(Editor’s Note:—Upon publication by the Yale University Press of Journey To The “Missouri,” by Toshikazu Kase, one of the first authoritative Japanese books to appear since the war, the. Naval Institute requested former Admiral Nomura to review it for the Proceedings, inasmuch as Admiral Nomura was the person best informed on the subject in question. Admiral Nomura did more than write a review—he wrote a full analysis and discussion of the whole background of Japanese politics leading up to the war. Consequently Admiral Nomura’s contribution is being printed here in the article section rather than in the Book Review Section of the Proceedings. For those who will be prompted to read Mr. Kase’s book, Journey To The “Missouri” is published by the Yale University press, New Haven, Conn.)
I have just finished reading Journey to the “Missouri” by Toshikazu Kase. It is a most interesting and instructive book—and naturally so, since the author is the most brilliant and ablest member of the Japanese Foreign Office. I remember Foreign Minister Matsuoka telling me over twenty years ago that Mr. Kase was a bright and promising man.
From the book it is apparent that the author was taken into the confidence of Premiers Konoye and Kido as well as Foreign Ministers Matsuoka, Togo, and Shigemitsu. And he describes the actual state of affairs through the changing eras so vividly that the readers receive the impression of being actual witnesses of the events taking place. On the other hand the book gives the readers the impression that before and during the last war the Foreign Office invariably acted with good sense, and that all the responsibility of waging the war and bringing about Japan’s complete war should be attributable to the military clique alone.
Although I have not at hand the data to contest the statements in the book one by one, I give my own impressions below.
In the middle and latter phases of the Meiji era Japan had on one hand such warrior-statesmen as Yamagata, Oyama, Katsura, Yamamoto, etc., while on the other it had such career statesmen and diplomats as Ito, Mutsu, Komura, and so on. They cooperated well in steering the ship of the state after due discussion and deliberation. In the days of the Sino-Japanese and Russo- Japanese Wars there did not exist such a word as “military clique’s diplomacy.” Around the time of the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921 Tanaka was in office as War Minister. I have been told by a certain ex-ambassador that Tanaka then encouraged the Foreign Office to bestir itself, going so far as to say to Foreign Minister Uchida, “The military has no intention of conducting diplomacy. If a diplomatic policy to cope with the situation is shaped on your part, I will willingly stamp my approval seal on it without looking.”
A few years before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, when Terauchi came back to Tokyo relieved of the post of Commanding General of the Manchurian Garrison Army, I was told by him that enthusiasm for recovery of national prestige by the Chinese people had become prevalent in Manchuria. So much so that unless measures were taken immediately to meet the situation properly, all that had been achieved as a result of the Russo-Japanese War would be lost eventually, and that this Chinese resurgence had all the makings of a crisis.
In 1928 Chang Tso-lin died due to the bomb explosion when his train was bombed on his way back to Mukden from Peking. At that time Tanaka, being Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister of Japan, endeavored to deal with the case lawfully, examining closely the causes of the matter. However, the matter became complicated contrary to his intention. And, due to lack of thoroughness of the measures taken, the Tanaka cabinet resigned, failing to satisfy His Majesty on the matter. Around that time I, along with Sugiyama, went round North China and Manchuria, paying visits to the 6th Division, then located in Tsinan, and to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, then located in Mukden. On our return to Tokyo we reported to Tanaka on the situations we had found. Tanaka himself seemed to have been shocked by Chang’s death, and it was evident that he had had no part in the bombing.
The Manchurian Incident was taken advantage of, however, to consolidate Japan’s position in Manchuria. The military command had regarded this area as the very front line of our national defense. This violated the Nine Power Treaty, so that U. S. Secretary of State Stimson proposed economic sanctions against Japan. However, instead of going the length of such a measure, the United States instituted the policy of non-recognition. As a result the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned, and Foreign Minister Shidehara also retired from the active diplomatic service. Thus the diplomacy of Japan came to be weighed in the balance from this time on. It may well be said that the dual government, civil and military, brought about by the independence of the military command from the civil government effectuated by virtue of the Meiji Constitution, was the cause of the downfall of the Empire of Japan.
