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Philip A. C. Chaplin.—I apologize for treating two subjects in one communication,[1] but they are connected in my experience by a ship in which I served. She was H.M.S. Wrestler, my first ship and therefore a memorable one. I joined her in January 1941, as she lay in dry dock in Portsmouth dockyard refitting. There was a bitter east wind blowing and she had been in dockyard hands for more than a month, so that she looked more like a wreck than a destroyer. Besides, she was one of the oldest and smallest destroyers in the Navy List at the time, built in 1917 and displacing 1150 tons. I was a young Ordinary Seaman, green as grass; the °bvious target for some terror propaganda from the older hands. How much truth, if any, there may be in the stories that I am about to set down here I cannot tell; I hope that anyone who can will tell me.
My first story concerns the correspondence °n Extraordinary Rolls that has been appearing in these columns in recent months. Xot far from where we lay in dock, was another destroyer, both newer (1930) and larger (1360 tons) H.M.S. Bulldog. I was told that in 1939, shortly before the beginning of the war, she had rolled 90° while on passage through the Bay of Biscay. She had lain on ber beam ends for a minute and rolled slowly back. And we were expecting to pass through the bay in a month or two!
The other tale was told to me also in Wrestler’s Messdeck. H.M. Ships Rodney and
Nelson were sisters, often called the Cherry Tree class battleships because they had been cut down (by 14,000 tons) by the Washington Naval Treaty. They differed by 900 tons displacement, but very little else. They were proceeding once in line ahead through the bay when the weather turned dirty suddenly in the middle of the first watch. The Officer of the Watch in Rodney, the leading ship, sent the bridge messenger, a boy first class, to bring up his oilskins. The boy started aft along the upper deck and was washed overboard almost at once. He could not swim so he floundered around without noticing much, and no one had seen him go overboard. After a while he washed up with a thump on the quarterdeck. Blessing his luck, he went below to the officer’s cabin to look for the oilskins but he could not find them so he went forward to the boys’ messdeck to shift into dry clothes. There he found that his key would not fit the padlock on his locker. Puzzled, he went to the boy’s instructor and found that he was a stranger. He looked hard at him and read the name on his cap ribbon; it was H.M.S. Nelson.
Not much of a connection you may say, but read on. In November of the same year, Wrestler ran into a gale off the Azores during which a boatswain’s mate was washed overboard at the break of the forecastle and inboard on our own quarterdeck! The ship rolled 52°. Admitted, that is not much of a roll but it scared me; I was on watch in the wheel house as telegraphsman and holding on to a deck beam overhead to steady myself. My feet slipped and swung up level with the helmsman’s shoulders; looking down past them and out of the door I could see only cold sea water.
The E.D.O. in the Navy Today
(See page 293, March, 1952, Proceedings)
Robert S. Burpo, Jr., Lieut. Comdr., U. S. Naval Reserve.—Under the Duty Assignments in Cdr. Ralph Gerber’s article “The Engineering Duty Officer in the Navy Today,” an important organization staffed by ED’s has been omitted. This organization is the Material Laboratory at the New York Naval Shipyard. This is a Bureau of Ships technical laboratory employing eleven hundred civilian engineers and technicians and administered by a captain and a small staff of Naval officers.
This laboratory engages in developmental, investigation and testing work for BuShips and for other agencies of the Department of Defence. Duty at the Material Laboratory is one of the prize billets under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships because of the wide range of technical work undertaken here. Some idea of the scope of engineering endeavor at the Laboratory is indicated by a partial listing of current projects: investigation of the mechanical properties of plastic laminates for structural purposes, design and development of new gyro compasses, applications of radioisotope techniques to Navy research problems, improvement and refinement of radio and radar components, the development of improved batteries for submarines, refinement of measurements of shipboard vibrations, and multitudes of other problems.
A tour of duty at the Material Laboratory is a veritable technical education in itself.
