The opening of Japan by Commodore Matthew Perry and a formidable naval squadron in 1854 represents perhaps the outstanding accomplishment of American Far Eastern policy in the nineteenth century. By breaching a barrier of seclusion which had been maintained for more than two centuries, the United States was able to introduce a society of some thirty millions into the international comity of nations. This achievement, perhaps inevitable, was most gratifying to the United States, for the young republic had succeeded where other internationally more sophisticated powers had failed.
The very success of Commodore Perry in forcing open the door of Japan has tended, unfortunately, to obscure the broader pattern of his Pacific policy. Perry rarely considered the opening of Japan as an end in itself. Rather was he inclined to envisage it as one in a series of moves designed to establish American maritime power firmly in the Pacific. In an era when the steamship was beginning to supplant the sailing ship, and when European powers were pressing for commercial expansion in the Far East, Perry foresaw that it was desirable, if not necessary, for the United States to acquire coaling stations and naval bases scattered strategically throughout the vast Pacific Ocean. “Though it does not belong to the spirit of our institutions to extend our dominion beyond the sea,” he said, “positive necessity requires that we should protect our commercial interests in this remote part of the world [the Pacific], and in doing so, to resort to measures, however strong, to counteract the schemes of powers less scrupulous than ourselves.” It is against a background of such considerations that not only his famous expedition to Japan but, also, his more prosaic, though extremely significant, byplays in the archipelagoes of the Pacific should be studied.
What is often not appreciated is that the United States government, with Perry concurring, was not very confident that the expedition to Japan would meet with success. If Americans had their doubts in the matter, European governments and peoples had none. As far as they were concerned, the expedition was destined to failure, for, in their opinion, the opening of Japan could only be a costly and bloody business. It was inconceivable to them that the United States with its long record of timidity in Far Eastern affairs would resort to the use of the force which the Japanese venture appeared to demand. Sophisticated European newspapers chuckled at the temerity of the United States and amused their readers with jibes and puns at the expense of Perry and his government. Thus, Punch jestingly observed that “Perry must open the Japanese ports even if he has to open his own.”
There was, all things told, little if any reason for the United States to hope that its overtures would be favorably received by the Japanese. The Island Empire lay completely beyond American intellectual and commercial horizons and what little was known about that mysterious land was gleaned primarily from the Dutch, who themselves were not too well informed. Moreover, the few Americans who had in previous years attempted to invade the national privacy of Japan had been repulsed, at times under circumstances which reflected adversely on American dignity and prestige. The forebodings and uncertainties which characterized the preparations for the expedition to Japan were thus to a great extent well founded.
The instructions for the expedition originally drawn up by the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and revised by Commodore Perry, reveal clearly the prevailing doubts. They indicate, too, that the Commodore was not to restrict his activities to Japan. Thus:
If the squadron should be able, without interfering with the main object for which it is sent, to explore the coasts of Japan and of the adjacent continent and islands, such an exploration would not only add to our stock of geographical knowledge, but might be the means of extending our commercial relations and of securing ports of refuge and supply for our whaling vessels in those remote seas.
In a sense, then, it was because of a desire to take precautions against a setback in Japan by securing ports of refuge elsewhere that Perry was induced to consider his mission in a new light.
It was really only when he was at sea bound for the Orient that the Commodore was able to ponder more thoroughly the problems of his mission and to collate his scattered thoughts. In a letter written from the island of Madeira on December 14, 1852, Perry communicated his conclusions to the Secretary of the Navy.
Since leaving the United States I have had leisure to reflect more fully upon the probable result of my visit to Japan, and though there is still some doubt in my mind as to the chances of immediate success in bringing that strange government to any practicable negotiation, yet I feel confident that in the end the great object in view will be effected.
As a preliminary step, and one of easy accomplishment, one or more ports of refuge and supply to our whaling and other ships must at once be secured, and should the Japanese government object to the granting of such ports upon the main land, and they cannot be occupied without resort to force and bloodshed, then it will be desirable in the beginning, and indeed, necessary, that the squadron should establish places of rendezvous at one or two of the islands south of Japan, having a good harbor, and possessing facilities for obtaining water and supplies. . . .
