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Main fleet to Singapore. By captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. New York. The Macmillan Company, 1952. 238 Pages. $3.75.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral H. V.
Wiley, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Admiral Wiley is Dean of the College of _ nSineering, University of California. He 'aas in command of Destroyer Squadron 29 at arokan, Borneo, in 1941 when the Japanese 0pened hostilities.)
Captain Grenfell is a retired naval officer, ccessful writer, and journalist. He uses his w ensive knowledge of naval history and jna,r.are along with a sure story-telling talent •s Main Fleet to Singapore. tj ae hook may be divided into three sec- of°tb ^rst Part P*cWres the background te ,• 6 ®rR>sh in Eastern Asia and the stra- * Conception and building of the Singa- 0jr^. ^eet base. Throughout all the building theln®aPore ar,d British sea power in Asia, reanarne of Winston Churchill appears and navf^ears, and he is blamed for the British other Co"aPse *n December, 1941, although wer government agencies admittedly also defee Culpable. For Singapore, like the U. S. V.nses *n the Philippines, the matter boils larj .to “too little and too late,” particu- •p,111 supply of aircraft, loss CfSeconc^ Part dramatically describes the 0 the Prince of Wales and Repulse on
December 10, 1941, “the turning point in British History,” the rapid conquests of Malaya and Dutch East Indies, and the naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean in early 1942. The chapter on the “Inquest on the Disaster” discusses Admiral Phillips’ decisions to take his “Eastern Fleet” into the China Sea and its prompt loss. Much consideration is given to the British tradition of aggressive action, and the feeling that “the fleet could only have refrained from all attempts to interfere with a Japanese landing at the expense of becoming an international laughing-stock.” In spite of Churchill’s consideration that the fleet should be held as “a vague menace” and should have adopted a hiding strategy, and the realization that no air cover was available, the Admiral carried' out his time-honored indoctrination that the mission was to seek out and destroy the enemy. It should be noted that at the same time the U. S. Asiatic Fleet was in hiding beyond bombing range from Manila. The night before Pearl Harbor, at Churchill’s request and upon orders from Admiral Hart, four U. S. Destroyers departed Balikpapan, Borneo, to reinforce the British Eastern Fleet at Singapore. The heavy ships were sunk just before the destroyers arrived on the scene, and the American division returned to Java upon learning that no air cover was available. Captain Grenfell feels that the plan for our Asiatic fleet to retire to
Singapore and reinforce the British was not carried out “as promised.” The war plan that contained this feature was in existence only a short time and was superseded by a different one more than a month before Pearl Harbor.
The third portion of the work, which seems to be an afterthought to the thesis of the book, concerns the details of the Coral Sea and Midway Battles of May and June, 1942, and how the U. S. Navy through the use of its aircraft regained command of the Pacific from Japan and became the dominant sea power of the world, ending the epoch of the venerable tradition that “Britannia Rules the Waves.” In his analysis Captain Grenfell develops his moot theory that “a fleet that relies on destroying the enemy’s aircraft rather than his carriers should be more secure.” He points out the advantage of having the enemy fleet come to you, instead of the ingrained British naval custom of finding the foe and joining battle as quickly as possible. His argument regarding the offensive and defensive in the use of aircraft is not clear cut.
The author is superb in describing battle action but his observations regarding strategy, tactics, and diplomacy sometimes seem narrow and slanted to his personal views. The book is vividly written and avoids technical terms. It should be of interest to all naval officers, amateur strategists, historians, and the general reader.
AMERICAN CRISIS DIPLOMACY, The Quest for Collective Security, 1918-1952. By Richard \Y. Van Alstyne, with a foreword by Graham H. Stuart. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952. 165 pages. 83.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Samuel S. Stratton, U. S. Naval Reserve
(Lieutenant Commander Stratton is a radio and television news commentator in civilian life. His essay “Korea: Acid Test of Containment” won the 1952 Naval Institute Prize Essay Contest.)