A Mechanical Great Circle Computer
(See page 185, February, 1952, Proceedings)
S. J. Raiter, Lieut. (J.G.), U. S. Naval Reserve.—I have read with considerable interest the paper written by Ensigns MacFarland and Kinnear titled “A Mechanical Great Circle Course Computer” in the February, 1952, Proceedings.
Though it has long been known that the shortest distance between two points on the earth’s surface is the smaller arc of the great circle passing through these points, it is also well known that prevailing currents and winds may mean the course made good should be something completely different from the great circle course. The actual distance covered may, in some cases, be considerably greater than the great circle, but much less time consuming and less costly- Hence, a vessel equipped with a computer similar to that described by the authors would not, with up to date meteorological information, keep such equipment in continual use.
For more than a year the writer has been closely associated with proposals for automatic navigation. The suggested computers have included rhumb line, great circle, plane sailing and mid-latitude types. All of these, for aircraft application, seem to suffer from two objections. Weight and size! The authors should keep in mind what aircraft designers mean when they say “compact and light.’ Their (the author’s) statement, “The fact that this computer weighs little, takes up little space, and requires virtually no power to operate makes it practicable for airborne use,” bears careful scrutiny when we are dealing with airplanes of narrow silhouette: and loaded with electronic fire control equipment and associated radar. The smallest and lightest great circle computer with associated input and output devices known to the writer weighs approximately 500 lbs., and will only perform navigation.
There are several points in the paper which should be clarified. First, Figure 1 is in error: the great circle course between present p°" sition and destination should be concave downward. Second, there are numerous sets of equations for a great circle course compu' tation, and a thorough investigation is essential to the most feasible instrumentation- Third, it might be well to mention that the equations for the great circle solution are usually written with a difference in present longitude and destination longitude. The sum was therein written because the Greenwich Meridian was crossed by the course laid down.
I think the authors have done a commendable job in developing this computer, and a good deal may be said for the use of mechanical components. The newer, lighter and more compact units, though, are almost divorced from purely mechanical components to give them, with some sacrifice in accuracy, the characteristics just mentioned.
How Naval Bases Can Sell Sailors Short
(See page 1083, October, 1951, Proceedings)
Leslie R. Heselton, Jr., Lieut. Comdr., U. S. Naval Reserve.—I am a little behind in my reading of the Proceedings and have just finished the October issue containing the article “How Naval Bases Can Sell Sailors Short” by Commander James C. Shaw, U. S. Navy. The truth of this article is apparent to most officers and needs little comment. The real problem is how to bring the matter to the attention of the Base Commander. Nearly all commanders wish their bases to be of genuine service to the fleet. Moreover, regardless of the actual situation, they honestly believe that they are supplying the best service possible. Possibly the commander of the base which Commander Shaw found the most fault with, in reading the article, muttered “Thank God, that isn’t this Base.” The imperative thing is for the captain of a ship whose crew is receiving poor service, to make sure that the base commander himself is cognizant of the problem, so that following ships may be better served. If he settles the matter himself or corrects it by merely contacting subordinate base personnel his ship may benefit, but as soon as he clears the yard, the original method will undoubtably be resumed. Only when the commander himself has the facts can a lasting solution be obtained. By this I do not recommend running to the commander with all the trivial problems that arise, nor do I mean to bypass the chain of command in any way. Certainly the first thing to do is request the proper subordinate to correct the situation. But even after it is corrected the commander should learn of it, with proper credit for the solution if due, so he will know that the problem existed and be prepared to prevent it in the future. This may be done in many ways—for the major problems an official letter is in order; for less important ones conversation with the staff should handle it; and in any case we must not forget how much good maybe accomplished by- conversation at the officers’ club or during visits.
