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The Launch of the United States Frigate “Constellation”
(See page 1091, Sept. 1947 Proceedings)
Mr. H. H. Holly.—In connection with Lt. Ferguson’s interesting article, it is timely to take note of Admiral Spruance’s recent remarks in the press as to the necessity of extensive restoration work on the Constellation. Needless to say, to defer such work will only increase its extent and jeopardize the future of the old vessel. One cannot but recall a tragic parallel in the recent loss of the schooner yacht America.
The Constellation must be preserved either as a commissioned vessel or as an exhibition ship. There are few, if any, objects in this country which have witnessed and been part of so many important events in our history. No battle site can claim connection with as much of historic importance; yet the cost of maintaining a large number of battlefield parks is accepted by the public as well justified. Furthermore, the Constellation, the Constitution, and the old whaleship Charles W. Morgan are the only survivors of our once vast fleet of naval and merchant vessels which made history in the golden age of sail. No amount of writing can give the correct perspective to events in the age of sail, as can these old vessels. Their value is far more than sentimental when they alone can give to present and future generations a true picture of their times, and a more accurate understanding of their characteristics and accomplishments.
It is certain that everyone wishes to see the Constellation remain a commissioned ship of the Navy as long as practicable. It is undebatable, however, that the primary function of the Navy is not as a maintainer of relics. It is likewise a fact that, as a part of our national heritage, the frigates Constellation and Constitution do not belong to the Navy, but are the property of the American people with the Navy serving as custodian. If and when, therefore, the time should come when the Navy should feel unable or disinclined to continue to maintain either of these vessels, it would be their obligation to turn over the duty to some other agency. There are a number of museums and other public and private organizations which would eagerly have accepted the America, and would unquestionably be more than willing to take over the Constellation or the Constitution as exhibits of outstanding interest. It is recalled that when the City of New Bedford found itself unable to take over the Charles W. Morgan, the old whaler had to leave her home port, but is now permanently maintained and open to the public at the Marine Museum at Mystic, Conn.
While the frigate Constellation is still in floating condition, let her future be decided —either to be put in condition to remain in commission as the mother ship of the United States Navy, or to be turned over to some other agency to preserve her for future generations as one of the greatest symbols of a great naval history.
The Navy Fitness Report System
(See page 779, July 1947 Proceedings)
Commander D. Y. Taylor (C. E. C.), U. S. Navy.—I have read with great interest Lieutenant Commander Cagle’s article on the Navy Fitness Report System published in the July 1947 issue of the Proceedings and feel that the author has done a great service in taking a whack at the present fitness report system as now executed. I concur with him that a fitness report system is necessary and that the present system is well conceived and a marked improvement in theory over the old system. The reason for the failure of the present system and of its predecessor is mildly but none-the-less accurately implied in the words near the end of the article “—if reporting seniors will follow instructions
Under the old system, ratings were made on an absolute basis from zero to 4.0, 4.0 being perfection. Reporting seniors were obliged to rate each officer as to whether he was good, bad, or indifferent, against an absolute standard, not an easy and not always a pleasant task. In the course of years the great preponderance of all ratings came to fall in a range from 3.5 to 4.0, with many “perfect” officers. Obviously such ratings were not realistic, and in an effort to relieve reporting seniors of the onerous burden of judging their fellow men on an absolute basis, the Navy promulgated the relative form of fitness report now in use. Under the present system the reporting seniors have to judge men only in relation to each other and with no reference to their absolute qualities.
