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Action in the Mediterranean, 1801
The cover of this issue of the Proceedings reproduces, in part, a painting by Italy’s foremost marine artist, Rodolfo Claudus. The scene is that of a fierce engagement between the U.S.S. Enterprise and a Tripolitan warship in August, 1801.
The painting was commissioned for presentation to the United States Naval Academy by the Italian Naval Academy at Leghorn, and the Amerigo Vespucci transported the gift to Annapolis in time for the 150th anniversary of the memorable battle. Purists in the field of the history of ships may possibly find points to criticize in the Claudus painting, but the spirit of the presentation is an item which is beyond criticism.
The Enterprise was commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Sterett, U. S. Navy, who, on August 6, 1801, reported the engagement to his superior officer, Commodore Richard Dale, stationed on the U.S.S. President off Tripoli. This is Sterett’s own account:
“Sir, I have the honor to inform you, that on 1 of August, I fell in with a Tripolitan ship of war, called the Tripoli, mounting 14 guns, commanded by Rais Mahomet Rous. An action immediately commenced within pistol shot, which continued three hours incessantly. She then struck her colors. The carnage on board was dreadful; she having 30 men killed and 30 wounded, among the latter was the Captain and the first Lieut. Her sails, masts and rigging were cut to pieces with 18 shot between wind and water. Shortly after taking possession, her mizenmast went over the side. Agreeably to your orders, I dismantled her of everything but an old sail and spar. With heartfelt pleasure I add, that the officers and men throughout the vessel, behaved in the most spirited and determined manner, obeying every command with promptitude and alertness. We have not had a man wounded, and we have sustained no material damage in our hull or rigging-”
Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan
(See page 1271, December, 1951, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral L. S. Sabin, U. S. Navy.— The “Inside Story of The Pearl Harbor Plan” (December 1951 Proceedings) by Robert S. Ward is a fascinating story. It is a noteworthy contribution to the history of that infamous day.
Because the surprise was so complete and the Japanese victory so overwhelming, I suppose that it is only natural to assume that no precautions were ever taken prior to December 7, 1941 to anticipate hostilities. Nevertheless, many precautions were taken, some of them are a matter or record; and the fact that they prevented neither the surprise nor the Japanese victory does not alter the fact that they existed.
One of the statements made by the author is indicative of the wide spread belief that the operating schedule of the Fleet was so rigidly routine that units regularly got underway on Mondays and returned on Fridays. This is not true even though the Japanese may have shared this belief as expressed by the author in his statement: “counting (therefore) on the known custom of the Fleet during maneuvers to enter Pearl Harbor on Fridays and to leave the following Monday . . . .” (Italics are mine.)
I have no documents to support what I say; but my memory is clear on the principle if not on the details. At the time of “Pearl Harbor,” the Fleet was organized essentially into three operating Task Forces. To each of these Task Forces ships were assigned from the various type commanders, except that all carriers operated with one
Task Force and the battleships were split between two Task Forces.
Serving as Staff Gunnery Officer for ComBatShips (Rear Admiral Anderson), I recall attending a Staff conference called by the Admiral shortly after he had returned from a Type Commanders’ conference held by CinCPacFleet. As I remember it, this conference was several months before “Pearl Harbor.” The Admiral informed us that a new and somewhat complicated Fleet operating schedule had been made up which would insure adequate upkeep periods while at the same time keep two Task Forces at sea most of the time, at least one Task Force at sea all of the time and insure irregular departures and arrivals in Pearl. The new schedule would approximate six to nine days at sea and seven to ten days in port for each Task Force. Periods at sea would be varied as would time in port to meet requirements. Departures from and returns to Pearl would occur on various days of the week. Overlaps of several days of two of the three Task Forces would be provided from time to time in order that type commanders and their staffs might have an opportunity to discuss matters of type interest with Division Commanders, captains of ships and their officers.
