. It was his choice to stay on, however, and he was considered something of a rare bird for wanting to do so. It was three days before a knowledgeable yeoman was found to ship him over).
The years 1934-35-36 saw a strong career concept at work. The reenlistment rate then was 85%. True, there was an economic depression on and there were strong inducements to reenlistment—but there were strong inducements to getting out, too. Advancements came slowly and a general pay reduction had gone into effect shortly before. Nevertheless, from the high rate it would seem that the prevailing fashion in those years was to stay with the Navy.
To foster a strong career concept, then, is to foster a higher rate of those who want to reenlist. But how to make it stronger? It is a general and nebulous idea and apart from one concrete suggestion, the “solutions” seem as general as the concept. This first suggestion is to play down the idea of fixed periods of enlistment. (As typified in the old story of the recruit’s saying, at the end of his first day in the Navy: “Well, only three years and 364 days to go.”) In place of the fixed periods would be flexible periods of from four to six years, depending on (1) points based on quarterly marks and other notations in the service record and (2) the prevailing international situation.
A few years ago such a proposal would have been complicated by a longevity-pay change. Prior to June, 1942, the man who completed four years of service (for all purposes—the man who stayed on for a second cruise, in the long-range view) received a 10% increase in base pay. And he went on to receive another 5% increase every four years. The present pay bill, however, generally provides a variable increase every two years. Standard periods of enlistment, therefore, have little influence on the pay scale at the present time.
Other ways to foster a stronger career concept might be based on the following little- discussed fact. Enlisted men with three or more service stripes have something special in common with commanders, captains and above. Both groups have proved that the Navy is the main profession of their life. They meet on this common ground and are set apart from the “in-and-outers.” Where to go from this point, I don’t know—except to emphasize the idea of enlisted men’s time-inservice seniority.
Yet other answers might be based on the patent fact that it is much more difficult to get a man to want to reenlist than to enlist for the first time. Obviously the Navy has failed to sell itself as a career to the great majority of first cruise men—at the very period they spend their full time in the Navy and are under its direct influence. Has the idea ever been put forth of it being a privilege to reenlist? If so, I have never heard of it. The fact of the matter is that most men nearing the end of their enlistment seem to consider it a favor to the service if they were to ship over. However, under the present conditions a privilege-to-reenlist argument would not be very valid anyway—not with 2.5 and 2.75 marks as minimum standards. It would seem, though, that if any psychology were to be applied in stepping up the rate it would most logically be applied in the privilege-to-reenlist aspect.
Summary and Course of Action
A major theme of this paper has been that reenlistment, after all, is something the enlisted man himself must do. For this reason, his ideas and viewpoint should be given due consideration. Where applicable, portions of the fore-going discussion have been presented with this in mind.
When a man thinks about shipping over, he must weigh the favorable aspects against the unfavorable aspects of devoting four more years of his life to the Navy or even of making a career of the Navy. He must weigh the immediate inducements to reenlistment against the various veteran’s benefits, the opportunity to put his fine Navy training to use in civilian life and the inclination to follow the fashion of leaving the Navy when the career concept is at low strength. Also, he is often faced with an unpleasant process. Unfortunately, he no longer can look with anticipation to those standbys of a few years ago—reenlistment leave and choice of duty station; for these now exist in little more than name only.
A strong force lies with those of us, officer and enlisted, who have made the Navy our career. Secure in our knowledge that our profession is a fine one and that the alert, ambitious young man benefits himself by shipping over, we must make a more vigorous approach to the whole subject of reenlistment.
Some of us can best play our role by talking up and encouraging the shipping-over idea among the younger men, either with the spoken word or the written word. Others— those in higher levels of authority—are in the position to bring about basic, far-reaching countermeasures against those factors which discourage reenlistment. Stress must be laid on the favorable aspects of naval and military life; for the unfavorable ones, unfortunately, are usually the most self-assertive. The immediate inducements to reenlistment should first be strengthened and then emphasized and reemphasized.
Through such combinations will we be able to reduce by two or even three those four out of five men on their first enlistment who now do not desire to stay in the Navy. The Navy owes it to itself to retain the best.
1. An outstanding destroyer in which the writer served four years ago had a reenlistment rate of something like 90% in the two deck divisions. It seemed that the idea of leaving the Navy just didn’t occur to those sailors . . . verging on treason, in effect. He has yet to see the equal of those divisions for harmony, smooth efficiency and good will in its sailors.
2. It is not so far-fetched as it would first seem and it has its precedents. Certain overseas service before 1912 counted “double time” for retirement and its payments. Even in 1953 a few men were being transferred to the Fleet Reserve under the old “16-year Bill.” These are men with considerable broken service but who had served before 1925.