The Basis of Sino-Soviet Accord

There has long been far too much surmise as to the basis and nature of the Red-Chinese and Soviet Russian cooperation which now looms large in Far Eastern strategy.

Fortunately, appraisal of international Communist cooperation in the Orient need not be based upon speculation alone. In fact, there is but little need for surmise in determining the basis for past, present, and future Chinese-Soviet Russian cooperation, for such accord finds its recent genesis and diplomatic foundation in the “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.”

It is a document occasionally referred to in general terms, but seldom discussed as to specific content. However, it would be advisable for the Western world to have a better understanding of the treaty, for that document stands today as one of the most significant and meaningful international agreements of modern times. It is the foundation on which the entire structure of Sino- Soviet cooperation is erected. Preceded and accompanied by a Chinese pro-Soviet propaganda effort, the signing of the “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance” took place in Moscow on February 14, 1950.

That the Treaty, to run for 30 years, was no routine affair is evident from the list of individuals who participated in negotiating it. The list included Mao Tze-Tung and Chou En-lai, the latter being Premier of the Chinese Government Administration Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, both representing China, and J. V. Stalin and A. Y. Vishinsky for the Soviet Union. Only a treaty of first magnitude would involve such important negotiators.

The first paragraph of the treaty discloses a primary element of Chinese, as well as Russian, foreign policy. The relationship between the two nations goes beyond the matter of friendship, as each promises not only to strengthen the friendship, but also to increase cooperation between the two powers. Cooperation between powers has considerably more meaning than friendship. The latter can be passive, while the former involves positive action. This has significance in any attempt to appraise the relationship between those two huge Communist states.

Mutual Defense Aspects

Principal and immediate objective of such asserted friendship and cooperation is exposed in the same opening paragraph of the treaty that pledges friendship and cooperation. That prime objective is the prevention of a powerful Japan. Both China and Russia state their determination to prevent “the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression.” It thus becomes evident that Russia and China have no desire to see a resurgent and militarily powerful Japan, unless, as can be seen, that powerful Japan becomes a part of the Far Eastern Communist block.

The portion of the above quotation regarding Sino-Soviet determination to prevent not only imperialism and aggression by Japan but also by any nation collaborating in any way with Japan, has implications of tremendous scope. It means that any act, which, in the opinion of China or Russia, constitutes aggression in Asia, and which act is accompanied by any kind of collaboration with Japan, can fall under this provision of the treaty.

This matter of Japanese, or Japanese- allied, aggression in Asia is not limited to the opening paragraph, or preamble, of the treaty, but is the subject dealt with in Article 1. In fact, Article 1 stiffens the language of the preamble.

Both contracting parties undertake jointly to adopt all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the contracting parties being attacked by Japan or any other state allied with it and thus being involved in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.

The broad scope of Article 1 is readily apparent. It constitutes, in essence, a Sino- Soviet mutual defense pact in Asia. The breadth of its meaning could involve any action by Japan or another power which, in the opinion of China and Russia, “violates the peace” of Asia. This could, in practice, include any military action in any part of Asia provided that the nation conducting such action was directly or indirectly collaborating with Japan.

With large numbers of United States troops based in Japan and with Japan serving as a logistical base for Allied forces now in action in Korea, it is apparent that the United States, as well as the United Nations, action in Korea could come under the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In view of statements of the Red Chinese government leaders, the United Nations action in Korea is subject to the above provisions of the treaty. As will be pointed out later, it is apparent that both Red China and the Soviet Union are taking the position that the above quoted portions of the treaty serve as the legal basis for Chinese entry into the Korean conflict and also for Russian material assistance to the Korean and Chinese Communist forces. That such is a logical deduction is substantiated by the fact that the treaty calls for maximum military assistance, but does not require formal declaration of war against the offending nation or nations.

Thus, from the standpoint of Chinese Communist attitude toward the Soviet Union, this Sino-Soviet Treaty is of historic importance in that it brings Red China and the Soviet Union into close military alliance. It is of further importance in that both China and Russia are now following a line of action with respect to Korea which, according to their interpretation, clearly falls under the provisions of the treaty.