Japan did not adopt the Open-Door policy in Manchuria. In 1932 the Manchurian Incident developed its effect on Shanghai where armed conflict occurred. Being then appointed Commander-in-Chief, 3rd Fleet, I went there in haste to assume the post. Admiral Pratt of the U. S. Navy, my intimate friend and then Chief of Naval Operations, had said casually to Ambassador Debuchi that it would be best to “allow Nomura to deal with the case.” Thus it happened that I went there to settle the conflict and succeeded in bringing about a local settlement of it, cooperating with Ueda, Shirakawa, and Shigemitsu. Araki, then War Minister, withdrew the troops from Shanghai after the settlement of the conflict. On April 29 of the same year several of those who were present at the ceremony in Shanghai for the commemoration of the Emperor’s Birthday, were seriously wounded by the bomb thrown by a Korean. I lost my right eye, and more than one hundred splinters still now remain in my body; Shigemitsu lost one leg, and Shirakawa died later.
In 1937 another Incident occurred in Peking. It developed into the “China Incident” which became so complicated that it remained unsettled even after eight years. Konoye as Premier and Hirota as Foreign Minister both endeavored in vain to bring about a local settlement of this incident, with the result that the Military Command became more and more dominant over the Civil Administration. In other words the professional diplomats became more and more impotent. As a result the Nine Power Treaty was violated and the Open-Door policy was discarded, so that the relations between Japan and the foreign powers deteriorated precipitately to the point where the end result was eventually the Pacific War. However, even though it may be said that the Military Command acted arbitrarily in the course of the above mentioned developments, still no declaration of war had been made. And there was a definite limit in the scope of the actions taken by the Military Command, so the Konoye cabinet can not be absolved from the responsibility of bringing the situation to the ultimate crisis regardless of their laying it at the door of the arbitrariness of the Military Command.
In 1939 I was appointed Foreign Minister. As the first step for settlement on the issue of the Open-Door policy I talked with United States Ambassador Grew relative to the opening of the Yangtze-kiang and Si- kiang (West River). Although I had the support of Premier Abe, War Minister Hata, and Navy Minister Yoshida, the diplomats along with the military authorities on the spot looked with disfavor on the matter, so that before it was put in execution the Abe cabinet resigned.
In 1940 the second Konoye cabinet was born in which Matsuoka took the portfolio of Foreign Minister. Matsuoka wished me to take the office of Ambassador in Washington. But in my talk with him at that time I became acquainted with his intention of strengthening the relations of Japan with Germany after the arrival of Mr. Stahmer, who was coming to Japan shortly. Thinking that this intention and the idea of improving the U. S.-Japanese relations would be incompatible, I said as much to Navy Minister Yoshida, and at the same time I declined Matsuoka’s offer.
Both Konoye and Matsuoka entertained the fallacy that by means of the Tripartite Alliance Japan would be able to extricate herself from her state of isolation and yet at the same time reach an understanding with America. It is quite astonishing that they should show such a lack of understanding of the mentality of the American people. Oikawa, Yoshida’s successor as Navy Minister, also desired to avoid a U. S.- Japanese war, yet nevertheless supported the Tripartite Alliance. But Oikawa felt somewhat uneasy, it seems, after the conclusion of the said Alliance. Therefore he again urged me to go to America as ambassador so earnestly that I, on my part, had to accept the proposal. Matsuoka also approved it. This may be attributable, I surmise, to the mentality of a drowning person who will catch at a straw, because he knew that I knew President Roosevelt well—an acquaintance going back to the time when Mr. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
Matsuoka was more than enthusiastic in regard to the Tripartite Alliance and regarded the conclusion of the said Alliance as a success. At the time of the Hiranuma cabinet, before Konoye’s administration, the question of the Tripartite Alliance had been proposed, but no decision on the matter could be made even after scores of debates and arguments. In the meanwhile the Nonaggression Pact had been concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hence the Hiranuma cabinet resigned, voicing its utter astonishment in the statement of “complicated and baffling.” The Alliance proposed at that time, after all, aimed at substantially the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Foreign Minister at that time was Arita.