The foregoing schedule was placed into effect. I remember that Task Force One sortied from Pearl in the middle of a week and in the middle of a week-end on several occasions and I recall at least one Saturday night sortie as well as similar returns to Pearl. The schedule was designed to accomplish the following:
(1) That there be a Task Force at sea at all times.
(2) That two Task Forces be at sea the the majority of time.
(3) That departures from and returns to Pearl by each Task Force follow no rigid pattern.
(4) That acceptable periods of maintenance, repair and recreation be provided for.
(5) That an occasional overlap of two Task Forces in Pearl be provided in order to afford meetings between the Type Commander and his Captains.
I believe the Fleet operating schedules for pre-Pearl Harbor will bear out the foregoing. Maybe the Japs had our schedules. I don’t know. But I do know the schedules were designed to prevent the very thing that was charged: namely, a stereotyped departure on Monday and return on Friday. Naturally, a Task Force was “in” over a week-end and sometimes there were two. That happened to be the case when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
Vice Admiral W. S. Anderson, U. S. Navy (Ret.).—I have read with much interest the informing article by Mr. Robert E. Ward in the December, 1951, Proceedings, entitled “The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan.”
On December 7, 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese, you will probably remember that two Fleet Task Forces were at sea. Task Force No. One, which included eight battleships, was in Pearl Harbor. Referring to these battleships, Mr. Ward states “They were sunk or heavily damaged.”
I am not proposing to minimize the estimate of the damage done by the Pearl Harbor attack. However, it was bad enough without unintentionally overstating it. I am sure Mr. Ward will welcome a comment or two which I think will help to set the record straight. Of the eight battleships in Pearl I'arbor at the time of the attack, the Arizona was torpedoed and blown up. She was a complete wreck. The Oklahoma was torpedoed and capsized. She was subsequently raised.
Besides the Arizona and Oklahoma, the Nevada, California and West Virginia also were torpedoed. The Nevada got underway and proceeded toward the Harbor entrance. There were serious fires in the West Virginia. These three battleships slowly settled on the bottom, a process which took some hours. Had there been adequate salvage pumps available they could have been kept afloat. These five ships, except the Arizona and possibly excepting the Oklahoma, as to which I am not sure, were subsequently floated, overhauled, and repaired, and did excellent service before the war was over, notat'y at Surigao Straits.
The Tennessee had a considerable fire in her after part, which was controlled. It will be realized that the damage to the Tennessee, the Pennsylvania and the Maryland, in which ship I was, could hardly be classed as serious inasmuch as about twelve days after the attack they proceeded to the West Coast and underwent such repairs as were necessary. This work was to repair the damage done by several bomb hits. The damage done by bombs was relatively unimportant as compared to the damage done by the torpedoes.
Had there been anti-torpedo nets available for the Fleet’s use, the damage done to the battleships by the attack would have been relatively minor. These nets were not available until some months later. Apparently none of the investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack brought out that the Navy Department had once or twice vainly endeavored to get the necessary appropriations for nets. Had their efforts been successful one year earlier than they were, it can be seen what a tremendous effect it might have had upon the safety of Task Force No. One’s battleships when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
I cannot conclude these observations without paying my homage to the efficiency and gallantry displayed by all ranks and ratings of the battleships at the time of the attack. We all stand in silent salute to those brave officer-, and men who lost their lives there.
A Case of Necessity
Mr. George C. Peck, Whittier, Calif. —I have often wondered if the U. S. Navy is cognizant of the fact that my grandfather stole the wheel of the U.S.S. Constitution.
My maternal grandfather, Captain Elbert Stannard, a well-known Yankee skipper of a century ago, opened a naval “graveyard” at Port Washington, Long Island, where he stripped the copper from the hulls of many of the obsolete ships which he had bought from the U. S. Navy.
Due to the radical change in naval construction during and after the Civil War, the Government prepared to sell many of the old wooden ships of the line. Two of the veterans, the Constitution and the Powhatan,
lay side by side in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Captain Stannard bid on both ships and eventually bought the latter. In preparing to tow the Powhatan to his Long Island yard, he discovered that the ship’s wheel was missing, and when the lost helm could not be located it was replaced by the one from the Constitution, whose fate was then in doubt.