If by chance a reporting senior were blessed with a given number of officers all of whose absolute ratings were to fall in the range from 3.5 to 4.0, and if these officers were the only officers known to the reporting senior, under the present system the relative ratings would follow the shape of the probability curve which places approximately 68% of them (the author’s “Correct Distribution” column in the table is incorrect) in the middle 40% bracket. An equal number would be in the top and bottom 10% brackets and an equal number in the upper and lower 20% brackets. If another reporting senior were burdened with an equal number of officers, the absolute ratings of whom were in the range from 2.5 to 3.0, and if these officers were the only ones known to the reporting senior, their relative distribution under the present system would be exactly the same as for the first reporting senior whose officers were of a much higher calibre. Under the present system the reporting senior is relieved of the responsibility of being just on an absolute basis and is required only to have an opinion of the relative worth of the officers whom he knows; and if a reporting senior meets his officers at all, he can not well avoid having an opinion as to their relative worth. Theoretically (and practically) in the course of time a junior officer will receive many relative ratings from many reporting seniors, in competition with many other juniors, and the composite of these ratings will establish his relative standing among all other officers of like rank, classification, and corps. Officers who ultimately receive a high composite relative standing are obviously due for promotion before those lower on the list, regardless of what their absolute qualifications may be. The undersigned can imagine ,'no system which is basically more sound than the present one. It must be most disheartening to those officers who sired the present fitness report system to see their brain-child so misused and misunderstood as to be almost completely discredited in such a short time. Their effort was worthy of a better fate.
The table published by the author confirmed my misgivings that I have probably done real harm to some outstanding young officers in the Navy by literally following the instructions accompanying the present fitness report. The ratings of my officers followed approximately the probability curve with the result that most of them were rated in the middle 40% which, if the actual distribution set forth in the author’s table is typical, makes them comparable with the bottom 10% of other officers as actually reported. The published table is, of course, extremely limited. It would be interesting if the Bureau of Naval Personnel would publish a similar table showing the actual distribution of officer ratings on a Navy-wide basis. I believe it would closely approach the table published with the article.
I concur with the author that a rating of certain abstract virtues should be restored to the fitness report. Honor, loyalty, forthrightness, and similar virtues are not too common in this day of “angles” and “rackets,” and to omit them from fitness reports is to ignore attributes which are inherent in most of our noblest men.
I disagree with the writer that “experience in rank” should be given any consideration whatsoever. It should be borne in mind that the purpose of the fitness report system is to evaluate officers for promotion, and all other things being equal, a commander of more experience should normally be promoted before one of less experience. The author’s statement that “It would be unfair to compare commanders of seven years’ experience with those who are ‘fresh caught’ ” is true. It would be unfair to the commanders of seven years’ experience. A commander who is “fresh caught” should not be expected to compare with a commander of seven years’ experience.
The advisability of showing or referring his fitness report to the officer reported on is debatable. Human nature being what it is, it is not pleasant to continue associations with an officer on whom you have adversely reported, if he knows it. Similarly it is sometimes embarrassing to continue relations with an officer whom you have praised in his fitness report and he knows it. Furthermore, in many cases such reports are not held in confidence by the officer reported on, and an officer adversely reported on may in the “privacy” of the wardroom give his opinion of the skipper. Likewise an officer who has been favored with the skipper’s praise may also advertise the fact. In either case the result is detrimental to the morale of all the other officers. Furthermore, most officers in the Navy are good. Their prequalifications and training make them so. Therefore, the difference between a good man, a better man, and the best man is often a difference in abstract qualities, in intangible impressions, which are extremely hard to explain and justify to an officer in whom you have cited some weakness or item for correction. I sincerely believe that the morale of each officer and the esprit de corps of the ship is best served when no officer knows the skipper’s opinion of him during their tenure together.
However, I also sincerely believe that on the occasion of the departure of either the reporting senior or the officer reported upon, a frank discussion of the junior officer’s qualifications and characteristics should take place. It might be well if, at that time and only at that time, the reporting senior furnished the junior officer with copies of all fitness reports which he had made on the officer during their tour together. Such a practice would enable the reporting senior to report honestly to the authorities in Washington without the embarrassments above- mentioned, and would also provide the junior officer with a frank evaluation of himself at a time when he is about to make a fresh start under a new reporting senior.
Action far more drastic than “re-impressing” commanding officers with the far-reaching importance of fitness reports is necessary if the present fitness report system is to be saved. And it should be saved.