The close alignment of China and Russia is further reflected by provisions of Article 3, by which both signatories pledge not to participate in any coalition or other measures against the other contracting party.

Article 4 requires each contracting nation to consult with the other in all international matters of common interest. This constitutes the contractual basis for Sino-Soviet cooperation in international affairs, and as such is of significance in any evaluation of world Communism. It also gives the documentary basis for Soviet support of Red Chinese claims to a place in the United Nations, as well as Chinese support of the Soviet position on the Japanese peace treaty. All of which reflects Sino-Soviet collaboration in international affairs, which collaboration in turn finds its documentary genesis in the treaty.

Article 5 continues with two more provisions apparently designed to cement Sino- Soviet relations. The first of major importance is the pledge by each of the contracting parties that it will not interfere with the internal affairs of the other. This is of particular interest in any agreement between Russia and another Communist-dominated nation. Such a provision reflects Soviet recognition of the national pride and independence of the Chinese peoples as a whole. As such, it constitutes a propaganda aspect of the treaty, as it is something that will appeal to the Chinese people, regardless of their political beliefs. Yet, it is a matter of speculation whether the Soviet government will faithfully adhere to the pledge. It’s the same kind of pledge that Joffe, the Kremlin’s agent, gave Sun Yat-sen, and which the Soviets then proceeded to violate.

The second portion of the article provides for consolidation of economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union. It will be noted later that positive steps were taken to implement this portion of the treaty. The treaty was signed by Chou En-lai, for the People’s Republic of China, and by A. Y. Vishinsky, for the Soviet Union.

Changchun R. R. Agreement

On the same date that the treaty was signed, the two nations became signatories to certain ancillary agreements. The first of these was “The Agreement on Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dairen between the People’s Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” This agreement, like the treaty, was signed in Moscow by Chou En-lai and A. Y. Vishinsky.

Any settlement between Soviet Russia and Red China with respect to the Changchun Railway is of major importance as an indicator of Sino-Soviet relations. The Changchun Railway derives its importance from the fact that it is the communications key to the control of Manchuria. As referred to in the agreement and in current Chinese articles, the Changchun Railway includes the rail net of both the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, which rail systems originally were opened to traffic in 1903 and 1907 respectively, and which, since their construction, have been a major item of contention between conflicting imperial interests in Manchuria.

Article 1 of the agreement provides for the Soviet to transfer to the Chinese government all of the Soviet rights in the joint administration of the Changchun Railway, such transfer to be made without compensation. The transfer is, according to this article, to be completed by the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, but in any event not later than the end of 1952.

This promise to transfer to China the control of the Changchun Railway is clearly a provision that will appeal to the Chinese people as a whole, and as such the agreement will serve to accomplish a two-fold propaganda objective: first, it will serve to indicate that the Soviet Union is not imperialistically inclined in matters relating to Chinese holdings, and second, by implication, that the Red Chinese government has the prestige to obtain such concessions from the Soviet Union. This cannot help but be useful to the Chinese Communist government in its attempt to demonstrate that it has prestige in the foreign relations field and can obtain worthwhile concessions for China. Consequently the agreement has real propaganda utility. At the same time it at least represents Soviet willingness to help “make face” for the Chinese Communists at home.