With the conduct of our foreign relations in the recent past a subject of much bitter political controversy these days, the appearance of any work that undertakes to examine the background of our present difficulties in sober and comparatively detached terms is bound to be a literary event of some consequence.
Mr. Van Alstyne’s volume reviews—in rather remarkable detail for so brief a book— the major happenings in American diplomatic history since the end of World War I. To say that his approach is both sober and detached, however, is not to suggest that his judgments, especially in the atmosphere of the day, will find enthusiastic acceptance on all sides. On balance he comes down more often on the side of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations than not. But at least he does so less as an apologist than as a scholar whose researches have convinced him that the major problems of the period-" Yalta, for instance—were rather more complex than purely partisan critics have sometimes implied.
Naval readers will appreciate the author s hard-headed concern with the elements of national power and security as central factors in any sensible foreign policy. And though they may not agree with all of hjs conclusions, they will be attracted too by his ample treatment of events in Japan and China.
In general Mr. Van Alstyne seems t0 share the view recently expressed by Ambassador George F. Kennan (in a somewhat similar foreign policy review, American pl plomacy, 1900-1950) that the war again5
Japan, whatever its immediate antecedents! followed almost inevitably from World V I. Not being concerned with the backgroulK of that conflict as well, he does not make additional judgment that Kennan ma' that both wars should never have be fought at all! As for the communist v*ct0^ in the ensuing Far Eastern power vacu ’ the author does not indicate that there jtt much we could have done to foresta ^ though such efforts as we did make complicated, he implies, by President R° t velt’s wartime obsession with the fiction China was a “great” world power. At ^ rate Mr. Van Alstyne supports, ^vlt‘ 0f entirely accounting for, the supreme ir0 the moment, which is that to ensure peace and security of the Pacific "ecajcu- must painfully—and not without a ^^g lated risk—reconstruct virtually t e
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere we fought the war to destroy.
On such speculative matters the book suffers from the defects of its own virtues. Being chiefly a scholarly historical review (as the Kennan book is not), it will probably leave the average non-academic reader—who is, after all, looking primarily for an answer to the question, “where do we go from here?”— with a certain sense of inadequacy. The main Points of the author’s own outlook, summarized briefly in two concluding pages, would have been more effective had they been developed at greater length in the body °f the text instead of being tacked on, almost as an afterthought, at the end.
FORCE MULBERRY, by Commander Alfred Stanford, USNR. New York, N. Y.: William Morrow and Company, 1951. 240 Pages (including appendices and index). S3.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Robert H. Lindig (SC), U. S. Navy,
(Lieutenant Commander Lindig was an °perations watch officer with U. S. Naval Advance Base, Utah Beach, at the time of the “ ormandy landings.)
Force Mulberry is the story of the planning and installation of the artificial harbor off the /;• S. Normandy beaches in World War II. ,, e aim of the author has been one of Painting a picture” of the entire Mulberry Peration from its inception by various mining Groups to its final installation off f Normandy beaches, with an evaluation p^lng made of the various steps involved.
mally) an over-al] evaluation of its success is made by the author.
^ *' hile many of the conclusions drawn may e the author’s own, he appears to have 0j °bed them through an exhaustive study official records and reports, blueprints, charts. Commander Stanford, an eye- ness to the many dramatic events he de- de * J.CS’ ^ad access to ad records and confi- nt>al memoranda behind Force Mulberry. 'vo\ C Story *s told hy each chapter being en around a certain key phrase or state- § * from official war papers and dispatches,
vit i c*laPter headings as “This project is so a . . . >» “Top-Secret, Bigot,” “The success of the invasion would depend . . . ,”
• “Outlook Wednesday to Friday little change . . . ,” and “Flow can be maintained” will give an idea of the way in which this story is developed. The story is made doubly interesting in many chapters by the writer’s use of the names of officers and men involved rather than the use of their official assignment designations.