Factors in Leadership
Lieutenant Commander James C. Small, U. S. Naval Reserve.—I have always believed that Leadership, that factor which is concerned with the efficient use of the human element, could, if expressed as a workable formula, become much more important to our Navy in perfecting that union between personnel and materiel which results in military supremacy.
My experience has been that Leadership in a military organization is a bi-lateral function. First, there is the normal Chain of Command which provides leadership of a basic, elemental nature, constantly strengthened by the fundamentals of indoctrination, regulation, and custom. Second, there is the absolutely human element, which must take into consideration that no two human beings are exactly alike.
In the perfect military establishment, the Chain of Command would provide absolute and complete leadership. We could, therefore, express Leadership in this formula:
L = M.
In the above formula, L represents Leadership and M is the Chain of Command.
However, training and indoctrination can never be so complete that every individual in the military organization will re-act in exactly the same manner to the same stimulus. Therefore, it is logical to assume that Leadership, which can briefly be described as the ability to lead, is a natural function of the Chain of Command as related to the performance of the individual. This human factor, therefore becomes the “X” factor in the following Leadership formula:
L = MX.
Leadership is the first function of command. Without it nothing can be accomplished. There is no reason to believe that the superbly high level of efficiency of the Chain of Command, the “M” in the formula, will not be maintained in the United States Navy. Therefore, to increase our “L” we must increase the value of “X” the human element, in the formula.
It is my belief that certain closely related conditions tend to establish this “X” factor, and that Naval personnel can be so conditioned as to increase the value of this part of the formula, thus establishing the value of “L” at a relatively high level. In other words, the quality of Leadership in the military organization can be materially increased by certain definite conditions. And it appears to me that “X” equals an integration of these conditions:
Knowledge. Knowledge invites confidence. Confidence invites leadership.
Intelligence. This must be controlled by standards of acceptance of personnel.
Bravery. The power to perform a duty in spite of fear rather than foolhardy exhibitionism.
Respect. It must work up and down. Treat seniors with respect, not servility. Treat juniors with respect, not condescension.
Self control. If you have to run in circles, don’t scream and shout. Save that shrill voice for
“Full AsternI” Maintain personal dignity.
Loyally. Make it work down as well as up. When the Flag wants the name of the person who pulled the boner, and you’re the skipper, reply
“CO USS Soandso.”
Common sense. Make an estimate of the situation and analyze it upon a basis of fairness and rightfulness. Even the book can be wrong.
Interest. The “follower” must feel that the leader is interested in him. Top leaders possess an inherent interest in others. It can be cultivated.
I do not presume that these are the only conditions that affect the “X” value in the Leadership formula. But I do know that they are essential. And, with the exception of intelligence, they are all conditions that can be increased in value by training and cultivation.
Leadership is a tiring attribute. It must be exercised at the most inopportune times. But remember, any person in the Chain of Command can give a command to a junior and have it carried out. Only a leader can give the command and have the junior want to carry it out to the best of his ability.
One day on a carrier flight deck, Admiral Nimitz said, in effect: “Boys, Bull Halsey’s back!”
And the men on that flat top cheered.
Some day, in the distant future if Cincpac introduces you under similar circumstances, you wouldn’t like to be greeted by silence, except for the bosun’s mate who whispers in a loud baritone: “So what! the old B !”
Admiral Halsey had a pretty big “X” in his Leadership formula.
Atomic Energy—Whither Bound?
(See page 895, August 1947 Proceedings)
Mr. Peter W. Mourer, Jr.—-The excellent and scholarly article by Admiral Parsons which leads the August issue of Proceedings impels the writer to break his resolution to “Stay-to-hell-out” of any and all discussions of nuclear fission. It is noteworthy that the Admiral has traced from source—i.e., Klaproth’s discovery of uranium oxide 157 years ago—and, by factual summary, shown the many barriers, both political and technical, yet to be surmounted before international control becomes a reality.
For “debunking” the extravagant predictions and half-baked conclusions currently being promulgated by the sensational portion of the daily press and certain pseudoscientific publications, the Admiral deserves great appreciation, not only from the Service, but from all other men who are concerned with orderly and beneficial use of a knowledge so potentially fraught with destruction. It is to be hoped that he will continue this good work.
