I
The Japanese Chief of Police bowed to the two American officers and, according to the Japanese code of politeness, asked them to be honorably seated in upholstered armchairs.
It was September 27, 1945, and Military Government was to be set up in the city of Himeji, Hyogo Ken (prefecture), on the main Japanese island of Honshu. The armed officers, one Army and one Navy, represented the joint planning and training that characterized the occupation of the country. The 33rd Infantry Division had landed two days before on the beach of Wakayama in battle order. Some 3,000 troops were in the process of taking over Himeji and vicinity.
The Military Government officers explained that their mission was to aid the troops in carrying out the de-militarization of Japan. They would also procure, according to authorized procedure, materials and labor that the troops needed from Japanese sources. In general, they would act as liaison between the troops on the one hand, and Japanese officialdom and citizenry on the other hand.
To start, the American officers desired rooms for their duties in the police station. Good buildings, conveniently located, in that bomb-shattered city were scarce.
The police chief seemed either slow to comprehend, indecisive, or uncooperative. Apparently he was unwilling to give up any rooms, as he had received no word from his higher echelon as to the establishment of a military government office in police headquarters. However, he would try to telephone the prefectural governor in Kobe, forty miles distant. The result of the phone call was both gratifying and illuminating. The police chief would be glad to provide any rooms needed, including his own!
This incident was our official introduction to Himeji, a city representative of a cross section of Japan. By getting the cooperation of the police, Military Government was successfully launched. Police functions in Japan far out-range and are more powerful than those held by American police. Anybody who has spent a few days in Japan has been made aware of that fact. Students of American Military Government schools had drilled into them that immediately upon entering a Japanese town they must get hold of the head of the police force.
As might be expected of police, given wide powers in a country of few democratic traditions, they are strict if not ruthless masters of the ordinary citizens while, at the same time, humble servants of their superiors. Americans were not their superiors before the war, hence the about face. This factor has played one of the greatest parts in the U. S. occupation of Japan. The Japanese Police provided an excellent, ready-made tool for our use. And the Japanese people have suffered no ill effects from our policy. We have used the Police to accomplish our legitimate aims, guaranteed by the surrender instrument. At the same time we have granted the Japanese people freedom of speech, of assembly, of religion, and of increased power to labor. An effort is being made to democratize the police. Supervision over or curbing some of their dictatorial powers has been instituted.
For instance, the notorious Thought Department of the national police organization was immediately abolished by General MacArthur. No longer does the Japanese Government suppress criticism, political dissent, and opposition groups. No longer do the police supervise public meetings and activities of political parties. Formerly Factory Police sought to promote harmony throughout industry by encouraging paternalism on the part of employers (which system, we must admit, had some good features in hard times), discouraging labor organizations and settling labor disputes. Nowadays, labor unions are permitted and Japanese police cannot intervene in labor matters except to restore law and order. Instead, arbitration boards, representing contending interests, and under direction of prefectural governors, have been set up. Our forces reserve the right to take action if production or transportation vital to our needs is disrupted.
One incident that occurred in our area I set down to illustrate the cooperation of the police. We had received a letter of complaint about a so-called auxiliary police-force (the “Ichinomigumi”), composed of a few ordinary citizens, certain members of which were alleged to be intimidating other citizens into making payments to them in order to avoid being reported for having hoarded goods. Furthermore, the auxiliary policemen were alleged to be receiving extra rations of rice—- a particular sore spot to Japanese. The office wrote to the police chief of Sasayama, some forty-five miles distant, asking him to explain in writing within a fixed time the accuracy of the allegations. A characteristic attitude of the police towards American Military Government was thereupon revealed. Before the time limit was up the chief and assistant chief appeared in person at the office with a written report. The chief explained that the auxiliary police had been allowed in his district to combat robberies of foodstuffs committed by a sudden advent of city dwellers into the country. He admitted that the force in question was not provided for by the Japanese law. He opined that it had outlived its usefulness, but considered about half of his district still desired it. He would be grateful if the Military Government Office would direct him what to do. The MGO explained that the occupation forces depended upon the regular police force to maintain law and order; extra-legal bodies exercising law enforcement tended to become undisciplined and irresponsible. The chief immediately decided to abolish the auxiliary force, and departed with an invitation to visit him some weekend.
