At no time history have merchant vessels played so vital a role in the prosecution of a world-wide conflict as they did in the trying days of World War II. The significance of cargo shipping in the success of military movements, and its consequent relationship to national welfare and security, have never been underscored so heavily as this war.”1 And yet no one can accurately prescribe how puny these efforts may be when compared to what may be necessary in a future conflagration.
As Duncan S. Ballantine points out in the preface to his book, U. S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, the distinguishing feature of modern warfare is its inclusiveness. Two experiences of so-called “total war” within the first half of the present century have demonstrated that the military decision is not made upon the field of battle alone. Rather there now enter as major factors many elements of political, economic, psychological, and scientific character which previously were only of minor importance. Thus the capacity of a nation to wage a total war is a composite sum of many factors, of which national resources, industrial capacity, manpower, and transportation are but a few outstanding examples.
When viewed from a broader aspect, the science of warfare may be segregated into three more or less general yet distinct categories, namely, strategy, tactics, and logistics. When grouped in this manner, the many problems and considerations of ocean shipping naturally fall within the field of logistics. This phase, in turn, becomes one of the major components constituting logistical support.
As is perhaps well known, the word “logistics” is derived from the French “logistique,” and although initially its importance in a planned campaign was not fully appreciated, Napoleon gave classic expression to its meaning when he said, “An army marches on its stomach.” When expanded in the light of current international alliances, with the United States acting as the “Arsenal for Democracy,” ocean shipping becomes the prime mover in getting the supplies and materials from (lie source regions to the operational theatres of the combatant bellies.
Geographically, the United States is strategically and technically an island. It cannot be reached or even approached except on or over vast stretches of sea. This is true even in so far as our northern and southern neighbors arc concerned, for the approaches via Canada and Mexico involve long traverses of the sea. Consequently if the United States is to continue, peacefully or otherwise, to project supplies, equipment, and material to all those countries actively allied with our ideology of the Rights and Freedom of Mankind, maximum use will have to be made of the sea lanes radiating from our shores.
Furthermore, in spite of our vast resources, our untapped hinterland, and our somewhat nebulous “unlimited power,” the United States is economically dependent upon these same sea lanes for the receipt of strategic materials vitally necessary not only to our war-making capacity hut to our civilian economy as well. Two world wars have already cut heavily into this country’s supply of raw materials. While we are rich in natural resources, we are poor in tin, a primary requisite in engine bearings; in rubber, so vital to transport; in bauxite, basic in the manufacture of aluminum; and in other materials which, in time of emergency, become in premium demand but in short supply.
Thus our dependence on the sea as a medium of transportation of critical materials and the impedimenta with which to wage total war is a stark reality and not a propagandized peroration of maritime interests. Ocean shipping, in fact, becomes our Achilles heel when it is realized that it will take whole armadas of ships to accomplish the task of ocean transportation.
Our critical common denominator, logistically speaking, then reduces to a question of ships. Merchant ships! That vital component embodied in the generic term, “Sea Power,” and which, when interpreted properly, means we have the wherewithal to freely make use of the world’s seaways in any ocean or on any sea throughout the globe despite any enemy force opposing such use! It is that portion of our tangible sea power which is too frequently overlooked and too easily neglected and forgotten in peacetime, and without which we cannot utilize the waterways of the world either for access to the market places of the universe or for prosecution of our war aims.
To infer that modern warfare is a battle of supply is but to repeat a cliché already worn thin. However, there can be no denying the facts. There never were and never will be enough ships in wartime to satisfy all demands. During the last war it was a major battle to determine the percentage of shipping that could be allocated to the different theatres, operations, and commands. For instance, in the Pacific about 20 per cent of our shipping was reserved for civilian requirements. Another 30 per cent was allocated to supplying our Allies. The remaining 50 per cent was distributed to the various theatres by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In each area the portion of the shipping pie allotted to the military would then be further subdivided among the different operations either in progress or being staged. No, there never was enough shipping to go round, and consequently the effective control of that which was available became of paramount importance.
From the foregoing the significance of ocean shipping and its effective control can be surmised. It assumes an imposing stature, not only when viewed against the background of peacetime requirements, but also with respect to its wartime weight, consequence, and attendant mushroom growth. Effective centralized control becomes mandatory. It is believed that this was the underlying reason which last year prompted the Secretary of Defense to assign to the Navy the responsibility for the operation of sea transport for the Armed Services.
At first glance, the implementation of the above directive might appear to be a simple transitional process whereby the Navy gradually absorbs the responsibility and control of the ocean shipping now operated by the' Army. But, naturally, it is -not as simple an integration as all that; if for no other reason than the complex structure of the Navy’s bureau organizational system. In common with other departments of our Government, the growth and structure of the Navy Department has been a slow and evolutionary process, except during the white heat of national emergencies or actual war when the pressure of events demand and secure the obvious or necessary organizational changes even though only of a temporary nature.
