Must We Live in Fear?

We are a frightened people! The citizens of the United States of America, that colossus among nations, live in fear. Our children are taught to hide beneath their school room desks; our citizens scan the skies, apprehensive that some dreadful force may soon strike them from above! There is a feeling of urgency, of haste, surrounding everything we do—as if we were straining every fiber to batten down before the storm breaks. And when it does break, what form will it take? Will it be atom bombs crashing down upon us to blow up our homes and loved ones? Or will it be communists boring from within and awaiting the signal from some far-off potentate to spring at our throats and destroy us?

One of our pet fears, of course, is the U.S.S.R. Many feel we are in mortal danger of attack; and our one hope is that we shall be permitted just a little more time to prepare to meet the terrible onslaught which could be unleashed against us at any moment. Well, what about this communist threat? How real is it? How well are we situated to meet the storm, when and if it does break? Perhaps if we analyze our fear of U.S.S.R. power we shall be able to place it in proper perspective.

Let us begin our analysis by examining a globe; for geographical position is the fundamental factor in the power potential of any nation. Only by examining a globe can we see the land areas and the sea areas of the world in true perspective and in their true relationship to one another. Charts, maps, and other flat projections of the surface of the earth are distorted in one way or another. (Indeed, maps and charts are oftentimes distorted deliberately in order to convey an impression of geography favorable to some special theory or concept.)

If we turn our globe on its axis until central Asia is before us, we are soon impressed by the vast size of this Asiatic continent. (If we look at a flat map, a mercator projection, the impression is almost terrifying; for on such a projection Central Asia is expanded far out of proportion to its actual size.) Central Asia encompasses one-sixth of the total surface of the earth, we are told. Somehow we associate this vast land area with power. It is vast; therefore it must be powerful, we say. We sometimes picture it as a monstrous walking bear preparing to devour any who may dare to stand against it. At other times we picture it as a huge fluid mass, which will one day break its flood gates and engulf the entire civilized world.

We pity the Europeans, who have the misfortune to dwell on that small appendage of the Asiatic continent known as the European peninsula. Surely, we are told, it is only a matter of time until the vast, mysterious genie of the Asiatic hinterland breaks out of its borders and sweeps over all of Europe. There is a good possibility, we are told, that both the European and Asiatic continents will be overrun. Then, when he stands supreme on the shores of the Atlantic and the Pacific, he will turn his attention to the United States. It will then be only a question of time until he destroys us.

This is essentially what mankind fears most of all today—the vast mysterious power of the Asiatic continent, sweeping everything in its path. It matters little that nothing quite like it has ever happened before. It matters little that the countries of Western Europe and Eastern Asia have not fared badly, individually and collectively over the centuries, against the power of the interior of Asia. The fact that this power might become irresistible at some indefinite time in the future seems more important to us at the moment. It might therefore be appropriate to ask ourselves this question: If the peoples of the Asiatic hinterland have never exercised world domination before, on what basis do we concede them the power and ability to do it now, or in the near future? Let us turn to the field of geopolitics, where we may perhaps find some clues which will enable us to clarify our thinking on the power of the U.S.S.R.

Geopolitics may be defined as the application of the geographic, political, and economic influences of history to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Geopolitics is not an exact science; indeed, quite the opposite is true. Geopolitics is very much like politics. In domestic politics two individuals can look at the same political scene and see different things. For example, a member of the political party in power looks at the manner in which our government is conducting its affairs and comes away with a sense of pride and a feeling of accomplishment. A member of the opposition party views the same situation and comes away with much the opposite impression. Rather than pointing with pride, he views with alarm.

So also with the geopolitician. One geopolitician can study the contours of the globe and their effect on the history of mankind and arrive at one set of conclusions. Another can look at the same globe, analyze the same historical data, and arrive at a totally different set of conclusions. The situation confronting a nation may thus be considered favorable or unfavorable, depending upon the point of view of the individual.

