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NEW GUINEA AND THE MARIANAS, MARCH 1944-AUGUST 1944. Vol. VIII of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Boston: Atlantic-Little Brown. 1953. $6.00.
Reviewed by Richard S. West, Jr.
(A member of the Department of English, History, and Merriment, U. S. Naval Academy, Professor West is the author of biographies of Admirals Buchanan and Porter and' is currently engaged in writing a life of the notorious Ciiril War general, Ben Butler.)
In the spring of 1944 the Southwest Pacific from Guam to New Guinea, which had been quiet since the Japanese conquest in 1942, awoke once more to the varied din of war. American submarines patrolled deep inside of Japan’s inner defense perimeter. Fast carriers pounded strategic points on that defense line. After the break through the Bis- marks Barrier, General MacArthur and Admiral Kinkaid of the Seventh Fleet executed a bold series of leaps along the northern shore of New Guinea from Hollandia to Vogelkop (“bird’s head”) peninsula. Admiral Spruance with the Fifth Fleet and Admiral Turner with a vast amphibian force seized Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas and fought Japan’s Mobile Fleet under Admiral Ozawa in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19-20. These varied operations in the Southwest Pacific, initiated as they were by the March 12, 1944, directive °f the Joint Chiefs of Staff, complemented one another and accomplished the great strategic results of unhinging Japan’s Defense Perimeter at its southern end, of punching a hole through the center of the perimeter by the seizure of Saipan, of practically eliminating what remained of Japan’s naval aircraft in the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” and of recovering Guam as an advanced base. This manifold and indeed Homeric story is dealt with in Professor Samuel Eliot Mori- son’s latest volume in his series on United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VIII, which is entitled New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944—August 1944.
The Japanese, dislodged from Hollandia by MacArthur’s force aided by fast carrier strikes, were disappointed by MacArthur’s subsequent failure to attempt a point-bypoint conquest. When MacArthur, by leapfrog tactics reached Biak, the Japanese put the “Kon” reinforcement plan in operation in an effort to hold Biak’s strategic airfields at the southern end of their Defense Perimeter. News of Spruance’s advance upon Saipan, however, forced them to cancel “Kon” and substitute the “A-Go” plan for a grand blow by their Mobile Fleet to knock out the invading American Fifth Fleet. Already, however, Japanese shipping had been so seriously crippled by American submarine patrols that Ozawa’s fleet was forced to accept the added hazard of using unrefined fuel oil from the Dutch East Indies. And as the Japanese fleet sortied from its bases its movements were reported by our submarines. •
The Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 1920, 1944, is rated by Professor Morison as “a naval action equal to Midway in tactical interest, and . . . the greatest carrier action of all time. In the history of World War II this battle occupies a place analogous to that of Jutland in World War I.” As at Jutland the inferior fleet delivered its blow and made its getaway, and Admiral Spruance like Jellicoe followed a cautious policy, for which he has been criticized. But the differences between the Philippine Sea and Jutland are quite as striking as the similarities. Ozawa inflicted negligible injury upon Spruance, and in the two days of fighting lost 426 planes, or all but 47 of the planes in his Mobile Fleet, and from submarines operating west of Saipan he suffered torpedo hits that cost him two carriers, including his flagship. Ozawa beat Mitscher to the draw, but the latter had an overwhelming number of fighter planes in the air, and the American superiority both in numbers and in training proved disastrous for the Japanese. Although three of the American air admirals (Mitscher, Clark, and Montgomery) were disappointed that Ozawa had been permitted to escape, Morison holds that Admiral Spruance “was right” in declining on the night of the 19th to be lured into a westerly chase when “his sense of his mission, to protect the amphibious operation against Saipan, precluded his running undue risks. ...” However but few readers familiar with subsequent operations will be apt to share the author’s opinion that “The Battle of the Philippine Sea contributed as much to victory as if Ozawa’s fleet had been destroyed.
1)
The Marianas invasion—its code name was “Forager”—got underway at the same time as Operation “Overload” in the Atlantic; but whereas the units in the invasion of Europe were staged from continental bases, Operation “Forager” had to be staged from mid-Pacific island bases a thousand miles to the east. Although the logistics problem was immense, the quantities of available material of all kinds were now astronomical in comparison with early days in the Solomons.
Moreover, the techniques of amphibian invasion were improved over those employed in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and Admiral Turner and Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, U.S.M.C., were able to put their earlier experience to good use. In the operations against Saipan, Tinian, and Guam large use was made of naval gunfire by troops on shore. New types of specialty ships, such as the floating dry dock, were on hand to build up without delay the facilities of the advanced base at Guam. “Frogmen” cleared away underwater obstructions from landing beaches, a new portable LVT landing ramp enabled vehicles to climb the coral cliffs back from the beaches. Napalm was used for the first time.