Perry unquestionably had in mind the Bonin and Liu-ch’iu Islands and, possibly, Formosa. What else could have been meant by “islands south of Japan”?
Although he had, like many a veteran of the War of 1812, overcome in his later years much of his animosity for the British Navy, Commodore Perry could not always resist the urge to twist the lion’s tail. He was passionately irked, at times actually envious, when he contemplated the British success in securing a string of naval and commercial bases which literally girdled the globe. He was, however, able to draw some consolation from the apparent neglect of the English. Thus, in the same Madeira letter, he wrote:
Fortunately the Japanese and many other islands of the Pacific are still left untouched by this unconscionable government [England]; and, as some of them lay [sic] in a route of commerce which is destined to become of great importance to the United States, no time should be lost in adopting active measures to secure a sufficient number of ports of refuge.
After Perry and his squadron reached China, dispatches from the Secretary of State arrived, and the Commodore was pleased to learn that his opinions had fallen on sympathetic ears.
Perry was anxious to proceed with his mission but a number of unforeseen obstacles arose. Because of the unsettled political situation in China, where the Taiping Rebellion was raging, and the consequent anxieties of the American Minister, Perry encountered considerable difficulty in assembling the ships of his squadron. Finally, on May 17, 1853, after a delay of more than a month, Perry sailed for Naha, the principal city of Okinawa in the Liu-ch’iu Islands. There he staged what was to be a dress rehearsal of the coming negotiations with the Japanese. The experience he acquired at this time in the intricacies of Oriental diplomacy was to stand him in good stead in Japan. While the Commodore was busily engaged in coping with the suspicious local officials, landing parties were sent ashore to explore the island and small boats were dispatched to sound the harbor. Arrangements were also made for the establishment of a coaling station for the squadron.
His business being completed, Commodore Perry hoped to leave for Edo (Tokyo) but decided to wait until he was able to assemble a squadron of sufficient might to impress the Japanese. Never a man to waste time, Perry seized the opportunity to visit the Bonin Islands which lay less than a week’s sailing distance to the northeast. Leaving the Mississippi and Supply behind at Naha, the Susquehanna, Perry’s flagship, with the Saratoga in tow, departed on June 9, and on the morning of the 14th arrived off Peel Island (Chichi-jima), the principal island in the Bonin group.
The Bonin Islands, situated roughly midway between Tokyo and the northern Marianas, are composed of three groups. The northern group is known as Muko-jima Retto; the central, as Chichi-jima Retto; and the southern, as Haha-jima Retto. Like many islands of the Pacific, the Bonins had in the course of centuries been sighted, forgotten, “rediscovered,” and again forgotten. It is therefore not surprising that, when various governments proceeded formally to annex the islands of the Pacific in the nineteenth century, disputes over sovereignty occurred frequently.
The Bonin Islands were probably first sighted by the Dutch navigators, Matthys Quast and Abel Janszoon Tasman, during their voyage to the north Pacific in 1639. The Japanese did not reach the islands until 1670, but a fictitious tale that they had been discovered in 1593 by the feudal lord, Ogasawara Sadayori, was accepted unquestioningly in the west during the nineteenth century. In 1824 the islands were visited by the British whaler, Transit, captained by James J. Coffin of Nantucket; Massachusetts; in 1827 the famous explorer, Captain Frederick W. Beechey, declared them to be the property of the British Crown. In the following year the Russian explorer, Fedor Liitke, called at the islands, but, apprised of Beechey’s act, made no claim of annexation on behalf of his government.