After the Hiranuma cabinet, two cabinets of short duration, Abe’s and Yonai’s, succeeded in turn. At the time of the administration of the Yonai cabinet the question of the said alliance was again raised, and again the cabinet resigned because of it. After that the Konoye cabinet was reinstated. The Tripartite Alliance proposed at the time of the administration of the Konoye cabinet differed in its nature from that at the time of the Hiranuma cabinet. Essentially it took up the United States as its objective and aimed at restraining her from becoming a participant in the war in Europe. There are even some who assert that as there were included some leftist elements in Konoye’s brain-trust, the Tripartite Alliance concluded by his cabinet had been engineered by the leftist element.
Konoye, being a peer, was a refined gentleman and a man of popularity in every sphere of society. He was clear-headed and a good talker, being very logical in his arguments. Having a liking for new ideas, he undertook various new schemes. However, becoming the premier at such a youthful age, he lacked experience, so that he installed in key posts some persons who were popular yet who were also stubborn and who were sources of worry to him later. He did not have the perception to discern the sheer difficulty of obtaining the two incompatible things, the Tripartite Alliance and the U. S.-Japanese understanding, just as the maxim puts it, “No man can wear two pairs of shoes at the same time.” This was a short-sighted blunder on the part of Japan, although man becomes clever only after failure and even the great mind sometimes commits a fault.
In 1941 the second Konoye cabinet resigned in a body and the third Konoye cabinet was born. This change was all brought about in order to oust Matsuoka and install Toyoda in his place. Nevertheless, the new cabinet carried out immediately the dispatch of troops to southern French Indo-China as had been planned, thereby inviting the U. S. severance of economic relations with Japan. The cabinet, although deeply desirous of amicable relations between Japan and the United States, actually caused the relations to deteriorate more and more, eventually bringing about the economic severance between the two nations, a step just short of war. And my talk with Mr. Hull came to a halt with this and the subsequent pronouncements on his part.
I think now that what proved to be the insurmountable obstacles to friendly relations between the United States and Japan were: (1) the China Incident, (2) the Tripartite Alliance, and (3) the Advance of Japanese troops into southern French Indo- China. But it was only after the end of the War that I learned the whole truth, especially in connection with the following matters:
At the Imperial conference held on July 2, 1941, it was decided that in order to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere preparations should be made for a war with Great Britain and the United States; and that the structure for the southern advance would be strengthened even at the risk of an armed conflict with Great Britain and the United States. Hence the advance of troops into southern French Indo-China was planned by the second Konoye cabinet and was put into execution by the third Konoye cabinet, so that Konoye’s purpose in reorganizing his cabinet was discarded immediately, and by himself.
Therefore, after profound mental anguish, he made desperate efforts to ease this crisis even to the extent of trying to arrange a conference with President Roosevelt, who had always exhibited friendliness toward him, but this objective he could not attain. Konoye was opposed to a war against the United States, and moreover he had fully understood after deliberation with Admiral Yamamoto that in the case of war, even though our armed forces would be able to display activity with vigor at the earlier phase, the war would eventually be protracted and no probability of ultimate victory could be expected.
The resignation of the third Konoye cabinet was due to the difference of opinions between Konoye and Tojo. And the Navy at that time, in spite of its inherent opposition to a war against the United States, was still mindful of its public popularity. So instead of taking a resolute anti-war attitude, it evaded the responsibility of deciding between war or peace by putting it solely on the shoulders of Konoye. This also, it seems, strengthened Konoye’s intention of resigning. If at this critical moment Yamamoto had been in office as Navy Minister, he might have taken a determined attitude and the history of Japan might have taken a far different course. Or he might have been assassinated by the opposition party in that case.
The below mentioned matter, which also came to my knowledge only after the termination of hostilities, is also of great importance.