In our country we recognize the importance of considering a number of different points of view as we chart our political course. We recognize the wisdom of the two- party system. We believe it to be the foundation of sound government.

The same may be said of geopolitics. A number of different geopolitical theories must be studied and analyzed as we chart our future course. The two-party system is as essential to the formulation of sound foreign policy, and to the formulation of the military policy which supports foreign policy, as it is to the formulation of sound domestic policy.

A few years ago Sir Halford J. Mackinder, a British geographer, wrote a book titled Democratic Ideals and Reality. His book has since become one of the most influential books on geopolitics. However, since his views are those of but one individual in this highly important, though controversial, field, it is essential that they be subjected to careful scrutiny before they are accepted in their entirety. It might therefore be appropriate at this time to take an opposing view deliberately, in order to test the validity of Mackinder’s theories on geopolitics. For convenience, let us borrow from Sir Halford himself and name the contending geopolitical parties the landsmen and the seamen.

Sir Halford Mackinder was a British subject. He lived in a country which, over many centuries, drew its strength from the sea and which became, and still remains, one of the most successful politico-military forces of all time. Yet, when he studied the globe, he saw it through a landsman’s eyes. Like so many today, he was impressed by the vastness of the Asiatic hinterland. He somehow associated this vastness with power. Surely, he reasoned, here in the interior of the vast Asiatic continent must lie the pivot of the world!

Mackinder believed that the land power of this great continent might one day succeed in outflanking and defeating sea power by seizing its major bases on the perimeter of Europe and Asia through a series of conquests from the land side. The Persians, for example, attempted to conquer the Greeks by seizing their major seaports from the land side; they almost succeeded. The Carthaginians tried with a series of land campaigns to conquer the Romans by capturing their home territory, including many of the bases which supported Roman sea power; they, too, almost succeeded. Yes, these things almost happened, but not quite. What actually did happen was this. Persia bled herself white in a series of costly land campaigns against the seafaring Greeks. They won a number of land battles, but the superior staying qualities of Greek sea power brought the final defeat of the Persians. The Carthaginians suffered much the same fate. Driven from the seas by an emerging Roman navy, the Carthaginians sought to recover their losses in a series of land campaigns. While Carthage won many battles on land, the cost of these land campaigns was more than she could endure. As a result, she lost the war. The superior staying qualities of Roman sea power eventually prevailed.

Napoleon tried to destroy English sea power by capturing and consolidating all of Europe and Western Asia into one vast empire. Both the Kaiser and Hitler tried the same thing. All three of these landsmen succeeded in winning many battles on land; at times they gave a good account of themselves at sea. But none of them ever succeeded in bringing about the defeat of the sea power which opposed them. In each case control of the sea was the decisive factor; for, the side which controlled the seas had access to the material and human resources of the rest of the civilized world! By mobilizing these worldwide resources and by transporting them across the sea to points where they could be brought to bear against the continental enemy, the sea powers have repeatedly succeeded in defeating their continental adversaries!

Nevertheless, Mackinder was so impressed with the potentialities of that vast inland area of Eastern Europe and Western Asia that he named it the “Heartland.” The name “Heartland” itself is significant. It is indicative of the importance which Mackinder attached to that area in its relation to the rest of the world. Mackinder saw his Heartland as the one region of the earth out of reach of sea power! He believed that here in the Asiatic hinterland, safely removed from the influence of sea power, it would one day be possible to build a strong military base and a self-sufficient economy. He predicted that the invention of the engine and the airplane would soon permit land (and land- based air) transportation to compete on equal terms with sea transportation. These advances would then give the Asiatic heartland interior lines of communications, superior, in his opinion, to the world-wide sea communications of the sea powers.

Let us examine Mackinder’s predictions, in the light of present-day developments in transportation. Perhaps it will provide a clue to how much we have to fear from the colossus of the Asiatic hinterland.