In 1830 a group of five white men of various nationalities and about fifteen Hawaiians established a settlement at Port Lloyd, on Peel Island, the main island of the central group. During the next twenty years, though the settlement itself grew very slowly, Port Lloyd developed into an important port of call for whalers in the western Pacific. Peopled principally by deserters from whalers, constantly subjected to the depredations of lawless seamen, and ignored by all governments, the colony at Port Lloyd led a troubled existence. The law of the knife prevailed and disputes were frequent, especially between two of the original settlers, Matteo Mozaro and Nathaniel Savory, who contended bitterly for leadership. In 1842 Mozaro, looking for outside aid, went to Hawaii and presented a rather one-sided account of affairs in the Bonins to the Acting British Consul, Alexander Simpson. The unsuspecting Englishman provided his visitor with a document “recommending ... to the settlers to receive Mr. Mozaro as their head,” advice which the colonists contemptuously ignored. When Commodore Perry arrived in the Bonin Islands in June, 1853, the settlement consisted of thirty-one inhabitants—westerners and Pacific Islanders —who generally acknowledged the leadership of Savory.
On the day after the Susquehanna and Saratoga dropped anchor Bayard Taylor, the famous writer and renowned world- traveler who had been taken on as a master’s mate at Shanghai, was sent ashore at the head of a party to explore the southern half of Peel Island. The resulting report remains the most graphic account of the island yet written. The northern part of Peel Island was investigated by Charles Fahs, an Assistant Surgeon of the Susquehanna, while another officer was ordered to explore Staple- ton Island to the north. Heine and Brown, photographers assigned to the expedition, executed a number of daguerreotypes which enliven the rather dull journal of Commodore Perry and capture for posterity the Bonin Islands in the mid-nineteenth century.
While the shore parties were prowling about the islands, Perry held a series of conferences with Nathaniel Savory who, because of his American citizenship, found especial favor in the eyes of the Commodore. What occurred at these meetings will probably never be entirely known. Whether Perry confided to Savory his plans for the Bonin Islands must always remain a matter of conjecture, but Savory could not have been completely unaware of the Commodore’s hopes. One of Perry’s first acts was to purchase a plot of land one thousand yards long and five hundred wide, situated near the entrance to the north side of the harbor, and suitable for the erection of a steamer depot. The land was claimed by Savory, who readily consented to part with it for the token sum of fifty dollars. Savory was immediately appointed agent for Perry to look after the land. Perry, it is evident, acted with a certain amount of caution, purchasing the land in his capacity as a private citizen rather than as a representative of the United States government. Savory was also appointed agent to oversee the interests of the American naval squadron in the Bonin Islands. For this service he was attached to Perry’s command with the rating of seaman and with the customary allowances for pay and provisions. John Smith, a seaman from the Susquehanna, was assigned to assist Savory in his new duties.
Taking an interest in the welfare and development of the settlement, the Commodore put ashore some livestock with instructions that no slaughtering be allowed for at least five years. Seeds of all types were also distributed to the settlers so as to increase the variety of crops. But perhaps the most commendable of Perry’s activities during his brief stay in the Bonin Islands was his attempt to replace the anarchy which had prevailed for so long by arranging for a government of law and order. The settlers were assembled by Perry and, probably under his direction, the draft of a code of government was drawn up. This code, known as the Articles of Agreement of the Settlers of Peel Island, became operative, if only theoretically, a few months later.
The government, now officially named the Colony of Peel Island, was to be composed of a Chief Magistrate, assisted by a council of two. The settlers immediately elected Savory to the office of Chief Magistrate, while two Englishmen, James Mottley and Thomas Webb, were elected Councilmen. The tenure of office was to be two years. All laws enacted by the Chief Magistrate and the Councilmen had to be approved by two-thirds of the settlers. Pending the enactment of further legislation thirteen basic laws were adopted. Among other matters, these laws provided for the amicable settlement of disputes, prohibited the settlers from encouraging desertion from visiting ships, and forbade ships’ captains to discharge members of their crews or to put ashore ailing men without the consent of the Colony’s officials. All penalties were to be in the form of fines. Evidently the principle of “spoils of office” was immediately accepted, for Mottley and Webb were appointed sole pilots for Port Lloyd.
In his activities in the Bonin Islands, Commodore Perry comported himself with the proper circumspection to be expected of one who had always been a stickler for regulations. None of his acts could in any way be considered as interference by the United States with the rights of sovereignty which any power might possibly have claimed over the archipelago. In his purchase of land he acted as a private citizen; in the organization of an instrument of government the settlers were, outwardly at least, permitted to follow their own inclinations.