As might be expected, the agreement contains certain phrases, which, until proved otherwise, must be considered as escape clauses for the Soviet Union. Although a terminal date (the end of 1952) is provided for the turn-over of control of the railway to the Chinese, there is a provision in the same article to the effect that until the transfer is made, the currently “existing Sino-Soviet joint administration” of the railroad will remain unchanged, and after the transfer of control, the key posts in the administration of the railroad “will be periodically alternated between representatives of China and the U.S.S.R.” Such clauses justify suspicion of the actual intentions of the Soviet Union. For despite the definite transfer date, there is the means provided by which the Soviet Union can retain practical control of the administration of the rail system. Unless the Russians intended to make use of such provisions, it is not likely that these provisions would have been included in the agreement. This, again, tends to point up the propaganda purpose of the agreement, for while the Soviet Union goes through the diplomatic motions of giving back something to the Chinese that the Chinese have long wanted, the same agreement provides the method by which the Soviet Union, while ostensibly making the transfer, retains a large element of actual control.*

Port Arthur Agreement

Article 2 of the agreement pertains to the historically controversial area of Port Arthur. Soviet and Chinese interest in Port Arthur is understandable. Located at the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, Port Arthur commands the northern portion of the Yellow Sea and as such dominates the sea approaches to Southern Manchuria and the North China ports of Taku (Tientsin) and Chin-huang-tao. Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, the latter on the northern tip of the Shantung Peninsula, are the key control points of Red China’s inner northern line of sea defense.

By Article 2, the Soviet Union promises that the base and its installations will be handed over to the Chinese Government upon completion of a peace treaty with Japan, or not later than the end of 1952, with Chinese compensation to the Soviet Union for improvements made since 1945.

As was the case in the purported transfer of the Changchun Railway, this transfer of Port Arthur to the Chinese has escape clauses for the Soviet Union. The last paragraph of Article 2 states that in the event of either of the contracting parties becoming the object of aggression on the part of Japan or any state that may collaborate with Japan, and as a result thereof becoming involved in hostilities, China and the Soviet Union may jointly use the naval base of Port Arthur for the purpose of conducting joint military operations against the “aggressor.”

Such a provision provides for continued Russian use of Port Arthur. In view of the wording of this provision, it becomes much clearer why the Chinese and U.S.S.R. propaganda, as will be noted later, continuously refers to the Korean conflict as “aggression.” By considering United States and United Nations action in that light, the door is kept open for continued Russian utilization of Port Arthur. At the same time, the agreement has served the propaganda purpose of “demonstrating” Soviet good-will for the Chinese Communist government and people, and the Chinese government gains prestige by being able to obtain concessions for a great-power nation. Yet, due to escape clauses in the agreement, the Soviet Union still can continue to base a large portion of its Pacific sea power on Port Arthur.

Nor can there be any doubt as to the Russians using Port Arthur, for Article 2 of the agreement, at the time of its signing, refers to Port Arthur as “the jointly-utilized naval base, Port Arthur.”

Historically, this Chinese-Russian relationship has a precedent. This open arrangement for joint Sino-Soviet use of Port Arthur is very comparable to the similar provision of the Li-Lobanov Treaty of 1896, by which Russia was promised the use of Chinese Yellow Sea ports in event of aggressive war by Japan. As such, the February 14, 1950, agreement serves to continue Russian influence in littoral Asia and, at the same time, continues long standing Russian-Chinese cooperation in the application of sea power in the Western Pacific.

These historical implications of Sino- Soviet reaffirmation of Manchu-China and Tsarist-Russian arrangements for joint use of naval bases are of major significance in evaluating Chinese Communist attitude toward the Soviet Union, as the Agreement points to Chinese continuation of close alignment with Soviet sea power in opposing what the Chinese might consider to be incursions from the Pacific.

Soviet Credits to China

The second agreement, signed on the very same date as the treaty, provided for a grant of credit from the Soviet Union to Red China. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union granted China a credit of $500,000,000 to extend over a period of five years. This credit, the agreement stated, was for the purpose of paying for industrial, railroad, mining, and other equipment for the restoration and development of Chinese economy. The agreement was specific on the point that the material should be purchased from the Soviet Union. Of at least incidental interest is the fact that the value of the credit was not based upon Chinese Communist dollars, nor upon Soviet rubles, but rather on United States dollars. It is doubtful that the agreement was intended to convey the idea, but it does, that a “decadent capitalist” nation serves at least one purpose, that of providing a reliable monetary standard for loans between Communist nations.