The basic character of the Navy Department, extending backward for slightly over one hundred years, has been the bureau system. By an Act of Congress of 1842, five bureaus were created among which the business of the Department of the Navy was to be distributed in such manner as the Secretary should judge to be expedient and proper. The Act further provided that the duties of the said bureaus were to be performed under the Secretary of the Navy and that their orders were to be considered as emanating from him with attendant full force and effect as such. By law, the Chiefs of Bureaus, who normally were Naval officers, were responsible to and subordinate to the Secretary. Since the bureaus were established in mutual independence of each other, the power to coordinate their separate activities rested entirely in the hands of their superior, the Secretary of the Navy. Despite countless attempts to alter the fundamental form of the organization established by the law of 1842, it remains the basic legislation upon which the Navy Department is built. Virtually every one of the efforts to modify that structure has centered on two broad issues:
(1) The extent to which military requirements should govern the major policies and activities of the organization, and
(2) The nature of the agency that should determine these military requirements and exert military direction.
Ultimately, the necessary authority to formulate military requirements and exert military direction and policy supervision over the bureaus of the Navy Department was vested in and continues to be the prerogative of the Chief of Naval Operations.
With the foregoing as a necessarily brief background of the historical development of the Navy Department organization, it should be quite obvious that the business of transportation within the Navy would naturally fall into the bureau pattern of cognizance. Because it was charged with the procurement, warehousing, and distribution of all general supplies, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts became similarly charged with the responsibility for transportation of those supplies to the points of delivery or use. This involved assignment of the necessary contractual authority to that Bureau for the transportation by rail, by highway, and by commercial aircraft. Similarly, by an old regulation, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts was also charged with the responsibility for the chartering of commercial ships when such were required for the Navy’s use and for the transportation overseas in less-than-whole shiploads where commercial transportation had to be provided.
Because of its sole responsibility for the procurement, training, and distribution of Naval personnel, it was only natural, under the bureau pattern of organization, that the old Bureau of Navigation (later the Bureau of Naval Personnel) should be given the necessary authority to contract and arrange for passenger transportation by rail, highway, and air, and even overseas surface transportation where Navy-owned resources for that purpose were inadequate.
In a similar manner, the Marine Corps exercises authority over its own immediate requirements.
Intrinsically, then, it should be noted that no single agency in the Navy Department has complete functional authority and responsibility over all forms of transportation, either used by or controlled by the Navy. However; the Chief of Naval Operations has delegated the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Transportation) as the centralized point of coordination and direction of naval transportation activities. Under this directive the latter officer is specifically required to coordinate and direct the efforts of all Naval and Marine Corps activities delegated the responsibility for providing transportation of Naval personnel and material by highway, rail, and sea, in accordance with the requirements as determined by Chief of Naval Operations, and to coordinate transportation by air with other naval transportation activities; and to exercise this mission and objectives for the Naval Reserve in the same manner as, but separately from, the regular Naval Establishment.
These, then, are the administrative channels which the Chief of Naval Transportation Service used in conducting the business of ocean shipping. Consequently, as has been stated before, any acquisition of new business, not Navy, is not a simple absorption process. Rather it involves careful consideration and detailed analysis before the methods, procedures, and arrangements of operation can be integrated into existing channels funneling from a bureau structure. Once these problems have been resolved, the Navy will be in a much better position to direct and administer the employment of ocean shipping engaged in military operations than during the previous two wars, as may be readily seen from the following paragraphs.
During the past war the actual control of shipping suffered a painful growth which has been, temporarily at least, arrested. In the early phases of the struggle it soon became apparent that if the military shipping requirements were to be met, some means had to be found to bolster the efficiency and reliability of the ocean shipping engaged in direct support of the overseas forces of the United States. In short, two measures appeared to be mandatory: (1) closer supervision of the operational control; and (2) more effective control of personnel. Closer supervision of vessel employment would be reflected in less “turnaround” time, chiefly as a result of drastically reducing the “in-port” time. Hence, more trips per vessel and less backlog of cargo. A more effective control over the civilian personnel involved would reduce sailing delays incident to unscheduled personnel problems ashore. This in turn would stabilize convoy problems relative to makeup, departure, joining, rendezvousing, etc.
A still more pressing problem requiring immediate solution was the situation of having the Army and the Navy bidding against each other to obtain the ships which were in short supply but premium demand. Therefore, on the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President, in a letter to Chairman Land of the Maritime Commission, announced the creation of a Strategic Shipping Board. Acting under the supervision of the President and composed of Admiral Land, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, the Board was to establish policies for and plan the allocation of merchant shipping to meet military and civilian requirements, and to coordinate those activities of the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission. The actual operation of shipping was to remain in the hands of existing organizations.