Not that Perry did not have some positive ideas on the problem of the sovereignty of the islands. Great Britain’s claims, based as they were on Captain Beechey’s act of annexation, infuriated him. Perry was insistent that Britain had “not a particle of a claim to priority of discovery,” while the bestowal of names on the islands by the British navigator he considered to be unmitigated presumption. “The inhabitants,” Perry sarcastically pointed out in his journal, “practically disown the paternity of the English sovereign, and do not recognize the names given in his [Beechey’s] self-assumed sponsorship . . . the very dignified appellations of Buckland and Stapleton . . . are quite ignored by the inhabitants, who speak of these places respectively as Goat and Hog Islands.” Carried away by his exasperation, Perry continued with more heat than relevancy to his own argument: “The only evidence of British possession is the occasional hoisting of the English flag on one of the neighboring hills, a duty that was originally delegated to a wandering Englishman who chanced to be on the spot.”
On his return to Naha in the Liu-ch’ius, Perry drew up an account of his activities in the Bonins and expressed his views to the Secretary of the Navy. In his report Perry expounded at length upon the commercial possibilities of the islands and reiterated his doubts as to Great Britain’s rights of sovereignty. Britain, he felt, had by her lack of interest in the development of the islands forfeited any claim that might have accrued from Captain Beechey’s action in 1827. Realizing the ramifications of any drastic action on his part, however, he wisely requested further instructions. As to what he personally hoped these would be, Perry has left us with little uncertainty. “Should the department,” he wrote, “ . . . deem it desirable for me to take possession of the islands in the name of the United States, I will do so and adopt the best means of holding them.” What he considered the “best means” to be Perry did not say.
Assembling the ships of his squadron, Perry then sailed for Japan. There, as is well known, his “fire-breathing” ships and his refusal to be treated in the cavalier fashion customarily reserved by the Japanese for “barbarians” paved the way for the ultimate success of his mission. Having communicated to the officials of the Tokugawa Shogunate the intention of the United States to open relations with Japan and ominously reminding the Japanese that he would return for an answer with a mightier fleet in the following year, Perry sailed for China.
The Commodore fully realized that he had won the opening round by sheer bluff and that the real problems of his mission were yet to be met. Should the Japanese adopt a strong stand upon his return and refuse to enter into negotiations, there would be, in view of his instructions cautioning restraint, actually little or nothing that he could do in reply. He was understandably reluctant to return to the United States without having made arrangements for coaling stations and ports of refuge in the western Pacific, in Japan or elsewhere. Accordingly, Perry decided to assert what he considered to be American claims in the Bonins. The U.S.S. Plymouth under Commander Kelley was ordered to take up a station at Naha and to proceed to the Bonin Islands at the close of the hurricane season, there to survey and annex the southern group.
In accordance with instructions, Commander Kelley sailed in October for Port Lloyd where he secured pilots and guides from the settlers. Proceeding then to the southern group, he carried out a careful survey and took possession of the islands in the name of the United States. A plate attesting to this act was attached to a sycamore tree near the beach of the harbor of the main island (Haha-jima), while another plate and a bottle containing documents setting forth the “true history of the discovery of the islands” were buried nearby. The group was named the Coffin Islands in honor of its American “discoverer.” The main island was called Hillsborough and the harbor on the southwestern side Newport. Three smaller islands to the west and south were named Plymouth, Perry, and Kelley Islands. His mission completed, Commander Kelley returned to Naha.
Meanwhile, news about the American naval expedition to Japan was being followed very closely in America and Europe, and Perry’s visit to the Bonin Islands had not passed unnoticed. Thus it was that when the Commodore was at Hong Kong preparing for his return voyage to Japan, he became involved in a diplomatic wrangle with the British. For this development Alexander Simpson, erstwhile British Consul in the Sandwich Islands, was chiefly responsible. Aroused by Perry’s activities in the Bonin Islands, Simpson had addressed a letter to Lord Clarendon, Her Majesty’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reminding him that the archipelago belonged to Great Britain. He also provided an account of the original settlement, information which he had published as early as 1843. Lord Clarendon immediately forwarded these advices to J. G. Bonham, H. M. Superintendent for Trade at Hong Kong, and instructed him to take up with Commodore Perry the implications of his activities in the Bonin Islands.