First, let us consider the statement that the Asiatic hinterland—Mackinder’s heartland—is out of reach of sea power. Here Mackinder reveals his appreciation of the effectiveness of sea power by stating, as a condition for the development of his superior land power, that it must be located in some far-off interior, out of reach of the influence of sea power. He did not foresee the time when aircraft, flying from mobile ship bases (aircraft carriers), or flying from land bases in bridgeheads on the perimeter of Europe and Asia, would be able to reach the most remote sections of the Asiatic heartland. He did not foresee the day when every acre of his ideal land power, every interior line of communication, and every military and industrial complex would be brought within the reach of the long arm of sea power.

Let us now turn to new inventions. Have these enabled land transportation to catch up with sea transportation, as Mackinder predicted? Here is perhaps where Mackinder committed an error of which most of us are susceptible from time to time. Most of us are able to see quite clearly how new developments will result in advances in fields of endeavor with which we ourselves are most familiar. But many of us somehow seem unable to comprehend that those same developments also permit advances—sometimes even greater advances—in fields with which we are not so familiar. Thus, the steam engine, which brought advances in land transportation, also brought comparable, or even greater, advances in sea transportation.

Some of the advances which we are witnessing in sea transportation are impressive. For example, there are ships at sea today which displace over eighty thousand tons. One ship, which displaces over fifty thousand tons—the S.S. United States—made the passage from the United States to England at an average speed of over forty miles an hour. This speed is comparable to that at which one would travel across the United States by train! It exceeds the world’s motor- boat speed record of only a few decades ago! Moreover, as an indication of things to come, another speed boat within the past year travelled across a lake in Scotland at a speed of about 200 miles an hour!

Today we are witnessing merely the dawn of the atomic era. Before many years have passed ships will be powered by nuclear energy. Long before this new source of power will have been developed for use in land or airborne conveyances, it will be practical for use in the propulsion of ships.

The trend in the speed and size of ships is still upward. The sea can support hulls of unlimited size and weight. Research in hull and propulsion design is opening up new horizons. The tremendous possibilities of nuclear energy are yet to be fully explored. The limits on size, speed, and radius of action of ships are not yet in sight.

Meanwhile, ships are being put to many uses. Not many years ago an inventor built a boat and attached wings to it. The boat rose from the water, flew around in the air for a while, and then settled back on the surface of the water. Today there are indications that the flying boat has tremendous future possibilities. Another inventor built a ship with a flat deck running the entire length of the top of hull structure. This ship is known today as the aircraft carrier. It, too, has a tremendous future.

It is not difficult to imagine huge ships— or fast-moving bases, displacing hundreds of thousands of tons—moving over the surface of the water at some future date at greatly increased speeds. And then, as our power resources continue to increase, someone will conceive the idea of attaching wings to these seaborne “satellites”—wings and sufficient power to permit them to rise into the outer atmosphere. These things are likely to come to pass on the sea; for water will support structures of almost unlimited size and displacement.

Now, we can be certain that if we in the United States arbitrarily restrict ourselves in the development of any new techniques for using the seas, there are others who will be eager to step in ahead of us. Should this ever come' to pass, the people of the United States will, indeed, have reason to live in fear!

Let us examine briefly the influence which the airplane is having on our geopolitical outlook. As a result of the development of the flying boat and the aircraft carrier, the airplane has gone to sea. Indeed, there are some who believe that the future of the sea- based airplane may be as bright as, or even brighter than, its future as an instrument of land power. The airplane, which increased the range and effectiveness of weapons operating from land bases, also brought about similar increases in the range and effectiveness of weapons operating from sea bases. The development of the airplane has done much to stimulate thought in the field of geopolitics. The rapid advances in air transportation have served to emphasize the differences in the philosophical outlook of the landsman and the seaman. Thus far the body of thought which has grown up around the airplane seems to have divided itself along traditional party lines—those of the landsman and those of the seaman.