On the basis of their formal statements following the signing of the treaty and the ancillary agreements neither of the signatories underestimated the significance of the documents. Chou En-lai, speaking for the Chinese Government, stated:

The conclusion of the above treaty and agreements is based upon the vital interests of the great peoples of China and the Soviet Union and indicates fraternal friendship and eternal cooperation between China and the Soviet Union.

Speaking for the Soviet Union, Mr. Vishinsky stated that by the signing of the treaty and agreements “a new remarkable page has been added to the history of Soviet- Chinese relations,” and later in the speech described the documents as being of “tremendous historical importance.”

The March, 1950, Sino-Soviet Agreements

The “Sino-Soviet Economic Agreements,” reportedly signed in Moscow on March 27, 1950, further implemented the February, 1950, Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. These agreements were said to provide for the formation of two Sino- Soviet companies for oil and metal exploration and production in Sinkiang province, with profits to be shared equally by the two countries. A third company, also joint Sino- Soviet, was formed to develop three aviation routes: Peking-Chita, Peking-Irkutsk, and Peking-Alma Ata. Such agreements show at least an attempt to implement the treaty by actual economic action. Also, the March agreements indicate Chinese-Soviet cooperation in pooling Russian equipment with Chinese resource potential with the prospect of joint profit. Also these projected developments indicate a definite Chinese orientation toward Inner Asia and Soviet Russia.

The treaty and agreements still loomed large in Chinese foreign policy in mid-1950. On June 6 of that year, Mao Tze-Tung delivered a report to the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In that report, Mao paid special tribute to “the strong unity in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies,” and went on to state that “the new Sino- Soviet Treaty, which is of great historic significance, has consolidated friendly relations between the two countries.”

Further indication of Chinese determination to continue the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union appeared with the printing of the address of Chou En-lai before the National committee of the People’s Consultative conference, on September 30, 1950, commemorating the first anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist government. In that address, Chou, in his official capacity as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated with respect to the Soviet Union:

The People’s Republic of China resolutely sides with the world camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union and has established the closest fraternal relations with the Soviet Union. During Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s visit to the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which is of great significance in world history.

That the strategic and international political consequences of China’s apparent policy did not escape Chou is evident from his later observation:

Because of the Treaty, nearly 700 million people of the European and Asiatic continents have united in close alliance militarily, economically, and culturally, and thus greatly strengthened the power of the two countries to guard against aggression from the East.

This passage is of considerable importance in that it contains an open reaffirmation of the February 14 treaty as a military alliance between China and the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that Chou in one portion of his address did not specify Japan as the source of possible aggression against which the Sino-Soviet alliance would guard, but rather he broadened the implications of the treaty by referring simply to “aggression from the East,” which of course might seem pointed at the United States.

The 33rd anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia again gave the Chinese propaganda machine the opportunity to quote Mao with respect to Sino-Soviet cooperation, as well as the common ideology of the two nations. An editorial “The October Revolution and Peace” in the November 1, 1950, issue of People’s China* quotes Mao on the subject of Communist China’s debt to the Soviet leaders:

The Chinese were introduced to Marxism by the Russians. Before the October Revolution, the Chinese were not only unaware of Lenin and Stalin, but they did not even know of Marx and Engles. The salvos of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped the advanced people of China and of the whole world to adopt a proletarian world outlook as an instrument for looking into a nation’s future or for re-considering one’s own problems. Follow the path of the Russians—this was the conclusion.

While noting the contribution of Mao to the victory of Chinese Communism, the editorial paid specific tribute to Stalin, stating:

In achieving that victory under the brilliant leadership of Mao Tze-Tung, the Chinese people owe a special debt to the great Stalin. His profound scientific elaboration of the key problems of the Chinese revolution and his analysis of its concrete and specific features, its various stages and lines of development, have given them unfailing guidance.