I rambled on a little more than I intended to regarding Naval Bases. The real purpose of this letter was to mention the close similarity to Air Stations. Except for the time spent on carriers nearly all flight personnel are continuously dependent on Air Stations for their comfort and efficiency. After a period of time at any station an aircraft squadron will have some sort of arrangement with the station for mutual benefit. However, the real problems arise when away from the home base, whether a complete squadron or only one aircraft. Having stopped at most Naval Air Stations in the United States and overseas, I found the differences to be very- apparent. Although fewer persons are inconvenienced (as compared with a warship) when an aircraft receives poor service, the problems are just as real to them, and when the number of aircraft is considered the total is probably just as great.
For a simple example consider a single aircraft stopping for the night at an intermediate station. After landing the pilot finds himself at a considerable distance from the parking area. He is usually informed to park in area so-and-so. After much radio conversation he finds out where the area is and how to taxi there. Upon arriving at the area he waits for an indifferent signal man to direct him to the exact parking spot. Having climbed out of his aircraft he finds the ground crew has disappeared and he must carry all of his equipment, as a minimum consisting of a parachute, his handbag, and many maps and forms, to the operations office to check in. Then he must scout around for the proper personnel with whom to make arrangements for refueling. He finds that the BOQ is at the other end of the station, there is no transportation available, no secure place for his flight gear, that he must be in complete uniform en route to the BOQ, and that the only place to change is the small head in the operations building. Having surmounted these difficulties he arrives at BOQ and is informed that he can have a bed in the dormitory when the boy returns from mess and makes it up. After finally obtaining his bunk it is too late to do anything except sleep so that the cleanliness of the room doesn’t bother him too much. After going through the same procedure in reverse the next morning he departs vowing never to stop at that station again. Perhaps that is the reason for the poor service, the station would rather not have any transients. The above may be a rather extreme example, and although there are few stations quite as bad, nonetheless there are some. However, I am happy to say that the Navy Department is working to correct the worst offenders and that conditions should improve. Also it must be mentioned that there are many stations at which it is a genuine pleasure to stop.
A Bit of Boston History
(See page 2041, December, 1919, Proceedings)
Miss Dorothy Ford Mayhew, Cambridge, Mass.—In Boston the 17th of March has a double significance; the St. Patrick’s Day celebration shares honors with the commemoration of Evacuation Day. On this occasion there is generally some mention of the British having withdrawn their forces from the town on the agreement of the Americans not to burn it. This elliptical reference tends to rouse speculation as to the state of affairs which could have caused the Colonists to contemplate doing such a thing, so drastic in consequences to their own people and property.
Last year, in processing an early file of the Proceedings, I found an article which shed considerable light on this question. It was entitled: “How Our Infant Navy Strangled a War Horror,” was written by Edgar Stanton Maclay, and appeared in 1919. It does not deal primarily with the evacuation of Boston, but with an event that occurred some three or four months earlier which exerted a strong influence on the British to withdraw.
It does not specify that there was any formal agreement, nor even indicate that the Americans did intend to burn the town. But it does explain why the British were afraid they would—why, for more than three months, they entertained acute apprehensions of being caught in an uncontrollable holocaust—and why it was expedient for them to extricate themselves in advance from a potentially untenable position.
Their fears were based on guilty knowledge, on two counts: 1) that the Colonists possessed the means to accomplish this end;
and 2) that they, the British, had intended, by these very means, to do it themselves. Since the author expresses doubt that the Americans comprehended the nature of a weapon which had fallen into their hands, or realized how it put them in a position to turn the tables on their foes, the British retreat may have had some earmarks of “fleeing where no man pursueth.”
For Boston was to have been burned only not by the Americans. Originally, this arsonous intent was part of the British strategy for bringing the recalcitrant Colonists to terms and suitably punishing them into the bargain. In extenuation, the author makes clear that it was neither the Crown Forces nor the Government in England that fostered this plan. It was the American-born Royalists who insisted on “town-burning”— not for Boston alone, but as a general policy- And it was they who, against the advice and protests of military and parliamentary leaders, demanded the importation of the latest thing in town-burning apparatus- Thus, in the fall of 1775, destruction of the city awaited only the arrival from Europe of the machinery on which they depended to effect their purpose.