The landsman sees in the airplane new possibilities for expansion in the mobility and capabilities of land power. He sees in the airplane an opportunity to extend the influence of land power over the domain of the sea, which heretofore has been denied to him. He sees in the airplane an opportunity to avoid, if need be, the dominating influence of sea power, under which he has chafed for so many centuries. He sees in the airplane an opportunity to cast off the shackles of the shore line—an opportunity to fly over the sea to exert his influence in distant lands, which were previously denied to him by sea power. Here at last is his opportunity to catch up with, and even surpass, sea power!

To the seaman, the airplane also represents opportunity. To him the airplane is another means of increasing the mobility and capabilities of sea power. He sees in the airplane an opportunity to. extend the dominating influence of sea power over land areas previously denied to him. He sees in it an opportunity to fly over minefields, coast defenses, and other traditional land barriers to deliver the most modern weapons— including thermo-nuclear weapons as they may become available—at great distances inland from the coast. The seaman sees in the airplane an opportunity to increase still further the centuries-old gap which has existed between land power and sea power.

The development of the airplane has also increased the vulnerability of both land transportation and sea transportation systems. But land transportation systems, previously safe from interdiction from the sea, have now become vulnerable to an even greater degree than have ships, which travel over a ready-made highway system, requiring no bridges, no tunnels, and no maintenance or repairs.

Thus, the interior communications system of the power of the Asiatic hinterland appears to suffer by comparison with that of the sea power. The truth of the matter is that the side with control of sea communications is in a position to concentrate superior military power, as well as superior political and economic influence—at points on the European and Asiatic perimeters more easily and more economically than can any landlocked power of the Asiatic hinterland. For this reason the chances of a land power being able to move out and engulf the entire perimeter of the European-Asiatic continent are not great—unless the maritime powers deliberately bring about their own destruction by abdicating their dominating position at sea.

Today in Korea we see demonstrated the application by the maritime community of superior force at a point on the Asiatic continent. Control of sea communications enables us to sustain our army on the Korean peninsula five thousand miles across the sea, yet only two hundred miles from the vast manpower resources of Manchuria. Control of sea communications also permits us to maintain the necessary air control over the battle area.

Sea communications make nations of the western European peninsula more accessible politically to Washington than they are to Moscow. For this same reason Greece and Turkey are more accessible to Washington than to Moscow. Jugoslavia and China are more accessible to Washington than to Moscow. Jugoslavia has already found it to her advantage to reorient herself toward the maritime community. China cannot turn her back on the sea for long, without destroying for an indefinite period her influence in the Western Pacific basin. When she turns toward the sea she will rejoin the maritime community, where her best interests have always lain.

The important political, as well as military, decisions of history have gone to the side with the superior lines of communication, that is, the side with control of sea communications. With due apologies to Mackinder, that is as true today as it has been in the past. The possibilities offered by technological developments indicate that it will continue to be true in the future.

Let us now sum up the seaman’s geopolitical philosophy. The seaman studies the same globe as the landsman, but his gaze does not remain fixed on the large land masses. He also sees the vast water areas which surround the land masses and stab deep into every continent. He recognizes these water areas as the primary communication system of civilization. He reads in his history how early civilization expanded and flourished along the seashores of the world. To him the Mediterranean basin was the true heartland, the true power center of the ancient world. Control of the Mediterranean Sea was the key to that power center. He notes that today the centers of civilization and modern economic power are still concentrated in areas easily accessible from the sea. He sees the North Atlantic basin as the true power center of the modern world. Control of the North Atlantic Ocean is the key to that power center today. He also sees evidence that the Pacific basin may one day be the power center of the future world. To the seaman, Mackinder’s heartland is still the Asiatic hinterland.

The seaman sees the Asiatic hinterland beset by many fundamental physical difficulties, which no amount of human endeavor can completely solve. He recognizes that much material progress has been made in this vast inland area during recent years; but he also recognizes that its achievements are dwarfed by the far greater progress made by the maritime world. Compared to the total power potential of the maritime world, he sees the power potential of the Asiatic hinterland still outclassed by a wide margin.