This emphasis on the ideological bond, the guidance exerted over the Chinese Revolution by Stalin, and the leadership of the Soviet Union in the “camp of peace” could well be interpreted as an indication of Chinese Communist willing alignment with the cause of world Communism, in which the Soviet Union, headed by Stalin, requires recognition of Russian leadership. This, in turn, indicates further willingness, if not determination, of the Chinese Communists to implement the February treaty particularly with respect to cooperation in foreign affairs. It is also indicative of a strong orthodox Communistic attitude toward the Soviet Union by Communist China.

Economic and Communication Cooperation

Tangible implementation of the treaty was reflected in a notice in early January, 1951, to the effect that telephone communications between Peking and Moscow had been established. The report stated that the line was the longest overland telephone link in the world, extending over 12,000 kilometers. According to the report, service was inaugurated on December 12, 1950.

It might be noted, parenthetically, that establishment of telephonic communications between China and Russia would constitute an important method of bringing about, by communication, further orientation of Communist China toward Inner Asia, Soviet Russia, and away from the sea.

A significant report of Chinese-Soviet economic cooperation in Sinkiang appeared in May, 1950. According to this account, there was an ever increasing amount of agricultural materials exported to Russia, in return for which Sinkiang received farming, industrial, and communications equipment from the U.S.S.R.

Of some added interest was the report of large agricultural exports from Sinkiang to the Soviet Union, for it shows how important the eastern loop of the Soviet Turc-Sib Railroad is in integrating Inner China’s agricultural economy with the economy of the Soviet Union. Such integration furthers the process of orienting China towards inner Asia and the Soviet Union. The convenience of exporting Sinkiang’s agricultural products to the Soviet Union, and the accessibility of Sinkiang for Soviet shipments of industrial products, is understandable in view of the fact that the Turc-Sib Railroad passes much closer to Sinkiang than does any Chinese railway.

To use the rail system, Sinkiang products would presumably pass over the roads leading through the Dzungarian Gate, thence to the rail line. This has at least incidental historical significance, in that it illustrates the age-old role of the Dzungarian Gate, which since ancient times has served as the communication route between Inner China and Central Asia. It might also be observed that in laying out the location of the rail line, the Russian engineers apparently had a good appreciation of history and geography when they looped the Turc-Sib southern extension of the Trans-Siberian Railroad close to the historic east-west passageway between what is now Russian Turkistan and Chinese Sinkiang.

Thus, such evidence of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Sinkiang, accompanied by the reported Chinese governmental treaty approval and participation in such a policy, has deep historical importance, in that it reveals a new direction in Soviet-Chinese relations in connection with Sinkiang area. Both Russia (under the Tsars and under the Soviet regime) and China have long recognized the geographical importance of Sinkiang as an East-West gateway in central Asia. Historically, this has resulted in longstanding competition between China and Russia for control of Sinkiang. Consequently, the Chinese Communists’ formal encouragement, by treaty, of Soviet penetration into the agricultural activities of that province, together with the indicated Chinese approval of integration of Sinkiang’s basically agricultural economy with that of the Soviet Union, indicates that the long period of Chinese-Russian contention over Sinkiang is at least for the time being at an end. That it marks a fundamental and long range change in Chinese-Soviet relations is apparent. It appears that such a change is reflective of a long range, rather than a transitory, Chinese Communist policy, for even the partial integration of Sinkiang economy with that of the Soviet Union is not the kind of action that would be permitted by a nation contemplating a quick switch in current policy. The direction of a nation’s economic orientation cannot be changed by governmental flat.

Stalin Peace Prize Award

The Soviet Union is encouraging the pro- Soviet policy of the Red Chinese government and reciprocating in the development of a feeling of collaboration and friendship. One of the most significant of these indications of Soviet effort to strengthen the cultural bond involved Sun Yat-sen’s widow. In September, 1951, it was announced that the International Stalin Peace Prize would be awarded to Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen). The deep international Communist tinge of the award and the ceremony connected with it was indicated by the list of Communist dignitaries attending the presentation. The list included, significantly, Kuo Mo-jo, director of Chinese propaganda, ambassadors and consular officials from the various Communist nations which have established diplomatic, relations with Red China, and the Soviet ambassador, N. V. Roshchin, who was accompanied by N. T. Fedorenko, counsellor to the Soviet Embassy. Official nature of the award was further indicated by the fact that the prize was presented by Mr. Fedorenko.