The story of New Guinea and, the Marianas is the story of the same courageous fighters that we have seen in the earlier volumes, but who now are building on past experience and wielding immensely more powerful weapons against an enemy whose strength has begun to ebb.
NORTH FROM MALAYA. ADVENTURE ON FIVE FRONTS. By William O. Douglas, Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 352 pp. $3.95.
Reviewed by Dr. Amry Vandenbosch
(Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, Dr. Vandenbosch served in the Department of State and in the Office of Strategic Services (C.B.I. Theatre) during the war. He is the author of numerous articles and several books on Southeast Asia.)
This is the fourth travel book in very nearly the same number of years by the peripatetic member of our highest court. In this volume Mr. Justice Douglas gives his impressions of the situation in the troubled world of East Asia, specifically in Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Formosa and Korea. Justice Douglas is a keen observer who quickly senses the essential factors in a complicated situation. He has also mastered the art of presenting his observations and impressions in very interesting form. There are no dull pages in this book.
Justice Douglas is highly sympathetic with the British in their difficulties in Malaya and holds General Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner in high esteem. He respects the general’s ability and his policies. Templer realizes that his problem is political almost as much as it is military. Douglas is sharp with the Chinese. He characterizes the banditry which plagues
Malaya as “a racial alliance against law and order that has known few equals.” He states that but for the sympathy and support of Chinese villages the guerillas would have been liquidated long ago. Justice Douglas’ conclusion on Malaya is fairly optimistic. The civil conflict is becoming steadily more manageable as political reforms “cure the basic ills of the nation.”
Americans will naturally be very much interested in what Douglas has to say about the Philippines, but the section on the former American dependency is not the best in the book. And strangely, it is the shortest of the five sections. The discussion is strictly limited to the struggle with the Huks and the current political situation, thus omitting important factors. Some of his judgments of leading personalities will by no means be universally accepted. Jose P. Laurel, the man who was president of the Japanese puppet republic during World War II, is described as not only able but honest. Laurel apparently convinced the American jurist “that whatever he did that had the appearance of sympathy with the Japanese cause, he did under compulsion.”
Douglas’ analysis of the tangled and extremely unhappy situation in Indochina is good. Though he seems unnecessarily severe with the French, the author does not come up with easy solutions for the basic problems of the country. In writing about Burma he becomes almost lyrical, influenced no doubt by his ardent sympathy with the social aspirations of its political leaders.
Justice Douglas deals rather favorably with the Formosan regime, but he is convinced that it cannot rally the people of Asia, as it represents the past that failed and not the hope of the future. He is likewise convinced that Chiang cannot reconquer the mainland without the support of the United States Navy and Air Force, and probably not without the aid of the United States Army. This would mean all-out war with China, and a war with China for that purpose would be “most disastrous.” His analysis of the dismal alternatives which confront the United States and the United Nations in Korea contain nothing new. Americans have pondered over them for some time.
In a summary chapter in which he puts down some reflections on the relations between the United States and Asia Justice Douglas has some interesting and worthwhile things to say, but few that are helpful in formulating actual American policy.
This is an informative and interesting book deserving of wide reading, but for serious students of Eastern Asia it is no substitute for less exciting but more comprehensive treatises.
FROM FRIGATES TO FLAT-TOPS. By
Edward Arpee. Lake Forest, Illinois: 1953.
276 pages. $7.50.
Reviewed by Admiral J. H. Towers,
U. S. Navy (Retired)
(iOne of the greatest contributors to American naval aviation, Admiral Towers was Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics at the outbreak of World War II, then commanded Air Force, Pacific Fleet, was Deputy to Admiral Nimitz, and at the end of the war succeeded as CinCPac and CinCPOA.)
Edward Arpee undertook a difficult task in covering in one book the story of the life of Rear Admiral William A. Moffett and the story of the development of Naval Aviation. Both stories are interesting and are considerably interwoven during the last two thirds of the book; but it is to be expected that many readers will skim lightly over the earlier part of Admiral Moffett’s career in order to get into the story of his well known role in the building of Naval Aviation from an infant to husky and vigorous maturity.
Only those of us who had the good fortune to know Admiral Moffett intimately can realize the intensity of his efforts in behalf of his chosen specialty. A careful reading of the earlier part of the book will disclose that he could be intense about any subject which interested him. Upon his assignment to naval aviation duty his entire waking moments were focussed upon ways and means of saving naval aviation from destruction by its enemies within and without the Navy, and to build it up as the Navy’s strong right arm.