When the seaman looks at the globe he is not particularly impressed with the size of the Asiatic hinterland. He is more likely to be impressed by the vast area and power potential of the other five-sixths of the globe, most of which can be motivated, through the convenient sea communication system, against any aggression which might be instigated in the interior of Asia.

Thus the seaman holds little fear for the future of the maritime world, regardless of what nation may assume its leadership. While the landsman permits himself to be frightened by huge land masses, the seaman points to the evidence of history to support his more optimistic views. Unlike his land- bound geopolitical opponent, who since the day Greek fire was invented has been predicting the doom of sea power, the seaman sees the sea power of the future as a greater dominating force than it has ever been in the past. He sees the airplane, nuclear energy, and other new developments increasing the capabilities of sea power even to a greater degree than they increase the capabilities of land power.

While the advances already made are impressive, and in some cases even terrifying, we can be sure that they will be dwarfed by the scientific developments of tomorrow. Hut whatever the future may hold, it is the seaman’s conviction that the nation which succeeds in adapting these new developments— including thermo-nuclear weapons and whatever may lie beyond—to increasing the effectiveness of its sea power, will be the dominant world power of the time.

Who is right then, the landsman or the seaman? In the field of politics, who has the right answer, the conservative or the liberal? Those who believe in the two-party political system see wisdom in the maintenance of a sound balance between two extreme philosophies. Therefore, somewhere between the extreme views of the landsman and the extreme views of the seaman there must lie a sound middle course. In our search for sound foreign policy, and for sound military policies to support our foreign policy, we must make certain that both the landsman and the seaman are given equal opportunity to be heard in the highest counsels of government. For, unless there is an understanding and appreciation of the point of view of both the landsman and the seaman, the sound middle course may not be found.

There is evidence that the philosophy of the landsman prevails at the moment. For fear, more than anything else, seems to govern the thinking and the actions of our people, fear of the seemingly vast power of the Asiatic hinterland. This fear stems from the landsman’s point of view, which apparently is accepted throughout the land, almost to the exclusion of the seaman’s view.

Why does this situation exist in the United States, which is potentially the greatest maritime power the world has ever known? Why is it that the fear of the mysterious power of the Asiatic hinterland is so widespread in our country? The answers to these questions are not easily found, although an approach to them may be summarized as follows:

Man is a creature of the land. He lives his life on land. He is far more familiar with events which take place on land. He visualizes land warfare, land transportation, and all the other activities on land far more readily than he can visualize similar activities at sea. He sees army and land-based air installations in his community. He observes them in operation. On the other hand, when he sees a ship it is usually lying dormant in port.

Most men have never gone to sea, and therefore know very little about the sea. Only a relatively small percentage of the population of our country has any direct connection with the sea. Even these—fishermen and members of the merchant marine and Navy for the most part—have the opportunity to observe but a minute segment of the influence of the sea. Of those who do go to sea, only a few have occasion to reflect on the meaning of the sea to our civilization. Fewer still have the inclination to reduce their reflections to writing. As a result, the seaman’s point of view is not widely recorded in our country. Unlike the day-to-day news value of the various facets of land power, the intangibles, the subtleties and the long-range influence of sea power are not readily apparent to the casual observer.

Our understanding of the seaman’s point of view is further restricted by a severe shortage of its proponents in the field of education. Very few of our educators have had the occasion or the inclination to study the philosophy of the seaman. Therefore, the vast majority of the historical and geographic material written in this country reflects the landsman’s point of view. The majority of the textbooks used in our schools and colleges also reflects the landsman’s point of view.

A large proportion of the maps in our children’s textbooks feature the land areas, while the sea areas which surround them are given little attention. The maps in most of our encyclopedias and atlases are constructed the same way. However, the history of early civilization is a story of the struggle for control of the Mediterranean by the people who lived and migrated and died along its shores. Yet how many maps do we find which feature the Mediterranean Sea in the center, with the contiguous land areas along its shores? Would that not be a more accurate illustration for the study of the progress of early civilization?

