I
Military air transport is periodically under attack in newspaper articles, congressional hearings, and even among military circles. These attacks are usually based on the grounds of economy or on the grounds of duplication and government competition to commercial carriers. It matters not that these two complaints are, in their final analysis, irrelevant to the basic justification of a military air transport. They are charges that find popular support, and reveal the general lack of appreciation for the role of air transport as a part of the armed services. It is easy to state that military air transport is uneconomical just as an army division at Camp Jackson is uneconomical on a holiday weekend; but when the division is fighting the Communist forces in Korea, and the Airlift is taking coal and food to the citizens of Berlin, both are bargains and more than worth every dollar spent. It is simple to admit to the charge of duplication or competition to commercial airlines by pointing out that military air transport duplicates and competes just as an army convoy of trucks and mobile field equipment duplicates and competes against the Greyhound Bus Line and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe; but transferred to the sands of North Africa, the charges of competition and duplication are forgotten. Such sententious replies, however, do not deter the critics who continue to make attacks which, if not met with a full defense, may well result in an impotent military air transport unable to support the strategic tasks of the armed services.
The strategic importance of military air transport is its justification. Frequent attempts have been made to compare costs with commercial airlines and to justify the air shipment of certain types of cargo. All of these are side issues and are likely to becloud the fundamental reasons why a strong military air transportation system is a necessity. In his testimony before the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, February 27, 1947, in regard to the cost of operating the Naval Air Transport Service, Admiral J. W. Reeves, Jr., U. S. Navy, stated, “... May I point out that while a knowledge of actual costs is essential, the justification for military air transport lies not in the lower cost but in the fact that it is a necessary preparation against future war. For that matter, this same reason is the justification, and the only one, for an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force.” Critics often contend that if the air transport organizations of the military did not exist, then the commercial airlines would be stimulated to expand to handle the traffic of the armed services, and at a lower cost to the taxpayer. Others complain that much of the cargo and passengers carried by military air transport does not rate air priority in the first place, citing the fact that a plane load of mattresses was shipped from the West coast to Honolulu only to remain months in the warehouse on arrival. This latter argument contradicts the first argument that military air transport cuts into the business of commercial airlines since if the traffic carried does not rate air priority then there would be no business for the airlines. Neither argument considers the all-important fact that we must have a military air transport force in being for wartime use, and that pilots must be trained just as the B-36 pilots and carrier pilots are trained, and that ground crews, support personnel, routes and facilities must be maintained in a high state of readiness for any emergency.
There is no attempt to belittle commercial airlines. A strong commercial air transport system is a vitally important national resource. Aside from the economic factors, it is used as an instrument of foreign policy. It assists in the development of isolated areas; it enhances the prestige and spreads the cultural influence of the nation; it facilitates intercourse with official representatives in foreign nations, permitting face to face consultations which have resulted in vital decisions to states and people. Commercial airlines will undoubtedly be of inestimable value in event of an emergency. But to depend on the airlines to furnish all the airlift required by a war emergency would be to disregard the lessons learned from the last war when military requirements stripped commercial operators of personnel and equipment, disrupting communications, transportation, and airline organizations without providing effective replacements for an extended period. The fact that military requirements were not even partially met during the transitional period and for several years thereafter only emphasizes the necessity for the military to have its own air transport force.
It must be recognized from the beginning that the greatest value of military air transport is realized in consideration of its relation to the strategic elements of time and space. The value increases as distances become greater and the time element receives more emphasis. For the United States, these distances are over vast expanses of oceans and, accordingly, principles of naval strategy are peculiarly applicable in evaluating military air transport. In showing how the elements of strategy of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan are supported by military air transport, a clear appreciation of its strategic importance can be realized.