In addition to the award itself and the high Communist representation from both the Chinese and Soviet governments, the speech delivered by Ilya Ehrenburg, noted Soviet author, warrants special note. It seems logical that only a major cultural and propaganda event would justify the presence in Peking of such a noted Soviet literary figure. Also of interest is the content of Ehrenburg’s address, for it illustrates the careful and studious manner in which the Soviet representative let it be known that they are aware of the cultural heritage of the Chinese nation.

Although it was an address of presentation of an award to an individual, Ehrenburg, did not miss the opportunity to note the “great discoveries” of China’s people, and China’s contribution to the advancement of mankind. With rhetorical grace and much subtlety, he made a strong point in emphasizing how China’s cultural heritage has contributed to the “victory of the Chinese people.” Such recognition of Chinese history by a non-Chinese speaker could not fail to have been appealing to the Chinese, who are recognized for their historical consciousness.

Also, it is interesting to note the knowledge of Chinese literary history reflected in the part of the address that pointed to how the works of the “great poet Chu Yuan” and the philosopher Mo Ti presaged the present ideas of Communist China. This further illustrates how the Soviet representatives in China follow the Chinese Communist line of trying to utilize selected aspects of China’s cultural history as a basis for the present Chinese Communist government and its actions.

Other passages of the address are of value in attempting to evaluate official Soviet attitude toward implementation of the friendship provisions of the 1950 Treaty. The following excerpt is noteworthy, in that it is from Ehrenburg’s speech, the nature of which places it close to, if not in, the category of a policy pronouncement:

Let this [the prize medal] be yet another demonstration of the love, of the respect that the Soviet people have for the Chinese people. History knows of many alliances among states based on lies, on distrust, on cunning. Such alliances remind one of the marriages of convenience, they cannot stand the first test to which they are subjected. There are, however, alliances based on mutual trust, on truth, on straightforwardness. Such is the alliance between our two great countries. The solidarity and indissolubility of this alliance is the most reliable guarantee that the forces of peace will triumph over the forces of war.

In view of the nature of this address, it might be observed that it is doubtful that there would have been such an audience of Chinese and Soviet officialdom, giving by their presence governmental approval to the thoughts voiced by Ehrenburg, if such views did not meet with the approval of the two governments concerned. The ceremony has added significance in that this important Sino-Soviet ceremony occurred almost nineteen months after the signing of the Sino- Soviet Treaty of February, 1950.

Ehrenburg spent several weeks touring and speaking in China. His farewell statement included a passage which merits attention, for it indicates that the Soviet Union, and its spokesmen, are not unaware of the historical implications of the establishment and survival of the Chinese Communist government. He said:

Since the October Revolution, the victory of the revolution of China is the greatest event in the history of mankind. This victory has changed the face of Asia.

The First and Second Anniversary of the Treaty

Official Chinese reaction to the first anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance is worth noting in any evaluation of the nature of the official Chinese and Soviet attitude on the treaty after it had been in effect for one year.

As a means of showing favorable Soviet reaction towards the Chinese efforts to create a stronger bond between the two nations, People's China quoted V. M. Molotov’s description of the Sino-Soviet Treaty as “a great and powerful force in the consolidation of world peace without any parallel in the past or at present.”

Further indication that the enthusiasm for the treaty had not cooled on the part of either of the signatories during the first year it was in effect is provided by the exchange of greeting between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin on the first anniversary of the signing of the Treaty.

Mao’s message to Stalin stated, in part:

The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance has not only greatly helped in the construction of New China, but it has also provided powerful assurance in opposing aggression and defining the peace and security of the Far East and the World. We wish the further growth and consolidation of the friendship and cooperation between China and the Soviet Union.