I cannot recall any man who more loved a fight and who could think of more ways to win one. The author has given better than just a glimpse of that side of his nature. His effectiveness in dealing with opposition was due in large part to the fact that his opponents soon learned to be afraid of him, backed as he was by a host of friends who nearly always rallied to his support.
Admiral Moffett the officer did great things for his country; Bill Moffett the man, who died “with his boots on,” was beloved by all who had the privilege of really knowing him. From Frigates to Flat-Tops gives indisputable evidence to support those statements.
THE SUEZ CANAL IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Hugh J. Schonfield. New
York: Philosophical Library Publishers,
1953. 184 pages; 11 illustrations; index.
$4.50.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral John B.
Heffernan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(In past years Admiral Heffernan served on the Staff of the Proceedings on three different occasions. He is now the Director of Naval History in the Navy Department.)
The subject of this book is unusually timely, and interest in the Suez Canal is not likely to diminish as we come closer to 1968, the year Canal ownership passes to the Egyptian Government under the terms of the original concession.
Suez is not a new experience for Mr. Schonfield since he has already written three books concerning the Canal and its builder, Ferdinand de Lesseps. In this regard the author’s work suggests comparison with Du Val’s studies on the Panama Canal. (Cadiz to Cathay; And the Mountains Will Move; with a third in preparation, Captain Miles Du Val USN (Ret.); Stanford University Press.) However, we do not have an exact parallel because Du Val focuses on a navigator’s seagoing view of the canal which Schonfield virtually ignores. As some writers treat the Panama Canal merely as an engineering problem, digging a ditch and building locks, this book considers Suez as an international problem, and not as a waterway.
Starting with the Canal of the Pharaohs, the author traces for us the building and destruction of ancient canals which blended the commerce of the Nile with the Red Sea. At the end of the Roman era, and for a period climaxed by the Turkish capture of Constantinople, 1453, trade between East and West was complicated by endless difficulty. One fascinating conclusion stands out clearly; the problems and advantages of a canal were recognized almost as distinctly in the 20th
Century B.C. as they are in the 20th Century A.D.
The author presents a graphic account of the hurdles which de Lesseps had to clear before securing permission to build the Canal. Schonfield, an Englishman, is particularly frank in agreeing with de Lesseps that British opposition was exceptionally shortsighted. He recounts the purchase of what amounts to a controlling interest by the British Government, under Disraeli, as he follows the Canal’s history to January, 1952. The origin and growth of the explosive differences which have in the past, and which still hound Anglo-Egyptian relations, are stated objectively.
To this reviewer the principal criticism of the book would be that the author lightly sketches, or refers in passing, to various phases of the Canal story about which he would like to have more details. For example, the administrative machinery and operation of the complex international Suez Canal Company. Nevertheless, the book is excellent, for it compresses an unusual amount of readable information within limited space.
Appendices include the text of the original concession and principal modifications, as well as the significant parts of the International Agreement of 1888 and the Anglo- Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Suez Canal Traffic Tables are especially interesting; they spell out clearly the meaning of the Canal in world affairs. These figures are for the first full year of operation and three other years. The book gives transits for the years 18691951, inclusive.
Year | Number of T ransits | Suez Net Tonnage |
1870 | 486 | 436,609 |
1900 | 3,441 | 9,738,152 |
1920 | 4,009 | 17,574,657 |
1951 | 11,694 | 80,356,338 |
Still another table shows the tonnage by flag for selected years. The first nine nations are named, while all others are bulked in a tenth column, “Other Flags.” Not until 1920 did the flag of the United States of America appear in the Canal frequently enough to leave the “Other Flags” list. In that year the United States was in fifth place, but by 1925 the American flag had fallen to seventh place, and by 1930 to eighth. From 1935 to 1938 inclusive, the United States was back in the “Other Flags” column. For the years 1946, 1947 and 1948 the United States was second only to Great Britain, but in 1950 the Norwegians had pushed the United States down to third place.
REPORT ON MAO’S CHINA. By Frank
Moraes. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953. 212 pages. $3.75.
Reviewed by Tien-yi Li
{Mr. Tien-yi Li is an Assistant Professor of Chinese at Yale University.)
Here is a factual and thoughtful report on Communist China by an experienced journalist who made a tour of the country in ApriUJune, 1952, as a member of the Indian Cultural Delegation. Unlike many current writings based upon hearsay, it is a product of actual observations made by the author himself. It intends to give an objective description and evaluation of the conditions of Red China under the leadership of Mao Tse- tung.