Judging from my own experience, and knowledge derived from Allied sources in wide-spread parts of Japan, the Japanese police have maintained creditable law and order—this despite the fact that they are not so well armed as before our arrival. Crime waves, if such there are, have not assumed alarming proportions. Of course, black- market operations are serious problems. But the predicted food riots have not materialized. Of course, it devolves upon our troops to suppress riots. However, our initial occupation forces were small and have since become whittled down to skeleton units by redeployment to the United States. As one Army officer expressed it, “With our troops spread so thin, we are representatives of the United States, not an occupation army.”
It has been estimated that the total Japanese police force numbers about 75,000—approximately one to each 1,000 population. But the main strength of the police is the character of the Japanese. They are respectfully obedient to constituted authority. And the Police have the symbol of the Emperor to back them up. All police stations have the chrysanthemum insignia of the Emperor at their entrance. (The national police force described above is not to be confused with the “Kempeitai”-—military police which was demobilized upon our landing.)
It should be noted, however, that the autocratic power of the police has an element of weakness. If the police were too severe in any district, democratic ideas may excite some form of rebellion against them. To cite an isolated case, in one small town the police chief was frankly worried about “incidents” occurring when a small occupation unit moved out. Yet so far as I know no violence has materialized in that section. On the other hand, the police (as well as the citizenry) have a potential power they hold back due to respect for our forces. The Korean and Chinese population in Japan have tended to form a disorderly minority, to the annoyance of both the Japanese police and our forces. Granted, a natural resentment due to past treatment inspires some violent conduct. However, there have been too many instances of Chinese and Korean “racketeers” profiting from the present-day leniency of the Japanese towards nationals of “subject” or “allied” powers. The Japanese by mere weight of numbers could “take care of” the above-mentioned races, but have acted with marked self-restraint. It has been well- established that the so-called Korean police force (sometimes known as the Self-Defense Corps) could not be controlled. SCAP ordered it dissolved. Reliance for order now rests entirely with the Occupation Forces and Japanese police.
II
Hyogo—A Cross Section of Japan
To state that as goes Hyogo Ken, so go all the prefectures would be to over-simplify this analysis. However, on the main islands of Japan all the people are of the same race, speak the same language, and have the same psychological make-up.
A few words will illustrate this representative cross section of Japan. In 1940 the population of the four main islands of Japan was 73 millions, with the majority living on the Pacific side of Honshu, and on the parts of Honshu and Kyushu bordering the Inland Sea. Within these areas are located six metropolitan centers (including Kobe, capital of Hyogo) with a total population of over 14 millions. In recent years Hyogo Ken (population 3,132,000) has ranked fourth most populous and within the top ten in rice production of the 47 prefectures. The total area of Hyogo Ken is 832,285 square kilometres. It stretches from the famous Inland Sea on the south to the cloudy Sea of Japan on the north. A ken compares roughly to a state in America.
When military government was set up in Himeji, the city had a population of around 90,000; but by April, 1946, with the amalgamation of smaller neighboring cities and towns, Greater Himeji had reached a population of about 200,000.
Himeji is situated in an area where considerable industrial activity took place until American bombings on June 22, July 3, and the beginning of August, 1945. The district was an important producer of pig iron, steel products (50 percent of platings for commercial ships), silk spinning, salt, bombs, and aircraft, besides a wide variety of other industries.
The demilitarization program of the U. S. Armed Forces and the vagueness of the Japanese Government instructions acted to halt production of most industries having war-making potentiality. Under the circumstances, the Military Government Office aided the occupation forces in inspecting plants as well as interpreting the intent of SCAP directives. Consideration was given to appeals of Japanese concerns to reconvert to essential peacetime production or to obtain facilities to carry on legitimate operations. The Himeji MGO had brought to the attention of U.S. Army units in its district petitions from the Agriculture Section of the Hyogo Ken Government relative to the use of former Japanese Army areas as farm land. The petitions had been approved in all instances by the 33rd Division when they did not interfere with its occupation mission or normal training needs. An important principle of policy formulated by SCAP was to encourage increased food production by the Japanese while at the same time forbidding our troops to procure native foodstocks.