The Strategic Shipping Board had a brief and uneventful career. By definition the Board had never been intended to act as an operating agency. Its primary purpose was the development and formulation of policy, but even in this sphere it was characterized by impotence either to prepare current policies or to execute such as it did originate. Its very inadequacy, however, produced some important results during its brief career. It demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that some strong central agency must be established through which policy could be enforced, operational control of shipping concentrated, and information on tonnage availability be maintained. Out of the welter of discussion which followed its first meeting and subsequent ineffectiveness, a concrete proposal was born to create an organization similar to the British Ministry of War Transport. This took tangible form in Executive Order No. 9054 of February 7, 1942, which set up the War Shipping Administration, with Admiral Land designated as the Administrator in addition to his duties as Chairman of the Maritime Commission.
Under the terms of the Executive Order the Shipping Administrator had now a clear mandate to act authoritatively within a certain sphere. Among his functions and duties he was to “control the operation, purchase, charter, requisition, and use of all ocean vessels under the flag or control of the United States with the exception of certain vessels of the merchant type already assigned to the Army and Navy.” He was also to allocate vessels under the flag or control of the United States for use by the Army, Navy, other Federal Departments and agencies, and the Government of the United Nations. The last-named functions naturally gave use to the necessity of yet another activity to correlate the relationships with the shipping interests of our Allies on a governmental level. The agency to perform that duty was quickly formed by the establishment of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and was divided into two administrative groups, one in Washington and the other in London.
Thus, after much travail, there was erected during World War II the framework of two organizations which remained essentially unchanged for the duration of the war—the War Shipping Administration and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. Both were wholly civilian in character. And in so far as can now be estimated, a similar high level agency will have to be employed to control the assignment of shipping in any future war.
The authority vested in the War Shipping Administration and the form of administration through which it would be exercised were by no means settled on February 7, 1942. For fully a year after its establishment the details of the system being put into effect by the War Shipping Administration provided one bone of contention after another. Both Army and Navy contended with considerable justification that in surrendering their control over shipping to a supreme civilian authority, they had been left unable to plan with certainty as to the availability of tonnage for undertaking specific operations. Both Services, therefore, at one time or another during the first year of war separately made strong bids to abolish the War Shipping Administration and establish their authority as supreme in the whole field of merchant vessel operation and control. These attacks were withstood successfully by the aggressive attitude of Admiral Land, who was wholeheartedly supported by the President in his defense of the principles upon which the War Shipping Administration has been founded.
In the ferment attending this controversy there was a leavening influence at work which eventually proved to be the catalyst for resolving all the major problems of conflict between the needs of the military services and the dominant authority of the War Shipping Administration. Under a charter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there had been formed early in 1942 a Joint Military Transportation Committee for the very necessary purpose of considering problems covering the whole field of transportation which might be referred to it, and of making appropriate recommendations thereon to the Chiefs of Staff. With the extension of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization to the Combined Chiefs of Staff there was, of course, a similar extension of the Joint Military Transportation Committee to the Combined Military Transportation Committee. The membership of the Joint Military Transportation Committee comprised senior representatives from the Naval Transportation Service for the Navy and from the Army Transport Service for the Army. To this regular membership were added associate members from the War Shipping Administration. In the frequent meetings of this Joint Committee and the subcommittees which were designated to study particular problems, there gradually grew a harmonious understanding of the requirements peculiar to each of the Military Services, and, as between those Services and the War Shipping Administration, a better appreciation of the broad aspects of the shipping situation and total availability of the various types of tonnage for meeting all demands.
Today a more comprehensive Joint Military Transportation Committee continues in the steps of its wartime predecessor. Its functions embrace the problems relative to the entire field of military land, sea, and air transport. However, in more than one sense it is better equipped to resolve the many considerations involved. Its organization is not only well established but has been altered and amended as necessary; many confirmed precedents are available, as well as proven procedures with which to tackle the problems contained on the Committee’s agenda; and a wealth of experience and “know how’’ remains fresh from World War II. Finally, in consonance with reorganizational views now predominant within the national government, definite coordination channels must be followed within the National Military Establishment and between other governmental agencies involved in considerations of transportation.
Relative to improving the general situation now pertaining to military ocean shipping and its control, a detailed and exhaustive study was made by the Army Transport Service, the Naval Transportation Service, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most effective means of implementing the Secretary of Defense’s directive to the Navy to assume responsibility thereof. As a result of these deliberations, there was established a Military Sea Transport Service under the Department of the Navy. Under the aegis of this agency, composed of members from the three Services as necessary, it was expected there would be established a skeletonized organization so constituted and streamlined as to resolve existing difficulties, to correlate future planned requirements and capabilities, and to permit rapid organizational expansion in order to quickly, efficiently, and effectively handle the military shipping contingencies of any future emergency.