The wheel, a big-spoked double one of mahogany heavily inlaid with brass, had been a prize of war in that during the engagement with the British frigate Java, “Old Ironsides” had had her own wheel shot away and had replaced it with the one from the defeated Java. Although taken from the English ship, the wheel had originally been of a different nationality, for the Java had originally been a French vessel taken by Britain.
Later when it was decided to preserve “Old Ironsides” and she was being readied for towing to Boston, a wheel believed to have been the misplaced property of the Powhatan was set up and has presumably remained a part of her ever since. I have no idea what Captain Stannard did with the wheel of the Constitution or what became of it after his death in 1907.
In 1862 Captain Stannard sold one of his ships to Japan as a nucleus of that nation’s navy. Somehow that same ship was taken over by the Japanese Prince of Nagato and was used on the unprovoked attack on American shipping in Shimonoseki Strait in the early 1860’s. An article in the Proceedings (page 1546, November, 1942) several years ago described the circumstances surrounding the Battle of Shimonoseki Strait in which Commodore David Stockton McDougall, U.S.N., commanding the U.S.S. Wyoming, sank most of the Prince of Na- gato’s fleet, fails to mention that one of the Japanese vessels was a bark-rigged clipper, the former Daniel Webster, which Captain Stannard had sold to Japan.
My grandfather’s dealing with the Japanese led the New York Herald in 1904 to bestow upon him the title, “Father of the Japanese Navy,” a fact of which I did not boast strongly during World War II; and I’m still a bit dubious about owning up that he pinched the Constitution's wheel, although his act was obviously a practical necessity.
Shipyards
(See page 737, July, 1951, Proceedings)
Mr. F. G. Griffith, Ft. Wayne, Ind.—- In Ashley Halsey, Jr.’s article on Shipyards in the July, 1951, Proceedings, he mentions Hog Island ships on page 740, column 2. His reference to these ships having reciprocating engines like the Liberties is in error. They were equipped with General Electric turbines.
Top of column 2 on page 741 mentions 90 ships launched at Hog Island one Fourth of July. Hog Island, of course, had only 50 ways so 90 ships could not be launched there in one day.
Mr. Halsey may be referring to the nearly 100 ships all the American shipyards intended to launch on July 4, 1918. The Philadelphia yard’s first ship was not launched until August 5, 1918.
Captain Edward A. Crenshaw, Jr., U.S.N.R. (Ret.).—The very interesting article in the July, 1951, issue of the Proceedings by Mr. Ashley Halsey, Jr., focuses attention upon one of our most important National Defense assets—our shipyards.
But I am afraid that the article leaves some of the serious problems untouched and possibly conveys a somewhat incorrect impression on certain features. In an attempt to keep the record straight the following comment is offered.
First of all, as to the much-maligned Hog Island Ships—I believe there were 123 of them and not 90 as stated. In any case, they were certainly far from being a “burden to our peacetime shipping economy.” The Hog Island yard set the pattern for mass production of ships and so was of great value to the industry even though most of the ships were completed too late for the First World War emergency.
These ships were not powered with reciprocating engines as stated, but by excellent geared turbines giving a speed of 11 to 12 knots. When the depression in shipping developed in the early 1920’s the Hog Island ships were the last to be laid up and the first to go out again as conditions improved. They were in general most popular with the seagoing fraternity (the Navy used several) and were probably the best ships of their class we ever had in our Merchant Marine.
At the outbreak of the Second World War a number of these ships were still in service though past their expected life, and they proved to be very valuable. In convoy they were useful as column leaders owing to their general reliability and good station keeping qualities.