The Himeji Military Government Office was maintained from September 27, 1945, to July 10, 1946, with a varied staff of from one to two officers, two to four enlisted men, and one to two Japanese interpreters. Its commanding officer until March 5th was Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas D. Lamorte of Bronx, N. Y., formerly of the 27th Division. He was succeeded by his assistant, the author. The office functioned under the liberal supervision of the 31st Military Government Headquarters and Headquarters Company in Kobe.
At times, acting under orders of the commanding officer of the zone, the Himeji MGO had to assume jurisdiction in certain matters over a population of 2,101,800—equivalent to the entire Hyogo prefecture minus the cities of Kobe and Nishinomiya. These matters would include aspects of public safety and health, education, re-conversion of industry, and emergency requirements. A case in point was the running off of the elections for the Diet (Parliament) in April of last year. It was intended to make the election the most democratic Japan had ever had. Accordingly, the zone commander announced in newspapers that complaints in Hyogo Ken, outside of Kobe, should be referred to the Himeji MGO. Owing largely to the efficient planning beforehand of the Government Section of SCAP in Tokyo, complaints were surprisingly few. One complaint seriously offered by a candidate was that his placards were not being posted due to workers eating the paste (a by-product of the all-important rice). The election, it might be mentioned, voted into office many women Diet members for the first time, helping Japan along the road to democracy and reducing its sword-rattling proclivities.
III
Demilitarization Had Its Pains and Pleasures
Within the specified areas of Hyogo Ken, military government assisted tactical forces in the demilitarization program. Broadly speaking, this entailed inspection of all property of the Japanese Army and Navy. Our tactical forces had the responsibility of determining, first, if such goods were to be seized for their own use; second, if the materiel should be destroyed; third, if the property was susceptible to civilian peace-time use. If goods fell into the third category they would be released to the Japanese Home Ministry for equitable distribution among the population.
Property to be destroyed posed a more delicate problem. Ammunition in Hyogo Ken was disposed of by hauling it out to sea and dumping. Since it was axiomatic that American lives had to be protected as far as possible, Military Government obtained Japanese labor and transportation facilities. American tactical forces supervised. Naturally the work was not popular among the unskilled natives, but never did force have to be employed to get the necessary labor. Some three explosions occurred during this arduous work in Hyogo Ken and claimed a score of casualties. One American soldier was severely injured through rushing back into flames to aid disabled Nip workers. In retrospect, it is probable that destruction should have been carried out by Japanese armed forces themselves before they were demobilized. However, we had no way of being sure during the planning stage that Japanese soldiers would be docile.
From a viewpoint of demilitarization problems, Hyogo Ken was fairly representative of most Japanese prefectures. Within its boundaries were Army and Navy installations, arsenals, supply dumps, and laboratories. Caves honeycombed many sections of isolated countrysides. Places to be inspected— designated as “targets”—were provided SCAP by central Japanese agencies of the armed forces. Patrols of American soldiers led by junior officers would proceed to the targets in the course of reconnoitering specified areas. At the targets the senior Japanese officer would be present together with a few guards- Even a Japanese Army colonel or Navy captain would first salute an American second lieutenant. A complete inventory of the property, in English and Japanese, would have been prepared beforehand to be given to the U.S. officer. I have been told by one junior American Army officer that he ascertained that a high-ranking Japanese naval officer was holding back important information about stores. He threatened to shoot the Japanese (a threat he had no intention of executing), whereupon he got the desired data. In the early days of occupation some Nipponese naval officers wanted to tender Americans a sort of swan-song party at which they could wear their uniforms with all insignia for the last time.
To ensure a complete reconnoitering of a given area the cooperation of the local police chief would be asked. A common occurrence was for the police to invite the American patrol to a “humble” banquet at which Geisha girls might be present to keep beer and sake cups full. Here we find the vanquished in a bloody war taking pleasure in entertaining the victors. Such a phenomena could probably occur only in Japan. To analyze the reasons for such peculiar behavior is interesting. It would seem that the central Japanese Government passed down the order or suggestion throughout the nation that occupation forces were to be considered guests of the country. Moreover, Japanese have always had a combined respect and liking for Americans (believe it or not) which war propaganda has not eradicated. Furthermore, although not realized by Americans who have not lived in Japan, the Nipponese like parties, largely as a release from so many formal restraints in their normal life. Therefore they have enough excuses, if not reasons, for entertaining U.S. forces. One American lieutenant was told by a Japanese police chief who happened to be at another chief’s party, “Wait till you come to my district and I’ll give you a better party than this one.” As a general principle, if Americans accepted an invitation it was only at the end of their mission.