But, in late November of that year, the British Storeship Nancy was captured on the New England coast by the Continental Cruiser Lee, and she was found to contain, in addition to the usual military supplies, a curious and seemingly incongruous cargo* consisting of 50 giant frameworks hung with hundreds of mirrors, prisms and reflectors- These were listed as “carcasses,” and further described as “great frames for combustibles to set buildings on fire.”
The stores, naturally a windfall for the besieging Continental Army, were appropr1' ately distributed; the “carcasses” were set aside, and no more, apparently, was hear of them. According to the article, the captor- had no idea of the character or purpose ° their prize, but assumed these monstrosity to be some bizarre form of interior decora' tion. This—surely?—is an unwarranted con elusion.
To begin with, it is hard to believe the Colonists knew nothing of the British plan that their naval patrols were not watching t0 intercept the carrier. But even if the captnr£
was no more than a lucky fluke, the article would still make them out to have been almost impossibly naive—bumpkins agape at the outlandish appearance of these contrivances.
And this raises the question as to how the things were shipped. Considering the nature of their parts, one would suppose them to have been dismantled for packing and transport; otherwise, one can readily imagine the condition on arrival of the mirrors and prisms, after a November crossing of the North Atlantic in the hold of a small sailing vessel. This, in turn, supposes directions for assembling and mounting, and, indeed, very precise instructions for installation and orientation. Their papers, of course, might have been dispatched by another vessel; but there would still have been some illuminating notation in the ship’s papers—and, indeed, the descriptive passage quoted above reads like a cargo listing. Was the examination conducted by illiterates?
But, more particularly, it is beyond belief that a weapon of such power and magnitude could have been developed—and used—in Europe, without knowledge of it having reached even these remote American shores. In fact, it had—if it was the American Tories who were bent on using it. And information of that kind could no more be isolated then than now.
For these mysterious carcasses were the H-Bomb of their day. Installed on a strategic elevation, beyond cannon range, they needed only a few sunny hours to set fires that would raze to the ground and utterly destroy the largest city within the day. “There was no defense against them.” They could not be put out of action by defending batteries, but could put the batteries out of action by deadly “sun-fire” heat that no gun crew could withstand.
With fires that there was no possible means of controlling ignited simultaneously in every quarter of the town, with a panicked populace stampeding for the open country, the military defenders within the town might get out—as individuals—or be roasted at their posts. No formal evacuation, no orderly withdrawal, would be possible.
In wanton destructiveness, this hideous instrument had the “efficiency” of the atomic weapons of today. It was a terror weapon, cynical in concept and ruthless in application. And the British had sense enough to be afraid of it when it had fallen out of their hands. Considering that they had not been responsible for a policy that seemed about to “back-fire” on them, it is understandable that they should have chosen discretion as the prime concomitant of valor in determining their retreat.
Whether the Americans gained control of the weapon by accident or by design, it cannot be argued that their failure to use it was due to ignorance. A more tenable supposition is that they knew very well what they had; knew, too, its effectiveness as a force “in being,” enhanced by their very silence on the subject. Their restraint, then, would rather have been due to an innate aversion for resort to so brutal a method of warfare, an aversion they shared, as a common blood- heritage, with the responsible members of British society, including the Admiralty which banned the use of a machine considered “a shock to civilization.”
In first reading the article in question, note was made to refer back to it at the appropriate time to abstract the data (with suitable credit) for a Boston radio program devoted to New England history and lore. But in preparing this script, certain aspects of the original presentation led to question and speculation. While 33 years is more than the usual time lapse for opening discussion of an article, these comments may not be considered entirely amiss; for the subject is even more timely now than when it first appeared. Like so many historical footnotes, it serves not only to make clearer the event itself, but has direct application to problems of the present day.
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