Much of the spontaneous welcome everywhere given President Dutra of Brazil during his visit here a year ago was obviously motivated by a general appreciation of his country’s part in the recent world fight for freedom. Because of Hitler’s plans for Africa, most of us had been greatly relieved when Brazil placed her very strategic air and naval bases at our disposal. And long before that, materials from her industries and vast natural resources were being routed into anti-Axis arsenals. Later on, favorable first-hand impressions came from our men in Italy who made personal contacts with the Brazilians fighting there; while our air and naval personnel in the Caribbean and South Atlantic often worked side by side with Brazil’s to pronounce them serious workers and “regular guys.” Now and then, too, our public read censored dispatches concerning other Brazilian war activity, and so knew that a sizable job was being done by that nation in all fields.
However, in spite of laudatory compliments from President Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, President Truman, high admirals, and others in a position to know, not many of us are yet familiar with the important part the Brazilian Navy played in the overall war picture. In fact, many Brazilians themselves are still unaware of it. This is the result of strict war-time censorship, the assumed task’s usually monotonous routine, and the modesty of the Brazilian naval personnel. Yet without such wholehearted and laborious support the dates of many important victories would have occurred much later than they did.
Like most countries, Brazil was at first naturally confused by the pre-war appeasement attitude of the European Democracies. And to further complicate her local problem was the well organized Nazi group among her large Germanic population. There were also many Italian and Japanese blooded citizens sympathetic to the Axis cause. Nevertheless, even before committing herself officially, Brazil’s eventual direction of action loomed up clearly, particularly in the case of naval activity.
Intensified preparations began with the outbreak of fighting in Europe. The first step was the patrol of Brazilian coasts, and the expansion of naval technical abilities. Her fleet at that time consisted of 2 dreadnaught type battleships; 2 light cruisers; 10 destroyers (not all completed); 3 submarines; 12 corvettes; 10 auxiliary, mine, and river vessels. Additional craft were being completed abroad, but these were taken over by the various countries for their own use. Brazil’s merchant marine was sizable—305 vessels totalling 487,000 tons, which was increased to 652,000 tons before the end of 1941. Because many of these ships were carrying supplies destined for the Democracies, vicious, indiscriminate Axis attacks by submarine and air began as early as March, 1941. These increased sharply after Brazil severed Axis relations following the Pearl Harbor attack upon the United States. It was evidently realized by Germany that the recently signed American Defense Pact, Brazil’s traditional friendship with us, and her sympathy with the Democratic cause were but indications of her coming declaration of war, which occurred in August. Nevertheless the two nations were officially at peace until then, so the indiscriminate sinking of Brazilian ships, particularly in their own waters, was against the rules of war and decency. Besides small craft, 16 large vessels were brazenly torpedoed without warning that year previous to the declaration, some with heavy loss of life. One of these latter was a Brazilian transport merely carrying 700 soldiers between two Brazilian ports. Later on, passengers were sometimes machine gunned in the lifeboats, as in the case of the Itapage which sank in four minutes.
Brazil’s generally peaceful history—she gained her independence through evolution rather than revolution—probably had much to do with the degree of patriotic fervor that arose following her well-justified war declaration. Upon the call for specialists, for example, professional men even camped for three days in the streets of Rio de Janeiro waiting their turn to be signed-up and processed. A newspaper editorial summed up the general attitude in the statement, “We are in this war for liberty by the side of our American brothers as a great force dedicated to the defense of justice.”
Naval priority was at first given to the rushing of more troops and supplies to the new mainland and island bases along the northeast coast that bulged out toward Africa. This not only reduced the menace from a possible victory by Rommel over there, but also insured the failure of any coordinated local action in the area by Brazil’s Axis-blooded residents. It likewise prevented the establishment of hidden U-boat bases such as one previously discovered near the mouth of the Gurupi River. Before the end of the year even United States forces were operating at, or from, many of these bases. And for the sake of combat unity, the northern force of Brazil’s navy was voluntarily merged into the allied 4th Fleet. The principal base was at Recife (formerly Pernambuco), but numerous other ports helped out considerably. Brazil’s southern force, although smaller, also had a tremendous convoy and patrol job. It was based at Rio de Janeiro, where our vessels happening through that area were sometimes serviced.
Our lend-lease aid helped by the furnishing of equipment, supplies, capital, and technical knowledge for both combat and industrial use. By mid 1945 over $154,000,000 had been utilized under the plan, with much important raw material and finished products being sent us in return by Brazil. Brazilian naval officers and men were sent up here for instruction regarding the latest naval weapons and combat methods, and Brazilian vessels were outfitted with the best in anti-submarine devices. Eight destroyer escorts were permanently transferred by the United States to the Brazilian flag, along with eight sub-chasers, eight motor patrol-chasers, the transport Orzabo, and eventually other small craft. The naval shipyard at Rio de Janeiro was enlarged, and besides completing the 1940 class of Brazilian destroyers, it constructed three of our Fletcher class from plans and much material furnished by the United States.
Although Brazil had over 4,000 miles of her own coast line to guard, nevertheless on January 18, 1943, her war vessels extended their convoy duty another 1,500 miles northward to Trinidad, where many great convoys were made up. Most of the gasoline and oil used in the North African and Mediterranean campaigns were among the valuable cargoes escorted. Yet the raw materials coming north to the United States from the south were probably of still greater importance. Eventually all of the South Atlantic convoy duty was turned over to the Brazilian Navy, an act which relieved still other United States and British vessels for urgently needed service elsewhere.