The suspicion might arise that by this means the Japanese can soft-soap and hoodwink our forces. Naturally, the “guests” should have their ears to the ground—-but not under the table. It has been my experience that the use of this device to withhold information is rarely resorted to by the police. Secret caches of military supplies, usually petroleum products, have been uncovered, it is true. Investigation has revealed that certain small cliques of Japanese army and navy officers in collusion with firms or black-marketeers wrongfully diverted the goods just after the surrender in order to realize a profit.
IV
Can You Trust the Japanese?
Constant appeals for a wide variety of services by both Americans and Japanese combined with mutual misunderstandings created many problems.
At times some members of the occupation forces thought they saw sinister or impudent motives underlying certain Japanese actions. For example, all police stations of the prefecture were directed to furnish a list of hospitals in their districts. One officer tore into a police chief because he had not reported a hospital right across from his station. The Japanese had acted in the belief that the U.S. troops were not interested in a Japanese physician’s private residence where a handful of bed-ridden patients were confined to mattresses on the floor, even though the Japanese called it a hospital.
In certain cases GI’s complained that the Japanese knew what was wanted, but acted dumb. Undoubtedly this charge has some basis in fact. It is hard to prove, but nevertheless it tends to arouse the old suspicion of their duplicity. Whatever the truth of the matter, the following incident proved a boomerang to the Japanese involved. Two U.S. Army units in Himeji paid in advance a newspaper dealer for a month’s subscription to an English edition of a Japanese daily. After the month was up, the paper was still being delivered. Finally the dealer presented another bill of sizeable amount. When told the extra papers had not been contracted for, the dealer stated that the Japanese custom was to continue delivery unless there was notice to the contrary. The units did not pay the bill.
Confusion was sometimes caused by a native ascribing certain promises or orders to a service man who had returned to the United States. If no standard papers could be produced, or if the alleged American’s colleagues or successors had no knowledge of the matter, the situation was somewhat akin to a judge who must make a decision on a case with no evidence before him. There are Japanese claims totaling thousands of yen rejected or held up because of this point. They constitute a very small per cent of the total. In general, the Japanese receive payment through a fair procurement system. On the other hand, I have known a few cases where GI’s seized property unheedful of the regular procurement method. As a receipt one scribbled on a piece of paper, “John Doe, FBI.” Such instances were not condoned and were investigated by MGO, unit commanders, and MP detachments.
It was well established that many Japanese laborers would loaf on the job if left alone. In some extenuation, a subnormal diet diminished the incentive and strength for strenuous work. Moreover, it was determined that a few laborers well supervised could do more than an undirected mob. One hard-boiled visionary American officer once ordered the MGO to get 500 laborers for work early the next morning. With difficulty the number was obtained. Then it was found that only half the laborers could be used. As might be expected, the real headache was to procure permanent skilled workers. Due to Japan’s crucial housing shortage, private contractors would pay higher wages than those rates fixed for carpenters, plumbers, and electricians by U.S. Army headquarters in Tokyo. For big jobs, therefore, U.S. Army units would arrange with contractors to supply skilled laborers en bloc rather than to hunt everywhere digging up individual workers.
Petty larceny by male laborers was an almost ceaseless annoyance. Prior to the war, foreign residents could leave their homes unlocked, without worry. But to the Nips in their present hard times it must have seemed that the GI’s were bringing in huge supplies of cigarettes, chocolates, sugar, and wool socks. Surely they would not miss a few items here and there. The temptation was too great. In this connection, in the spring of 1946 the 24th Division set up its own Provost courts in the area to try offenses against the occupation forces. Previously the Japanese courts had been trying such cases according to Japanese law, but with some coaching from the American side-line. Upon setting up our courts, some Japanese offenders benefited from certain features of American law. The Nipponese judiciary learned that there is such a thing as a suspended sentence. Therefore, the youthful thief of a chocolate bar could be set free instead of being sent to a juvenile prison to be “reformed.” On the other hand, American provost courts had the advantage of being tough when circumstances demanded it, and the salutary effect of serving notice to the Japanese that no offense could be forgotten. Those adjudged guilty were turned over to Japanese penal institutions. A lieutenant colonel of the 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, took steps to insure humane treatment of prisoners he had sentenced. He directed prison officials to avoid overcrowding inmates and to allow them a certain time outdoors for exercise. Japanese penology apparently has always been based on the theory that harsh treatment of prisoners will reduce tendencies to crime. Certain features of the system Occidentals can hardly understand, although it may make sense to the Japanese. For instance, the practice is still continued of making a group of prisoners squat on their legs for a considerable time, just staring into space, with talking prohibited.