The history of civilization since the Fifteenth Century is largely centered on the struggle for control of the North Atlantic. Yet, how many maps do we find of the North Atlantic basin, featuring the North Atlantic Ocean in the center, with the surrounding land areas displayed in such a manner that the full significance of this great modern heartland can be appreciated? Would that not be a more accurate illustration for the study of events which have taken place in the last five hundred years?

While there has been a significant scarcity of historians, geographers and publicists with the seaman’s point of view, the landsman has been fortunate in having many eloquent proponents of his views. One of the most eminent among these is, of course, Sir Halford J. Mackinder. The eloquence of his presentation probably surpasses anything that he might have anticipated. For, in summing up his views he reduced them to his famous, ear-catching jingle:

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island:*
Who rules the World Island commands the World.”

This famous admonition is accepted as fact by a great many people today. Yet, it is only a theory, the validity of which has never been demonstrated by history! (Major General Karl Haushofer, the German geopolitician, was an admirer of the heartland theory. He was one of the architects of some of Hitler’s strategic blunders!) Can it be that Mackinder’s well-known rhyme, accepted as fact by so many whose investigation of geopolitics goes little beyond it, is the basis for the fear of the heartland which has been plaguing our people since the close of World War II? Could this be the reason so many statesmen continue to quake at the roar of the voices from the Kremlin? One wonders whether the full advantages of the two-party system are available to us today to assist us in the formulation of own our external policies.

Now, is it not about time that we Americans placed our fears of the Asiatic hinterland in proper perspective? If this can be done we shall perhaps be able to devote more of our energies and resources toward a more constructive approach to our problems, which are primarily political rather than military in nature. The war in progress is primarily a war of ideas rather than of bombs and bullets. It is the age-old struggle of men to maintain their liberty and their personal dignity, in the face of the relentless encroachment of tyranny. It is a war in which military measures have only secondary, transient influence—influence of a negative, rather than of a constructive nature. In this struggle of ideas neither the Iron Curtain of Europe nor the Iron Curtain of the atom bomb will be the deciding factor. There are, as always, risks involved in the present situation, but perhaps the military risks are not so grave or so immediate as they may sometimes appear from the landman’s point of view.

It is time for the citizens of the United States to review their geopolitical outlook and begin to appreciate the strength which is inherent in our maritime position. It is time to strike a new balance between our assets and our liabilities. When this is done we shall find that our spiritual, political, and material resources are tremendous—if only we learned how to use them!

Our rearmament program of the future must include a strong revival of political awareness. There are evidences that such a revival is already underway throughout the nation; but it must gather momentum, and it must build toward the future. Any long range solution must include a program for our public schools. Our children, the citizens of tomorrow, must learn to understand and appreciate the overwhelming strength of our position. They must learn to appreciate the meaning of the seas which surround their country and which have had such a decisive influence on our rise to a position of world power. Indeed, our continued existence as a world power may depend upon how well our citizens grasp the significance of the seas to the maintenance of our liberty and our prosperity.

But while we build toward the future, there is still today. Our approach to our present-day problems should be one of confidence and determination, rather than of fear—confidence in the inherent strength of our position, and determination that our political ideas shall prevail. We must rid ourselves of the fear of the Asiatic hinterland which has plagued our citizens during the past many years. We must scrutinize carefully the admonitions of those who for reasons best known to themselves, may seek to play upon our fears. Few can think clearly or conduct the affairs of state wisely when motivated by fright.

To the prophets of doom, who since time immemorial have seen fit to frighten their brethren with tales of the horrible fate which awaits them in the conflicts of tomorrow, we might suggest this thought:

The world has never been a safer place in which to live. Here are the statistics:

The human population of the earth has doubled itself in the last one hundred years!