Many phases of the planning and execution of this operation, however, necessarily call for the use of alphabetical designations of the military as well as a description of both the American and British Military Organization. This, at times, may prove to be somewhat confusing to the layman and also to the military. However, the abbreviations used are carefully covered in footnotes and there is a complete glossary of code words and common U. S. Naval abbreviations at the end of the book. Also to be found is a Mulberry Bibliography. At the end of the book, there are five appendices on the Task Organization and Assignments as well as other important and interesting statistical information.
The descriptive ability of the author is excellent and to anyone involved in “Operation Overlord” (the Normandy invasion operation) many of the scenes described will be quite familiar. To those not on duty in this operation, the descriptions of places and situations will be found interesting, “down to earth,” and (not to be boring) sometimes amusing.
There are twelve photographs in the book as well as the inside front and back covers containing charts of the invasion area and a plan of Mulberry “A.” These also help to supplement the author’s descriptions.
As a final note to Force Mulberry, the following quotation from Samuel E. Mori- son’s introduction seems to “sum up” the story’s success. “In this book Commander Stanford has made a very important contribution to the history of World War II, and in the writing of it he has recaptured the tense excitement, almost desperation, of planning and executing the landings in Normandy.”
FIGHTING ADMIRAL: THE STORY
OF DAN CALLAGHAN. By Francis X.
Murphy. New York. Vantage Press, Inc.,
1952. 214 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Paul F.
Dugan, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Rear Admiral Dugan, on Admiral King’s Planning Staff in 1942, was commanding officer of the U.S.S. Heywood (APA-6) and look part in the assaults on Tarawa, Kwaja- lein, Eniwetok, and Saipan.)
The man who answered the plea of the troops on Guadalcanal: “Where’s the
Navy?,” and who coined the famous phrase, “We want the big ones,” is immortalized in this factual story of the life of Dan Callaghan.
Admiral Callaghan grew up in San Francisco and Oakland with the scent of the sea in his nostrils. Two things inspired him with the desire to be a naval officer: the thrilling story of Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, and his friendship with his uncle, the late Rear Admiral John J. Raby. His religious background at home and his training at the Jesuit college of St. Ignatius—now the University of San Francisco—developed in Dan the strong religious and patriotic characteristics which carried him to outstanding success as an officer and to his heroic death in the Battle of Guadalcanal.
Dan’s career is traced through the Naval Academy, where he graduated in 1911, and his various duties as an officer on board cruisers, old destroyers, and battleships. His adventures in revolutionary disturbances in Mexico, China, and Nicaragua are recounted, together with his war-time duties in World Wars I and II. After World War I Dan, on Washington duty, met the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Gunnery duty on the battleships Idaho and Mississippi, and staff gunnery duty with Admiral Richard H. Leigh gave Dan the chance to contribute towards the improvement of the gunnery performance of the Battle Force, as the Pacific Fleet was then called.
When President Roosevelt, in 1938, was looking for a “saltwater sailor” to be his naval aide, his personal physician, Rear Admiral Ross T. Mclntire, recommended Commander Dan Callaghan, and the assignment was soon made. For almost three years Dan, promoted to Captain, accompanied the President on his history-making trips and served him unobtrusively and efficiently as naval adviser and confidant.
Captain Callaghan departed Washington in March, 1941, to take command of the heavy cruiser San Francisco. Surviving the Pearl Harbor attack without damage, the ship was ordered to the South Pacific where a sortie against the Japanese build-up at Rabaul was in the making. In the Japanese bombing attack on the task force Dan handled his ship skillfully. Every one of his crew of 1000 men thought highly of his skipper: a lieutenant is quoted as saying, “One can feel no more secure with 20 inches of armor” than with Captain Dan on the bridge.
The author describes the events leading up to the climax of Dan’s career: the command which consisted of two heavy cruisers (including his former command, the San Francisco), three light cruisers, and eight destroyers. With these he was ordered to defend Guadalcanal against a Japanese fleet that proved to have two battleships, a light cruiser, and eleven destroyers.