The Chinese mainland is not unfamiliar to the author who in his capacity as a war correspondent visited Chungking and various other places during the last stage of World War II and learned a lot about Chinese people and politics. But the regime that is now controlling the land is not the same as before. During a short period of time, China has undergone sweeping changes which are bound to leave an indelible imprint upon the life of the Chinese people. Fully aware of these changes, the author proceeds to tell and discuss what he actually saw during his recent visit.
Mr. Moraes both directly and indirectly expresses his disapproval of the Communists’ thought control and other rigid measures. His depreciations and suspicions can be detected throughout the book. However, he gives the new regime due credit for its achievements. He takes cognizance of the fact that the new rulers in China have somehow succeeded in identifying the people with the government and in creating “individual pride in collective action.” While toeing the Moscow line, the Communists do not ignore the conditions indigenous to China. Their concentration on the indoctrination of the youth has produced conspicuous results and accounts for their potential political strength. The time-honored reverence for the head of the family is now being fruitfully shifted to a new loyalty to the head of the state. Land reform has been carried out to a large extent and industrialization which is now the highlight of the Communists’ economic program is being pushed through at an ever-increasing- speed. Some public construction works have been consummated. The completion of the Hwai River flood control project furnishes a typical illustration.
The author places special emphasis on the leadership of Mao. By a penetrating analysis of Mao’s personality, theory and practice, he rules out the possibility of Titoism in China. Being an Indian, he has a thorough understanding of the mind and heart of Gandhi and Nehru. His comparison of these two great Indian leaders with Mao is particularly enlightening.
Finally, Mr. Moraes puts forth his main thesis: India and China are now “wrestling for the political soul of Asia,” and whether Asia goes Communist or not depends mainly on these two nations. He gives the impression that India is a truly democratic country and will alone play a vital role in winning other Asiatic nations to democracy. It seems that here he has too much confidence in the capabilities of his country and over-estimates the democratic nature of Nehru’s government and Indian society.
SMALL BOAT CONSTRUCTION. By
Robert M. Steward. New York: Rudder
Publishing Company, 1950. $6.00.
Reviewed by Howard I. Chapelle
{Author of “The History of the American Sailing Navy” and many other scholarly studies in maritime history and naval architecture, Mr. Chapelle is also well known as a yacht designer.)
The art of boatbuilding covers a vast field of knowledge of the modes of construction, selection of materials and of the various ways of assembling a boat: no one book can possibly cover the huge store of knowledge that would make one a master of the trade. Hence, there is always need for books on boatbuilding, covering some particular portion of the art. Robert M. Steward’s book,
Small Boat Construction, will be heartily welcomed by those requiring information on the construction of the modern small sailing yacht. This book deals almost entirely with the standards and modes popular with most yacht designers; which are those developed about New York and in New England. The book is remarkable for the excellence of its illustration; details of boat construction are shown with great clarity which adds immeasurably to the value of the book to the beginner in boatbuilding.
While the book must, of necessity, cover a great deal that has already appeared in print, Mr. Steward has brought the description of methods up to date by showing application to recent types of pleasure craft. Criticism can only be confined to sins of omission: information on the installation of engines is lacking and, in these days, many will consider this a serious fault; a regrettable outlook in the eyes of the lover of the art of boatbuilding but a real problem nonetheless. The nomenclature used in the book will seem odd to an old-time boatbuilder as Mr. Steward calls the “Chock Rail” a “Monkey Rail” and a “Carlin” a “Header.” Small Boat Construction will be most useful to anyone intending to build a small sailing day-boat, week-end sailing cruiser or sailing racer of modern yacht design.
NAUTICUS 1953. Edited by Captain Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs, German Navy (Ret.). E. S. Mittler und Sohn, G.m.b.H., Darmstadt, 1952; 245 pp. with 25 pictures, many sketches and 23 statistical tables, DM 13.
WEYERS FLOTTENTASCHENBUCH 1953. Edited by Alexander Bredt. J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, Munich, 1953; 290 pp. with 784 ship sketches, deck plans and photographs, DM 26.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander H. W. Drexel, U. S. Naval Reserve
lLieutenant Commander Drexel was attached to the Naval Technical Mission in Europe in 1945 and spent many months with the mission in Germany, evaluating technical progress. He is an associate professor of German at the U. S. Naval Academy)
Nauticus 1953 is the twenty-ninth chronicle in a series founded by Admiral Tirpitz in 1899. Nauticus undertakes to create the basis for a sober and objective view of the world situation and Germany’s position in it. It reports on the increase in German shipping since the war, the trade and commerce of the free world, and also that of the Russian sphere.
There is a special chapter on the rebuilding of Helgoland. Sovereign rights in coastal waters are discussed, with a table of what each nation claims. The age-old problem of a sea power against a land power—the U.S.A. versus Russia—merits an article. Historically investigated, the conclusion is that the sea power will win.