II
Mahan believed foremost in the concentration of forces as a fundamental principle of all warfare. He emphasized communications, the “lines of movement by which a military body ... is kept in living connection with the national power” as the “most important single element in strategy, political or military.” And finally, he proclaimed the value of a central position or “a series of central positions connected with one another.” The establishment and maintenance of bases of operations (i.e., positions) along the avenues of approach provide this country with the “interior lines, shorter lines, by which to attack.” These are not exclusively elements of naval strategy. Jomini’s principles of war included them and Clausewitz laid particular stress on the element of concentration. These three elements, “concentration,” “communications,” and “position” are fundamental, and from these basics other strategical factors, such as the Japanese principle of surprise and Foch’s principles of economy of forces and freedom of action, are derived. It is noteworthy, however, that Mahan in emphasizing the greater benefit conferred by sea power over longer lines of communications has singled out the factor of distance, which most enhances the value of military air transport.
Take the first element, “concentration,” the problem of concentrating strength where the enemy is weak and preventing a similar concentration of the enemy against our forces. “Concentration” demands mobility. The essence of mobility is speed, and speed is the cardinal feature of air transportation. That is not to say that the entire concentration can be, or will be, accomplished by planes. That is to say that an earlier initial concentration of our forces at a critical position can be attained by means of military air lift. The war in Korea is a prime example. Stephen T. Early, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, said in a television program last summer, “It is the first time in history—as far as I know—that any nation has made a successful piecemeal commitment of its armed forces in the face of a moving, hard striking enemy army—and won the initial decision. I refer to the failure of the enemy to drive the American advance forces out of Korea. The Communists confidently expected to do this.
“It is not the style of action Americans would have chosen. Normally, we would mobilize a sufficient number of troops to do the job; we would back them up with all the supplies and guns and ammunition and airplanes and bombs that they would need. And then, when ready, we would go to work. That’s the way it happened in Normandy on D-Day.
“In Korea, that was not the case. When we spotted this invasion by the North Koreans as an all-out attack, we started to get out the American women and children. We ordered airplane cover and Navy convoy protection. And they got out safely.
“The President of the United States acted promptly. MacArthur never hesitated. A battalion of soldiers flew to South Korea, got out of their planes, and began to fight the Communist enemies of that little country.
“It was from this one battalion that the forces of today had to be built.* They have stopped the advance and gradually will win back the territory that has been lost to the Communists.” This early concentration of arms and men made possible initially by air transport enabled the United Nations to delay the enemy long enough to permit a larger concentration or build-up that enabled the U. N. forces to drive the North Koreans back to the very border of Manchuria.
Another example of concentration, this time of supplies in lieu of troops, is the logistic build-up for the Sicilian invasion. The victorious Allied armies of North Africa required outfitting for the expedition into the mountainous terrain of Sicily. New and different items of equipment were required. The delivery by air of many of these items contributed materially to enabling the Allied armies to meet the strategical timetable.
Again, there is the concentration of transport planes and flight and ground crews themselves. Within a period of 72 hours several transport squadrons of the Pacific Division of MATS were alerted, dispatched, and transported from Hickam Field in Hawaii to Weisbaden in Germany, to be immediately thrown into the big Berlin Airlift. This could not have been accomplished by using civilian transport planes.
This element of concentration cannot be over-emphasized. We cannot wait for a war emergency to begin thinking about building up an air transport organization. What would have happened if we hadn’t had an air transport force in being at the time of the Berlin blockade by Russia? By stripping our military air routes in the Pacific and other areas of the world, transport aircraft were thrown into the airlift. Pilots were already qualified and ground crews were already trained. This speedy concentration of air transport enabled us to win a clear cut victory in a cold war with Russia. What good are our war plans to reactivate bases, say, in the Aleutians, unless we are prepared to land a defense battalion at those bases quickly to hold them until they may be put back into wartime operation? What would have happened if MacArthur hadn’t had the air transport to deliver the first battalion to Korea?
In order to justify even a small military air transport organization, the argument has been advanced that it is necessary to maintain a nucleus of trained personnel in time of peace for expansion in time of war. But this argument overlooks the element of “concentration.” It’s like saying that we should man a destroyer with 100 trained regulars as a nucleus and call in the reserves to make up the complement in event of war. We need more than a nucleus, we need a force adequate to support all the initial requirements of each of the armed services. If the Strategic Air Command requires logistic airlift to support its plans for atomic bombing, these needs must be instantly met. If the Navy requires airlift to permit early concentration of a Marine landing force on, say, Wake Island, transport planes and trained crews must be available. If the Army requires troop carriers to permit a speedy concentration of assault troops at Korea, aircraft must be there to do the job.