The Liberty ships were unfortunately given the “smart Alec” name of “Ugly Ducklings,” which seems to have created a not entirely justified prejudice against them in many quarters. It is hard to estimate what we would have done without them during the emergency. The real reason for their reciprocating engines was the lack of available capacity for cutting reduction gears for the Navy and for the enormous merchant ship program all at once. When this capacity became available, the shift was made to the much more popular Victory ships with their speeds of up to 20 knots. But there were fewer Victories, and, since they were so popular with the Navy, few showed up in the merchant ship convoys.
The reciprocating engines of the Liberty ships were certainly of a long obsolete type. But even at that their construction was a testimonial to the versatility of our industry since most of the contracting firms had never before built marine engines.
Design of these ships lent itself to easy construction by not too expert yards with their inexperienced forces, and the construction of some 2,700 Liberty ships was of inestimable value to the war effort. In appearance the Liberties actually (in spite of the “ugly duckling” title) greatly resemble the Victory ships. The latter have much superior cargo gear.
Since we have so many of these ships it might be in order for the engineering geniuses to study the possibility of designing a power plant that might be substituted for the present reciprocating engines to give them 3 or 4 knots more speed. It is of course seldom economical to make major changes of this type in an existing ship—especially an old one. But should we find ourselves in
another full scale war emergency again within the next few years our steel industry would be severely taxed once more, and the ability to make use of several hundred completed hulls and thereby quickly produce some faster ships would be most welcome.
As a matter of fact the Liberty ships were not responsible for 8 knot convoys as stated. Such speeds were dictated by older and smaller ships in use at the start of the emergency. When the so-called “slow” convoys were made up of Liberty ships, the standard speed was 9.50 knots and this was often exceeded. One large and heavily- loaded convoy made 10.3 from Norfolk to Europa Point for example.
Mr. Halsey' does not touch upon the serious point of the very high cost of ships built in our yards as compared with those built abroad. There is no question as to the necessity of our maintaining the capacity to build ships as needed in an emergency. But it will probably prove difficult even with the aid of generous subsidies to make the operation of American built ships profitable in competition with foreign ships which cost half as much. Our ships are as well built as any and probably better equipped than most, but the high cost is a difficult obstacle.
Another problem not mentioned is the very high operating cost of our ships with their existing wage scales and working rules. When unlicensed men draw over $5,000 a year on steady work with their food, bedding, etc., thrown in, and a 40 hour week at sea, it is hard to see how ship operators can successfully compete in world trade with ships whose pay scale is less than half of this.
Any future major war emergency will unquestionably call for a further increase in our shipping and this can only be supplied by the private yards. Consequently it certainly is most important to see that some at least are kept in operation. But this will require a careful study of the whole problem of peace time shipping.
How Naval Bases Can Sell Sailors Short
Lieutenant Commander E. F. Gallagher, U. S. Navy.—“How Naval Bases Can Sell Sailors Short” by Commander James C. Shaw, U. S. Navy, which appeared in the October, 1951, Proceedings was read with great interest.
Commander Shaw has made an outstanding contribution to the Naval Service by his clear delineation of some of the critical problems present at Naval bases.
It is hoped that this article may be the seed which falls upon fertile ground, for as phrased in the Gunnery Instructions of the Navy, “of far greater importance to officers than the material or tools committed to their charge is the personnel with which they are concerned.”
Uniform Tonnage Measurement
(See page 1297, December, 1951, Proceedings)
Mr. Arthur H. Morse, Elmhurst, New York.—I read with great interest Capt. R. T. Merrill’s comments on the effect on seaworthiness of certain methods of measuring net tonnage.
An example of such methods which he did not mention was that of the Suez Canal Commissioners relating to accommodation for radio telegraphy, which accommodation they held, must be subject to dues the same as passenger space. As a consequence, some British shipowners, as late as 1911, would allow radio companies to fit their ships on “Via Suez” routes only on condition that they, the companies, installed their apparatus in knockdown cabins which could be dismantled for the canal transit; and one shipowner even demanded that such cabins should be provided by the radio company. As a matter of fact, a few canal-routed ships were provided with these knockdown radio cabins, the reason for which, I assume, has long-since expired.
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