It is interesting to remark that the mild demeanored Japanese female workers were easy to control in every way. Their happiness in a new-found freedom in working for easygoing GI’s was obvious.
Upon receiving one benefit, certain business firms, hospitals, and schools would immediately request another. Besides being caused by greed, such situations were largely due to a real lack of supplies of all kinds. For example, a dry-cleaning establishment was glad to get a contract with the occupation forces, but then pointed out it had no fluid. Could MGO get it gasoline or benzol?
The expression prevails in mercantile circles, “caveat emptor”—let the buyer beware. As pointed out before, you “have to be on the ball” in dealing with the Japanese.
How would the above line of reasoning apply to the police? Good results were obtained if the police were instructed to ask questions at once in case they did not understand the exact meaning of a request for information or action. Furthermore, in case of doubt the police were to furnish more information than they thought was needed. It might seem that the latter instruction was drafted by Simon Legree, but the answer is found in the nature of the Japanese. They are inquisitive and thorough in the collection of information and statistics of all kinds. Americans before the war were amazed by the never-ceasing diligence of the police in adding data to their records. Even in a little station some “junsa" (polite word for cop) was always writing something in his book.
V
Respect Begets Friendship
A cardinal point in the over-all plan of General MacArthur’s headquarters is that the actions of the occupation forces will be such as to gain the confidence and respect of the Japanese. By this course not only is day to day cooperation secured but seeds of enmity for a future war are removed. Psychologists may find that the Japanese people have transferred some of their respect and veneration from the Emperor to MacArthur himself. America had the respect of Japan before the war. We still command that respect despite a small minority of our forces who have been called “high school commandos.” These youths, too young to have been in combat, feel that they can indulge in looting and violence to collect the fruits of victory.
What has been learned during the occupation? Without reflection on our foreign policy or personnel it seems hardly necessary to debate that our occupation of Japan has been more successful than that of Germany. Yet some experts held at the start that in many respects our problems in Japan would be more complex than in Germany, and that without an exact plan carefully followed our occupation difficulties would be more difficult than anticipated.
I have witnessed spontaneous good-will send-offs to our troops. Even more surprising is the petition by the Himeji assembly and other civic bodies that U.S. troops remain in the locality indefinitely. Dated June 25, 1946, upon the departure of 24th Division troop's, which succeeded the 33rd Division, it is addressed to practically anyone in authority who would listen—to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the Military Government Section of the 8th Army, and the 25th Division, the latter unit being the one logically located to come into Himeji if any unit did. To catch its full spirit it is reproduced in its Japanese English:
Petition for Continual Garrisoning of the U.S. Occupation Forces in Himeji Area.
In the outset, we, representing 200,000 citizens of Himeji, beg hereby to express our heartfelt appreciation for your kindnesses shown us since the 33rd Division advanced here on September 25th, 1945.
About that time, the bottomless disappointment and apprehensions of. the social situations brought about after the non-conditioned surrender by our country, were entertained by all the Japanese, young & old, not only in Himeji but in all parts of Japan, driving them into the pit of despair and loss of hope in future. Demagogues and false rumors then prevailed in Japan, however, have been melted away just like snow before the sun, since the arrival of the Occupation Forces. We did find out what the U.S. personnel are in their everyday attitudes towards the citizens.
It was only from that time on that the citizens of Himeji in collapse condition in the vast bombed area were brought to consciousness and encouraged to try their utmost efforts to their reconstruction work. . . . We have the pleasure to report you that their kind instruction and advice incessantly given us on Education, Economic, thought and others have resulted our reconstruction. In the meantime, we cannot express our appreciation too much, for the kind efforts made for us by the Army in order to maintain the peace and order in this area. It is no doubt that our present status could not have been attained without these efforts by the Occupation Forces. We were earnestly desirous that the U.S. Army would stay here with us as long as possible—till their withdrawal from Japan, if possible.