III
Another Mahan element is “communications”—the lines of supply, reinforcements, and replenishments. Our communications lines are dictated by our strategy. That is one of the main reasons why our air lines of supply must be operated by the military. Sole dependence on commercial airlines ties the military establishment to operations along commercial air routes. Since military air routes extend to areas of combat operations, it is absolutely essential that the closest possible integration exist to permit effective control by the military.
The history of World War II furnishes many examples of the importance of military air transport in maintaining our lines of communications. When the Japanese had effectively blockaded China and cut off supplies on the old Burma Road, delivery was accomplished by air “over the hump.” The capacity of this airlift exceeded over four times the amount the old prewar Burma Road could deliver. “This was expensive transportation,” says Life: “AAF statisticians have not yet been able to compute the cost of landing a gallon of gasoline in China. Crossing the mighty Himalayas, many an airman went to his death—the final number killed was 850; planes lost amounted to 250. But the tonnage delivered was beyond the most fantastic dreams: 24,000 tons in August 1944, to 44,000 in the next January, to 69,365 in July, the last full month of war. The Hump was not the only operation which demonstrated that jungles and mountains are best conquered by air supply. In May, 1943, British Brigadier Orde Wingate, the fabulous onetime leader of guerrillas in Abyssinia, harassed the Japanese behind their lines in Burma for three months, almost entirely dependent on air supply. Lord Louis Mountbatten’s armies in Burma were furnished by air: 615,000 tons of cargo, 315,000 reinforcements flown in, 110,000 casualties flown out—the whole project divided about 60% American, 40% British. Nowhere else was the arrival of the age of air transport more conclusively proved.”
As pointed out before, the longer the distance, the greater is the benefit conferred by military air transport. The greater savings in time achieved by air transport can be a decisive factor in a strategical maneuver or a pending battle. There is no doubt that the swift delivery of shaped charges and super-bazookas direct from the factories over our air lines of “communications” to our “position” in Korea, in time to combat effectively the serious Communist tank threat against our forces, contributed tremendously to stopping the invaders and to turning the tide of battle in our favor.
Closely akin to the element of speed which makes air communication lines so important is frequency of service. The value of air transport in supporting Mahan’s element of communications is directly proportionate to the frequency of the flights. It matters little that the flight time from San Francisco to Tokyo is only 43 hours, if one spends days or weeks en route waiting for a flight. From the standpoint of personnel, the time saved by frequent scheduling of flights actually increases our manpower potential. It is elementary physics that a swift-moving flow of liquid through a small pipe will deliver as much as a slow-moving flow of liquid through a larger pipe. By applying this principle to the fast-moving flow provided by air transport, the diameter of the pipeline is lessened and we come up with a savings of manpower and supplies as a result. To illustrate, assume that 10% of a 500,000 man Navy is in transit filling the pipeline. That is 50,000 men non-available for the Navy. Of this 50,000, say 30,000 men, a reasonable estimate, are in or awaiting transit in the overseas pipeline. Since air transportation, counting stopovers, is roughly four (4) times as fast as surface transportation, then the size of the pipeline could be cut down to 7,500 men thus making 22,500 men available to the Navy. Assuming average overseas in-transit time by plane as 5 days, these 1,500 men per day could easily be handled by a fleet of 43 R5D’s. Although this is merely a hypothetical example, the increase in the effective manpower realized by this great savings, which is dead time otherwise lost via slower transportation systems, is quite real.