Perry presented his case very creditably in his discussions with the British representative. In his reply to Bonham’s original communication the Commodore rightly observed that the account of the initial settlement of the Bonins furnished by Simpson was far from accurate. Simpson, on the basis of information provided by Mozaro in 1842, had stated that the first settlers were Mozaro and Millichamp, entirely omitting reference to Nathaniel Savory as well as to Alden Chapin and Charles Johnson. Chapin, an American, and Johnson, a Dane, had participated in the original expedition and had lived for many years in the islands. Perry, in supplying the missing information, cited what he believed to be the nationalities of all. He insisted that Mozaro was an Italian subject, an opinion which has since been the starting point of many disputes. The controversy, of course, revolves about the conflicting American and British criteria of citizenship. As far as Perry was concerned, Mozaro, having been born in Italy, was a subject of Italy. The British maintained, however, that Mozaro had served in the British Navy and had for years considered himself a British subject. Perry’s purpose in disputing Mozaro’s British citizenship was quickly revealed. “So far as the nationality of the settlers would apply to the question of sovereignty,” argued the Commodore, “the Americans were as two to one, compared with the three others, who were subjects of different sovereigns.”
Having refuted what he considered to be Great Britain’s claims to sovereignty based on prior occupation, Perry then insisted that England possessed no rights based on discovery. He pointed out with great detail that England had been preceded in the Bonin Islands by the navigators of several nations, and that the islands had been known to European cartographers for several centuries. Captain Beechey, Perry maintained, had had no right to annex territory which had been discovered by others. American claims, he concluded, were much sounder, resting as they did on the visit to the archipelago by Captain Coffin. Perry was correct when he stated that Coffin was an American citizen, but he was wrong in holding that the Transit, Coffin’s vessel, was an American ship.
In explaining his purchase of a plot of land in the Bonin Islands, Perry made it clear that he had completed the transaction in the role of a private citizen. His motives, he assured Bonham, were the best: he had simply wished to forestall speculation on the acreage fronting the harbor, a problem certain to arise when Port Lloyd became a coaling station along the route of future trans-Pacific steamship lines. Perry, in a friendlier tone, then suggested that both the United States and Great Britain cooperate in the establishment of a port of call in the Bonin Islands, regardless of which nation possessed sovereignty. Being without instructions, the Commodore recommended that the question be referred to their respective governments for further discussion. Bonham readily agreed to refer the matter, for Great Britain would have been placed in an awkward position in the event of strife. The Crimean War had recently broken out and a Russian fleet under Admiral Putiatin, known to be a good friend of Perry, was then cruising in the Pacific.
What is so impressive in these discussions between Perry and Bonham is the ignorance of the British government concerning affairs in the Bonin Islands. Perry’s information was, in many respects, erroneous and his confident stand on several basic points, especially his failure to know that the Transit was a British whaler, was to cause him considerable embarrassment when he returned to the United States. It is clear, however, that he made a conscientious effort to acquaint himself with the history of the discovery and settlement of the islands. That the British government could, on the other hand, open discussions on the basis of a flimsy report like Simpson’s was, to say the least, extraordinary. Great Britain clearly had no rights to sovereignty over the islands based upon priority of discovery; it manifestly had no sound rights resting on prior occupation. For almost twenty-five years the British government had not made a really significant effort to provide for the administration and protection of the settlers in the Bonin Islands. It now, however, proceeded to imply that the annexation act of Beechey had been followed by actual occupation of the islands.