Stalin’s greeting stated, in part:

I do not doubt that our treaty will continue serving the cause of friendship between the Chinese People’s Republic and the Soviet Union, and the strengthening of world peace.

Chou En-lai on Strategic Implications

In further recognition of the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty, Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Communist Government, prepared a special article for publication in Pravda, the newspaper mouthpiece of the U.S.S.R. Because of his high place within the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, as well as his position in the government, particularly in matters relating to foreign affairs, Chou’s statement is of major significance.

The Chinese people regard this the Anniversary of the February, 1950 Treaty as one of the most memorable days, because this Treaty has tremendous world historic significance. . . .

China and the Soviet Union are two great world powers with a population of 700 million united as one. . . .

During the past year, these stipulations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance have not only exerted tremendous influence on the great cause of opposing imperialist aggression in the Orient and defending peace in the Far East and the world, but will certainly exert even greater influence in the future.

These three quotations from the chief foreign policy spokesman for the Chinese Communist government reflect a deep Red Chinese awareness of the historic nature of the alliance between China and the Soviet Union. Chou, as indicated by the above, is not blind to the tremendous manpower united through such a relationship, nor its strategic implications.

Indication that Chou apparently considered the treaty invoked can be discovered in his later condemnation of United States Policy in Asia, particularly on Korea and Japan, stating:

It is precisely this scheme of American imperialism, which violates all international agreements and overthrows the foundations of a common peace with Japan, that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance resolutely opposes. . . .

Significantly, Chou uses the present tense in above quotations in referring to the treaty’s opposition to what he terms aggression in the Far East.

With respect to the manner in which the Soviet Union has fulfilled its obligations, Chou stated:

She [the Soviet Union] has extended generous assistance to the Chinese people, and greatly helped the economic rehabilitation and development of the country. The Chinese people warmly thank Generalissimo Stalin and the Soviet Government for their great friendship. No matter how vociferously the imperialistic aggressors fret and fume, the great friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples grows closer and closer with each passing day.

1952 Chinese and Soviet Attitudes

According to a Hong-Kong United Press dispatch, the second anniversary of the treaty was celebrated in China with a nationwide observance. Communist Chinese radio comment was quoted as follows:

During the past two years friendship between the Chinese and Soviet peoples has been expanded and strengthened.

Because of the existence of the mighty alliance between China and the Soviet Union, American imperialism has had to refrain from expanding the Korean war. Through the aid of the Soviet Union China has achieved great results in economic and national defense construction.

This demonstrates as long as China stands together with her ally any imperialist aggressive plot can be crushed.

On February 14, the Associated Press reported that the second anniversary of the signing of the treaty had been marked by an exchange of notes between Stalin and Mao. Mao, according to the report, expressed to Stalin gratitude for the “unselfish support” of the Soviet government and the Russian people during the two years in which the treaty had been in effect. Stalin, in return, expressed a desire for a further strengthening of alliance and friendship between the two countries. Significantly, the report stated that the exchange of notes between Mao and Stalin was published on the front pages of all Soviet papers, and almost every paper devoted its lead editorial to the anniversary.

Such a well publicized and top-level official support of the February, 1950, treaty indicates that the attitude of the two governments concerned had not changed during the second year of the Treaty.

In summation: The existence of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, as well as the methods by which it has been implemented, point to the following conclusions with respect to Red Chinese-Soviet Russian relations:

1. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Alliance and Mutual Assistance is the keystone in the structure of Chinese Communist international relations.
2. By communications and transportation agreements Communist China has demonstrated the extreme degree to which she has followed a policy of economic cooperation and integration with the Soviet Union.
3. Communist China has embarked upon a long range policy of collaboration and friendship with the Soviet Union.
4. By so doing, China has oriented herself toward inner Asia, consciously seeking her base of power inland, and by thus turning her back to the sea she has reversed the course of the last two centuries of Chinese history.