From the standpoint of supplies and spare parts, this service in communications makes its value felt in a different way. Along our strategic lines of communications we find depot and stock piles at our various bases (i.e., “positions”). An adequate stock is maintained to permit orderly replenishing by surface shipment; but critical or low usage items are handled differently. These are controlled at central depots and air shipments are made as needed. In other words, military air transport makes it possible to eliminate the necessity of keeping many items on hand, reduces the number of points at which certain items of supply must be stocked, and permits a flexible system of distribution of critical spares where most needed. Frequent flights are an important factor in this system of supply. Admiral Oscar C. Badger insisted upon maintaining a minimum of four flights a week from Guam into Tsingtao in 1948 when he had command of the Seventh Fleet at that base. He pointed out that any less frequent service would have made it mandatory to stock more spares and set up more elaborate repair facilities. Through regular and frequent flights he could rely on Guam to replenish his critical and low usage spares and to accomplish repairs to pieces of equipment beyond the capabilities of the ships’ forces.
Speed and frequency of flights are not the only factors supporting the element of communications. Tonnage is also important. The larger type aircraft such as the Boeing C-97 will carry five times the load of the old Douglas R5D. Although larger flight crews and more ground personnel are required, the C-97 will still lift approximately two and one-half times more for the same manpower effort expended in flight crews and ground personnel as the R5D. Where the efficient employment of manpower is a bottleneck, this clearly represents an effective increase. Operation “Vittles” pointed out the need for larger transport planes; the Pacific airlift to Korea has shown us its value. By employing big modern planes, together with the old World War II workhorse, the C-54, the Pacific airlift has grown bigger and bigger until in September it exceeded the Berlin Airlift by 10,000 plane miles per day. While Operations Vittles averaged about 240,000 plane miles per day, the Pacific airlift averaged in September about 250,000 plane miles per day. During that month, a four-engine transport plane was dispatched across the Pacific at a rate of one every hour and fifteen minutes. During the first three months of the Korean crisis, the Military Air Transport Service and its civilian contractors hauled nearly 8,000 tons of high priority cargo across the Pacific. This tonnage included almost 34,000 passengers—troop replacements or personnel with special skills. It is safe to contend that without this great trans-Pacific effort, our forces probably would have been still drawn up around Pusan at best,—and might even have been driven from the beachhead entirely.
These three factors—speed, frequency of flight, and airlift capabilities—are the yardsticks of air communications. Together with the number of planes, flight crews, and ground personnel available, they determine the maximum capacity of our military air routes. These capacities are limited and have always been less than the stated requirements of the three military services, even in peacetime. If our communication lines are to be effective in wartime, there must be a reservoir of aircraft and trained personnel available for quick mobilization. These reserves should be separate from the airlines whose organizations will then be working overtime also.
If the element of concentration demands a force in being, the element of communications demands a force in reserve. The continued emphasis on the air transport components in our Air Force and Navy reserve program is of vital consequence to our national strategy.
IV
The third Mahan element of “position” (i.e., islands or shore bases capable of being used as bases of operations) is supported by military air transport by eliminating personnel, supplies and facilities which would otherwise have been required in the absence of a reliable air line of communications. An excellent example of this is medical air evacuation. Medical air evacuation is using our lines of communications in reverse. It is a continuing process making possible the reduction in the number of hospitals which would be required to be maintained in forward areas or “positions.” It reduces the burden upon those who care for the sick and wounded, cuts down on time spent awaiting transport to base hospitals in the mainland, and most important creates a great morale booster and insures early and excellent medical treatment in rear echelon hospitals equipped to handle the cases. A very important effect is the material reduction of consumables in the form of food, clothing, etc., which would be required in the forward areas by the sick and wounded. The amount of savings in personnel, facilities and supplies which would otherwise be required for the care of the wounded in the theatre of operations is indicated by the fact that during the first three months of the Korean War, the Military Air Transport Service evacuated more than 4,400 medical patients from the Pacific theatre to the United States, and in the first four months of its existence, the Combat Cargo Command shuttling between Japan and Korea carried over 52,000 medical evacuees. Medical air evacuation to a large extent is “something for nothing,” since the main flow of personnel and material is to the forward areas, and space on otherwise empty returning planes is used for this function.