Shortly after the close of the conversations with Bonham, Perry departed for Japan where, in the following months, he successfully negotiated a treaty. No sooner had this been done than he ordered the Macedonian, commanded by Captain Abbot, to proceed to the Bonin Islands. Captain Abbot was specifically instructed to survey the waters in the track between the Bonins and Japan as well as to look into the affairs of the colony. The Macedonian arrived at Port Lloyd in April, 1854. Yielding to the request of the settlers, Abbot lent them an American flag. Since the squadron under Commodore Perry’s command was about to depart for the United States, Savory was paid off as squadron agent for the Bonin Islands. He was also presented with a letter from Perry advising him that “steps ere long may be taken to give greater importance to Port Lloyd.” With these heartening words from the Commodore, Savory watched the Macedonian sail away.
Upon his return to the United States Perry discovered that the question of the sovereignty of the Bonin Islands had not been settled with Great Britain. He lost no time, accordingly, in acquainting the American public with his opinion of the value of the islands. That he devoted much time and effort to the project is partly evident in his preparation of additional notes on the Bonin Islands for inclusion in the journal of the expedition, which was soon to be published. In the supplementary remarks Perry expressed his fears that the privilege, obtained in the Treaty of Kanagawa, allowing American ships to stop at the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, was inadequate, since too many restrictions were imposed. To remedy the situation Commodore Perry proposed active colonization of the Bonin Islands.
These views were extensively elaborated upon in a paper presented before the American Geographical and Statistical Society in New York on March 6, 1856. “The Bonin Islands,” said Perry, “may be looked upon as offering to a maritime nation a most valuable acquisition.” Although he felt that the islands were not as well endowed by nature as other groups in the Pacific, he believed that their strategic importance justified the establishment of a permanent settlement. In addition to being a port of haven, such a settlement would serve as a port of call for steamships and a base from which missionaries would be able to disseminate the gospel in the countries of the Far East.
An independent community would thus grow up in a part of the world, hitherto but rarely visited; they [the settlers] would enjoy an excellent climate, with a sufficiency of land to supply all their wants; ships would be drawn to the port for supplies and refitment, bringing with them articles of exchange in trade. The proximity of localities favorable to the taking of whales, would make it desirable to establish here a whaling station, by which the vessels engaged in that business, instead of the loss of time and consequent cost of resorting to the Sandwich Islands, or the ports of China, for refitment, could have their wants supplied at this settlement.
An active trade might also be opened with Japan, the Lew Chew Islands, and Formosa, countries close at hand; and with China, not far distant,—and at this Island might be established a depot of coal, wharves for the accommodation of steamers, which sooner or later will traverse the seas in this quarter of the globe.
In refuting British claims to sovereignty over the islands Perry now brought forward a new argument, namely “squatter sovereignty.” Possession, he insisted, constituted the “superior, and only bona-fide claim.” It must be observed that Perry’s views on sovereignty were not at all consistent. In rejecting British claims deriving from Bee- chey’s act of annexation, Perry had invoked the doctrine of discovery. This, however, had not deterred him from annexing the southern group on the basis of Captain James J. Coffin’s visit, which Perry chose to interpret as a discovery. He had next called forth the concept of sovereignty based on the nationalities of the original settlers and by extraordinary hairsplitting and legalistic reasoning had attempted to establish an American claim on the grounds of actual occupation. He then preceded to negate this argument by championing Japanese sovereignty stemming from prior discovery and occupation, for which, incidentally, there was no authentic basis. Last, but not least, Commodore Perry refuted his own contentions, inasmuch as American citizens, by his own admission in his journal, were a decided minority among the settlers actually residing in the Bonin Islands.
It goes without saying that Perry was not interested in the acquisition of the Bonin Islands alone. Rather did he view the island group as one in a series of American bases spanning and dominating the central and northern Pacific. He was none too confident of the results of the treaty he had negotiated with Japan and feared that American whaler crews, with their customary unruly behavior and brawling in port, would strain the hospitality extended to them at Shimoda and Hakodate. To provide for this eventuality, Perry felt that it was absolutely necessary for the United States to obtain ports of refuge in the Pacific of a more permanent and secure nature. Thus it was that he looked forward to the day when the United States would be ensconced in the Bonin Islands, Liu-ch’iu Islands, and Formosa.