In the decision made by the Imperial conference held on September 6, 1941, are included the following:
1. The Empire of Japan should perfect the preparation for war by the latter part of October, with the determination not to shrink from a war with the United States (as well as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) in order to ensure the self existence and self-defense of the Empire.
2. Parallel with the above the Empire of Japan should try to obtain the demands of the Empire through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain, exhausting all diplomatic means for this purpose.
3. The Empire of Japan should determine to commence war at once on the United States (as well as on the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) in case by the beginning of October the negotiations should not have produced any prospect of obtaining the demands of the Empire.
At that time the Emperor looking with great disfavor on this plan, closely questioned Konoye on the matter one day before the Imperial conference. In accordance with Konoye’s advice the Emperor then summoned Sugiyama and Nagano in audience, with Konoye also present, and vehemently questioned them on the plan. All things considered, it was decided at the Imperial conference that primary importance should be attached to diplomacy; at the same time preparations for war were being made.
Nagano, my close friend, was a good- natured man who was well aware of the national potential of the United States. After my return home from the United States he told me that although he could not say definitely that Japan would be able to win the war, the situation had come to such a point as left no alternative but to resort to war. Even then there was criticism of his irresponsibility in consenting to begin the war without any prospect of victory.
At the Imperial conference held on December 1, commencement of the war against the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands was decided upon, and on that occasion Tojo made a general report to the Throne, and Togo made a report on the progress of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations.
It was not until the end of August, 1942, that I returned to Japan. As the war had broken out contrary to my intention, I thought that an ex post facto report need not be made immediately. But I submitted a written report to the Foreign Minister in lieu of an oral one. One day thereafter Togo held a customary garden party at his official residence. On that occasion he reminiscently told me in particular that before he was installed as Foreign Minister the foundation stones for the conflict had been laid, so that there was left no alternative but to take the course thus set.
The official document of the Japanese Government proposing severance of the negotiation was to be delivered to the U. S. Government at 1:00 P.M.., December 7, U. S. time, but it was delayed in preparation at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Therefore it was already 2:00 P.M.. when I reached the State Department and I interviewed Mr. Hull at 2:20 P.M. This delay was a matter of great regret to me. The Japanese government’s note, of course, had been drafted by the Foreign Office, and consultation had been made thereon with the military authorities. Although the Foreign Minister, I think, might not have been acquainted with the operational orders, he should, of course, have been fully aware of the general tendency of the situations to be brought about thereafter. However, in Washington nothing was known, and I myself became acquainted for the first time with the attack upon Pearl Harbor by the radio news.
In the battle of Midway the Japanese Navy lost the cream of its air force, and after that the change of tide in the war situation set in. By the time of the fall of Saipan the general war situations were settled unfavorably for us so that the Tojo cabinet was obliged to resign. The eight months of the Koiso’s administration after that appear to have been spent wastefully. In spite of the cabinet’s statement that all depended on the outcome of the struggle on Leyte, it was lost; Iwo Jima was occupied, and in April Okinawa was invaded, so that the Koiso cabinet collapsed. But the time was far from ripe for seeking peace.
The Suzuki cabinet after Koiso’s was regarded as a peace-making cabinet. Suzuki, steering the ship of state as if intending to continue the war on one hand while seeking peace on the other, led the nation to the termination of hostilities in obedience to His Majesty’s wishes.
Suzuki was a great man of noble-mindedness, sincerity, and loyalty who had already been beyond the problem of life or death.
The persons who did the most to save the Japanese people from utter ruin by disposing of the stupendous difficulties properly and thereby bringing about the termination of hostilities, were the Emperor and Suzuki.
I express my profound respect to those who paved the way to peace under the most difficult circumstances—circumstances whose difficulty I was well aware of in my capacity as liaison member.
After all, the Military Command’s independence of the civil government was the principal cancer of Japan. Militarism was born of this system. This blunder should be liquidated with a firm attitude, and never be repeated in the future.