Let us go into the element of “positions” more deeply. Supplies and spare parts are tied up at three places in the passage from manufacturer to user: in main depots, in advance or field depots, and in the transportation pipeline. Advance depots call for construction of facilities at our geographical “positions.” Any reduction in the number of field depots or in the stock levels within them obviously enhances our ability to establish these strategic positions. Less men, money, facilities and supplies would be required in establishing and maintaining them. This reduction in the number and size of field depots is facilitated by the rapid means of transportation available by air, and permits expeditious logistic support of a great range of spare parts from the main depots at larger bases.
Excellent examples of how air transport supports the strategic element of “position” are our overseas military air routes to Alaska and along the Aleutian chain. Many of the bases are operated in a reduced status or inactivated completely, and the requirement for frequent air transportation to those bases to a large extent is justified by the necessity of maintaining the operational know-how over these routes to support any build-up of our positions in Alaska in emergency. The Military Air Transport Service maintains routes to our foreign treaty bases in some cases for no other reason than to support our potential positions there in case of war. If air traffic requirements are met along these routes, it is all well and good, but that is purely incidental. The maintenance of these routes from a strategic consideration is justified even if the aircraft are flown empty.
Under the present tensions existing in the world today the maintenance of strong active and potential “positions” along the periphery of the Communist heartland is of vital importance. This requires both a strong air transport force in being as well as a substantial reserve—the first to provide the initial concentration, the second to facilitate the build-up of power that will be required. If we ever hope to contain or contest the expansion of Stalinism, we must pose an ever present warning which cannot be ignored. The ability to land troops and equipment quickly by air at any of these critical positions definitely strengthens our strategy.
V
That our military air transport force is of great strategic value has been amply demonstrated by historical examples of World War II and of subsequent crises. That the force must be a force in being, backed up by strong reserves and ready for any sudden war emergency, has also been shown. But the extent of our strategic air transport force and the method of employment will depend on the overall political and military strategy of this nation and of Russia.
It is essential that our military air transport be adequate not only in numbers but in military configuration. The ability to provide initial concentration by air and to keep open our lines of communications under adverse conditions must be maintained at all costs. Infiltration may be accomplished in the air by enemy fighters as well as on the land or on the sea. Our air lines of communications must be protected. Ships move in convoys under the protection of destroyers and small escort carriers. Truck convoys are provided armored vehicles and armed detachments. On the other hand, provisions for protecting our transport planes are entirely lacking. While there have been instances during the last war where fighter cover was furnished to protect individual transports, they were isolated cases usually for the protection of high level military or political personages aboard. No protection has been afforded for strategic air transport either in the form of individual arming or organized fighter cover to protect a segment of the line of communications exposed to enemy interception. This is due to two causes.
First, our military air transport is a derivative of civilian airlines. At the present time the majority of the planes in our transport are R5D’s and C-54’s, military versions of the DC-4, aircraft that are obsolete and of a design that is 10 years old. Even the new transport aircraft being procured by the armed services today are adaptions of civilian types. Second, our air lines of communications have never been seriously threatened by the enemy. Such threats that did exist, such as in the “Hump” operation, were accepted under the doctrine of “calculated risk.” That the odds were in our favor is supported by the statistics. On the other hand, when Germany cut the Allies’ sea lines of communications with submarines and, incidentally, came near winning the war, the risks involved could not be accepted. A tremendous effort was exerted toward defeating the submarine menace. Improved weapons and new tactics were developed. Since our air lines of communications have not been disrupted, the incentive for developing weapons and tactics for the defense of air transports has been lacking.
Peripheral operations by our strategic air transport will require some measure of self-protection for the planes. They should be armed just as our tankers and supply ships are armed. The position of Germany, hemmed in on all sides by Allies possessing air superiority over its own territories, made such protection unnecessary during World War II. But there is no assurance that in future wars we will exercise command of the air in all theatres. Air superiority cannot always be attained, and protection for our transport planes must be afforded where the issue is in doubt. We should not overlook the fact that the decisive superiority of air and sea power possessed by the British disrupted Rommel’s supply and was the basic cause of his defeat at El Alamein. Enemy air power was forced increasingly to assume a defensive role or, in numerous cases, was diverted to transport service, carrying motor and aviation fuel to North Africa from bases in Crete and Greece. On Palm Sunday, 1943, over 50 Junker transports bringing troop reinforcements were shot down by Allied fighters. Some 150 enemy transport planes were shot down attempting to reinforce Von Arnim after the Mareth line breakthrough. Certainly the loss of Germany’s air line of communications was an important factor in the conquest of North Africa by the Allies.