To our great surprise and regret, the U.S. Army units, the very hope of our citizens, are reportedly moving out from this area, recently. Citizens are now strongly requesting us everyday to submit the petition to the SCAP through the necessary channels for their continual stay in Himeji, deploring that their loss in this area seems to the citizens, travelling as it were, in the pitch- dark night way without any light with them.
We hereby again beg to request the garrison of the U.S. Occupation Forces for the benefit of this area.
It is evident that the presence of our forces is desired for more than bonds of affection. The troops have given employment to large numbers of_ Japanese. They have bought many supplies from native dealers—which supplies incidentally are to be paid for by the Japanese Government, the same costs to be subtracted from the reparations due us. Furthermore, the Japanese are stunned by their disaster. The government is in the process of recovering from paralysis. Due to lack of essential supplies, the government requires certificate after certificate before firms can get the means to operate. The occupation forces have the power to help desirable firms to get going.
I have been assured numberless times by Japanese that they hold no animosity due to presence of American or British troops, but that fear is held for occupancy by Russian or Chinese troops. American officers who have had censorship duties have found general respect for our troops. If the question of fraternization arises, it will be relatively unimportant. That Japan never again becomes a threat to the peace of the world is of primary importance. Japanese have told me they bear no resentment against Americans for the bombing of their country. The masses remember Pearl Harbor and realize that both America and Japan were betrayed by Japanese military autocracy. Whenever I critized Japanese customs or institutions over there, I always found eager listeners. Remarking once upon the fact that the Japanese never defended their system or criticized America, an intelligent Japanese observed that they realized they were beaten and had a decided inferiority complex.
It is possible to argue that the Japanese may be polite students of the best features of our government and science while awaiting a future day of victory. That risk must be avoided by proper supervision for years to come. Native teachers realize their responsibility in shaping the new Japan. They indicate a willingness to abide by SCAP directives. They are glad to be free of the officiousness of strutting army officers who were formerly attached to schools. Much work remains to be done in encouragement of free discussion and development of individuality among students. This factor was emphasized in the March 30, 1946, report of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan.
It is easy to reach the conclusion that the Japanese will torture us or treat us over-kindly. Such a summation is hasty over- generalization. The strong and conflicting reactions of the Japanese temperament are neatly summed up by Professor George Trumball Ladd, late Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy, Yale University, writing on “Mental Characteristics of the Japanese” in the 1943 edition of the Encyclopedia Americana:
Nowhere else in the world’s history have there been more notable examples of supreme self- sacrificing devotion to persons and to a chosen cause. On the other hand, ... a certain instability . . . , often amounting to fickleness, and a tendency to reverse movement, to change opinion, parties and sides, even to entertain contradictory plans and purposes characterize the sentimental temperament. In this way must we account for the extremely puzzling nature, to a man of different race temperament and of Occidental culture, of many of the mental characteristics and of much of the conduct of the Japanese people.
A pre-war residence in the Japanese Empire of over three years as a consular official gave me the feeling that Japan, like any other nation, was composed of good, bad, and indifferent people. I further considered that millions of innocent (and dumb) people were being led down the road to the slaughter house by the all-powerful war lords. As stressed before, the great mass of Japanese now realize that their plight is due to the megalomania of the military. Therefore, Japan today is reminiscent of the virtues of Madame Butterfly rather than of the brutality of the Samurai warrior.
A last, but not the least, factor of why the Japanese consider Americans with favor involves Uncle Sam as Santa Claus. The Japanese with their fatalism and Oriental philosophy are not “community-chest” minded. They are not great givers of charity except to members of their own family. But they are grateful for what they receive from philanthropists. They appreciate the medical supplies and food they have received from the United States in the past and look forward to more.
Before the war Japan decried the fortification of Guam. Today we could probably fortify Japan itself to protect America, and Japan would be the last to complain. Japan had pride heretofore in its invincibility. Likewise it respected the United States for its record of victorious wars. Nippon has an awe of the successful. In the unhappy event of our being involved in war again in the Pacific, I believe that Japan would seek a chance of rehabilitation by association with the United States.