The lessons of the past mean nothing if they are not recognized and digested in time to be of use in the future. Loose control of the ships in the pipeline of support is but one example. Static bottoms, either on berth at supply centers or temporarily diverted to a warehousing status in the off-loading ports, represent gross inefficiency in a system which is inherently and fundamentally dynamic. The more the in-port time can be reduced, the more expeditious the turn-around time and the less the mountain of supplies awaiting shipment overseas. Deductively, centralized control is essential, and this involves not only the expeditious scheduling and minimum in-port time but, in turn, it reaches back into the phasing of the flow of materials to the dockside as well. Proper timing, selection, and motion are essential to a properly phased flow of support. Detailed implementation of the many facets can only be accomplished as a result of complete control defined and executed from the center.
To attempt to fathom the future may well be a hopeless task. Nevertheless, in evaluating the probable organization which would be required to allocate and control shipping in the foreseeable future, we must bear in mind not only precedents and procedures already established but also organizational changes taking place. Perhaps the best estimate of any future wartime shipping organization would provide for a high level, perhaps civilian, governmental agency at the top of the pyramid whose chief function would be the allocation of existing tonnages in resolving total requirements, military and civilian, versus capabilities. This agency would perhaps be similar to the war Shipping Administration of World War II with an additional function of controlling all merchant shipping not specifically allocated to the military. This type of organization, however, would be identical to and no better than that which was in existence during World War II. Exactly as the shipping situations of 1917-1918 were not particularly comparable to those of 1941-1945, so, too, who can gainsay that those of 1951, 1961, or 1971 will not be totally different? Therefore, with respect not only to ocean shipping but also in regard to the entire field of transportation, a thorough reorganization appears mandatory if substantial progress is to be anticipated in the future. Improved performance, special unification for planning, and coordinated implementing measures are some of the significant features upon which this conclusion is predicated.
It is presented that the logical method of obtaining the reorganization contemplated above must begin on the national level by the establishment of a Department of Transportation. This department should gather up, regroup, and contain within its physical fold and jurisdiction all the multifarious and heterogeneous governmental units and agencies now dealing with transportation problems according to their own specific functions and commitments. To succeed, such a department must naturally be so constituted as to be all inclusive, and its jurisdiction and functions must be so defined as to insure that fundamentally it is capable of resolving its business to the best interests of the national welfare—not only now but especially during emergency conditions. With such an organization it would then be possible to control and direct the movements and actions of each of the composite units toward the best interests of the United States as a whole.
Systems, like people, are presumed to acquire stature and dignity with maturity. Consequently, the establishment of a Department of Transportation now, in relatively peaceful times, would obviate the hectic reorganization and Topsy-like growth so familiar in wartimes. War on so vast a scale as may be contemplated in the future inherently demands long range planning of the highest order. This, in turn, requires complete coordination and closest liaison on a national and, perhaps, an international level. Finally, its execution requires split- second timing and phasing if the remainder of the National Defense Mobilization Plans are to be properly executed. These should be cogent reasons for reorganization.
It is not the intent nor the purpose of this article to go into the details of the organizational features involved; that is, whether the Department should be confined to a policy and procedure level or whether it should enter the operational field. Suffice it to say that, in so far as ocean shipping is concerned, there would undoubtedly be a Division within the Department devoted to “Ocean Shipping” or “Sea Transport.” Within this division the Military Sea Transport Service would either have direct representation or appropriate liaison. It would be within this portion of the Department that the coordination and resolution of ocean shipping matters involving the military and the civilian requirements would be resolved.
The employment and control of the shipping allocated to the military, and not subsequently assigned to the Fleet and Service Force Commanders, would be exercised under the over-all supervision and administration of a Military Sea Transport Service in the Department of the Navy. The various problems arising within the National Military Establishment would, in turn, be resolved by the Joint Military Transportation Committee. Representation for additional tonnage to meet requirements and inter-governmental agency matters would follow channels through the Department of Transportation.
In any future war, in addition to the organic requisites of land and air power, it should be recognized that to defend our country we must control the seas; but to win wars, we must intelligently and effectively utilize the seaways. In the words of Vice Admiral R. It. Carney, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), “The bulk of the world’s trade must still be carried in ships, and ships must now be able to survive new perils. We cannot ignore the sea, nor can we by-pass it. We have won it, humanity will need it for generations to come, and we must keep it. We must resist every effort to belittle its importance, and we must seek continually for new ways to convert the seas to our use and security needs.”
The opinions or assertions contained herein are the private ones of the author and arc not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.
1. Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman, U. S. Maritime Commission.