We cannot limit our air transport operations to only those areas in which we have definite air superiority. In fact, the successful maintenance of our air lines of communications in the face of enemy action may be the prerequisite of establishing air superiority of our own. Today, we have no provisions for protecting our essential strategic air operation on any prolonged basis from interception in areas exposed to frequent fighter movement. This situation must be remedied.
Faster and heavier transport planes should be procured independently of commercial airlines in order to incorporate features required by the military purpose of the operations, such as long range to overfly vulnerable bases, the ability to operate from runways existing along the military routes to be served, the capacity to carry heavy equipment and the arming with guns or air to air missiles for defense against enemy fighters. These planes are needed now. It will be too late to wait for a war emergency to commence procurement. At such time all aviation industry will be tooled for combat types and we will be forced to enter the war with what we have—old and obsolete transports.
Since the war, essential strategic air transport requirements have been fulfilled with great difficulty. Operation Vittles and the great Pacific Airlift were accomplished at the expense of seriously weakening our military air routes in other parts of the world. The small size of our military air transport force has made it necessary to supplement the airlift to Korea with a large number of civilian contract carriers. If other strategic airlift demands are made, we will be unable to meet them with the present force. Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force stated, “When we look at the requirements for air transport in order to measure our capabilities in terms of available or planned transport planes, we find that the main requirements are the deployment of certain forces which are an absolute must to be put in position on D-Day. In addition to that, we have the normal requirements of the Military Air Transport Service, its Zone of the Interior requirements, the support of these Armed Forces units which need not all be deployed on D-Day, and the theatre requirements under existing plans. To this might well be added the requirements for the transport of certain ground troops and as much of their equipment as can be carried, as well as further requirements which might result from an increase in the deployment of United States forces in Europe. When we add these figures together and take into consideration our capabilities as of the present time, including not only the military planes available, but a practicable percentage of the civilian airliners which might be taken over in the event of war, we find a very substantial deficit.” *
The possibility of another all-out total war is an ever present threat. But more and more military leaders are beginning to realize the probability of a different type of war of a more limited scope. Clausewitz first suggested it and later Delbruck, the great German military historian, developed the distinction more fully. He called this limited war strategy, Ermattungsstrategie (the strategy of exhaustion). It is the type of strategy presently being conducted between the Communist nations on one side and the freedom-loving nations on the other. The war in Korea is just one phase of this strategy. Manpower and war resources available, the political aims of the countries involved and the threat of atomic warfare, all have effects in determining the nature of this political and military strategy. Moreover, leaders of all the major powers of the world have realized that no one really wins a war of devastation and annihilation. The size of our air transport should ever be adequate to support the Ermattungsstrategie.
Today, with the menace of Communist aggression hanging over free people, another “Korean Crisis” may develop in other sensitive spots of the world. The first military requirement is to reach these critical areas in the shortest possible time, to strengthen our strategic positions with a concentration of troops and material. After the initial concentration, reinforcement and replenishment of supplies must be brought in. In supporting these missions, a military air transport force is thoroughly justified.
Graduated from the Naval Academy in the class of 1936, Commander Amme served for 16 months in the Aleutians during 1942-1943 in VP 43 and as Commander Officer, VP 45. Later he was Operations Officer, Fleet Air Wing 14 and Multi-Engine Training Officer, ComFair West Coast Staff, in 1944. As Executive Officer, he put the U.S.S. Corregidor out of commission in 1946. He obtained his first taste of air transport operations as Commanding Officer, VR-8. Later, he went to the Staff, NATS Pacific Wing as Operation Officer, and when NATS and ATC merged in 1948, became Director, Plans and Operations, of the Pacific Division. He is at present Executive Officer, Naval Air Technical Training Unit, Olathe, Kansas.