Unfair to Admiral Peary
Professor William Herbert Hobbs.— Those whose memories go back to 1909 cannot have forgotten the short-lived exaltation of Doctor Frederick A. Cook as the Discoverer of the 'North Pole. While it lasted, this stupendous hoax rocked the country. In Cook’s lectures, in his interviews with the press, and in books by him and by his sympathizers, baseless statements were given out derogatory to the true discoverer, Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary of the United States Navy.
Now after the lapse of more than a third of a century a book (Matthew Henson, Dark Companion) has appeared which purports to be an autobiography of one of Peary’s assistants, who has already outlived Peary and all but one of his other assistants.
Throughout the Arctic portion, this biography is a boastful glorification of Henson with outright disparagement of Peary and of his other assistants. References to Peary and Henson jointly are to “Matt and Peary.” Peary is even accused of the rankest cowardice, though he was as near without fear as any man could be.
As one who has himself had experience of the Arctic, who is the author of the full- length life of our greatest explorer, and who has known intimately both Peary and his assistants, I am in a position to state that this book, which purports to be history, is largely fiction. Only a few of the more serious of the false statements can here be pointed out.
On Peary’s second double transection of the inland ice of North Greenland in 1895, a sledge journey of about twelve hundred miles, his only companions were Hugh J. Lee and Matthew Henson. It was a terrible journey and one on which the men nearly died of hunger. Peary gave high praise to both his companions, and of Lee he wrote that he was as “full of sand as a sea beach.” Henson, however, describes Lee as a whimpering weakling and a serious drag upon the expedition. On the return Lee, who had been suffering from dysentery as well as from hunger, collapsed on the ninth day; but after a day’s rest and nursing by Peary, he recovered and walked the entire four hundred miles back to the base, with daily marches generally in excess of twenty miles. This is attested both by Peary’s narrative and by Lee’s unpublished diary which I have been permitted to read. According to Henson, however, in Matthew Henson, Dark Companion, he and Peary with one Eskimo dog “joined in a weird trinity of tractive power to haul the crippled Lee home in a desperate attempt to cheat death.” Incidentally, he gives the distance that they dragged Lee as “120 miles,” though it would have been four hundred.
On the eastward journey Henson claims that he alone drove all three sleds with thirty-eight dogs in all, that Lee fell behind, got lost, was found whimpering (by Henson), and so lost six days—all quite untrue, as shown by Peary’s and Lee’s narratives.
Worst of all the book’s charges is that Peary threw away his rifle and ran in panic from a wounded musk cow. The attack on the herd is briefly described by Peary. His first shot, he says, killed a bull; then “a cow half turned, and as Matt’s rifle cracked, fell with a bullet in her fore shoulder. Without raising my rifle above my hips, another was dropped. Then another for Matt; then the herd broke and we hurried in pursuit. A wounded cow wheeled, and with lowered head was about to charge me; again Matt’s rifle cracked and she fell. As I rushed past her, he shouted, ‘My last cartridge.’ ”
Now Matt’s account:
“With an angry gutteral sound she (the cow) charged out after Peary. He dropped the useless rifle on the snow, turned and ran. ... He could no longer hear or feel the musk ox, so he stopped running. Peary dropped down on the snow, puffing heavily . . . ‘Matt, you saved my life,’ he panted. Matt approached him, grinning broadly. ‘Just a lucky shot. It had to be. It was my last. But goddam, Lieutenant, you sure can run.’ ”
But for their mean spirit, these untrue accounts might perhaps be explained by the lapses of memory in a man already eighty- one years of age and without a diary trying honestly to recall events which happened from a third to a half a century ago. Had the author read the books at his elbow in the Explorers Club, he would have known that Henson’s stories could not be true. Through introductions the book appears to be endorsed by three distinguished Arctic explorers, but two of them have advised me that they refused to endorse it, did not read the manuscript, and wrote what they did as a tribute to Henson the man.