Other experts write on the condition of preparedness and the naval policies of the great sea powers. Of particular interest are the investigations of Russian naval preparedness and the measures taken by the Western Powers as they are shaping up in NATO and the maneuvres of the Allied Navies. The German Republic now has a small fleet to protect its coast. This is contrasted with the fleet of the East Zone, which is integrated with the Russian Navy and run by it.
The most modern branch of navigation, radar, has found a well-illustrated presentation which is really a small radar-compendium. There is also a detailed treatment of the German developed self-guided and remote-controlled missiles, Hitler’s miracle weapons, now being further developed by the United States and Britain.
The voluminous statistical tables cover all international commerce.
Weyers Flottentaschenbuch 1953, statistics on all warships of the world, is the first postwar edition, the thirty-seventh in a series founded in 1900.
Ships are listed by countries, with all technical and military details, clarified by 782 sketches, photographs and deck plans. The Russian fleet is also represented, but the information concerning new construction, conversions, etc., is very unreliable.
A supplement in this edition gives a list of the ships of the German Navy and Air Force and what became of them.
This manual answers many questions of political, military, and historical significance, and gives a basis for comparison among all the fleets of the world.
EXPLORATION OF THE VALLEY OF THE AMAZON. By Lieutenant William Lewis Herndon, U. S. Navy. Edited and with an introduction by Hamilton Basso.
' New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. 195 pages plus maps and pictures. $3.75.
Reviewed by Commander James C.
Shaw, U. S. Navy
[A frequent contributor to the Proceedings, Commander Shaw is the Director, Current History Division, in the Office of Information, Navy Department.)
Anyone attempting to prove the old saying that a naval officer “can do anything” would ■ find basis for his argument in the adventures and writings of Lieutenant William Lewis Herndon, USN, who in 1851-52 crossed South America by way of the Amazon Valley from Pacific to Atlantic. Herndon and Passed-midshipman Lardner Gibbon, who simultaneously followed a different route through the same valley, undertook explorations at the express direction of the Navy Department in order to gather information regarding navigability, agricultural possibilities, and commercial resources “whether of the field, the forest, the river or the mine.” They accomplished the mission in competent fashion and each then wrote a book containing an official narrative report of findings. Mr. Hamilton Basso has dusted off the Herndon report, edited it for modern readers and written an engaging introduction.
At the time of the Herndon-Gibbon journey, the Amazon was largely a mystery to the civilized world. The two officers braved mountain cold, river cataracts, feverish jungles, and suspicious aborigines in pushing through to their goal. Those who read today’s impersonal government reports will be startled at Herndon’s descriptions of a dance with a fat lady at a ball in the wilds, a storm in open waters in a boat built “like a haystack,” and a mythical South American version of the Loch Ness monster. His literary style easily stands the test of time, but what is most amazing is the vast knowledge of such varied sciences as botany, zoology, and mineralogy displayed by this sailor so far
from blue waters. Herndon was a canny observer and a competent journalist.
Hamilton Basso, in the introduction, adds some intriguing background material as to the expedition’s genesis and consequences. Mr. Basso states that Matthew Fontaine Maury, the Navy hydrographer, feared a civil war would break out unless something were done about slavery. As a staunch Virginian (and subsequent Confederate naval leader), he could not abide the thought of freeing the slaves without recompense to the owners—the slave investment at the time was some billion and a half dollars and some other solution must be found. Maury argued that if the Amazon were opened up to commercial and agricultural enterprise, the slaves might be transferred en masse out of the United States to Brazil. It is probable he had this thought in the back of his mind when he encouraged the government to undertake the exploration.
As to the consequences of the expedition, there was indeed a growth in trade to Brazil. However, the most unique result of the Herndon venture was to urge a young man, one Samuel Clemens, out of a print shop and down the Mississippi, there to catch the first boat for Brazil, to see the land Herndon had portrayed. However, no boat was leaving for Brazil from New Orleans and since Clemens had to eat, he shipped on a Mississippi River boat as apprentice pilot. Half a century after the publication of Herndon’s story, Mark Twain credited the Exploration of the Amazon Valley with starting him on a writing career.
It is too bad that more of the fine pictures contained in the original volumes were not included in Mr. Basso’s edited version, but in these days of high publication costs the lack is understandable. It is also regrettable that Gibbon’s tale could not have been condensed in the same book.
The Herndon-Gibbon story is a good example of the Navy’s traditional interest in the welfare of the United States in matters beyond the orthodox preservation of peace and defense of the nation.
★