Commodore Perry was one of the few men of his generation who foresaw the requirements of expanding American sea power in the Pacific. He studied America’s commercial and military needs in great detail, and in an age when western interest in the Pacific was dawning, he sought to stake out an American preserve. He championed a policy which was to be carried out thirty and forty years after his death when the United States acquired Samoa, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean. His policy is today more than ever a pillar of American diplomacy and of American naval power. Like many another pioneer, however, Commodore Perry was not to live to see the consummation of his plans and hopes.
The reasons for the failure of the policy of the “first American imperialist” are many. It is evident, first of all, that Perry was far too pessimistic in his estimate of the Treaty of Kanagawa, which he himself had negotiated. Although he had good cause for reservation, he was in no position to understand the terrific impact the treaty would have on domestic Japanese politics. It was too much to expect that he, or any Westerner for that matter, would perceive that only a slight push was all that was necessary to bring the crumbling Tokugawa Shogunate and its traditional policy of seclusion crashing down in ruins. Moreover, regardless of whether or not Americans shared Perry’s pessimism, the negotiation of a treaty of commerce with Japan by Townsend Harris in 1857 provided all and more of the advantages and benefits which Perry had insisted would accrue from annexation of the Bonin Islands. Annexation of the small island group, it was now felt by many Americans, would serve no worthy purpose.
A second reason for the rejection of Perry’s positive policy is to be observed in the play of American politics. When Perry received his instructions and departed on his mission to the East, Millard Fillmore and the Whig Party were in power. Though not inclined to pursue expansionist policies, the administration had to face the blunt political reality that much of its political strength lay in New England. In that area there was concentrated the mercantile centers and whaling industry of the nation, whose interests were actively promoted by Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State. Consequently, the administration and Perry were mutually sympathetic to a policy of securing island bases in the Pacific. The last dispatches which the Commodore received from the Whig administration expressed approval of the proposals which he set forth in his Madeira letter. The Whigs were succeeded in office, however, by Franklin Pierce and the Democratic Party, and months passed before Perry received instructions from the new Secretary of State.
The Democratic Party of 1853 did not sympathize with Perry’s Pacific policy. It is little wonder then that when the Commodore’s bellicose reports from the Pacific arrived in Washington, the government was filled with trepidations. Secretary of the Navy, J. C. Dobbin, who much preferred to cooperate than to clash with Great Britain, immediately sent out frantic dispatches admonishing restraint. Considerations of this type partly prompted the Pierce administration to scuttle Perry’s Pacific projects. The Treaty of Kanagawa, moreover, was regarded as sufficient guarantee that American shipping interests in the Far East were not being slighted, and no move was made to press potential American claims to the Bonin Islands.
There is last to be taken into account the attitude of the British government. No real effort had ever been made by Great Britain to make use of the Bonin Islands, but it was felt at the same time that it would be unwise to allow the islands to fall into the possession of the United States. The British had little faith that Perry’s mission to Japan would be carried off successfully. If the ports of Japan were not opened to Western shipping, then the strategic and commercial value of the Bonin Islands could not be too highly estimated. Port Lloyd would lie in the direct route of trans-Pacific steamship lines, forced to sail south of the inhospitable Japanese islands. It was also to be considered that with the United States firmly established in the Bonins the outpost of American sea power would be advanced far across the Pacific. The rising young republic might thus be in a position to secure an advantage, slight though it might be, in the trade with China. With an eye to the future, Great Britain decided to assert her claims to the islands, tenuous though they were. And a hesitating American government thought it expedient to drop the matter.
With the abandonment of direct American interest, the Bonin Islands once again became an international no-man’s land. The Japanese government, stirred by knowledge of Perry’s activities and fearing that the annexation of the islands by a foreign power would pose a threat to the security of Japan, proceeded in 1861-1863 formally to annex and colonize the Bonins. Though the venture was a failure, it was undertaken anew by the Restoration government and in 1875 the Bonin Islands were incorporated into the Japanese Empire. In 1945, with the surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers, the Bonins, along with other island groups in the central Pacific, were occupied by the United States, their final disposition to be determined by a peace treaty.