Submarine attacks continued until even after the German capitulation, but the comparatively heavy losses experienced in the area early in the war were largely eliminated. The Brazilian Navy, alone and together with U.S. vessels in use at the start, guarded 3,167 ships in 614 convoys, totaling 16,500,000 tons—and this with a loss of not one-tenth of one per cent!
To further illustrate the importance of the task, here is the national distribution of the tonnage covered:
Ship Nationality |
Tonnage |
American |
6,884,823 |
Brazilian |
6,138,506 |
British |
1,618,299 |
Panamanian |
933,082 |
Norwegian |
301,500 |
Swedish |
233,008 |
Dutch |
140,538 |
Lithuanian |
77,350 |
Belgian |
73,976 |
Greek |
27,793 |
Yugoslavian |
16,601 |
Polish |
6,606 |
Egyptian |
8,969 |
Uruguayan |
8,268 |
Peruvian |
2,768 |
Little rest was allowed. Some Brazilian warships made 77 convoy trips, many over 60, and even the small sub-chasers over 40. In addition several destroyers twice escorted U.S. transports that carried the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to the Mediterranean. And' as usual, the life was grueling and laborious, particularly in bad weather. It was only luck and good seamanship that kept other small vessels from being capsized and lost in storms, as was the unfortunate little corvette Camaqud on July 21, 1944.
The Brazilian Navy Department reports that their vessels alone had 38 separate contacts with U-boats in 1943, (a contact being anything from a propeller sound to a torpedo attack), 14 in 1944, and 24 in 1945. The air forces did much to keep the number down, of course, but some credit for their work must in turn be given to the Brazilian Navy, for supplying those bases from which the planes operated. The accompanying map shows the locations of these contacts as well as the spots where Brazilian ships were sunk off South America. It well illustrates the fact that Brazil was far from being “on the sidelines” during the conflict. She had ship losses in other areas, too, with four of them being off New York, and one even in the Normandy Landing. Her naval warfare death list totals over 500 men.
Although but three warships and one auxiliary went down, one of them tops Brazilian naval tragedies. This was the cruiser Baía (usually anglicized' as Bahía) blown up July 5th, 1945—nearly two months after Germany surrendered. Although the cause may well have been a floating mine, the area was one frequented by German submarines; in fact, one turned up in Argentine two days later. Moreover the Brazilian destroyer Babilonga reported sound contacts in the same location a few days later, and after making six attacks with “mouse trap” and depth bombs reported that a dark object identified by some as a metal hull came to the surface momentarily, to be followed by air bubbles and a large slick. Of the 375 aboard the Baía, over half (including four of our own naval technicians) were lost. And many of the survivors were lucky to be picked up from rafts after days of tropic exposure so rigorous that many of their comrades had jumped overboard to welcome death by drowning.
At the time, like most Brazilian vessels, the Baía was on duty as part of the long line of beacon and rescue ships aiding the great airlift of U.S. troops from Europe, most of whom were destined for the war in the Pacific against Japan. This added naval activity had released over 25 more U.S. and British vessels for combat duty in the big “wind-up.”
In commenting upon the work of the Brazilian Navy, our Atlantic Fleet Commander, Admiral J. H. Ingram, who followed it very closely, said, “Brazil did nobly, and her help as an ally stands out in Brazilian- American relations.” He placed particular emphasis upon the exceptionally ready manner in which officers and personnel had undertaken every job during the war, no matter how much disagreeable labor was entailed; and he added that even the Brazilian press had not given sufficient recognition to the large task that had been so commendably accomplished. Other favorable comments by American and British national leaders are a matter of common record.
Being the largest, richest, and most populous country in South America, as well as having so many combat-experienced men, Brazil could easily have obtained a position of overwhelming fighting power down there after the war. However, she is by nature and tradition one of the world’s best neighbors, and so is content to maintain comparatively modest forces, with emphasis upon training.
Naval training is exceptionally thorough, and naval service is looked upon as a lifetime career. The officer training program consists of five steps, with admission based only upon minimum moral, intellectual, and physical requirements. It begins with a year’s general nautical course for all at the naval school. The candidates are then classified into the Naval Administration Corps, Marine Corps, or Naval (Line) Corps, for an additional one, two, or four year course, respectively. Practical training included shipboard service for the Naval and Administration groups, with Marine duty service for the other. After graduating from the school the young officer (2nd lieutenant, and then 1st lieutenant) is left alone for self-education during a definite period. In the auto-didactic stage he studies textbooks while gaining practical experience, and is subject to periodic examinations. As lieutenant-captains the Naval Corps men take a finishing course in armament, communication, hydrography, or machinery. Competitive examinations then admit some to the technical staff, and at a higher rank they attend the Naval War College.
The lower ratings usually come up from naval recruits sent to the naval apprenticeship schools. After a year there they join the Fleet as deckhands or cabin boys (“Grumetes”). Combined experience and textbook study follows before the “Cabo,” or petty officer, stage is reached. Then comes the petty officers finishing school which graduates the successful into 3rd naval sergeants. Further study and competitive examinations bring a warrant officership to some.
Of late it has been the practice of the Brazilian officer training vessel, Almirante Saldanha, to visit our east and west coasts upon alternate years. This vessel was especially built for training purposes (by Vickers Armstrong in England). She is large for a sailing vessel, being 307 feet long, and of 3,400 tons, with an exceptionally high freeboard. Auxiliary diesel engines give 1,400 horsepower, but she sometimes makes from 12 to 14 knots under sail alone. Her training armament ranges from a torpedo tube on through five types of guns. Besides a complement of 356 officers and men, including 31 spic-and-span red-coated Marines, she usually carries about 60 midshipmen.