The wild night melee that ensued when Admiral Callaghan’s force headed directly into the Japanese bombardment force o Guadalcanal has no equal in modern nava history. The author quotes from the voice radio (“TBS”) log the actual orders g>ven and the reports received by the Admiral dur ing the battle. A salvo from the battleship Hiei killed Dan Callaghan, three of his sta officers, and Captain Cassin Young of t San Francisco, but it did not wipe out t fighting spirit of the American force, " continued to fire with every gun that "°u
bear. >5
When the news of Admiral Callage1 death reached the White House, Presi Roosevelt said: “I knew Dan was too kr3vfl a man to live.” Trained for the job, in this well-written story, he went wil ^ into the jaws of death in defense of his ideals. ^e-
Father Murphy, a member of tllC. 0fic demptorist Order, was the civilian Ca^ ^ Chaplain for the Midshipmen of the ^ Naval Academy from 1944 to 194'. gr0uS contributed historical articles to num periodicals, has published a previous book, A Monument to St. Jude, and has conducted a weekly religious program over Station WBNX, New York City.
Aside from the story of the development °f the character and professional ability of °ne outstanding naval officer, the reader is presented, in Fighting Admiral, with a picture of the way of life of the career officer. In this story we find displayed the many facets °t such a career. This book earns a prominent place among the few biographical studies of the naval heroes of World War II.
Marine aviation in the Philippines. By Major Charles W. Boggs, Jr. USMC. Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. 160 pages.
Reviewed by Captain William M. Harden, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
Air cover for the initial Leyte landing, October 20, 1914, was to be supplied first by ^dmiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, then by Army air units based at fields on Leyte, however, the Third Fleet was still providing a'r cover for the Leyte operation on November 27. Halsey wanted to leave the ‘A'ippines but MacArthur, who was not Satisfied with the work of the Army air units, "as loath to let him go. Halsey then resided MacArthur of the First Marine Air based in the Northern Solomons; . acArthur immediately ordered the Ma- ’Ues to Leyte. Major General Ralph J. th^C^eH’ ^MC, Commanding General of e 1st MAW, had been seeking for a long r e a combat mission for his aviators. The £ Marine air units arrived at Leyte from Sa°uSainville on December 3, 1944; that day Marine aircraft flew their first f'on in the Philippine campaign. Missions nst convoys and Japanese reinforce- ts were the first assigned the Marines. p^. . main theme of Marine Aviation in the y\r llPpines is the close air support given I)infantry by the SBD’s (Douglas sai^Hess) and F4U’s (Chance-Vought Cor- 1 °f the 1st MAW. This close air support
was not utilized until Luzon was invaded on January 9, 1945. Major Boggs describes the difference in training of Marine and Army troops and their use of close air support. He very vividly points out the reluctance of the Army ground commanders in the Philippines to make use of close air support. But once shown the effects of close air support these same commanders were most unwilling • to release the air arm from their areas.
First Marine Air Wing planes were used by the infantry commanders for flank protection as well as striking targets less than 300 yards in front of the ground troops. Major Boggs should have published his volume at an earlier date so that the planners of the Korean War could have refreshed their memories on the vital close air support problem. Not only the U. S. Army troop commanders but also the commanders of the Philippine Guerillas were overwhelming in their praise of the Marine close air support. Various captured enemy diaries expressed the horror and complete respect of the Japanese for “The Diving Devildogs of Luzon.”
This study is one of the best on the problem of close air support; it is very well documented and supplied with excellent maps. As in the other monographs of this series the appendices are most informative and a propos.
Thumbnail Review
Jet Propulsion Turboprops. By Volney C. Finch.
The National Press, Millbrae, California, 1950.
256 pages. $5.00.
Mr. Finch, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Stanford University, explains: “This exposition of the amazing new aircraft powerplant was planned on the Engineers’ Council for Professional Development postwar specification for engineering study and is, therefore, a ‘paste and scissors’ collection of recent applications of generic principles to the development, design, construction, operation, and evaluation of the turboprop.”
Each chapter has an excellent bibliography; the book is well indexed; the writing is clean and adequately illustrated. Recommended for the graduate student in aviation engineering and the professional aviation engineer—a text, not a collection of popular articles.